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The September 11, 2001 Jihadists attack on the West and the subsequent wars on 
terrorism indicate that war may be a permanent condition of life in the contemporary 
world. This implies that to understand contemporary society, culture and 
communication requires an understanding of war because war could perhaps 
provide a perspective through which to understand the world. The aim of this study is 
to provide such a perspective and to critically explore the link between war and 
communication. However, in approaching a study of war one is confronted with a 
pervasive pacifist anti-war ideological bias. To overcome the bias the study adopts a 
critical strategy: firstly it deconstructs the taken for granted assumptions about the 
positive value of peace and then it reconstructs and traces the contours of a Western 
tradition of philosophical thought that considers war as being an integral and 
formative aspect of human identity and communication. Chapter 2 uncovers the 
limitations of the pacifists' discourse on war. Chapter 3 traces the Western tradition 
originating in Heraclitus that considers war as formative experience of being human. 
Chapter 4 traces war and killing as formative of language and communication. Using 
these insights a careful reading and interpretation of how war informs the thought 
and functions in the texts of selected social theorists of the twentieth century. 
Chapter 5 traces war as an agonistic structure in the works of Johan Huizinga on the 
role of play and in the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Chapter 6 explores the idea of 
war as a model of society in the works of Foucault. Chapter 7 investigates the central 
influence of real and imagined war on Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the media. 
Chapter 8 explores the way war structures the thought of Lyotard on the postmodern 
condition. Chapter 9 concludes by drawing implications on how a perspective on war 
contributes to development of communication theory and understanding life in the 
postmodern condition. 
 
 KEY WORDS: War, battle, agonistic, killing, death, play, peace discourse, Huizinga, 




Table of contents  Page 
  
1  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: COMMUNICATION AS WAR BY  
OTHER MEANS 1 
1.1 Background of the study  1 
1.2 Purpose of the study  3 
1.3 Questions guiding the study    3 
1.4 Theoretical orientation of the study   3 
1.5 Type of study, methodology and strategy  14 
1.6 Outline of the study  15 
2 CHAPTER 2: ETERNAL PEACE OF THE GRAVEYARD: REVIEW  
AND CRITICAL READING OF LITERATURE OF PEACE  
DISCOURSE 19 
2.1 Introduction  19 
2.2 Peace as a dominant ideological construction  20  
2.3 Kant's joke of the eternal peace of the graveyard  21 
2.4 Misconceptions about war and peace  24  
2.5 The reality behind the peace consensus: peace kills  25 
2.6 Review of representations of peace in the discourse of peace  
studies and activism   26 
2.7 Linguistic cleansing: constructing the peace newspeak  30  
2.8 Social science police: media scholars and global surveillance  39  
2.9 From polis to polizie: constructing the global humanitarian  
 concentration camp  44 
2.10 Conclusion 46 
3  CHAPTER 3: HOMO POLEMOS: I KILL, THEREFORE I AM: HOW  
WAR AND KILLING CONFER HUMAN IDENTITY  49 
3.1 Introduction  49 
3.2 Towards a new perspective on war and rediscovery of old tradition  50 
3.3 Beyond the myth of the noble savage  51  
3.4 The primacy of war in human existence  56  
3.5 Inhuman is human and human is inhuman: learning to understand  
 war from the ancients  61  
v 
 
3.6  Back to the future: a view from Darwin to Aristotle  65  
3.7 War as the divine and human spirit: making gods and men   68 
3.8 The gift of death: war as source of meaning  75 
3.9 I kill, therefore I am: killing as source of consciousness and  
 self-consciousness  79 
3.10 Conclusion  89 
4 CHAPTER 4: POETRY IS IN THE KILLING: BLOODY ORIGIN OF 
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION  91 
4.1 Introduction  91 
4.2 Language, death and killing  92 
4.3 Polemos and logos are the same: the bloody origin of language  
 and communication  94 
4.4 Traces of war in speech: unity of polemos and logos  110 
4.5 Social construction of meaning: the bigger stick makes  
 meaning stick  119 
4.6 War as the ontological and epistemological foundation  
 of communication 126 
4.7 Conclusion  127 
5 CHAPTER 5: PLAY IS BATTLE AND BATTLE IS PLAY: WAR AS 
CULTURAL FOUNDATION IN THE THOUGHT OF HUIZINGA AND 
SCHMITT 129 
5.1 Introduction  129 
5.2 Johan Huizinga: Homo Ludens  130 
5.2.1  The agon: culture as battle-play  130 
5.2.2 From battle to play: agonistic character of life  130 
5.2.3 Indivisibility of playing and fighting: not a metaphor  134 
5.2.4 Play is battle and battle is play: agon as foundation of culture 135 
5.2.5 Origin of knowledge and philosophy in the battle-play  139 
5.2.6 The battle-play as structure of law  143 
5.2.7 The battle-play as structure of poetry, art and politics 145 
5.2.8 Huizinga's social critique: decline of agonistic spirit and  
 seriousness that kills 147 
5.2.9 Huizinga confronts Carl Schmitt  149 
5.3 Carl Schmitt: the concept of the political  152 
vi 
 
5.3.1  War makes the state, and the state makes war  152 
5.3.2 Enemy and friend: not a metaphor  154 
5.3.3 Politics as war by other means; war as politics by other means  156 
5.3.4 Peace kills  163 
5.3.5 Schmitt and Huizinga: war as the language of life  168 
5.3.6 Schmitt in Hobbes's theatre  170 
5.4 Conclusion: aesthetics of a beautiful war 171 
6 CHAPTER 6: WAR AS ORGANISING PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY: 
FOUCAULT'S ANALYTICS OF WAR  175 
6.1 Introduction  175 
6.2 Power: warlike relation of force  176 
6.3 Fabrication of the disciplinary individual in perpetual battle  182 
6.3.1 The central role of killing  183 
6.3.2 The soldier as ideal model for the human being 185 
6.4 War apparatus as model for society  191 
6.5 War makes society and society makes war  200 
6.6 War as politics: strategy as foundation for external relations  
 between states and societies  201 
6.7 Politics as war: tactics as the internal organising  
 principle of societies 201 
6.8 War as communication: communication as war  206 
6.8.1 Discourse as weapon in battle for power and knowledge  208 
6.8.2 Meaning inscribed by power and the outcome of battle  210 
6.8.3 Individuals are constructed in discursive battle  211 
6.8.4 Discourse as battlefield  213 
6.9 Conclusion  215 
7 CHAPTER 7: WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:  
WAR IN THE MEDIA THEORY OF MARSHALL MCLUHAN  219  
7.1 Introduction   219  
7.2 The mechanical bride: between "hot" and "cold" wars  221 
7.3 Gutenberg galaxy: from dragon's teeth to armed men  229 
7.4 Understanding media: implosions and explosions in  
 the global village  232 
7.4.1 War games  245 
vii 
 
7.4.2 Weapons and war of the icons  249 
7.5 War and peace in the global village  254 
7.5.1 Weapons make the man  255 
7.5.2 Escape from mechanical universe into drug induced pacifism  
 and primitive technology  262 
7.5.3 War and pain as means of conferring human identity  264 
7.5.4 War as education - education as war  265 
7.6 Conclusion  272 
8  CHAPTER 8:  TO SPEAK IS TO FIGHT: WAR AS STRUCTURE OF 
THOUGHT AND SOCIETY IN LYOTARD'S POSTMODERN  
CONDITION  275 
8.1 Introduction  275 
8.2 War and communication in the postmodern condition  276 
8.3 Communication agonistics: to speak is to fight  277 
8.4 The war of all against all: positions for individuals and groups  
 in Lyotard's agonistic communication battlefield  281 
8.5 War on totality: the terrorism of consensus  285 
8.6 Lyotard's paganism: back to the future in a neo-medieval  
 postmodern world  295 
8.7 Conclusion  299 
9 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION: LIFE ON THE SHIELD  
OF ACHILLES  301 
9.1 Introduction  301 
9.2 Recapitulation and overview  301 
9.3 New understanding of war and implication for  
communication theory   304 
9.4 Life on the shield of Achilles: how understanding war contributes  
 to understanding of society and culture  319 
 





My thanks and gratitude to … 
• my supervisor Professor Danie Goosen for the encouragement, engagement 
and critical intellectual challenges that guided my research and writing and 
made this project an experience of intellectual growth  
 
• my co-supervisor Professor Danie du Plessis for believing in my commitment 
to complete this project and giving me valuable pragmatic advice  
 
• Professor Pieter J. Fourie for encouragement and involvement in the early 
stages of this project 
 
• Professor Viola Milton for her encouragement and support 
 
• Professor E.T. Terblanche for her encouragement, staunch support and faith 
in me 
 
• my long-time friend and colleague Professor Katy Khan for her kind 
friendship, support and encouragement 
 
• Professor Maurice Vambe for the valuable discussions and debates that 
helped to clarify my thinking 
 
• my long-time friend Dr Margot von Beck for her encouragement and valuable 
professional editorial advice 
 
• my wife Vihra, my daughter Mari-Elen and son Stefan for their support during 
my struggles while conducting and writing this research    
 






COMMUNICATION AS WAR BY OTHER MEANS 
With war being connected to everything else and everything else being 
connected to war, explaining war and tracing its development in relation to 
human development in general almost amount to a theory and history of 
everything – Gat (2008:xi) 
To understand war is thus to understand ourselves – Gelven (1994:18) 
You have to understand war in order to understand our culture – Hallin (2008) 
 
1.1  Background of the study 
Throughout the entire recorded human history war has been a constant feature 
of life while there is also ample evidence to show that war existed even before 
humans could record and communicate their experience in language. As 
historian Michael Howard (2000:1) notes, all the documented evidence 
indicates that war has been the universal norm in human history. For the 
inhabitants of the ancient world war was experienced as a natural 
accompaniment of life. As societies evolved becoming democratised and 
military technology modernised, so wars intensified and were transformed from 
the small wars of princes and kings to wars of people and entire nations in the 
nineteenth century (cf. Howard 2000), and culminating in the twentieth century’s 
Total War (Aron 1955), or as Bobbitt (2003) aptly names the last century the 
century of the “long war”. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s did not lead to 
peace but was followed by multiple small wars in various parts of the world. And 
as was the experience of past epochs, the twenty-first century opened with the 
Jihadist terrorists attack on the West on 11 September 2001 (known as 9–11) 
and the subsequent wars against terror signifying that war may remain as an 
integral part of contemporary experience. Thus in the contemporary 
postmodern world characterised by global spread of communication, 
awareness and experience of real or media mediated wars is increasingly 
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acknowledged. Indeed, mass media reporting on war is the single most popular 
topic that attracts mass audiences to the extent that war may be considered as 
the indicator of the health of the media (cf. Hallin & Gitlin 1993). As the twenty-
first century unfolds, war is "becoming a permanent social relation" and a kind 
of "general matrix" to describe social organisations and relations of power in the 
contemporary world (Hardt & Negri 2006:12-13). Media scholar Daniel Hallin 
(2008) observes that “we are in a time of war again” and predicts that 
we are going to be in perpetual war for a long time. So it seems 
very obvious that the culture – our culture – is in some way a 
culture of war. You have to understand war in order to understand 
our culture (Hallin 2008:1). 
Hallin’s (2008) urging that a proper understanding of culture requires an 
understanding of war also implies that it is equally important that an 
understanding of war is imperative for an understanding of communication. This 
is so because culture and communication have an intimate relationship to the 
extent that culture cannot exist without communication, while culture itself is a 
form of communication (cf. Carey 1989). Moreover, as war may become 
perpetual it could be assumed that an understanding is urgently required in 
order to understand any and all aspects of the world. Indeed, as military 
historian Azar Gat (2008) acknowledges: 
With war being connected to everything else and everything else 
being connected to war, explaining war and tracing its 
development in relation to human development in general almost 
amount to a theory and history of everything (Gat 2008:xi). 
With the long historical legacy of warfare and the prospect of perpetual war in 
the present and the future, it is prudent to consider Gelven’s (1994:18) 
contention that an understanding of war entails an understanding of ourselves.  
Therefore, following the suggestions by Gat, Gelven and Hallin this study 
proposes to explore an understanding of war that will provide a new perspective 
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on culture and communication and their relationship with war. Moreover, such a 
new understanding of war may be urgently needed because of the limiting and 
distorting hegemony of anti-war bias and the assumed peace imperative that 
dominates the thinking of scholars and the mass media.  
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The aim of this study is to provide an understanding of war that will contribute a 
new perspective on culture and communication in the contemporary world. 
Such an understanding will be gained by tracing and uncovering the way war – 
as a reality and as a concept – is represented in and structures the thoughts of 
social theorists since the time of antiquity. This study will trace the relationship 
between war and communication in the writings of social theorists and 
philosophers and demonstrates how war provides the cultural (un)conscious in 
the thoughts and writings of selected theorists of the twentieth century. 
1.3 Questions guiding the study 
The study is guided by questions about the link between war, culture and 
communication. The following questions seem central: Why and how a wide 
range of human activities are conceptualised in terms of war? Could war be 
considered as a universal model for thought, action and communication? Could 
communication be located in the practice of war? Could war be a form of 
communication and could communication be considered as war by other 
means?  
1.4 Theoretical orientation of the study 
For most of the twentieth century, and increasingly in the postmodern age of 
globalisation the assumption that peace and communication are intimately 
interlinked has gained a hegemonic dominance in popular imagination and in 
mass media and scholarly discourses. As against the deification and 
idealisation of peace, war is typically represented as senseless violence, a 
manifestation of inhumanity and an irrational disturbance of the normal state of 
peace that is supposedly, essential for the social existence of rational and 
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enlightened human beings. Because peacefulness is presumed to be the 
defining characteristic of humanity, the violence of war is assumed as being 
beyond rational human understanding (cf. Sontag 2004), and war is 
condemned as meaningless and presumed to be “about nothing at all” (cf. 
Enzensberger 1994:30).  
Central to both scholarly and public discourses is an explicit moral 
condemnation of war as an evil and an unquestioned consensus that praises 
peace as the ultimate moral good. There is also an unquestioned assumption 
that communication – popularly envisaged as an ideal polite dialogue – has the 
power to end war and restore humanity to its imagined pristine state of eternal 
peace. Thus communication – understood and defined as (a) transmission of 
messages, and (b) sharing of meaning – is assumed to be exclusively directed 
at attaining consensus, mutual understanding and thus as being the missing 
link between war and peace. Such a view is typically expressed by Habermas’s 
(1981:314) axiomatic claim that “our first sentence expresses unequivocally the 
intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.”  
If the natural aim of all communication is mutual understanding, then war, social 
strife and all forms of conflict – often described generically as violence – are 
assumed to be the result of breakdown of communication. Conversely, all 
communications are assumed to end when war begins. It is as if war and 
communication are mutually exclusive: on the one hand there is pure 
communication, dialogue and peace, while on the other, pure war, silence and 
no communication. Therefore it is assumed that improved channels of 
communication and an increase in the free flow and exchange of information 
and communication ought to lead to better understanding and peace. Such 
assumptions are based on the belief that all human beings share common 
values, but because of communication breakdowns the warring antagonists are 
unable to exchange information and to enlighten one another about their 
common humanity (cf. Hamelink 2008:78). Thus, to end war one must repair 
the communication breakdowns between individuals, groups, and societies (cf. 
Tidwell 1998:2), and repair the “communication breakdown in the global village” 
5 
 
(Hale 1999:143). Resolving all conflicts and ending wars is reduced to a mere 
technical “quick-fix communication-based solutions” (Putnis 1993:17). The 
solution seems simple because repairing the “communication failure” allows 
scholars to disregard all the substantive issues of the conflict and the 
complexity of the social context (cf. Hall & Hewitt 1970:19). Thus as Peters 
(1989:387) puts it: “Communication appeals to us because of the way the 
concept seems to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.”  
The inventions of new electronic communication technologies and their global 
expansion were assumed to offer the ultimate means to end conflict and war. 
Expressing such optimism, McLuhan (1969:90) declares that the new computer 
technology has the ability to translate incompatible languages and offer “a 
Pentecostal of universal understanding and unity.” The belief in the pacifying 
power of communication grew stronger in the postmodern world because the 
spread of communication technologies raised new hope for better 
understanding among nations and cultures (cf. Tehranian 1994:77). The end of 
the Cold War stimulated the globalisation of commerce, and the spread of 
liberal-democracy making the world seem as a common fraternity – “a global 
village” or a single global “network society”. It is as if suddenly all human beings 
were brothers and there were no enemies to hate and to fight. Humanity was 
assumed to have reached the end of ideology (Bell 1962), the end of politics 
(Mouffe 1993) and the end of history (cf. Fukuyama 1992:311).  
The end of history would mean the end of wars and bloody 
revolutions. Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes 
for which to fight. They would satisfy their needs through economic 
activity, but they would no longer have to risk their lives in battle 
(Fukuyama 1992:311).  
Therefore, scholars predict that “in the post-modern era war might be 




Moreover, in the imagination of philosophers, media scholars, and journalists, 
reality was also banished because human beings were assumed to live in a 
symbolic universe, a communicational or discursive world of hyperreality and 
mass media simulacra (cf. Baudrillard 1983, 1994; Eco 1987). In such an 
imagined virtual world “real” wars and conflicts could not, and did not happen 
because they were supposedly fictional spectacles constructed by the mass 
media, by Hollywood war films or by computer-generated war games.  
But against the hope of a unified humanity and imagined peaceful and warless 
world, the expansion of communication and commerce were paradoxically 
accompanied by an increase in warfare and social strife. A humorist writer aptly 
describes the end of the myth of global communication:  
If you stick a Babel fish in your ear you can instantly understand 
anything said to you in any form of language ... the poor Babel fish, 
by effectively removing all barriers to communication between 
races and cultures, has caused more and bloodier wars than 
anything else in the history of creation (Adams 1979:50).  
The return of war seems puzzling and incomprehensible because it does not fit 
within the predictions of social theories that assume that society is based on 
peace and consensus (cf. Mouffe 1993:1; Žižek 2002a:75). The lack of 
correspondence between reality and its imagined ideal representation in 
theoretical discourse is experienced as a crisis of understanding, as a puzzled 
scholar exclaims: “Peace or War? Utopia or nightmare? Global solidarity or 
tribal conflict?” (Hassner in Friedrichs 2001:478). Finally, the Islamists’ terror 
attack on the United State on 11 September 2001 was mostly 
incomprehensible, the distinction between war and peace seemed to have been 
“completely annulled” and all the concepts to make sense of the world seemed 
to have melted (cf. Beck 2003:255–256). The crisis of meaning is experienced 
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as if “all that is solid melts into air” (Marx in Berman 1983).1 The result of such 
conceptual crisis was that rather than offering reality congruent social analysis 
“all imagined stupidities were said and written”, revealing the bankruptcy of 
contemporary critical cultural theories and affirming their lack of contact with 
reality (cf. Žižek 2002a:40, 51–53).  
The lack of understanding of war exhibited by contemporary scholars is the 
result of acceptance of unquestioned assumptions about the negative and 
destructive nature of war. However, such a perspective that considers war as 
evil, entirely traumatic and destructive and without redeeming value is a result 
of social construction of meaning and product of cultural construction which 
begun after the First World War and reinforced since the Vietnam War by the 
ideological infusion of the anti-war peace discourse and has ultimately become 
the modern Western ruling myth of peace (Gray 2004:1). What negative 
approach ignores is that there is another cultural interpretation of war and a 
tradition that considers war as a positive phenomenon, and ascribes it as the 
central experience for construction of human sense of identity and meaning. 
Such a perspective has a long and respected intellectual tradition supported by 
almost all major philosophers dating back to ancient Greece (cf. Lomsky-Feder 
2004:83). 
If the return of war resulted in a conceptual meltdown and confusion, it was also 
a new enlightenment and signalled a “return to the Real” and attempts to regain 
a “firm ground in some ‘real reality’” (Žižek 2002a:19). The return of war and 
conflict signifies, according to Kagan (2008:3), that “the world has become 
normal again.” If the reality does not fit the theory then it is possible to suspect 
that our understanding of the relationship between war and peace are reversed 
and our assumptions about the pacific nature of communication are misguided. 
                                             
1 Berman documents a similar experience of conceptual crisis with the advent of modernity at 
the end of the nineteenth century.  
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Indeed, as Hamelink (2008:78–79) notes, all the assumptions about the 
pacifying influence of communication and the hope that information will change 
human perceptions, end war and lead to peace are groundless and lack 
empirical support. War does not begin in human minds but in the real conflicts 
of interests between the antagonists. War and conflict are permanent aspects 
of human reality; conflict is the source of creativity and growth, therefore all the 
efforts to eradicate and prevent conflict may be counterproductive (cf. Hamelink 
2008:78).  
War as the return of the real disrupts the discourse of theory and challenges the 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the benevolence of peace. Indeed, 
Nietzsche already diagnosed such a reversal of values being the source of the 
crisis of Western civilisation. As Nietzsche puts it:  
The valuation that today is applied to the different forms of society 
is entirely identical with that which assigns a higher value to peace 
than to war: but this judgement is anti-biological, is itself a fruit of 
the decadence of life. Life is a consequence of war, society itself a 
means to war (Nietzsche 1968:33).  
War is a constant unchanging fact of human existence. Therefore following 
Nietzsche the emphasis could be reversed: not peace but war should be 
considered the solid ontological point of departure for theory. Rather than 
consider conflict and war as exclusively destructive, its positive value as a 
source creativity and change need to be accounted for while some negative 
and destructive elements of peace need to be investigated (cf. Cramer 2006a; 
Cramer 2006b). The value of peace is becoming questionable, as indeed it was 
already questioned by all major Western philosophers in the past. The 
hegemony of peace discourse and the pacification implemented as social policy 
in the contemporary postmodern world are beginning to reveal some dangerous 
consequences for freedom of political action, communication and social 
existence (cf. Baudrillard 2002b:92–93; Behnke 2008:513; Fukuyama 
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1992:328-331; Hammond 2007:11). This should raise the question as to 
whether peace and not war may pose the greater danger to human existence.  
As against the imagined peaceful global postmodernity, an alternative 
perspective is offered by some scholars proposing that the contemporary world 
has come to resemble the Middle Ages (cf. Eco 1987), or it is experienced and 
understood as a move “back-to-the future” into a Neo-Medieval condition (cf. 
Kobrin 1998). According to Kaplan (2003:15), this implies that the world “is not 
‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’, but only a continuation of the ‘ancient’” and human 
nature does not change. Thus a return to the ancient Greeks’ understanding of 
war as a way of life (cf. Havelock 1972; Nietzsche 1997; Sidebottom 2004), and 
understanding the central place of warfare and violence in the Middle Ages (cf. 
Huizinga 1972; Elias 1978) could provide insights for understanding the way 
war is the organising principle of the postmodern world (cf. Foucault 2003; 
Hardt & Negri 2006).  
Therefore, to understand the postmodern world demands learning to live with 
conflict (cf. Gray 2004:104), and understanding the present demands a 
framework that allows us to enter “into the logic of conflictuality” (Eco 1987:84). 
How can one enter such logic of conflictuality? The idea of conflictuality is 
elaborated by two intellectual perspectives: a modern and mainly Marxist social 
conflict theory tracing their origin to Marx, and a second perspective identified 
with Nietzsche, Clausewitz and a whole tradition of Western philosophy that 
locates its origin in Heraclitus's conception of the formative character of war. As 
this study is interested in the role of war as against the Marxist notion of 
abstract social conflict it positions itself within the Western tradition with 
Nietzsche and his followers. The present study is firmly rooted in materialist 
ontology and epistemology because it considers the primacy of the human 
action of fighting as the concrete historical basis on which all human thought 
and ideas arise as theorised by Marx. However, while the study accepts the 
evidence and assumption that war is a trans-historical phenomenon, it also 
notes the specific historical manifestation of war that become inscribed in 
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historically contemporary theories; in other words, using Hegelian language this 
means that philosophy is the refection of its historical time in thought. Moreover 
while the study rejects idealism it traces and develops an alternative conflictual 
approach to that offered by the Marxist tradition. The main objection to the 
Marxists’ claim to offer a materialist conception and historicisation of conflict is 
their location in economic determinism. Indeed, the young Marx already offered 
a strong critique of the economic determinism and realised that economic 
productive activities, human labour and collective actions are dependent on, 
and find their condition of possibility and condition for their existence in the 
primacy war-making ability (Marx in Lichtheim 1982:149; Marx in Bryant 
1996:28). Following the primacy of war even Hegel’s idealism is ultimately 
based in real historical condition of warfare. Kojève (1980:186) notes that 
Hegel's idea of dialectics is derived from real historical facts of fighting and 
work. While Marxists consider history as a totality and conflict as resulting from 
economic competition and perpetual class struggles, Marxist theorising remains 
abstract and distanced from the idea of war. Foucault takes issue with the 
Marxist generalisation and notes that "it’s astonishing to see how easily and 
self-evident people talk of war-like relations of power or class struggle without 
ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant and if so what form" 
(Foucault 1980:119). Moreover, placed within historical context Marx’s and 
Engels’ conception of class warfare is not original but has been derived from 
the idea of a race war. Marx acknowledges in a letter to Engels: “You know very 
well where we found our idea of class struggle; we found it in the work of the 
French historians who talked about the race struggle” (Foucault 2003:79). As 
Foucault (2003:81) puts it: “Racism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in 
an inverted form”. The converse is also true and racism is echoed in socialist 
thought when it proposes to murder its class enemies within the capitalist 
society (Foucault 2003:262).  
Foucault (2003), following Nietzsche’s insights contends that society could be 
best understood as war. This is so because a society is based on relations of 
power and such power relations are always war-like relations of force and 
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violence and can be understood in terms of “the binary schema of war and 
struggle” and “the clash between forces” (cf. Foucault 2003:18).  
War as a source of meaning for human beings has been acknowledged 
throughout history. Ever since the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus 
identified war as the father of all things, all religious scripts have attested, major 
philosophers in all ages affirmed, and human history confirmed that war is a 
generative force of meaning. This is summarised by Nietzsche’s (1968:33) 
statement that life is the consequence of war, and society is a means to war, is 
affirmed again in the twentieth century by Emmanuel Levinas’ (1991:23) 
conclusion that war is human reality and the human being manifest himself and 
acquires meaning in war (Hillman 2005:2). In the twenty-first century, journalist 
Chris Hedges (2003:3–7) rediscovers that war is a force that gives us meaning 
when peace has emptied all meaning from life in the postmodern world (cf. 
Hammomd 2007:11; Fukuyama 1992:328–331).  
War as a source of meaning implies that war may be a form of communication. 
Indeed, Nietzsche (2009:90) argues that if “war is the father of all good things; 
[then] war is also the father of good prose.” For Nietzsche the fact that war is 
the origin of communication can be confirmed by listening to the formative trace 
of war in human communication: 
In the way men make assertions in present-day society, one often 
hears an echo of the times when they were better skilled in arms 
than in anything else; sometimes they handle assertions as poised 
archers their weapons; sometimes one thinks he hears the whir 
and clatter of blades; and with some men an assertion thunders 
down like heavy cudgel (Nietzsche 2004:183). 
Karl von Clausewitz links war and discourse more directly:  
Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political 
thought? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not 
peculiar to itself ... the Art of War in its highest point of view is 
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policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing 
notes (Clausewitz 1985: 402, 406). 
Implied in both Nietzsche’s and Clausewitz’s (1985) statements is the 
suggestion that war provides the grounding for communication and is itself 
another kind of communication. Indeed, Mattelart’s (1994) study of international 
communication notes that "communication serves first of all to make war ... War 
and its logics are essential components of the history of international 
communication and of its doctrine and theories, as well as its uses" (Mattelart 
1994:xiii). Thus war is the frame of reference for development of 
communication technology and communication theories (Mattelart 1994:xiv). 
War, fighting and conflict are the primary common experiences of humanity and 
influence the way people act, think and communicate. This way of 
conceptualising communication is based on an understanding that violence and 
war far from being mute forces that prevent communication, are themselves 
pure forms of communication and sources of meaning. Violence is always 
meaningful and opens channels of communication where there were none 
before. Both war and communication are institutional forms in which, and by 
which, humans relate to one another, and fighting is one such relationship.  
The link between war and communication is suggested by Lyotard (1984). For 
Lyotard (1984:16, 59) the starting point for conceptualising communication is 
provided by Heraclitus’ assertion that conflict is the father of all things. From 
this perspective communication is a mode of action and “to speak is to fight, in 
the sense of playing, and speech acts” that are subsumed within a general 
theory of agonistics (cf. Lyotard 1984:10). Communication is a form of action or 
a “language game” where each “speech act” is seen as a move in a game such 
as chess as (cf. Lyotard 1984:10, 16). All social games including 
communication are agonistic and competitive activities and their ultimate aim is 
winning (cf. Lyotard 1984:10). The agonistic characteristics of society and 
language and the link between play and fight could be better understood in 
terms of the Greek concepts of agon and the polemos as a cosmic war, as well 
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as human warfare, agon, play, strife, completion, and contestations – 
considered by Heidegger as the foundational principle for all human existence 
(cf. Fried 2000). The basic element of war is the fight or battle structured as a 
duel or fight between two wrestlers; war consists of such battles on an 
extended scale (cf. Clausewitz 1985). This hand-to-hand fight is a form of 
interaction and communication. The experience of fighting, battle and war is 
socially and culturally institutionalised thus providing a shared framework for 
action and thought that are internalised by individuals to form their mental 
conceptual system.  
The adversarial social procedures are internalised by the individual thus the 
acts of human thinking and reasoning are the reflection of adversarial social 
procedures (cf. Hampshire 2000, 2002). The cognitive structure of human mind 
is not simply a form of consciousness but is a disposition of the body, and 
reflects real social relations of power (cf. Bourdieu 1998:54). The most 
primordial and universal human experience is fighting, conflict and war; these 
structured interactions in turn structure all other forms of social structures and 
this is confirmed by the historical studies of Tilly (1975, 1990). 
What could be concluded from the above is that to understand communication 
and the way meaning is constructed requires understanding war. The common 
understanding of war within the discourse of contemporary scholarship is 
biased by the moral condemnations of war and the prevailing pacifist ideology, 
both are based on ignorance about the nature of war (cf. Davie 2003; Gelven 
1994). War should be understood beyond the narrow moral evaluations of good 
and evil (cf. Baudrillard 2002a), thus war needs to be understood and evaluated 
existentially (cf. Gelven 1994; Schmitt 1976). An understanding of war and how 
it communicates meaning is the key to an understanding of all aspects of 
human life. Such an understanding is not merely a theoretical exercise in 
explicating ideas, but is crucial for understanding the contemporary postmodern 
world and ability to live in it.  
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To begin the exploration the first task is to confront existing theories and 
concepts, explore and describe their shortcoming because of their neglect to 
consider the agonist and polemical dimension. Thereafter, to uncover the origin 
of communication in war and show the way war becomes a source of meaning 
for individuals, society, culture and symbolic communicative activities.  
1.5 Type of study, methodology and strategy 
This study is situated within the qualitative methodology, it is a descriptive and 
a critical exploration and interpretation. It offers a careful reading of 
interdisciplinary texts, explores theoretical approaches and endeavours to gain 
new understanding of the topic. The purpose is firstly to explore and contrast 
ideas, concepts and arguments regarding war, peace and communication 
across interdisciplinary fields and texts and to trace a tradition of positive 
consideration of war as formative of human identity and society. After having 
gained insights about the way war is represented in the thought of major 
philosophers throughout history, these insights will then inform a close reading 
of representative texts of selected communication theorists of the twentieth 
century to trace the way war is represented and functions in their thought and 
theories.  
In approaching a study of war in the present intellectual environment one is 
confronted with a pervasiveness of anti-war ideological bias that has the effect 
of enforcing a restrictive politically correct consensus. To be able to examine 
war without preconception, a methodological precaution is required, guarding 
against the danger of succumbing to this "presentism" and attributing current 
ideological meanings to evaluation of wars of different historical periods whose 
combatants had different and positive sentiments towards war. Attaining such 
detachment demands a Nietzschean scepticism about the value of the present 
moral values and a suspicion that our values are inversions of their origin 
values. For this purpose a critical research strategy will be adopted. Critical 
research involves a two-step process methodology: deconstruction and 
reconstruction (Harvey 1990:19, 29–30). Deconstruction is an act of destruction 
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as it takes apart the old accepted ways of thinking, and challenges the taken-
for-granted assumptions and unquestioned dominant ideas. Such challenge 
could uncover the shaky foundations to reveal as did Marx, that "all that is solid 
melts into air" (Marx in Berman 1983). After the destruction comes the process 
of reconstruction and tracing a new perspective. Reconstruction will be followed 
by a third movement which is that of interpretation consisting of case studies 
reading and explicating the way war operates in the thought and is represented 
in the texts of the following selected twentieth century theorists writing on 
communication: Huizinga, Schmitt, Foucault, McLuhan, and Lyotard. 
1.6 Outline of the study 
Chapter 2 begins the study by adopting a critical strategy. Because of the 
prevalence of pacifism and anti-war bias among scholars this chapter attempts 
to deconstruct these biases by questioning their taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the normative value of peace. The chapter will review and critique the 
literature of peace discourse and explore whether peace may not be potentially 
an oppressive regime and whether peace is not a disguise for conducting war 
by other means. The representations of peace will be evaluated and the 
methods used to propagate peace will be examined. After the deconstruction, 
and freed from bias, a reconstruction of war will begin in the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 begins a reconstruction of a tradition of thought that attribute positive 
value to war. It will offer a review of literature and reading of philosophical and 
multidisciplinary texts and will uncover a positive historical understanding of war 
and communication. It will trace the idea of war in Western tradition originating 
in Heraclitus and the ancient Greeks right through to the present and explore 
how war, conflict, sacrifice and killing are intrinsic experiences of being human 
and how they construct and structure the human identity.  
Chapter 4 continues the exploration that was begun in Chapter 2 and will focus 
the inquiry on tracing the role of war and killing as the formative forces of 
language and communication. It will investigate whether war and killing on the 
battlefield are the probable sources for language that develop as mean for 
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recording acts of war and transforming life, death and killing into poetic and 
aesthetic experience. After the reconstruction of a war perspective in this 
chapter and in the previous chapter the insights gained will provide a framework 
to be used for a case study carefully reading, tracing and interpreting how the 
idea of war operates and structures the thoughts and texts of selected social 
theorists of the twentieth century. (These will be discussed in the following 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.) 
Chapter 5 undertakes a case study by careful reading of the play theory of 
Johan Huizinga and his claims that play is the foundation of culture. The 
reading investigates whether Huizinga’s conception of play may be described 
as sub species of war and that play and war are experienced as 
interchangeable. Huizinga’s critique of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political will 
be evaluated and its similarity to Huizinga’s idea of the agonistic play-fighting 
explored.  
Chapter 6 will offer a reading of Foucault’s analytics of war that he considers 
as being a suitable model to describe society. Foucault’s insights will also be 
valuable for a better understanding of Schmitt’s view that war animates the 
political sphere (discussed in the previous Chapter 5). Foucault’s idea of war as 
the ever-present structure of thought and social formations will be explored to 
evaluate whether it provides a model that is more informative than the linguistic 
model used for analysis of society and communication.  
Chapter 7 will trace the way war is reflected and shapes McLuhan’s theory of 
the media. The chapter will demonstrate how the memory of the Second World 
War provides the initial background influence on McLuhan’s theory and show 
how as the Vietnam War and the Cold War intensify the place of war gains 
prominence and centrality in his writing. The chapter will explore the 
relationship between war technology and media technology and how they 
constitute the human environment and how weapons and media format shape 
human consciousness and the social structure. McLuhan’s views on 
communication media as forms of weapons will also be explored.  
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Chapter 8 will explore and trace the role of war and fighting in the postmodern 
theory of Lyotard. Lyotard’s view on communication as a form of a fight or 
agonistic language game will be read and interpreted for its implication for 
understanding the postmodern world. The possibility that Lyotard’s agonistic 
conception of society and communication provides a new understanding of the 
contemporary world will be evaluated as possible criteria to judge incompatible 
language games and decide outcomes of battles in the postmodern agonistic 
world.  
Chapter 9 will conclude the study and consider the implication of war for 
communication theory. The contribution of a positive understanding of war for 








ETERNAL PEACE OF THE GRAVEYARD: 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CRITICAL READING OF 
PEACE DISCOURSE  
In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and 
bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the 
Renaissance; in Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred 
years of democracy and peace, and what did they produce? The cuckoo clock  
– Orson Wells in The Third Man 
You should love peace as a means to new wars – and the short peace more 
than the long – Nietzsche (1969:74–75) 
Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the corruption which would be the 
result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption which would be 
occasioned by a continues or eternal peace – Hegel (1996:331) 
Peace becomes the postmodern label for war – Alliez & Negri (2003:112) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to begin an extensive literature review and critical 
reading of the literature of the peace discourse and its limitations so that a new 
perspective for understanding war and communication in the contemporary 
world could be constructed. Such critical review will uncover the assumptions of 
peace discourse, its topics and ideas, evaluate its claims and limitation, and 
raise questions about the values ascribed to peace in communication 
scholarship. 
In order to provide a new perspective on war for social analysis there is a need 
to question some of the often taken-for-granted assumptions regarding the 
nature and value of peace currently dominating the discourses of the mass 
media and academic scholarship. It is suspected that the dominant 
understanding of peace and war is ideologically biased and such bias come to 
distort understanding of war. 
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2.2 Peace as a dominant ideological construction 
The idea of “peace” has gained a hegemonic place in the discourse of 
intellectuals and the mass media. For most of the twentieth century 
philosophers and intellectuals have promoted the idea of universal peace and 
were urged, for example by leading anthropologist such as Margaret Mead 
(1963:133), to produced “propaganda against warfare, documentation of its 
terrible cost in human suffering and social waste” in order to “prepare the 
ground by teaching people to feel that warfare is a defective social institution” 
(Mead 1963:133). From being a minor fashionable preoccupation, since the 
1960s peace activism and peace research have become fast growing 
industries. The assumed need to end wars and violence by all means and to 
enforce peaceful existence on individuals, groups, societies and the entire 
world has been unquestionably accepted as self-evident truth. As a result 
international political associations have taken it upon themselves to proclaim 
scientific truths and criminalise heresy in issues of war and peace. Thus a 
UNESCO declaration proclaims that the primacy of peace must be accepted on 
faith and that “it is scientifically incorrect to say that we have inherited a 
tendency to make war from our animal ancestors” or “that war or any other 
violent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature” (Pinker 
1999:46). Accepting such dubious claims many scholars have consciously and 
unconsciously distorted historical data in order to produce an image of an ideal 
peaceful origin of the world (Keeley 1997:vii, 23, 170; Pinker 2003:27). As 
Keeley (1997:170) puts it, "both laypersons and academics now prefer a vision 
of tribal peoples as lambs in Eden." 
Yet increasingly the belief in the ability to abolish war and eliminate conflict is 
being questioned. As Sontag (2004:4) notes, no one, not even the pacifists 
believe that it is possible to eliminate warfare. Even a committed peace scholar 
such as Hamelink (2008:78) notes that the idea of conflict prevention may be 
unrealistic and undesirable and is based on erroneous scientific assumptions. 
Thus if achieving peace is a chimera and enforcing peace counterproductive, 
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what are the motives, aims and consequences of all the peace studies and the 
practice of peace enforcement?  
This chapter begins a critical interrogation of the idea of peace and the 
relationship of communication and peace. It uncovers the genealogy of the idea 
of peace, evaluates the relationships between peace and war. It also uncovers 
the strategy and tactics used by the peace discourse to manipulate language 
and the mass media. It concludes by evaluating the consequences and 
implications of enforcing peace. After having raised questions about peace in 
this chapter the way is opened for a read and recovery of another 
understanding of war and communication which will be conducted in Chapters 3 
and 4.  
2.3  Kant's joke of the eternal peace of the graveyard  
Throughout human history religious visionaries and sages have propagated a 
utopian vision of a world without enemies, imagining a time when men will be 
beating swords into ploughshares and all conflicts and wars would be banished. 
But such delusions were contradicted by the harsh reality of the human 
condition: war and conflict are central aspects of human existence. From the 
time of the Enlightenment the idea of peace gained inspiration from Immanuel 
Kant’s ironic musing about inaugurating a perpetual or eternal peace among 
independent democratic states. However, while presenting his philosophical 
dream Kant acknowledges the irony that the idea of eternal peace was inspired 
by a picture of a graveyard. Thus Kant adds a note of caution warning that 
eternal peace may be a counterfactual utopia:  
We can leave open the question whether this satirical caption to 
the picture of a graveyard, which was painted on the sign of a 
Dutch innkeeper, applies to human beings in general [or] to 
philosophers who dream the sweet dream of perpetual peace 
(Kant 2006:67).  
22 
 
Moreover, there is another irony here: Kant has taken the title “perpetual peace” 
and the model of peace from Abbé de Saint-Pierre who originally suggested 
that making peace among the European powers was a necessary condition to 
unite them for a crusade against the Turks (cf. Bell 2008:63, 76).  
Kant is aware that peace is not a natural state for human beings and thus 
rightly suspects that eternal peace may turn out to be the peace of the 
graveyard (cf. Behnke 2008:514; Rasch 2000). Indeed, for Kant (2006:6) the 
natural characteristic of human beings is their antagonism and “unsociable 
sociability” that is the foundation for all social existence and the driving force 
behind all human development. Therefore, in a world without war and conflict  
human beings would live the arcadian life of shepherds, in full 
harmony, contentment, and mutual love. But all human talent 
would thus lie eternally dormant, and human beings, as good-
natured as the sheep that they put to pasture, would thus give their 
own lives hardly more worth than that of their domestic animals 
(Kant 2006:7). 
In similar manner Kant muses about the possible necessity of war for evolution 
of humanity: 
… war ... is an unintended attempt of human beings … and yet 
deeply hidden perhaps purposeful attempt of supreme wisdom to 
prepare, if not found, legitimacy along with the freedom of states 
and thereby the unity of a morally justified system, and in spite of 
the most horrible tribulations which it imposes on mankind, and 
perhaps even bigger tribulations which the constant readiness for 
war imposes during times of peace, is one more driving force ... to 
develop all talents, which serve culture, to the highest degree 
(Kant in Krimmer 2010:24). 
Moreover, Kant acknowledges that as a cultural force war may be a positive 
contributing value for the construction of the sublime. For Kant it is the model of 
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war, or the imagined war and its dangers that create the sublime because 
contemplation of war from a safe distance construct the sublime by fortifying 
reason and allowing it to control sensuality. Thus it is the imagination of danger 
that gives rise to the sublime feeling. However, Kant extends his analysis and 
claims that it is not only the imaginary war but "even war, if it is conducted in an 
orderly fashion and with respect for the sanctity of citizens' rights, has 
something sublime about it" (Kant in Krimmer 2010:23). Therefore for Kant, the 
more people are exposed to danger the greater becomes their sublime 
experience as against the debasement and degradation of mind caused by 
peace (Kant in Krimmer 2010:22–23). By the orderly conduct of war Kant 
seems to refer to the aesthetic beauty of orderly arrangement and the elegant 
manoeuvres of the troops on the parade ground which were transferred to the 
battlefields by the military leaders of the seventeenth century (cf. Bell 2008:38). 
Kant is also very much aware that peace and prosperity are corruptive and 
decadent forces because without struggle human beings and societies would 
stagnate and die. For Kant war and conflict are the health of society, and as 
Hegel (1996) puts it: “Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the 
corruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people 
escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continues or eternal 
peace” (Hegel 1996:331). 
The idea of eternal peace seems as a utopian myth because the decisive 
process that shapes individuals and social life is the dynamics of power 
relations. And power relations are antagonistic and “warlike relations” (cf. 
Foucault 2003). Ever since ancient time the Greek philosopher Heraclitus 
proclaimed war as the father of all things, major social thinkers acknowledged 
war and conflict as being formative forces. Since the dawn of history human 
imagination, expressed in myths and literary discourse, attests to the fact that 
“the battlefield is symbolic of the field of life, where every creature lives on the 
death of another” (Campbell 1993:238). Life is experienced as a struggle for 
survival and the perpetuation of life depends on the ability to prevail and gain 
victory in warfare (cf. Tilly 1990). As Machiavelli (1968:96) suggests, it is safer 
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to be feared than to be loved. On the other hand, throughout history a peaceful 
and defenceless society invites others to make war on it.  
But such facts are neglected by most twentieth century Western peace 
fundamentalists – intellectuals, the global media, religious and secular utopian 
social reformers – that have transformed Kant’s joke of eternal peace into a 
quasi-religious dogma. Such an idyllic peaceful world is presented in 
Fukuyama’s (1992:311) idea of the “end of history” whereby happiness is found 
in economic prosperity and politics is transformed into management of society 
(cf. Mouffe 2005:1). But as Fukuyama (1992) concedes, such a mundane life of 
peace and prosperity does not provide meaning for human beings. Human 
beings can gain a sense of their humanity by challenging life in war and thus a 
world without enemies is also a world without friends and hence it is no longer a 
human world (cf. Nietzsche 2004:194; Derrida 2005).  
2.4 Misconceptions about war and peace 
Having uncovered some different conception of peace and war in the previous 
section it may be possible to assume that contemporary popular and scholarly 
discourses about the positive value of peace and the evils of war are grounded 
in errors. Indeed, Davie (2003:v) explicitly notes that the common 
characteristics of most discourses about war is based on ignorance and Gelven 
(1994:xii) laments that most contemporary writers on war do not understand it.  
For most contemporary thinkers war and conflict are assumed to be abnormal 
manifestations of archaic inhuman drives and signify some form of pathology 
and social illness because the natural state of human society is assumed to be 
based on altruistic peace and cooperation (cf. Cramer 2006). Thus war is 
assumed as evil and is ultimately associated with the ideas of destruction and 
death while peace is assumed as an absolute moral good.  
However, such assumptions are contradicted by history and reality. As 
Nietzsche (1968:33) notes, to “assign a higher value to peace than to war” is an 
error that is contradicted by all historical and biological facts. The reality is that 
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“life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war” (Nietzsche 
1968:33). 
From the time of antiquity war was always considered as being synonymous 
with life, strength, well being and expansion, while peace was associated with 
rest, stagnation and death. Indeed, that peace is the prerogative of the dead is 
aptly expressed by George Santayana’s (in Behnke 2008:515) observation that 
“only the dead are safe; only the dead have seen the end of war.”  
Thus, against the misconception of the liberal ideology, war is not entirely a 
negative phenomenon, it is possible to assume that it can be productive and a 
functional source of social change and cultural and economic profit, and it is a 
means of communication and a form of social relations (cf. Cramer 2006:284).  
2.5 The reality behind the peace consensus: peace kills  
If the positive value of peace is questionable then can peace be a benign social 
phenomenon? It is difficult to ask such question because of a prevalent 
intellectual consensus that assumes war is evil and peace is benevolent. Brown 
(1992:130) warns that the idealisation of peace and unchallenged consensus 
on its desirability in scholarly discourse should be a cause for suspicion 
because the over emphasis on the evil of war may conceal the oppressive 
nature of peace (cf. Brown 1992:131). Indeed, that peace may be more 
murderous than war is attested by the fact that  
at least in the twentieth century, the killing of citizens by states has 
claimed vastly more lives than the killing of soldiers in combat ... 
four times as many people have died at the hands of their own 
governments than have been killed in battle combat (Cooney 
1997:330).  
John Gray notes that the construction of a peaceful society has always proved 
to be more deadly that any warfare: “The Soviet Union was an attempt to 
embody the Enlightenment ideal of a world without power or conflict. In pursuit 
of this ideal it killed and enslaved tens of millions of human beings” (Gray 
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2004:2). More ironic is the fact that natural disasters kill more people than wars. 
As Agamben (1998:114) notes, in times of peace life is exposed to violence in 
more banal ways than in war: “Our age is the one in which a holiday weekend 
produces more victims on Europe’s highways than a war campaign.” Thus to 
acknowledge such contradictions the American satirist P.J. O’Rourke 
appropriately titles his book: Peace Kills (O'Rourke 2004).  
2.6 Review of representations of peace in the discourses of peace 
studies and activism 
Peace is promoted as the ultimate absolute good in the voluminous literature 
produced by scholars and peace activists. Yet in all that literature there is no 
clear definition of peace (cf. Mandelzis 2007:2), or a clear outline of how the 
ideal peaceful society could be. Mostly the peaceful society is defined 
negatively by what it is not rather than by any identifiable essential 
characteristics. The ideal peaceful society is claimed to be the opposite of the 
contemporary human society. Thus peace appears as an “empty signifier” that 
has no signified or meaningful content (cf. Laclau 2007:36). As Cubitt (2002:14) 
puts it: peace is a concept “that has no content” and “exists as hope, as that 
which is wished for.” But what is the peace wished for? A close reading of the 
peace literature reveals an image of peace that is not very flattering. Rather 
than the hoped for utopia, the conception of peace propagated by the peace 
discourse emerges as an illusion. 
As if to cure humanity from the scourge of war scholars who promote the idea 
of nonviolence. According to Kurlansky (2007:182) the most promising way to 
eradicate war is by non-violent response and non participation in war, as 
suggested by French novelist Anatole France. According to Anatole France (in 
Kurlansky 2007:182), 
war will disappear only when men shall take no part whatsoever in 
violence and shall be ready to suffer every persecution that their 
abstention will bring them.  
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In other words, this means that one should not oppose oppression and tyranny 
because it is the resistance that is the ultimate cause of violence and war. All 
kinds of social oppression and psychological repression must be suffered for 
the world to become a peaceful place.  
The same suicidal passivity is recommended by Gandhi. During the Second 
World War Gandhi recommended to the British that they should not resist the 
German invasion but let themselves be slaughtered. To the Jews Gandhi gave 
the perverse advice that in order to appease the Nazi dictator it may be 
necessity that “hundreds, if not thousands” of Jews should be slaughtered to 
raise the world’s consciousness and awareness of their plight (cf. Harris 
2006:202; Walzer 2006:332). But as Harris (2006:202) points out, arousing the 
consciousness of a world full of pacifists would require that all commit suicide to 
show their support for the victims rather than help them defend themselves. At 
face value Gandhi’s advice may seem naïve, but such conclusion may be 
misleading because of the political context of Gandhi’s advice. At the time of 
the Second World War India had already begun its struggle against colonialism 
and a suicide of the colonial master offered an easy road to freedom. Indeed, 
Gramsci (1986:106, 229) suggests that Gandhi’s concept of nonviolence is a 
strategy of the “passive revolution” and nonviolence is merely another name for 
a revolutionary “war of positions.” Today, even the Dalai Lama, a life-long 
champion of non-violence, concedes that non-violence is ineffective in the 
present war against terrorism and the intransigent power of dictators (cf. Times 
of India 2009). Indeed, liberation theologians have already condemned non-
violence as an inappropriate response to a world ruled by power politics and 
have contended that the practice of non-violence exerts a high cost in human 
lives, perpetuates sufferings, paralyses social action and perpetuates slave-
consciousness (cf. Appleby 2000:116–117).  
In the discourses of social science the conception of non-violence and peace 
are closely interrelated with the idea of tyranny. Peace is synonymous with 
predictable social order that can be achieved by repressive law enforcement 
(cf. Chernus 1993:99). The origin of such view can be traced to the Pax 
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Romana, an exploitive internal order that disarms resistance and is imposed by 
military conquest. In other words, peace is the military pacification of a society. 
Such view is shared by the discourses of peace activism and social theories 
that assume that order must be maintained at all costs and should be imposed 
by hegemonic elites using powerful sociological techniques to maintain that 
order (cf. Chernus 1993:106). Ultimately the aim of peace is to search and 
destroy any sign of disorder because freedom is the ultimate sign of disorder; 
freedom manifests a deviation from peace and is a potential source of disorder 
and thus it is an enemy of peace (Chernus 1993:108). To attain peace is to win 
the battle against disorder and that implies an imposition of monotonous and 
oppressive uniformity. As Bryzzheva (2009:66) puts it, the battle against 
disorder is a battle against human nature and “winning the battle against 
disorder would turn a brilliantly complex dialogic living into a morbid 
monologue” (Bryzzheva 2009:66). Thus Foucault’s (2003:30) observation that 
“we all have some element of fascism inside our heads” aptly describes the 
state of mind of peace discourse intellectuals.  
Cavin, Hale and Cavin (1997) demonstrate in their research that proponents of 
peace discourse present themselves as if they were gods possessing superior 
knowledge and are able to lead ignorant humanity towards eternal peace. 
Einstein, in an exchange of letters with Freud on the topic of curing the world of 
the menace of war, writes that global peace can be achieved only if the 
aggressive instinct of the majority of the world inhabitants is eradicated by 
having them submit to the rule of a minority group of benevolent intellectuals 
that has the interest of humanity at heart and every nation must unconditionally 
surrender its liberty and sovereignty and be ruled by the all powerful 
international body (cf. Peery 2009:22–23). Freud (2005) agrees that the ideal 
pacification would be achieved if a community of people repress their 
aggressive drives and accept to be ruled by “the dictatorship of reason” 
because such repression will lead to a “complete and robust unification of 
humanity” (Freud 2005:230). However, Freud realises that such psychological 
repression would also lead to the extinction of the human species because it 
will compromise their sex drive and ability to propagate. Nevertheless, Freud is 
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optimistic that the natural process of cultural evolution – or the long “civilisation 
process” as identified by Norbert Elias (1978; 1982) – will gradually result in the 
pacification and “domestication” of human beings (cf. Freud 2005:231–232).  
According to Freud (2004) the aggressive and dangerous individual must be 
dominated by society, the individual’s mind must be controlled by a social 
authority that constantly “watch[es] over him, like a garrison in a conquered 
town” (Freud 2004:77). For Freud the idea of military conquest is a central 
metaphor that informs his construction of the image of the healthy and peaceful 
human mind. For Freud the mind is a battlefield of resistance and conquering 
armies; blockages in mental development are comparable to an army being 
held up by resisting counter force; regression is as if troops retreat in face of 
enemy attack and psychotherapy is “compared to intervention of a foreign ally 
in a civil war” (cf. Brown 1989:108).  
Freud (2004) suggests that humans should emulate the ideal model of the 
peaceful societies of insects and termites that show no sign of cultural struggle. 
Thus for Freud  
the bees, the ants, the termites – struggled for thousands of 
centuries until they evolved the state institutions, the distributions 
of functions, the restrictions on individuals, for which we admire 
them today (Freud 2004:76).  
Freud seems to believe that human society is inferior to the peaceful and 
orderly society of insects. Freud of course presents a perverted view of 
evolution and has an idealised image of peaceful animal. However, contrary to 
Freud’s beliefs, the reality is that “in all carefully studied mammalian species, 
the rate at which their members kill conspecifics is several thousand times 
greater than the highest homicide rate measured in an American city” 
(Gottschall 2001:283). Ants in particular, habitually make war and their battles 
are epic in their proportions (cf. van der Dennen 1995). Thus “alongside ants, 
which conduct assassinations, skirmishes, and pitch battles as routine 
business, men are all but tranquilised pacifists” (Wilson in Thayer 2000:140). 
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Therefore, contrary to the common assumption that violence is abnormal the 
facts suggest that the idea of peaceful and non-violent society is not a normal 
condition but a sign of pathological abnormality. Indeed, pacifism is identified by 
some theorists as a pathological manifestation of inhumanity (Hardt & Negri 
2006:363). This is evident where the pacifist  
will submit to anything – cruelty, torture, insult, slavery, obscenity, 
ignobility, and defilement – just to live a few hour longer ... He 
would rather see his children raped, his family tortured, his culture 
eclipsed, his friends defiled, his own pacific religion destroyed, 
than lift a finger in violence against another (Gelven 1994:260).  
The concern with prolonging biological life regardless of quality of human 
existence has become the common concern for most Western scholars. The 
result of such concern is according to Henryk Broder (in Belien 2006) that the 
European has lost all sense of pride and honour and believes that “it is 
sometimes better to let yourself be raped than to risk serious injuries while 
resisting … it is sometimes better to avoid fighting than run the risk of death.” 
The desire to live in a risk-free society results in a paralysis of all actions. Thus 
Kant’s utopia of “eternal peace” becomes a graveyard for human society. 
As against the inhuman and insane reaction of such a pacifist, rage and violent 
reaction against the threat of violence are the appropriate natural human 
responses. Not responding to violence is an indication of being dehumanised, 
as Arendt (1973:127) notes, under such conditions the “conspicuous absence” 
of rage and violence “is the closest sign of dehumanisation.” To prevent man 
from defending himself and express rage and violence by pretending that such 
pacification is done in order to “cure” man of aggression is “nothing less than to 
dehumanise or emasculate him” (Arendt 1973:127).  
2.7  Linguistic cleansing: constructing the peace newspeak 
For most of the twentieth century many scholars produced propaganda against 
warfare. Language and discourse have become central areas for intervention 
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and manipulation for peace activism and academic scholarship. Scholars have 
dedicated themselves to constructing a new “language of peace” and a “peace 
discourse”. Cavin, Hale and Cavin (1997:243) note that “the re-visioning of 
human communication systems toward the inclusion of progressive, 
cooperative, and peaceful effects has long been the focus of scholars from a 
variety of disciplines.” The aim of scholars attempting to construct a new 
discipline of “peace linguistics” (Friedrich 2007:72), or field of study of “peace 
discourse” is not limited to scholarly inquiry, but to engage in activism and 
actively construct an alternative to war discourse (cf. Bugarski 2000:140). 
According to Friedrich (2007:72) the task of peace linguistics is to develop a 
single universal language to unify the world. Such a universal language was 
presumably available to humanity in the mythical pre-Babel world where 
speaking a single language people understood each other perfectly well and 
“had an identical understanding of the world around them” (cf. Friedrich 
2007:76). But as the task to develop a universal Esperanto is faced with 
difficulty, the immediate task for linguists is to purify the English language that 
has become the common language of the global village. This demands 
cleansing language of violence by removing the “masculine pronouns to 
encompass feminine beings” (Friedrich 2007:77), policing language to ensure 
that people use language responsibly and are “communicating peacefully” 
(Friedrich 2007:75), and developing tools to inculcate “non-confrontational 
manner” and “conflict avoidance” (Friedrich 2007:81). This will ensure that all 
can communicate successfully and harmoniously in their business dealing 
across the world (Friedrich 2007:81).  
According to Bugarski (2000:140) it is not possible to define the essence of 
“peace discourse” except by defining it negatively as an inverse of war 
discourse. Thus for Bugarski (2000), peace discourse “should have the feel of 
‘politically correct’ language” that should be characterised not by what may be 
said but rather by what may be prohibited and not said. The things that peace 
discourse should prohibit would ideally be dictated by an official banning list of 
objectionable expressions or by self-imposed censorship of a “highly selective 
avoidance list” of words and concepts (cf. Bugarski 2000:140). According to 
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Bugarski (2000:131) of utmost importance is to avoid any references that 
highlight differences of identity between social groups, and the use of the terms 
“us” and “them” that is central to any sense of identity should be criminalised as 
“hate speech”. In political speech personal pronouns such as “we” should be 
replaced by the singular pronoun “I”; “words such as must, all, never, can’t, 
won’t” should be dropped and replaced with “may, some, sometimes, perhaps, 
[and] try”; when answering a question “a tentative yes is often preferable to a 
decisive no, and the menacing link either ... or should make room for its 
friendlier alternative both ... and” (Bugarski 2000:141). Implicit in such 
prescription is the belief that deceptions and evasions should be the primary 
characteristics of peace discourse. Moreover, Bugarski (2000) suggests that 
“political and quasi-historical talk couched in past and perfect tense should 
shrink in favour of the future tense” in order to forget past history and increase 
concerns for the future (Bugarski 2000:142). Bugarski (2000) suggests that his 
strategy, drawn from Yugoslavia, could be applicable to any conflict situation. 
Behind such suggestion the real aim of such linguistic manipulation is the 
destruction of politics and negation of communal identification that ultimately 
will result in a world of atomised individuals without historical memory and a 
sense of real community. Bugarski’s (2000) authoritarian prescriptions closely 
resemble the linguistics manipulation of Orwell’s Newspeak. The aim of 
Newspeak was to make heretical thought unthinkable by restricting the 
vocabulary so that only precisely defined and authorised meanings could be 
expressed (Orwell 1990). A better solution is proposed by Swift who has 
Gulliver describe the practical language practice on the imaginary flying island 
of Laputa that had words abolished and replaced by things; the logic behind this 
was that “since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient 
for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express a 
particular business they are to discourse on” (Farb 1974:32–33).  
Ultimately it is the reduction of language to silence and practice of “living 
silence” that seems to be the essence of the language of peace (cf. Bryzzheva 
2009:75). Indeed, McLuhan raises the doubt about the pacifying nature of 
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language. According to McLuhan (1969:90), it is possible to assume that the 
spread of global communication and  
computers hold out the promise of a means of instant translation of 
any code or language into any other code or language. The 
computer, in short, promises by technology a Pentecostal of 
universal understanding and unity (McLuhan 1969:90).  
Nevertheless, it would be an error to imagine that language as the basic means 
of communication can lead to universal understanding because language is a 
technology that mediates and also separates people as it provides the concepts 
and classification schemes to note differences. As Bourdieu (1992) points out, 
language provides the concepts for “vision” and di-vision” of the world. 
Therefore, according to McLuhan (1969:90), a universal consensus, whereby 
humanity could unite in a cosmic consciousness, universal understanding, and 
harmony could only be achieved by bypassing language and communication 
technology altogether, because it is “the condition of speechlessness that could 
confer perpetuity of collective harmony and peace” (McLuhan 1969:90). This 
raises the suspicion that speechlessness is a characteristic of the dead rather 
than any living human society; a silent society entirely at peace shows no signs 
of life. 
Peace discourse assumes that by manipulating, distorting and directing 
language people will not be able to think about defending themselves against 
danger and thus ensure their own domination and be rewarded with a peaceful 
life. But such peaceful life is not one of comfort and affluence. According to 
Cubitt (2002:13) peace requires that the affluent West destroy its wealth 
because “the enemy of peace is wealth.” After destroying their wealth, 
individuals must surrender control over private property and their “private 
thoughts” (cf. Cubit 2002:17). Ultimately to attain world peace the West must 
unconditionally “surrender” itself to the non-European world (cf. Cubitt 2002:13). 
Implied in Cubit’s prescription is the assumption that it is only the West that is 
aggressive and needs self-pacification to fit into a presumed world inhabited by 
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good-hearted non-Western pacifists. Likewise, disciples of Gandhi’s philosophy 
suggest that non-violence is ultimately not a “seizure of power” but a 
transformation of relationships that would lead to a “peaceful transfer of power” 
(cf. Juluri 2005:209). In other words, this is not a vision of power-sharing among 
egalitarian partners but a formation of new power relations and a new hierarchy 
of domination by peaceful means. It is simply a conquest by other means. The 
ultimate idea behind non-violence and peace discourse is the ability to gain 
easy victory against an enemy that offers no resistance. Indeed, as Sun Tzu 
(1995:23) notes, war is deception and the “supreme excellence consists in 
breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” 
If deception is the essence of victory in war then the language of peace is 
aimed at disarming defence and making defeat acceptable. Thus if language 
has already been distorted by peace linguistics the victory of the non-Western 
world could not be understood as a victory because the concept of victory has 
been eliminated and the public has become convinced that “peace depends not 
on victory but on surrender” (cf. Cubitt 2002:13). From such a perspective 
Cubitt (2002:17) suggests that the Taliban may invade America but on condition 
that they must be “prepared to listen” to the peace discourse. But the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda reply that they have no need to listen or for dialogue: 
The confrontation that we are calling for does not know Socratic 
debates … Platonic ideals … nor Aristotelian diplomacy … But it 
knows the dialogue of assassination, bombing and destruction … 
Islamic governments have never and will never be established 
through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are 
established as they have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet 
(Al-Qaeda in Shultz & Beitler 2004:60).  
To the Western mind indoctrinated by peace discourse and in the Eurocentric 




The aim of contemporary peace discourse is similar to the aims of the peace 
movements of the Cold War era: both deny the reality of war, conceal the 
nature of the enemies and deny the fact that the West is facing dangerous 
enemies. Instead of acknowledging aggressive enemies the peace discourse 
portrays the enemies as victims of Western aggression and complains that the 
enemies are “demonised” by the mass media (cf. e.g. Ivie 1987:178–179; 
Steuter & Wills 2010).  
More insidious is the promotion of the concepts “dialogue” and “conversation” 
as new means of creating peaceful egalitarian participation in political 
discourse. The concept of “dialogue” is used to destroy political participation 
and democratic decision-making. Instead of real political debate public 
“dialogue” is promoted as a “therapeutic language” demanding endless “self-
disclosure” of personal feelings, enforcement of conformity to the standards of 
“good behaviour” and cooperation in conversation and elimination of all political 
contestations. The aim of this therapeutic dialogue is ultimately to destroy the 
democratic political process (cf. Tonn 2005:405). Indeed, Edelman (1964:44) 
already documented the insidious work of the “helping professions” – 
psychologists and social workers – that by re-classifying normal political 
behaviour as criminal pathology legitimate medical and police intervention to 
suppress political expression. The therapy culture has become all pervasive in 
contemporary Western societies (cf. Furedi 2004). The transfer of therapeutic 
methods into politics results in infantilisation of the citizens: the citizen is seen 
by their political representatives not as being in a political relationship, instead 
they are assumed to be in a parent-child relationship. The aim is to foster “good 
relationship” of family dialogue between the parent-politician who knows what is 
best for the child-citizen. The child-citizen is encouraged and urged to enter into 
polite dialogue to “tell mummy and daddy about our emotional inner lives” 
(Hammond 2007:116). Those refusing to enter this therapy dialogue by insisting 
on political discourse are classified as fundamentalists requiring police 
intervention to maintain the peace.  
36 
 
The same methods are also transferred into international relations, for example 
Kaldor (2001:148) proposes that “just as it is increasingly accepted that 
government can intervene in family affairs to stop domestic violence, so a 
similar principle would be applied on a global scale.” To keep the new world-
order and peace Kaldor (2001:133–134) recommends that errand states should 
be colonised by an international police force and democracy and peace be 
imposed by the power of the gun. Kaldor’s and other cosmopolitan promoters of 
the fiction of “global community” claim that it is a universal duty to intervene in 
other peoples wars. But such claim is the West’s pretence to omnipotence and 
belief that it has a moral responsibility to every human being. According to 
Enzensberger (1994:59) such a claim is a sign that morality has become “the 
last refuge of Eurocentrism.” External intervention in other people’s war is not a 
duty but a hindrance: stopping war before it reaches a decisive conclusion only 
ensures that it will be fought again. As Ignatieff (1999:175) notes, outsiders 
have no credibility in other people’s wars and “ethnic war remains a family 
quarrel, a duel to the death between brothers and can only be resolved within 
the family” (Ignatieff 1999:7). Behind the pious language of peace it is possible 
to discern the insidious old ideology of colonial repression. The old ideology of 
nineteenth century colonialism assumed that it was the “white man’s burden” to 
“bring peace to warring tribes” (Churchill in Kaplan 2003:23). The neo-
colonialism of peace deprives the natives of their freedom and humanity by 
defining them as “victims” of war and confining them, to “refugee camps” that 
are similar to the old totalitarian “concentration camps” where the “victims” are 
cared for by patronising humanitarian aid agencies (cf. Žižek 2002a:91). 
Bawer (2007) suspects that peace studies and peace discourse of activism is 
essentially a “peace racket” and the proclaimed humanitarian and anti-war 
sentiments are disguises for promoting anti-Western Marxist inspired ideology. 
Indeed, as Rapoport (1985:22) notes, for the Marxists (and the contemporary 
“progressive” humanitarians) “peace is the continuation of struggle only by 
other means” which is no different from Clausewitz’s (1985) assertion that war 
is a continuation of politics by other. For the Marxists there is no distinction 
between war and peace, because these are phases in the uninterrupted class 
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war and struggle to replace capitalism with socialist world domination. Thus war 
is a total strategy that effectively makes use of the interchangeability of political 
and military weapons (cf. Fuller 1975:202). For most of the twentieth century 
Marxists revolutionaries masquerading as pacifists waged their battle against 
their Western capitalist class enemies under the guise of “peace offensive” (cf. 
Aron 1955; Scruton 2006). Indeed, as Bourke (1999:360) notes, it was not 
unusual to see “peace” demonstrators carrying banners supporting communist 
armed struggle. In the twenty-first century peace movements have adopted 
military strategies to declare “symbolic war” that includes the use of Molotov 
cocktails against the police (cf. Juris 2005:413). Peace activism finally 
demonstrated its absurd logic when “on 15 February 2003, about a million 
liberal-minded people marched through London to oppose the overthrow of a 
fascist regime” (cf. Cohen 2007:280).  
Indeed such historical progression of the peace discourse is not surprising 
when the intellectual context within which it emerged is considered. Form it 
beginning in the time of the ancient sages peace discourse gained more 
prominence. Modern tradition of peace discourse may be located in the 
medieval cleric Erasmus condemnation of war that was provoked by the loss of 
his pupil Alexander, son of King James IX, both killed in the Battle of Flodden 
(cf. Howard 1978:14). Thus Erasmus’ promotion of peace is motivated by a 
lamentation about the loss of his financial and political benefactor in battle. 
Promotion of peace was taken-up by idealist Enlightenment philosophers. In the 
post-World War II context various forces converged to promote the peace 
discourse: in USA the Democrats adopted the idea of internationalising 
Roosevelt’s New Deal as beneficial to capitalist expansion and as excuse for 
political and military intervention to rescue “victims” of Russian aggression; in 
Europe former defeated German nationalists take the moral high-ground 
presenting themselves as new pacifists, while naive liberals and Western 
Marxists promote peace following dictates from the Soviet’s that turned war 
discourse into a deceptive peace discourse.  
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The way in which both liberals and communists did come to agree about 
“peace” in the second half of the twentieth century is no coincidence. The social 
construction of peace is a dominant ideology in present social theory and 
gained this dominant position as the result of war. As Michael Mann (in Joas 
2003:142–143) notes, military victories and defeats determine the course of 
social theory. The present pacifist’s theories usurped previous more war-centric 
ones: 
unfortunately for the militarists, their armies lost. The Austrian 
Empire disintegrated; Russia was conquered by Marxism; 
Germany lost two wars and its militarist theories were outlawed 
from civilisation. Finally, the United States became a super-power 
and rediscovered the usefulness of British transnational laissez fair 
for its own global hegemony. As liberalism and Marxism divide up 
the geo-political and geo-economic world, they naturally dominate 
its sociology. Since 1945 the militarists have been forgotten, the 
waverers purged of their more violent side ... and the 'classic 
tradition' of liberal/Marxist pacific transnational sociology has been 
enshrined in pedagogy (Mann in Joas 2003:142–143). 
The type of theory that becomes dominant is the result of legislation and 
inscription of power rather than pure scientific merit of the theory itself; social 
theory is re-written to accommodate the dominant world view. Thus peace 
discourse is another means of conducting war and gaining victory by deception. 
Such position is inadvertently expressed in the peace discourse, for example, 
Marsella (2005) notes that violence and war throughout human history have 
been the evolutionary forces promoting the survival of the fittest. Therefore 
Marsella (2005:652) concludes that there is “growing evidence that non-
violence and peace may be equally compelling options for the survival of the 
fittest.” The fittest are the new warriors of humanitarian intervention and the 
peace enforcement troops that are waging “war against war”, and like all 
ancient warriors their success depends on their ability to gain victory by 
deception. As Foucault (2000a:378) puts it: 
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The success of history belongs to those who are capable of 
seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to 
disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, 
and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; 
controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so 
as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.  
2.8  Social science police: media scholars and global surveillance 
The role of communication and the mass media is assumed to be central to 
conflict prevention and imposition of peace. Such assumption is enshrined in 
UNESCO’s constitutions and other declarations proclaiming that “war begins in 
the minds of man” and thus ascribing to communication and the mass media 
positive peace-inducing properties (Becker 1982:227). It follows that war and 
conflict are assumed to be the result of breakdown of communication. 
Therefore, more and better communication is essential to prevent conflict 
because once people have more information about each other they will 
understand each other and end their conflicts.  
However such assumptions may project unrealistic expectations about the 
power of the mass media and communication. Moreover, these assumptions 
are not supported by any scientific and empirical evidence (Hamelink 2008:78–
79). These assumptions are merely signs of wishful thinking because while 
idealists naively believe that wars begin in peoples’ mind and are caused by 
ideas and beliefs, realists correctly suggest that war is the cause of ideas and 
religious beliefs (cf. Richards 2006:651). Wars do not begin in people mind but 
are the result of real material conditions and the constant struggle for life (cf. 
Becker 1982:227; Hamelink 2008:78–79). This is evident in the emerging “clash 
of civilisations” (Huntington 1998) of the twenty-first century that is commonly, 
and erroneously, assumed to be caused by divergent religious belief. But as 
Richards (2006:651) notes:  
If religious difference is a factor in modern conflicts it is because 
people with different basic collective interests come into contention 
40 
 
over those interests while expressing differences of organisation 
as differences of belief. War is not a product of clash of 
civilisations but clash of civilisations is a product of war.  
Indeed, as Nietzsche (1969:74) perceptibly notes: contrary to the common 
belief that assumes that the good cause sanctifies war, the truth is that it is “the 
good war that hallows any cause.” War is the ultimate and efficient conflict 
resolution mechanism: removing or killing the opponent eliminates the conflict. 
Better and clear communication or free dialogic exchange do not resolve 
conflict and successful communication or rational discourse do not imply 
agreement and consensus. On the contrary, it is more likely that clear and 
honest communication is the source of conflicts. Peters explains that conflict is 
not a result of misunderstanding but of disagreement:  
Communication sometimes masquerades as the great solution to 
human ills, and yet most of the problems that arise in human 
relations do not come from a failure to match signs with meanings. 
In most cases, situations and syntax make the sense of words 
perfectly clear; the basis of conflict is not a failure of 
communication but a difference of commitment. We generally 
understand each other's words quite well: we just don't agree 
(Peters 1989:397). 
This is evident in the fact that the global increase in communication and social 
interaction that was believed to increase understanding and eliminate conflict 
resulted in increased disagreement and conflict (cf. Bauman 2001b:138; 
Huntington 1998:20; Ignatieff 1999:57; Therborn 1995:130; Žižek 2009:50). The 
reason for this is according Meyrowitz (1986:317), that people always interact 
better at a distance but “when people share the same environment, they often 
see more differences among themselves than when they are further apart.” 
Indeed, as Keeley (1997) notes, it is evident throughout history that social 
groups that regularly intermarry, and trade also more frequently wage war 
against one another.  
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But regardless of the lack of supporting scientific evidence for the assumption 
that communication and the mass media have pacifying power and can 
eliminate war, such beliefs persist and are propagated by powerful international 
political organisations. Removing communication breakdowns between 
individuals, groups, societies, and the “communication breakdown in the global 
village” (Hale 1999:143) has become the ideological commitment of most 
communication scholars. Thus scholars offer wholesale “quick-fix 
communication-based solutions to personal, social and economic problems” 
(Putnis 1993:17). Resolving conflict is considered as a simple technical 
problem: it does not matter that there are substantive issues for the conflict: all 
that is required to solve conflict or end war is to remove the communication 
barriers. Resolving conflict thus seems as simple act whereby the substantive 
issue of the conflict is transformed into a technical problem; the result is that the 
reality of the basic conflict is denied and repairing the “communication failure” 
becomes the central concern (cf. Hall & Hewitt 1970:19). Such obsession with 
communication is based on the assumption that communication is both the 
cause of many of our social problem as well as the solution for all our problems, 
as Peters (1989:387) puts it: “Communication appeals to us because of the way 
the concept seems to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.” The 
combination of beliefs and ideology among communication scholars has a dire 
result. As Morrison (2005:411–412) notes, “the problem that tends to afflict 
communication scholars in writing about war ... is ... the importation of sets of 
pacifist sentiment” and prevalence of self-righteous liberal ideology that results 
in vacuous sentimental texts that dispense platitudes and “read after the 
fashion of religious cults that use pseudo-scientific reasoning to promote a point 
by giving the appearance of scholarship where no scholarship exists.”  
According to Hamelink (2008) even though elimination of conflict from human 
life may be wishful thinking, counterproductive and based on faulty assumptions 
about the power of the mass media, nevertheless, communication scholars 
could still have gainful employment as members of a new global social science 
police. Hamelink (2008) envisages police squads of mass media analysts 
serving as watchdogs over the mass media. Scholars should engage in 
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continuous surveillance of media content and document all signs of 
warmongering thoughts in mass media reports. Thus Hamelink (2008:82) 
proposes to that 
an International Media Alert System (IMAS) is needed to monitor 
media contents in areas of conflict. This system would provide an 
‘early warning’ where and when media set the climate for crimes 
against humanity and begin to motivate people to kill others 
(Hamelink 2008:82). 
When such signs of political activity have been identified the offending media 
will be reported to international judicial tribunals for punishment and “military 
intervention by democratic paratroopers” will be called in to suppress local 
political activities (cf. Badiou 2005:78).  
In the name of abstract compassion for “distant suffering” (cf. Sontag 2004; 
Höijer 2004) demands are made for military humanitarian intervention to 
eliminate all those that dare to disturb the peace. As a journalist puts it: if non 
intervention to stop war means that people are being killed, “a measure of 
enforcement is going to be necessary” even if the use of such force results in 
new causalities, because such intervention is justified because its aim is to stop 
the war (cf. Lloyd 2004:175). It seems that for journalists and peace activists 
ending war is the only thing that matters, therefore despite the fact that external 
military intervention will kill innocent people; the killing is justified because it will 
end war once and for all. In other words, this is another way to say that human 
beings are the threat to peace, and only people could be eliminated then peace 
will be guaranteed. 
An example of external military and “information intervention” to promote peace, 
democracy and free speech was undertaken in the Bosnian conflict (cf. 
Hammond 2003:87). A Bosnian Serb broadcasting station satirised the 
occupying NATO peacekeeping forces and broadcasted critical commentary 
claiming that the UN International Tribunal to prosecute alleged war crime was 
a political instrument and was prejudiced against the Serbs. The UN demanded 
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an apology and re-transmission of the information without editorial comment 
and the broadcasters obliged.  
This compliance was ignored, however, and Nato troops seized 
control of the broadcaster’s transmitters. Following this show of 
force, the High Representative drew up new rules for Bosnian Serb 
broadcasting, re-wrote the organisation’s editorial charter, vetted 
its executive, and appointed a new transitional director (Hammond 
2003:87).  
Later Bosnian transmission was suspended again for broadcasting old Second 
World War films and for supposedly carrying “intense Serbian cultural 
programming” (Hammond 2003:87). Such totalitarian censorship was justified 
by the peace-mongers as a boost for free speech and justified by the claim that 
“the media have not done enough to promote freedom of expression and 
reconciliation” (cf. Hammond 2003:87). As Hammond (2003:87) ironically 
comments: “As if the surest route to free expression was to hand the power of 
censorship to an unelected foreigner,” and using such criteria “perhaps 
someone should shut down the BBC, an incorrigible purveyor of ‘intense British 
cultural programming’, including incessant wartime films and dramas.”  
Hidden behind the scholars’ peace discourse may be a desire for social 
domination, to pacify society and to reshape it according to the normative 
counterfactual utopian model. In this venture the mass media assume a central 
role. In order to promote the establishment of a relative state of peace 
throughout the world a form of “new guerrilla journalism” that has the illusive 
name of “peace journalism” is being actively propagated (cf. Morrison 
2005:411–412). The same motives are found behind the propagation of global 
ethics for the mass media (cf. Sonderling 2008). Thus the pious claims 
represent the desires of peace fundamentalist or “militants for peace” (cf. 
Appleby 2000:121). The humanitarian military intervention and peace building 
are euphemism for war by other means (cf. Rieff 2002). It seems likely that real 
aim of peace enforcement is to outlaw politics, to criminalise politics and 
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replace politics with the authoritarian rule by unelected global government. 
Liberalism is the prime example of an anti-politics movement. For the liberal 
politics is essentially deliberation and debate. By transforming politics into a 
peaceful deliberation or into Habermas’ rational discourse politics becomes a 
polite conversation. As Carl Schmitt (2005) notes, deliberations and liberal 
chatter are aimed at avoiding political decisions. Likewise, Habermas’ idea of 
rational discourse is an imagined counterfactual “ideal speech community” and 
not suitable for political action. Politics is not based exclusively on the rational 
discussion but on practical process of votes counting and arriving at a decision. 
Moreover, to arrive at rational consensus according to Habermas’ criteria may 
take infinite time as against the need for decisiveness of action in political 
contingencies. Nor can Habermas’ rational discourse allow for democratic 
participation because it excludes those participants that promote their own 
political interests.  
The peace vocabulary conceals the fact that peace is a “continuous police 
action exercised on the global polis”; peacekeeping is a perpetual war and 
peace is a continuation of war by other means (cf. Alliez and Negri 2003:110–
111). According to Alliez and Negri (2003:112) peace has become the 
postmodern label for war. 
2.9  From polis to polizie: constructing the global humanitarian 
concentration camp  
A close reading of peace discourse reveals that the dream of an ideal peaceful 
society is an illusion. In the Western liberal democratic societies the 
“pacification of existence” and elimination of war and competition between 
individuals and groups and the enforcement of tolerance and consensus have 
become new forms of violent physiological repression and social oppression. 
As Baudrillard (2002b) contends: 
It is because our society no longer allows space for real violence, 
historical or class violence, that it generates a virtual, reactive 
violence ... More subtle than the violence of aggression: a violence 
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of deterrence, pacification, neutralisation, control – a violence of 
quiet extermination, a genetic, communicational violence – the 
violence of consensus and conviviality which tends to abolish – 
through drugs, disease prevention, psychical and media regulation 
– the very roots of evil and hence of all radicality. The violence of a 
system which roots out any form of negativity and singularity 
(including the ultimate form of singularity – death itself). The 
violence of a society in which negativity is virtually prohibited, 
conflict is prohibited, death is prohibited. A violence which, in a 
way, puts an end to violence itself (Baudrillard 2002b:92–93). 
In the name of toleration and consensus no one is allowed to criticise an 
opposing point of view nor is allowed to say something important or 
controversial. According to Žižek (2008:1) intolerance is presented as tolerance 
and one is not allowed to express strong ideas that can upset the status quo; 
only “weak ideas” that have no consequence are allowed to be expressed. 
Ultimately a culture of anti-politics is constructed: political demands are either 
criminalised or medicalised and political opponents are declared to be insane 
and incarcerated in mental institutions because they dare to oppose the system 
(cf. Žižek 2008). According to Baudrillard (2002b:93) such a process of 
pacification leads to death of the social because over-protection leads to a loss 
of defences and immunity. In Western society an understanding of war and 
peace is deformed, as Bloom (1987:228) puts it: “Nietzsche sought with his 
value philosophy to restore the harsh conflicts for which men were willing to die, 
to restore the tragic sense of life.” However as the ideologues of pacifism 
believe that conflict is an evil they have deformed Nietzsche’s philosophy to 
make it conform to the pacifist vision and thus “conflict, the condition of 
creativity for Nietzsche, is for us a cry for therapy” (Bloom 1987:228–229). 
Ultimately the ideal peaceful world resembles a totalitarian state as Agamben 
(1998:123, 166) notes, the model or paradigm for the modern pacifist liberal 
society is the old concentration camp. 
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2.10  Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to challenge the taken-for-granted assumption that 
peace is entirely a positive condition. A review of the peace literature and a 
reading of the discourse of scholars and peace activists show that peace may 
not be an absolute moral good. On the contrary, peace can be oppressive and 
lead to tyranny. The oppression and tyranny result from the equation of peace 
with order, predictability and conformity and condemnation of freedom as a 
disturbance of the peace and ultimately the imposition of peace leads to 
suppression of freedom and elimination of opposing political views. As Mouffe 
(2005:1–2) notes, uncritical acceptance of the idea of peace as bureaucratically 
ordered society leads to destruction of democracy because struggles, 
contentions and agonistic confrontations are the driving forces of a vibrant 
democracy. Moreover, in many instances, peace is a disguise to conduct war 
by other means. Thus rather than encouraging communication, peace demands 
and imposes silence. An absolute warless world is either utopia or madness, a 
world where war and conflict are outlawed is no longer a real world but a world 
dominated by tyrants and allows no dissent (Schall 2004). Thus as Van Creveld 
concludes (1991:221–222):  
The only way to bring about perpetual peace would be to 
somehow eradicate man’s willingness, even eagerness, to take 
risks of any kind up to, and including, death ... probably it can be 
exercised only by turning people into zombies ... Robots would 
have to control men, men themselves turned into robots ... So 
monstrous is the vision as to make even war look like a blessing. 
There is nothing natural behind the belief in the idea that peace has a primacy 
in human life. As was seen in this chapter peace is a human invention, and 
indeed this was well put by Sir Henry Maine: "War appears to be as old as 
mankind, but peace is a human invention" (Howard 2001). And such invention 
over the centuries has become the dominant Liberal tradition as documented by 
Howard (1978). While Kant acknowledged that peace may be a utopian dream 
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and realised that it may be the peace of the graveyard, modern and 
contemporary writers have taken the utopian dream seriously. This raises the 
suspicion that earlier generations of philosophers’ propagation of peace was 
tempered by their experience of war, their vision of the tragic sense of life and 
possession of a sense of irony about the unreality of the utopian dream of 
peace. Such sensibilities are lacking among modern and contemporary 
thinkers. This raises the question as to why some modern philosophers and 
social theorists have taken Kant’s joke of eternal peace seriously. While it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to deal with this issue in depth, nevertheless 
some answers may be suggested. In the first instance modern peace discourse 
is shaped by the prevalent perceptions of war and influenced by the outcome of 
war as already suggested by Mann (in Joas 2003:142–143). Being influenced 
by the outcome of war implies, according to Schivelbusch (2004:18–19), that 
the losers of the war attempt to justify their defeat by taking the moral high 
ground to explain their miserable situation. Thus having been pacified they now 
claim a universal moral status for pacification and demonise the victors. 
Another reason for the promotion of pacifism is the relative lack of power of the 
intellectuals. Many of the contemporary promoters of peace have developed a 
sense of self-importance and promote themselves as practical policy adviser 
rather than critical intellectual thinkers. And as intellectual work is increasingly 
funded by state and international institutions and infused by dominant 
ideologies, these will be reflected and perpetuated in the intellectual knowledge 
production that conforms to political correctness. The anti-war bias of the 
intellectuals is also strengthened by their lack of personal experience of war 
because war has become the prerogative of professional soldiers and has been 
relegated to the periphery of modern societies. Indeed, Sidebottom (1993:242) 
uncovers a similar situation among the Greek philosophers living in the Roman 
Empire. While philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle living in the Classical 
and Hellenistic ages had personal experience of warfare, such experience was 
lacking in latter generations because war has become a distant reality. Thus not 
having knowledge about the role of warfare in ensuring the safe existence of 
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their society they could flirt with pacifism and condemn war (cf. Sidebottom 
1993:250, 262).  
What the review in this chapter uncovered is that the assumed social primacy of 
peace is a social construction and represents a dominant ideology. Such 
ideological bias has a negative effect on development of social theory because 
as Mann (2004:4) argues it results in social theory being written as "a happy, 
progressive, moral tale." The ultimate result is that the contemporary student 
does not have much knowledge of war or of history because, as Denitch (in 
Campbell 1998:55) discovers, historical facts are unfashionable in academic 
circles. The worst victim of Western ignorance of history and ideological bias 
against war is the African continent were the misrepresentations of warfare and 
enforcement of peace lead to promotion of disastrous policies and misdirected 
research (cf. Mbembe 2001:4–7; Pottier 2002:64; Rieff 2002). Thus, an 
unbiased understanding of war and its formative characters can greatly 
contribute to an understanding of peace.  
The next chapter will begin a recovery of ideas of war by reading representative 
interdisciplinary texts. It will review, read and interpret the literature of major 
philosophers and social thinkers, ranging from the ancient Greeks to 
contemporary, mainly Western theorists and reconstruct their vision of war. It is 
hoped that such an extensive review will provide a new perspective to 





HOMO POLEMOS: I KILL, THEREFORE I AM 
HOW WAR AND KILLING CONFER HUMAN IDENTITY 
To speak of the "origin" of Self-Consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight 
to the death for "recognition". Without this fight to the death for pure prestige, 
there would never have been human beings on earth ...  
The "first" anthropogenetic action necessarily takes the form of a fight: a fight to 
the death between two beings that claim to be men, a fight for pure prestige 
carried on for the sake of "recognition" by the adversary – Kojève (1980:11–12.) 
To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an 
oppressor and the man he oppressed at the same time: there remain a dead 
man, and a free man – Sartre (1973:19)  
This, O Muslim brothers, is who we are; we slay for our God, our God demands 
the slaying. I kill; therefore I am – Murawiec (2008:9) 
War is prescribed for you and ye dislike it but it is possible that ye dislike a thing 
which is good for you and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah 
knoweth, and ye know not – Koran (2:216) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following from the previous chapter where the self-evident assumptions about 
the primacy of peace were questioned, the aim of this chapter is to begin a 
reconstruction of a different understanding of war. This chapter offers a reading 
and traces the representation of war expressed in interdisciplinary texts of 
philosophers and social thinkers beginning in ancient Greece. Such a reading 
hopes to reveal a Western tradition of thought that considers war as more 
valuable and as being a defining characteristic of humanity and as the 
foundation for conferring identity for individuals and societies. From this 
perspective war can be assumed as both the individualising and collectivising 
human institution. While war is a social and collective activity at its core is the 
action of fighting and the act of killing that require interpersonal engagement. It 
is this engagement that the ancient thinkers assumed as being the source of 
identity and meaning for human existence.  
50 
 
3.2 Towards a new perspective on war and rediscovery of old tradition 
For most contemporary scholars, killing and war are instinctively assumed to be 
universally traumatic experiences because war and killing are presumed to be 
foreign to the normal meaning of being human. However, this perspective 
overlooks the fact that the meaning of war as destructive traumatic experience 
is a cultural product of cultural construction which begun in earnest after the 
First World War and elaborated and reinforced since the Vietnam war (cf. 
Lomsky-Feder 2004:84). Moreover, this condemnatory perspective that only 
sees war as being negative and destructive ignores the fact that there exists 
another Western tradition of thought, with a supporting strong historical 
genealogy, that considers war as positive force whereby fighting and killing are 
rites of passage and enable the warrior to construct a sense of identity and to 
actualise the supreme value of human existence (Bourke 1999; Lomsky-Feder 
2004:83–84). Moreover, not only Western tradition but numerous non-western 
traditions consider war, strife, conflict and contest as a source of meaning. Ever 
since the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus identified war as the father of all 
things, almost all religious scripts have attested, and major philosophers of all 
ages affirmed, and human history confirmed the fact that war is a generative 
force of meaning in human life. War is the central theme for Greek poets Homer 
and Hesiod; first historians Herodotus and Thucydides recorded wars in great 
detail and following their example in the Roman world, it is guiding reference for 
Cicero's studies. For modern thought, beginning with Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Hegel the reality of war is affirmed as a subject for philosophical thought. This 
affirmation expressed by Nietzsche’s (1968:33) statement that life is the 
consequence of war, and society is a means to war is affirmed again in the 
twentieth century by Emmanuel Levinas’ (1991:23) suspicion that war is human 
reality and the human being manifests himself and acquires meaning in, and 
through war. For Levinas (1991:21) the reality of war seems to challenge his 
preoccupation with the ethics of peace and contemplating the war experiences 
of the twentieth century he wonders "whether we are not duped by morality" 




What Levinas indicates by the suspicion is that morality deals with abstract 
notions – it may lead to self-delusion. This seems to express an affinity with 
Nietzsche’s suspicion that morality and moral discourse are fictions whereby 
the imagined world and the idealised human action have no reference in reality. 
This emphasis on ought to be and the neglect of what is, becomes seductive 
and in turn self destructive. Such an understanding was already evident to 
Machiavelli and shared by Nietzsche (cf. Sonderling 2008). The idealisation of 
moral fiction can become a vice and be more dangerous and murderous than 
any war, as noted by writers such as Arendt (1998b), Glenn Gray (1998), John 
Gray (2003) and Ignatieff (2001). They all point out that the essence of moral 
thinking are abstract notions that have corresponding inhuman abstract 
emotions. Abstract notions and abstract emotions pose a danger because they 
may be inappropriate for concrete occasions and lead to murderous self-
righteousness and inhumanity that can surpass the assumed inhumanity 
ascribed to war.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the naked truth of war is the only reality 
check against delusion of false morality (cf. Arendt 1998b:viii; Glenn Gray 1998; 
John Gray 2003:85; Ignatieff 2001:214). Thus in the twenty-first century, 
journalist Chris Hedges (2003:3–7) rediscovers that only war is a force that 
gives us meaning when peace has emptied all meaning from life in the 
postmodern world (cf. Hammond 2007:11; Fukuyama 1992:328–331). 
3.3 Beyond the myth of the noble savage 
Most contemporary thinkers assume that the human being is characterised by 
peaceful cooperation, empathy and understanding, while violence and war are 
presumed to be pathological and entirely inhuman. In other words, war is 
supposedly an “upsurge of the archaic” (Mouffe 1993:1). This assumed 
dichotomy between human and inhuman is based on the idea that human 
beings are a distinct species and removed from the animal world (cf. Sheets-
Johnstone 2007:340). Gribbin and Gribbin (1998:1) note that “the idea that 
humankind is special is so deeply ingrained that even people whose training 
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ought to have opened their eyes can fall prey to the cosy assumption of human 
superiority.”  
The human being is imagined as standing beyond nature and whose primary 
mode of existence is presumed as being a disembodied spirit with no relation to 
other animals (cf. Sheets-Johnstone 2007:340). And if the earthly origin of the 
human being must be acknowledged, the idealism still persists and it is 
assumed that man must be a descendant of a primordial peaceful noble savage 
that was a friend of all and enemy of none, as imagined by J-J. Rousseau. 
From this perspective war and strife are pathologies and the result of corruption 
brought by civilisation. Such view tends to confirm the pacifists’ self-delusion 
because "it is far more contorting to claim decent from imaginary pacifists who 
live in our dreams of prehistoric peace" (Bigelow 1969:156).  
Against the pacifist view of human nature, Hobbes (Foucault 2003:89) assumes 
that the original state of nature was a condition of permanent war of every man 
against every man and life was solitary, brutal and short. While Hobbes may be 
right about the state of war and human life may have been brutal, nevertheless, 
life was never solitary because human beings are by nature social or political 
animals, as Aristotle (1964:28) already discovered. Indeed, Hobbes (1958) 
acknowledges that his vision of the state of nature as being a condition of war 
where every man fights against every man is imaginary and may have never 
existed anywhere. Moreover, Hobbes (1958) acknowledges that the state of 
nature more appropriately describes the condition of social groups ruled by  
kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their 
independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and 
posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes 
fixed on one another – that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon 
the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their 
neighbors – which is a posture of war (Hobbes 1958:108).  
Thus Hobbes seems to acknowledge that man in his natural state never had a 
solitary life but it is only a metaphoric expression to denote the condition of 
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social groups that are in a permanent state of war-like disposition or are 
engaged in actual war (cf. Hobbes 1958:108). 
For Hobbes' imagined state of permanent primitive warfare is the result of 
primitive democracy: equal ability of each man to kill. This equal ability to kill 
persuaded primordial human beings to become constitutional experts and sign 
a social contract to establish an ordered social structure governed by a 
centralised monarchy in order to avert the terrible violent chaos of the state of 
nature. While Hobbes alludes to a bloody and violent state of nature, this is only 
an imagined state that is always deferred but never existed because of the 
primordial social contact, thus as Foucault (2003:92) notes: Hobbes presents a 
theatre. Ultimately, Hobbes’ view seems to converge with the peaceful idealism 
of Rousseau: the one assumes a peaceful origin of man and the other imagines 
a priori civilised social arrangement that prevents a return to a state of nature. 
Thus even the view of Hobbes is pacified and made to fit within the dominant 
pacifist ideology.  
This presumed peaceful human nature has become the current politically-
correct orthodoxy enshrined in international declarations and legislated as if it 
were the sole scientific truth (cf. Keeley 1997; Pinker 1999:45–46; Pinker 
2003:336; van Ham 2010). As Keeley (1997) documents, the pacifist ideology is 
so prevalent that it has become an epidemic in the social sciences to attribute 
an imagined peacefulness to pre-historical epochs. The assumed peaceful 
origin of human beings has become a dogma and is upheld by the wilful 
distortion of all historical data that contradicts such an assumption. With the 
prevalence of a pacifist ideology among intellectual elites the central role of war 
is mostly absent from social theories (cf. Brown 1992; Joas 2003). It is as if 
modernity comes into existence without violence and war (cf. Joas 2003:30–
31).  
Consideration of war is also absent from the images of man (or the ‘human 
being’) that dominate the discourses of Western social science and 
communication scholarship. Two dominant images claim to represent the 
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primary essence of human nature: Man as a Homo Sapiens, an image of a 
spiritual human being conjured by Descartes. Thus it is as if this disembodied 
and solitary rational thinking individual affirms his humanity by declaring “I think, 
therefore I am.”  
The other image presents the human being as a Homo Faber, or Homo 
Economicus, man as the toolmaker, craftsman or manufacturer of goods 
motivated by rational economic calculation. An extension of the economic 
image is the Homo Laborans2, man as the soulless labourer of the capitalist 
economy (cf. Cramer 2002:1845). This material image considers man as being 
dependent on skills and labour for survival. Thus while Hegel emphasised the 
primacy of the human spirit, he also sees man as “the working animal” who is 
able to conquer nature and by his labour transform it to his desire. Extending on 
Hegel, Marx sees labour as the primary means for survival and also as a form 
self-alienation (cf. Ferrarin 2000:291). From this perspective man is defined by 
his labour and production of goods and attains his humanity by declaring: “I 
labour, therefore I am.”  
These two images of man reflect the old dichotomy that considers the human 
beings as consisting of a body and a soul. These also represent the two 
dominant ideologies of idealism and materialism while both are grounded in the 
Western ideological bias of individualism. The idealism is derived from the 
religious conception of the divine origin of man as spirit, while materialism is 
derived from the secular-religion of the Enlightenment and Karl Marx’s 
materialism. Descartes’ disembodied thinker is a reflection of man as a product 
of divine creation, as if the human is a “Spirit” that descended from heaven. 
                                             
2 The Homo Faber could be characterised as a craftsman exhibiting a certain joy and pride in 
creating objects, such as the blacksmith in Homer’s Iliad producing weapons in ancient society, 
while the Homo Laborans is a soulless labourer concerned merely with necessity of maintaining 
the basic functions of “bare life” of the living body (cf. Agamben 1998:3). 
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Man as a labourer is Marx’s materialist inversion of Hegel’s idealism and 
considers man as responding to earthly needs of physical survival by self-
reliance and redemption through labour.  
But even Marx’s materialism does not escape the taint of idealism evident in his 
pronouncement that: “In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends 
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven” (Marx 1972:118). 
Unfortunately, in their haste to construct peaceful heavenly utopias, neither the 
idealists nor the materialists spend enough time on earth to observe reality.3 
Thus both philosophies share an immaculate perception of man that assumes 
an Immaculate Conception as the origin of man.4 The imagined paradise is 
dominant in contemporary vision of postmodernist philosophies’ negation of 
reality and a retreat into the virtual world or hyperreality. As if humans do not 
live in a real world but only exist in an imagined symbolic universe of language 
and discourse. Ultimately hyperreality is a secular reinterpretation of the 
religious vision whereby the pearly gates of heaven are transformed to the 
pearly gates of cyberspace (cf. Wertheim 2000). This is as if to confirm Carl 
Schmitt’s (2005) contention that most of social theory's concepts and 
conceptions are borrowed from theology.  
As against the idealist conception of man as disembodied thinker the Homo 
sapiens, and against the materialist conceptions of man as the labouring homo 
faber, a realist image of man is to present him as a warrior: the homo polemos. 
Following such line of thought Bigelow (1969:43) contends that indicative of the 
human characteristic is that "man should not be defined as the toolmaker, but 
rather as the warmaker." Thus against the claim to be human by proclaiming I 
                                             
3 Before Marx settled on the economic determinism he had a more realistic and excellent 
understanding of the central importance of war in human and social life, as will be seen below.   
4 The concepts “immaculate perception” and “Immaculate Conception” was used to discuss 
how the Afrikaner developed a sense of pure racial identity (cf. Sonderling 1998b:342). 
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think, therefore I am, it is possible to imagine that man became a human being 
when he proclaimed: I kill, therefore I am. 
3.4  The primacy of war in human existence  
The problem with the two dominant images of man – as a thinker and a worker 
– is that these are not primary characteristics of a human being. This is 
Aristotle’s (1964:32) conclusion when he contends that human “life is action not 
production.” To put it more clearly, the human condition is characterised by 
three fundamental human activities of labour, work and action. But it is human 
action that has a primacy over the others because it is the only activity that 
goes on directly between men without mediation by things or matter (Arendt 
1998a:7). Moreover, as will be seen further on and in the next chapter, human 
action is the foundation for human thought. 
Huizinga (1971:19–21) considers the activity of play as the primordial and 
primary form of human action that provides the foundation for development of 
human society and civilisation (cf. Huizinga 1971:23). However, Huizinga’s 
conception of man as a Homo Ludens – man as player – reveals that the play is 
a manifestation of contest and agon and is intertwined with, and 
indistinguishable from the activity of fighting and war. Indeed, it is Huizinga’s 
contention that play and fighting forms a single and indivisible field of human 
action (cf. Huizinga 1971:60–61; Huizinga is examined in more detail in Chapter 
5 in this study). Such a unity of play and fighting is evident everywhere in 
antiquity: 
We have to feel our way into the archaic sphere of thought, were 
serious combat with weapons and all kinds of contests ranging 
from the most trifling games to bloody and mortal strife were 
comprised, together with play proper, in the singular fundamental 
idea of a struggle with fate ... Seen in this way, the application of 
the word ‘play’ to battle can hardly be called conscious metaphor. 
Play is battle and battle is play (Huizinga 1971:60–61). 
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Even if the play is deadly it still remains play (Huizinga 1971:61, 69). Thus 
“there is no transition from ‘battle to play’... nor from play to battle” because 
they are indivisible (cf. Huizinga 1971:95). According to Huizinga (1971:110) 
the unity of “fighting and play” and “war and game” blend absolutely together.  
Ever since words existed for fighting and playing, men have been 
wont to call war a game... Language everywhere must have 
expressed matters in that way from the moment words for combat 
and play existed (Huizinga 1971:110). 
War and play are also directly interlinked and are coeval with speech, as is 
evident from the primary exemplar of the figure of Homer’s Achilles 
characterised as “doer of great deed and the speaker of great words” (Arendt 
1998a:25). In Homer’s text it is evident that war has a primacy over speech 
because it is the action that is immortalised by words (The link between fighting 
and words will be examined in the next chapter).  
War is also assumed as the foundation of social life as it brings people into a 
military unit that ultimately becomes the foundation for a political community: it 
is as if war makes society and society makes war (Tilly 1975). More extensively 
Marx (1972:115–116) considers war and conquest of territory as the driving 
forces of history. As Marx (1972:115-116) acknowledges:  
This whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by 
the fact of conquest: Up till now violence, war, pillage, murder and 
robbery, etc. have been accepted as the driving force of history.  
War lays the foundation for human division of labour and constructs a social 
hierarchy. For the ancient Greeks the division of labour is between the noble 
work of fighting and killing – whether in war or hunting – as against the 
mundane labour of production performed by the slaves. In the ancient world 
and in primitive societies the occupation of the respectable man was hunting 
and war or more precisely, noble free man was defined by his ability to use 
leisure and war was the ultimate leisure; in contrast the woman was tasked with 
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cooking and agricultural production (cf. Davie 2003:25). The woman and the 
slave mostly share a common status, because both were acquired as captives 
in war.  
Moreover, the life and work of the slave is entirely dependent on the noble 
action of fighting of the master who belongs to the warrior class. In a more 
fundamental way work, production and maintaining human life demand territory 
and non-human material and these are acquired primarily by war. According to 
Aristotle (1964:40) “it is part of nature’s plan that the art of war, of which hunting 
is part, should be a way of acquiring property.” The property so acquired refers 
to territory, slaves and women, all are assumed as essential for reproduction of 
life. According to Schmitt (Ulmen 1996), the territory and goods are firstly 
acquired by conquest then these are distributed among the warriors and only 
then can be used for production.  
To the extent that labour could claim primacy, it is directly related to the labour 
of war. This is evident in Homer’s use of the word “work” to describe what is 
done in battle: the hard work of battle is the act of killing (cf. Coker 2007:29). 
Marx perceptively notes in the Grundrisse: “War is therefore among the oldest 
labours” (Marx in Lichtheim 1982:151). Hegel acknowledges that the human 
labour or Work is always interrelated with the primary activity of fighting. For 
Hegel human history consists “of war and of work” or “the Action of Fighting and 
of Work” (Kojève 1980:38, 43, 185). Marx agrees with Hegel and concludes that 
the oldest form of human labour is the labour of fighting and war:  
War is therefore the greatest communal task, the greatest joint 
effort required to occupy the objective conditions of living 
existence, or to guard and perpetuate their occupation. Hence the 
community, composed of families, originally has a warlike, military, 
organisation, and this is one of the conditions of its proprietorship 
(Marx in Lichtheim 1982:149; Marx in Bryant 1996). 
War is the greatest communal task demanding the free labour of all members of 
the community to guarantee communal survival (cf. Marx in Lichtheim 
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1982:149, 151). Therefore, human history is inaugurated by the master and 
slave dialectic and it is the primary war-action of the master that set history in 
motion.  
The social hierarchy of master and slave is, according to Hegel, the outcome of 
the primordial battle to the death for recognition; the willingness to risk death 
and ability to kill defines a human being as against the natural fear of death 
shared by animals and coward slaves. As Kojève (1980:52) comments: “To be 
sure, without the Master, there would have been no History; but only because 
without him there would have been no Slave and hence no Work.”  
For Hegel, fighting and work are the only true criteria to evaluate human life 
(Kojève 1980:186). Thus for Hegel truth is not a divine revelation but 
ascertained from real war and social conflict:  
Hegel does not need a God who would reveal the truth to him. And 
to find the truth, he does not need to hold dialogues with "the men 
in the city," or even to have a “discussion" with himself or to 
"meditate" a la Descartes. (Besides, no purely verbal discussion, 
no solitary meditation, can lead to the truth, of which Fighting and 
Work are the only "criteria.") He can find it alone ... But all this is 
possible only because there have been cities in which men had 
discussions against a background of fighting and work, while they 
worked and fought for and because of their opinions (Kojève 
1980:186). 
Marx notes that “war attains complete development before peace” and that it is 
an error to imagine that the economic phenomena of wagelabour, productive 
forces and commercial relations have developed in social peace. According to 
Marx they have “developed at an earlier date through war and in armies” rather 
“than within bourgeois society” (cf. McLellan 1973:54). In similar manner 




The reversal of primacy of war and labour suggests a different view of history. 
Therefore according to Ehrenreich (1998:143) contrary to the Marxists’5 belief in 
economic determinism, "it is not only the means of production that shape 
human societies, but the means of destruction." As such war is assumed as a 
universal phenomenon, it is trans-historical and trans-social, practiced at all 
time and places (Hillman 2005:22; Keegan 2004a:48; Gilpin 1987). As 
Ehrenreich (1998:232) puts it: 
Analyse any war-making society and, sure enough, you will find 
the practice of war apparently embedded in and dependent upon 
that society’s economy, culture, system of gender relations, and so 
forth. But change that economy and culture – as in going from 
hunting-gathering to an agricultural way of life, or from agriculture 
to industry – and war will, most likely, be found to persist.  
Kaldor (in Shaw 1988) suggests that it is appropriate to acknowledge the 
importance of the “mode of warfare” alongside the Marxist conception of the 
“mode of production” that determines a society. According to Toffler and Toffler 
(1995:35) the way a society makes war reflects the way that society works and 
produces wealth. Ultimately, war expresses the way a society lives and its 
culture. This means according to military historian John Keegan (2004a:12) that 
war "is always an expression of culture, often the determinant of cultural forms, 
(and) in some societies the culture itself.” Or simply stated: war is “the 
perpetuation of culture by its own means” (Keegan 2004a:46). 
                                             
5 Ehrenreich’s contention is that it is “contrary to Marx’s belief” but such claim is an error 
because the primacy of war is clearly acknowledged by Marx and Engels. However, no such 




3.5  Inhuman is human and human is inhuman: learning to understand 
war from the ancients 
The discussion in the previous section revealed a different understanding of 
war as against the contemporary understanding informed by pacifist 
interpretation. To understand war it is useful to pursue further the way the 
ancient’s cultures understood it.  
Machiavelli (1970:277–278) proposes that our image of the peaceful human 
being as a divine creation is a reversal of reality. From Machiavelli's (1970:277–
278) understanding, Christianity holds the real world in contempt and only 
“glorifies humble and contemplative men, rather than acknowledge men of 
action”, as did the ancient pagans whose realist understanding “did not beautify 
men unless they were replete with worldly glory.” And for the ancients, worldly 
glory was primarily gained in warfare. For the ancient Greeks “man was a 
fighting animal, or he was no man” (Havelock 1972:25). Machiavelli's 
condemnation of Christian pacifism is a little misguided because he is well 
aware of the warrior Popes and the military capabilities of the Church during his 
own life time (cf. Chambers 2006:109–111). 
Following on Machiavelli’s insight and the ancient Greek philosophers’ 
recognition of war as primary factor in human life, Nietzsche (1997) concludes 
that our ideas about what it is means to be human and inhuman are hopelessly 
reversed. The primacy of war in all social relations contradicts all the belief in 
some primordial peace that existed in an imagined paradise that modern 
thinkers assume to have been the origin of humanity. Therefore, to ascribe 
primacy to peace is to misunderstand the human condition, as Nietzsche 
(1968:33) puts it: 
The valuation that today is applied to the different form of society is 
entirely identical with that which assigns a higher value to peace 
than to war: but this judgment is anti-biological, is itself a fruit of 
the decadence of life. Life is a consequence of war, society itself a 
means to war. 
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Nietzsche (1968) acknowledges the biological necessity of war but also realises 
that while biology and genetics 'made’ the human being, this does not mean 
that man is entirely 'determined' by biology and genetics. Indeed, as Nietzsche 
shows in subsequent studies on morality and values, human beings construct 
fictional worlds and fiction moral values that can be self-defeating and can 
endanger human existence because these values are not congruent with reality 
(cf. Sonderling 2008). Indeed, Machiavelli already warned about the danger of 
such moral self-delusion, as he puts it:  
The gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so 
wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what 
should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-
preservation (Machiavelli 1968:91).  
For Machiavelli human beings have become deluded and live in an imagined 
reality constructed by morality. But as Levinas contends, war is human reality 
and man shows himself in war: 
We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that 
being reveals itself in war to philosophical thought, that war does 
not only affect it as the most patent fact, but as the very patency, 
or the truth, of the real. In war reality rends the words and images 
that dissimulate it, to obtrude its nudity and its harshness. Harsh 
reality ... harsh object-lesson, at the very moment of its fulguration 
when the drapings of illusion burn war is produced as the pure 
experience of pure being ... The trial by force is the test of the real 
(Levinas 1991:21). 
Levinas refers to the wars of the twentieth century but universalises this to be 
the entire lesson of human history. The reality of war is proved by the fact that 
the central activity of war is to killing and to inflicting pain. For as Scarry 
(1985:4, 7) notes, to have pain is the only reality a human being can experience 
as real. To have pain is to have certainty because the "physical pain is so 
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incontestably real that it seems to confer it quality of ‘incontestable reality’ on 
that power that has brought it into being” (Scarry 1985:27).  
Human life, like all life, is a struggle for survival and ultimately has no particular 
meaning. What gives meaning to the world is the unending repetitive contest for 
power and domination, as Nietzsche (1968:550) concludes: “This world is the 
will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to 
power – and nothing besides!” However, human beings attempt to overcome 
the meaninglessness and nothingness of their existence and give meaning to 
their lives and deaths. Human beings give meaning to their lives by considering 
the struggle for survival and spiritualise it as a struggle for recognition that is 
conferred when one defies death. Thus war is "coeval with the moment of 
becoming human ... because the transition from animal to human required the 
willingness to risk life, to transcend the survival instinct and set immaterial 
values above material ones" (Margot Norris in Krimmer 2010:3–4).  
Nietzsche, following Hobbes, accepts the assumption of the primordial war of 
all against all and suggests that it is the constitutive principle of human life. 
According to Nietzsche one should be “able to derive a moral code for life from 
the bellum omnius contra omnes and the privileges of stronger individuals” 
(Nietzsche in Safranski 2003:113). For Nietzsche all this demonstrates that our 
understanding of the meaning of human and inhuman are reversed. What is at 
present presumed as a sign of being inhuman is in fact the proper characteristic 
of being human.  
When one speaks of humanity, the basic concept implies that this 
is meant to be what differentiates and distinguishes mankind from 
nature. But such a difference does not exist in reality: “natural” 
attributes and those that are called truly “human” have grown 
inseparably into one another. Man, in the highest and noblest of 
his strengths, is wholly Nature, and carries her uncanny dual 
character within him. His terrible capacities that are deemed 
inhuman may even be that fertile ground out of which alone all of 
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humanity can grow forth in emotion, deeds, and accomplishments 
(Nietzsche 1997:35). 
The things that are considered inhuman are perfectly all too human as attested 
by the ancient Greeks. Nietzsche (1997:35) points out that the ancient Greeks 
were the most humane people of antiquity and their humanness was 
characterised by healthy cruelty and a “tiger-like pleasure in destruction” 
(Nietzsche 1997:35). For the Greeks, “struggle signifies well-being and 
salvation; the cruelty of victory is the peak of life’s glories” and culture develops 
from murder and blood revenge and from overcoming adversity (cf. Nietzsche 
1997:37). Indeed, this reversal of understanding is confirmed by Glenn Gray's 
(1998:54) experiences during the Second World War, According to Gray 
(1998:54–55) contrary to the accepted Freudian understanding that when man 
destroys he is an animal because his humanity is proven by conservation, the 
converse is true: the satisfaction man has in destroying is a particularly human 
trait, or it is devilish which animal can never have. 
The ancient Greeks' experience of life as war leads the poet Hesiod (1976) to 
assume the existence of two (or twins) war goddesses on earth: the one Eris is 
a goddess of War while the other is the goddess of Strife (cf. Nietzsche 
1997:37). According to Hesiod (1976:59) the one Eris is the cruel deity of war, 
while she is not loved by humans, nevertheless, because of the necessity of 
war humans must endure her cruel demands and pay her respect (Hesiod 
1976:59). The other Eris is the goddess of strife and contest. This Eris is much 
appreciated because she motivates human beings to compete and strive for 
greater achievements. The Eris of strife is good because “she urges even lazy 
men to work” and “So neighbour vies with neighbour in the rush for wealth.” The 
strife is good because the “potter hates potter, carpenters compete, and beggar 
strives with beggar, bard with bard” (Hesiod 1976:59). 
These insights provided by the ancients exposes the error in the way the 
concepts war and peace are commonly understood within the contemporary 
consensus of social theory. In popular conception the notion of “war” and 
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“peace” are respectively associated with “life” and “death”. Thus “war” is 
intimately associated with “death” because it is assumed as being solely a 
destructive force leading to death. On the other hand, the notion of “peace” 
seems to be inseparable from the idea of “life” whereby peace is supposedly 
the guarantee of life. But these popular notions are contradicted by philosophy 
and history. In the first instance the definition of war as conflict and struggle 
indicates clear attributes and providing a positive definition of war. In the 
instance of peace, peace is defined negatively, as the absence of war and strife 
and such definition is an abstraction that does not have any positive essence 
attributed to peace. Almost all major philosophers since the ancient Greeks 
considered – some freely and others begrudgingly – war as the essence of 
human existence, and as an indication of human and social vitality. Peace was 
associated with non-being, with death, stagnation and decline.  
The idea of peace, pacifism and avoidance of all acts of war is not 
representative of the true nature of the human being. As Hegel observes, to be 
recognised as a human being man must risk his life in a battle to the death in 
order to distinguish himself from animals. According to Hegel (Kojève 
1980:158–159), avoidance of the risk is cowardice. In the light of Hegel’s 
observation it is possible to doubt the pacifists’ claim that war is inhuman and 
that the true characteristic of humanity is peacefulness and non-violence. It is 
as Gelven (1994) suspects: the pacifist may turn out to be less than human. 
(This was already reviewed in Chapter 2). 
A realist understanding of war in relation to human beings has been gaining 
insights from evolutionary biology (cf. Sheets-Johnstone 2007:340). However, 
such an understanding of man was already available to the ancient Greeks. 
3.6  Back to the future: a view of from Darwin to Aristotle 
Darwin’s idea of evolution points to a biological foundation of human existence 
and expands contemporary understanding that is still largely grounded in 
theological concepts (cf. Thayer 2000:125). It shows, as Pinker (2003) 
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contends, human nature is an unchanging biological inheritance and not a 
“blank slate” that can be entirely manipulated and programmed by any ideology.  
Such an understanding of the human being already existed among the ancient 
Greeks (cf. Thayer 2000:124). As a scholar contends: 
For political philosophy, a new "naturalism" points to a return to the 
Aristotelian view that values or standards of judgment have 
rationally intelligible foundations, thereby challenging the relativist 
or nihilistic orientation that has characterised most contemporary 
thought (Masters 1990:195).  
It is not the intention of this chapter to expand on the biological foundation of 
human nature and its relation to war as these have been reviewed by numerous 
scholars (cf. Ong 1989; Thayer 2000; Masters 1990; Wilson 1998; Pinker 2003; 
Ignatow 2007; Sheets-Johnstone 2007). However, the infusion of socio-
biological information provides a reality check against the excess of theological 
and metaphysical speculations about war and human nature prevalent among 
contemporary social theorists (cf. Masters 1990; Thayer 2000; Willhoite 1976).  
The lesson from socio-biology also seems to confirm Nietzsche’s (1968:550) 
contention that the world is a will to power and that the essence of human 
society is homologous with that of societies of baboons. The human “primate 
heritage” is manifest in eternal struggle for domination in which individuals 
compete against each others. In this sense human “politics” is not unique; 
“primate politics” is well established among the apes (cf. Schubert 1986). War 
described as “intergroup coalitional killing” (cf. Wrangham 1999:1), occurs 
regularly among other species (cf. Ong 1989). Thus war can be considered as 
being older than human beings and is not uniquely a human phenomenon. For 
human beings war is organised killing with a purpose and “is simply an 
inextricable part of being human” (Bell 2007:317). Therefore, it can be 
considered as a normal state of affairs of human life (cf. Hillman 2005:22). In 
light of all the evidence war is considered as a universal phenomenon, it is 
67 
 
trans-historical and trans-social, and practiced at all time and places (cf. 
Keegan 2004a:48; Gilpin 1987).  
Considering war as being an unbroken link between the modern world and the 
ancient Greeks, Havelock (1972:19–20) contends that Darwin's idea of 
evolution confirms that we are doubly linked to the ancient Greeks. We are 
firstly linked by common parentage we share with baboons, and secondly we 
are linked by cultural tradition of “warrior virtues” and the ancient Greeks' 
understanding of “war as a way of life” (cf. Havelock 1972:21). Thus both 
biologically and culturally the phenomenon of war is in the unconscious of every 
human being (cf. Brosman 1992:95; Bartlett 1994; Bryant 1996; Tilly 1975, 
1990, 1997). It is evident throughout history that war was always, and still is, 
the context against which everyday life was experienced (cf. Favret 2005; 
Cuomo 1996:42). It could be concluded that 
the imagery of war can reasonably be used this way because the 
war experience is, even during the long period of peace in modern 
world ubiquitous. Even if individuals are spared the experience of 
combat, there are social institutions and practices that keep the 
war experience alive, such as mandatory military service, and 
invocation of social values responsible for the willingness to wage 
war and story-telling in diverse media also keeps the experience 
alive (Steinert 2003:267). 
After the Islamist terror attack on the West on 11 September 2001 the concept 
of war emerged as a key term to describe the principle of organising societies 
(cf. Hardt & Negri 2006; Montgomery 2005:149). Thus for contemporary 
society, as much as it was in ancient Greece “warfare constitutes the chosen 
framework within which all other activities of men are placed, and to which they 
relate” (Havelock 1972:21; Sidebottom 2004:16). It is thus not surprising that 
the image of ancient warrior still provides a suitable representation and a 
paradigm for human beings (cf. Bryant 1996:28). The ancient Greeks' emphasis 
on military virtue, and the idea that war is a way of life inherited from the ancient 
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Greeks provided the West with a formidable cultural and moral tradition (cf. 
Havelock 1972:20), that for a long historical period ensured the ascendancy of 
the West over all other competitors (cf. Hanson 2000, 2002a; Lynn 2004). Such 
an understanding of war is important in the postmodern global world because 
as Kaplan (2003:15) contends the world is not ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’, but 
only a continuation of the ‘ancient’ and war is the central organising principle of 
the world and an appropriate metaphor to make sense of societies and cultures 
(cf. Alliez & Negri 2003; Hardt & Negri 2006:12; Münkler 2003).  
3.7 War as the divine and human spirit: making gods and men 
The harsh reality of naked power struggle, cruelty, violence and war is hard for 
many people to accept, so they attempt to escape from the "evils of life" and 
find salvation in religion. However, as Girard (1977) and Burkert (1983:1–2) 
note, the person escaping to religion is immediately “confronted with murder” 
and death at the very core of religion. The holy texts of all major religions are 
narratives of cosmic wars, bloody battlefields, torture and massacres. Thus it 
seems that in this world or in any other world, that there is no escape from war 
and violence. It is through war, as Heraclitus said, that everything comes into 
being and passes away; war is the father and king of all and makes some gods 
and some men (Heraclitus in Kahn 1979:67). In other words, human identity 
and consciousness and the idea of a supra-human deities or gods are born in, 
and through war.  
Indeed, Freud (in Vance 1980:378) suggests that God was born from a primal 
act of murder, from “the killing of the primal father of the primitive horde, whose 
image in memory was later transfigured into a deity.” Such transformation was 
a reality in the ancient Greek world where a mortal could distinguish himself in 
war and be transformed into an immortal god by being posthumously honoured 
with a cult (cf. Chaniotis 2005:36). It is no coincidence that the ways gods are 
represented in religious texts always reflect the character and way of life of the 
human group claiming to have such gods. As Finley (1972) concludes from his 
study of ancient Greek society: 
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God was created in man’s image ... The whole of the heroic 
society was reproduced on Olympus in its complexities and its 
shading. The world of the gods was a social world in every 
respect, with a past and a present, with a history ... The gods 
came to power on Olympus as men came to power in Ithaca or 
Sparta or Troy, through struggle and family inheritance (Finley 
1972:154).  
Thus war can be imagined as being both human and divine. According to de 
Maistre (2009:89) war is divine in itself because it is the law of the world; it is 
divine because it is beneficial for human existence; it is divine because it a 
great privilege to die in battle; it is divine because it is surrounded by 
mysterious glory; it is divine because it provides protection to great leaders; it is 
a divine quest for justice and revenge for inequality; and it is divine because 
God is always found on the winning side (cf. de Maistre 2009:89–91).  
De Maistre is not alone in attributing war to a divine injunction. The Bhagavad-
Gita, an essential text of the Hindu culture describes the god Krishna as a 
charioteer and war counsellor of prince on battlefield which is “the field of 
sacred duty” (Bhagavad-Gita 2004:32). In similar manner the Koran (or Qur’an) 
proclaims war as divinely ordained duty for Muslim men (cf. Malik 1992:38): 
War is prescribed for you and ye dislike it but it is possible that ye 
dislike a thing which is good for you and that ye love a thing which 
is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not (Koran 2:216). 
As Malik (1992:50) notes in his study of The Qur'anic concept of war: “In Islam, 
a war is fought for the cause of Allah.” Malik contends that from this it is clear 
that “a Muslim’s cause of war is just, noble, righteous and humanitarian. A 
victory in Islam is a victory for the cause of Islam.” Indeed, this circular and self-
affirming logic is historically affirmed in Islam and well documented universally 
as a fundamental axiom of the ancient religions. This is the opinion of 




If, in the absence of an imam, someone assumes power by force 
even if he were unqualified and assumes it without bai'a [the oath 
of allegiance to the Caliph], his imamate becomes binding and 
obedience to him is necessary in order to maintain the unity of the 
Muslims. That he may be unjust, vicious, or lacking in knowledge 
is of no consequence. If the imamate of force were challenged by 
another who replaces it by force, the latter becomes the 
recognised imam in view of the fact that his action is consistent 
with Muslim interests and maintenance of Islam's unity, in 
accordance with an utterance of ibn Umar who said: "We are on 
the side of the victor” (Ruthven 2004:62). 
Indeed, as Huizinga (1971) discovers, in the ancient world "winning as such is, 
for the archaic mind, proof of truth and rightness" (Huizinga 1971:103). Thus 
every war is claimed to be a just war and the proof of its justness is victory, 
because only victory in battle proves that the war was fought for a just cause. 
Thus from this same tradition Nietzsche’s Zarathustra aptly proclaims: 
You say it is the good cause that hallows even war? I tell you: it is 
the good war that hallows every cause (Nietzsche 1969:74). 
As against the common assumption that religion is an expression of piety and 
peaceful spirituality, the act of piety is grounded in, and emerges from the 
bloodshed of sacrificial killing (Burkert 1983:2).  
The worshiper experiences the god most powerfully not just in 
pious conduct or in prayer, song, and dance, but in the deadly 
blow of the axe, the gush of blood and the burning of thigh-pieces. 
The realm of the gods is sacred, but the “sacred” act done at the 
“sacred” place by the “consecrating” actor consists of slaughtering 
sacrificial animal (Burkert 1983:2). 
Such ideas are also reflected in the Aztecs ritual murder that was an expression 
of piety (cf. Ehrenreich 1998:65). At the heart of the sacred is an act of killing: 
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“Sacrificial killing is the basic experience of the ‘sacred’” (Burkert 1983:2–3). 
Burkert (1983:3) notes that the original meaning of the Greek verb “to act” is to 
make an offering to the gods or “to sacrifice”, and the ancients considered 
sacrifice primary as an act of “sacrificial killing” of a victim rather than self-
sacrifice. In similar ways in ancient Hebrew and Hittite the verb “to do” is used 
in the sense of “to sacrifice” (Burkert 1983:3), thus its meaning is closer to the 
expression “to do someone in” or kill. According to Burkert (1983:3) action and 
sacrificial killing construct the human being: the human animal becomes human 
because he is a Homo Necans; it is the act of sacrificial killing of others that 
makes man a Homo Sapiens.  
Burkert (1983:8, 43) notes that human sacrifice predate animal sacrifice and in 
terms of historical development animal sacrifice replaced earlier cannibalism. 
Evidence for substitution of an animal for the human is seen in the Biblical 
narrative of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son. There are also symbolic 
remnants of human sacrifice and cannibalism evident in Christianity: the death 
of God’s son is an example of perfect sacrifice and is re-enacted in the 
celebration of the Lord’s Supper where “the body of Christ” is eaten in the ritual 
of the Eucharist and hymns about blood and battle are sung (cf. Burkert 1983:8; 
Juergensmeyer 2003:162).  
The ancient myths of the Hebrews and Greeks show that the original and most 
desirable victim for divine sacrifice was a human being, and only later human 
flesh was substituted for animal meat (Ehrenreich 1998). The Biblical myth of 
Cain and Abel seems to confirm that God’s preference was for a meal of meat: 
Cain was a farmer and his sacrificial offering of vegetables was rejected while 
Abel was a herdsman and his sacrificial offerings of meat were accepted by the 
deity. In the ancient world it was assumed that the gods ate meat: 
The Aztec gods ate people. They ate human hearts and they drank 
human blood. And the declared function of the Aztec priesthood 
was to provide fresh human heart and human blood in order to 
prevent the remorseless deities from becoming angry and 
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crippling, sickening, withering, and burning the whole world (Harris 
1978:99). 
The substitution of man for animal was probably motivated by the realisation 
that keeping prisoners of war alive to be used as labour, or exchanged for 
ransom or sold into slavery were more profitable than killing them in an act of 
sacrifice in order to feed both gods and the human temple keepers of priests 
(cf. Davie 2003:195).  
Most victims for human sacrifice were acquired by war and slaughtered on the 
battlefield. Captured enemy prisoners were brought back to be killed at the altar 
of the gods. (cf. Burkert 1983; Harris 1978:100; Ehrenreich 1998; Todorov 
1992:143–144). The blood sacrifice – human and animal – is made to feed the 
gods and keep them alive and at the same time it keeps the social group alive 
as the sacrificed meat was also eaten by the group. Since prehistoric times war 
was made as a ritual killing and “sacrifice” of enemies on the battlefield to 
please the ancestors, or war prisoners were brought back for the required daily 
sacrificial ritual killing demanded by the tribal or national gods (cf. Harris 
1978:105). Thus for example, the Aztec warriors “waged warfare in order to 
fulfil their sacred duty” (Harris 1978:99–107).  
Because war was conducted by humans early religions assumed that war was 
conducted by the gods in the heavens. The priests and shamans were 
considered “spiritual warriors” doing battle on behalf of their group in the world 
of spirits (cf. Boyd 1997). When ancient kings died they were accompanied on 
their journey to the after-life by their military guards who were killed and buried 
with them or, as China’s first emperor had artisans craft a whole army of life-
size terracotta clay soldiers to guard the imperial tomb (cf. Man 2008).  
The human sacrifice can be considered as a form of language and an act of 
communication: dispatching a human as a messenger to the ghostly world of 
the gods (cf. Davie 2003:131). But what kind of communication can be 
established between men and the gods? The belief that through the act of 
sacrifice – a gift of flesh to the gods – one establishes a communion with them 
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may be a mistaken assumption. Human flesh is no different from animal meat 
and both human and animal sacrifice is prevalent in all early religions (cf. Davie 
2003:66). Such preference for meat would indicate that the original deity was a 
carnivore (cf. Ehrenreich 1998:31, 34). Indeed, most of the gods are 
represented as having ferocious attributes, therefore the idea of communion 
with such beasts is difficult to imagine. Evans-Pritchard (1954:23) suggests that 
the sacrifice is rather made against the gods. The sacrifice is made in times of 
trouble and the purpose of such  
sacrifice is to establish communication with God rather in order to 
keep him away or get rid of him than establish communion or 
fellowship with him ... the trouble comes from God and is evidence 
of his intervention in human affairs. Sacrifice is made to persuade 
him to turn away from men and not to trouble them anymore. It is 
made to separate God and man, not to unite them. In a sense they 
are already in contact in the sickness or other trouble (Evans-
Pritchard 1954:23–24). 
The ferocity and anger of the gods is evident from the way their character and 
names are described in religious text: the ancient gods are represented as 
conquerors and their names usually are references to being “the destroyer”, 
“the avenger”, and “god of battles” (cf. Davie 2003:113). Most of the primary 
gods of tribes and nations are gods of war. Among the various names attributed 
to a god, the primary importance places the emphasis on the god of war (cf. 
Lang 2002). In the Hebrew Bible the deity is introduced as “God is a warrior” 
(Longman & Reid 1995). God as a warlord fights on behalf of his people or 
stands in the ranks fighting side by side against their common enemies (cf. 
Niditch 1993:28). Indicative are the symbols of gods: weapons of war such as 
the sword and a bow and arrows. All such symbols of war represent power. 
This should not be a surprise because almost all the major religions owe their 
success to war, and to the use of the sword. Christianity expanded only when it 
was co-opted by Roman emperors and by contrast the initial pacifism of 
Christianity was, in part, responsible for the demise of the Roman Empire (cf. 
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Santassouso 2004). The limit of pacifism was acknowledged by the Catholic 
Church. The leaders of the early church realised that pacifism would lead to 
suicide rather than to expansion and growth of the church (Seaton 2005:74). 
Therefore a “just war theory” was elaborated to prevent total pacifism. In the 
Middle Ages the Christian Church acquired property and its Popes, Cardinals 
and Monks became formidable warlords and promote warfare. Thus Pope 
Julius II was known as the Warrior Pope, and a satirical dialogue (attributed to 
Erasmus) has him responding to St Peter’s refusal to admit him to heaven with 
the threat that unless St Peter opens the gates he will return with armed 
reinforcement to throw heaven's gatekeeper out (Chambers 2006:1). Indeed, 
success in battle was a guarantee for success of a religion (cf. Chambers 
2006:90). Muhammad already said: the sword is the key to paradise. Likewise, 
Christianity proved its invincibility in the wars against Muslim invaders during 
the Middle Ages and then embarked on Crusades into the East, into Africa and 
into the newly-discovered world of the Americas (cf. Chambers 2006). As 
Chambers (2006:1) puts it: "Blessed are the peacemakers. But blessed, too, 
have been the warmongers throughout the Christian centuries." 
Three centuries of crusades have subsequently established Christianity as a 
warrior religion. The crusades conceptualised as holy war were a response to 
the Muslim practice of Jihad, or holy war that centuries earlier lead them to 
invade and colonise European territories. The echo of the vocabulary of Muslim 
Jihad is discernible in St Bernard urging the French knights to embark on a 
Christian holy crusade:  
Clothe yourself with your impenetrable bucklers; the din of arms, 
the dangers, the labours, the fatigues of war are the penances 
God now imposes on you. Hasten then to expiate your sins by 
victory over the infidels, and let the deliverance of the holy places 
be the reward of your repentance ... Let a holy rage animate you in 
the fights; and let the Christian world resound with the words of the 
prophet: “Cursed be he who does not stain his sword with blood” 
(Turner 1958:11).  
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Acquisition of new land and building new churches demanded military 
protection and new monastic warrior monks emerged such as the Templars, 
Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights that combine the discipline of the monastery 
with the aggressive spirit of the warrior knight (cf. Bartlett 1994:260–264). There 
exists an existential and intimate relation between religion and war which 
implies that, as Aho (1981:3) notes,  
a society’s military ethics and its dominant religious mythology 
constitute a single, unified structure of meaning. A society’s 
Kriegethik – its preferred style of collective raping, looting, burning, 
and killing – is often “dialectically” or “reflexively” interrelated with 
its prevailing religious mythology. 
As Aho's (1981) study uncovers, such a structure of meaning animates all the 
major religions. Military vocabulary is central to all religious text and discourse, 
thus the “model of warfare” is the underling inspiration of the religious model 
(Juergensmeyer 2003:160). According to Juergensmeyer (2003:160) the main 
task of religion is “creating a vicarious experience of warfare.” For example, the 
Christian way of life is described as “Christian living is a war” and this is not 
considered as a metaphor or figure of speech but as a “literal fact” that needs to 
be emulated (Juergensmeyer 2003:160–161). Religion gives strength to the 
warrior promising that the strongest warrior on earth will also be the strongest in 
heaven (cf. Davie 2003:105). Hillman (2005:178) concludes that religion is war 
because both give meaning to life.  
3.8   The gift of death: war as source of meaning 
Ancient Greek wars begin with sacrifice ceremonies where an animal is offered 
to the gods and continue with human sacrifice on the battlefield. Thus war may 
appear like one great and continuous sacrificial action (cf. Burkert 1983:66). 
This is not a metaphorical description. 
This is not merely a simile. Many of the elements in which such 
warfare are correlatives of those in ritual sacrifice among the 
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Greeks: the sequence of procession, violent blow, the spilling of 
blood, the burning of flesh and the pouring of libations that stands 
at the centre of sacrificial ritual is paralleled by the sequence in the 
land battle: the march into battle, the blood spilled in the fighting, 
the funeral pyres and the truce ... Furthermore the cry of the 
women at the moment of sacrifice ... has its echo in the soldiers’ 
battle-cry, the alalagmos. The garlanding after battle adapts to 
warfare another practice from sacrificial ritual (Connor 1988:22). 
But Connor (1988) has the order reversed: the ritual of scarifies is an echo of 
war in society. Burkert (1983:47) notes that sacrifice and war are 
interchangeable. It is the battle that inspires the ritual of sacrifice and it is the 
battle and the heightened feeling of fear and ecstasy that create the religious 
experience.  
In essence it is the killing that justifies life (Burkert 1983:40). The act of killing 
that inaugurated the gods gives meaning to death as it elevates it from a simple 
meaningless natural event to the level of human meaning. The warrior – the 
man of action and vitality – takes war as the ultimate game of life; war provides 
the opportunity to test oneself, to prove one’s courage and thus human value by 
defying death in battle and surviving victoriously. From Homer to modern 
writers, most combatants describe their war experience as sublime and 
consider it a “lovely war” and as the most rewarding experience of their lives (cf. 
Bourke 1999:364; Holmes 2004:380; van Creveld 1991). As a United States 
marine describes his experience in Iraq: “We had a lot of fun, and we were 
doing something that had meaning” because it tested our courage and value as 
human beings (cf. Wright 2009:462). And in the twenty-first century a journalist 
admits that “war is a force that gives us meaning” because life in the Western 
postmodern world has become boring and meaningless (cf. Hedges 2003).  
For both the ancient and modern warrior war requires the acceptance of a 
death as the ultimate price one pays. This was central to the Western tradition 
and is also common in non-Western cultures. It is, for example evident in the 
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spirit of the Samurai warrior: he accepts death a-priori and thus becomes 
fearless in defending his master (cf. Nitobe 2006; Yamamoto 2001). Similar 
view is found in the Bhagavad-Gita (2004:37) where Lord Krishna advises the 
warrior-king Arjuna that once you are forced by enemies to do battle it becomes 
a sacred duty to fight without fear because to refuse fighting will bring dishonour 
that is worse than death. Therefore, as Lord Krishna says, one has nothing to 
lose:  
If you are killed, you win heaven;  
If you triumph, you enjoy the earth. 
Indeed, for various religions death in battle is a guarantee for martyrdom and a 
heavenly reward. In this sense Christianity can be considered as a cult created 
by death: by his death Christ was elevated to immortality and the rituals of 
remembrance performed by the cult of his disciples keep his memory alive and 
they are reminded of their own rewards after death. Thus, for any warrior, as 
Plato already observed, “life measured solely by its length falls short, but a life 
shortened by honour reaches its fullest measure” (Gelven 1994:xii). And as 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1969:75) advises the warrior: “Thus live 
your life of obedience and war! What good is long life? What warrior wants to 
be spared?”  
Because of the risk of death war is the ultimate expression of free choice. Thus 
if the warrior primarily distinguished himself by a virtuous life of courage and 
bravery he also expresses his life by choosing his ways dying. Indeed, for a 
proud warrior it would be an insult to hear someone say of him: he died 
peacefully in his bed rather than say that he died a noble death in battle.  
While it is commonly assumed that war is an act of self-sacrifice the Greeks 
understood that the main aim of battle was not the self-sacrifice of the warrior, 
but the killing and sacrifice of the enemy. But if killing the enemy is important, 
both the act of killing and of self-sacrifice ensures the life of the community. As 
Derrida (1995:17) suggests, life depends on the gift of death: “I put my enemy 
to death and I give my own life in sacrificing myself ‘for my country’.” (The use 
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of passive tense by Derrida is indicative of the tame postmodern European 
spirit.)  
The gift of death as an act of life-giving can be traced to the ancient Greeks. 
The ancient Greeks invented life from death by constructing politics or the polis, 
the Greek city state, as Virilio (1997:135) puts it: "They extracted life from 
death, from the relation to death, from the awareness of death." The relation to 
death would also include the act of killing. The Greek constructed a life with its 
own statues: citizenship in the political community, which was not simply a 
lifestyle or a "way of life" but the "proper life" (Virilio 1997:135). Virilio (1997) is 
alluding here to Aristotle's distinction between the words zen and bios, the 
natural life of animals as against the way human beings chose to live. Human 
life includes human reality that is different from natural reality: as against mere 
living human reality include consciousness and self-consciousness, an 
awareness of life in-itself and for-itself.  
The act of killing in battle gives rise to the emergence of a sense of the 
individuality and self-consciousness. War brings two collective bodies of men 
into conflict. But from the moment that two anonymous bodies of warriors 
collide the action becomes individualised: each man enters into a hand-to-hand 
battle that allows the individual to stand out from the crowd. According to 
Connor (1988:14) “the transformation of collective anonymous combat into 
hand-to-hand fights with sword or dagger” means that the “anonymous, 
narrativeless combat is suddenly turned into a replica of the Homeric battle 
scene” and beneath the practical necessity of war is an important symbolic 
expression.  
Underlying the violence and destruction of war is a logic based not 
on the use of war as a means to certain ends but on its 
effectiveness as a way of self and civic representation. The 
dramatic change at the moment trope – the shift from collective to 
individual fighting – reappears at the end of the battle through the 
censure of those who left the expedition at some point and through 
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awards to those who distinguished themselves in courage (Connor 
1988:17). 
This is the foundation of individual distinction and the basis for social hierarchy. 
Organised and disciplined warfare and hand-to-hand battle were a 
characteristic of Greek and Roman civilisation as against barbarians that did 
not fight this way (cf. Sidebottom 2004:20).  
In contemporary Western societies were life became meaningless some people 
are searching for ways to express their vitality again by challenging death in 
warfare and terrorism (cf. Juergensmeyer 2003:245). Others seek struggles, 
death-defying sports, or risk their lives in military battles in non-Western lands 
to test their courage and prove that they are still human beings (cf. Fukuyama 
1992:328–330). Thus for contemporary elites, as it was for the ancients, war 
continues to provide meaning. Burkert (1983:47) puts it thus: “War is a ritual, a 
self-portrayal and self-affirmation of a male society. Male society finds stability 
in confrontation death, in defying it through a display of readiness to die, and in 
the ecstasy of survival.”  
3.9 I kill, therefore I am: killing as source of consciousness and self-
consciousness 
For most contemporary commentators the salient characteristic of war is 
instinctively associated with dying. But according to Bourke (1999:xiii) “the 
characteristic act of men at war is not dying but killing.” Such an understanding 
exposes the faulty assumptions about war prevalent among social theorists. For 
example, Freud considers war as an act of suicide and as an expression of 
some biologically programmed instinctual “death drive” (cf. Freud 2004:70). 
Freud believes that the "goal of life is death" and his idea of the “death wish” is 
based on the assumption that there is a universal tendency in all living matter to 
return to the peaceful immobility of the inorganic matter (cf. Levin 1951:257). 
But Freud’s imputation is absurd: death is not an instinct and the aim of all 
organic life is to survive in the face of death. Indeed, Freud contradicts himself 
and denies that humans have a suicidal drive. According to Freud:  
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We have shown the unmistakable tendency to push death aside, 
to eliminate it from life ... Our own death is indeed unimaginable, 
and however often we try to imagine it, we realise that we are 
actually still present as onlookers. Thus, the psychoanalytic school 
could venture to say: fundamentally no one believes in his own 
death or, which comes to the same thing: in the unconscious each 
of us is convinced of his immortality (Freud 2005:183).  
Freud’s death instinct has more affinity with the Christian negation of life and 
praise of life after death, as if merely to live was "a major crime worthy of death" 
(Levine 1951:267). Such miserablist condemnation of life has been expressed 
by many philosophers since Socrates (cf. Nietzsche 1978:29). However, while 
praising life after death, the early Christians acknowledged the futility of self 
destruction. St Hippolytrus of Carthage complains about the enthusiasm of the 
new Christian converts to have themselves sacrificed and killed to attain 
martyrdom. And he notes that “the Church could not easily expect to expand if it 
continued to be known for the ostentation and voluntary death of its members” 
(Seaton 2005:74).  
Of course acceptance of death can be an inspiration for courage. This is the 
inspiration for courage on the battlefield shown by the Samurai warriors (cf. 
Nitobe 2006:33; Yamamoto 2001:13–14). Similar tradition also existed among 
the North American Cheyenne warriors:   
The fundamental point of Cheyenne military culture was that 
warriors already counted themselves among the dead prior to 
violent military engagement, and hence they were spiritually 
oblivious to danger or death. They prepared for battle by singing 
farewell to their relatives, dressing as for a funeral and singing 
their tribal death songs. They ritually confined themselves to death 
... Because Cheyenne warriors had already accepted death, their 
indifference to suffering and death was calculated to cause 
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maximum psychological terror [to their enemies] (Turner 
2003:101).  
Thus not dying but killing is the essence of life on earth. Life is a manifestation 
of killing (cf. De Maistre 2009:89; Berlin 2003:138). The world is a permanent 
carnage and such carnage ordains the great scheme of things (cf. De Maistre 
2009:87). Killing and violent death are found everywhere:  
You feel it already in the vegetable kingdom: from the immense 
catalpa to the humblest herb, how many plants die, and how many 
are killed! As soon as you enter the animal kingdom, the law 
suddenly becomes frightening obvious. A power at once hidden 
and palpable shows itself continually occupied in demonstrating 
the principle of life by violent means (De Maistre 2009:86). 
Killing is most perceptible in the life of human beings. As de Maistre (2009:86) 
notes, the murderous enterprise is central to human existence. In order to exist 
man has to kill: 
He kills to nourish himself, he kills to cloth himself, he kills to adorn 
himself, he kills to attack, he kills to defend himself, he kills to 
instruct himself, he kills to amuse himself, he kills to kill (De 
Maistre 2009:86). 
Killing is not entirely negative or destructive; it has rather a productive aspect. 
Paradoxically from primordial times it was acknowledged that the social bond 
has its beginning in killing and bloodshed. According to Hannah Arendt (1990) 
every beginning is an act of violence: 
That such a beginning must be intimately connected with violence 
seems to be vouched for by the legendary beginnings of our 
history as both biblical and classical antiquity report it: Cain slew 
Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and 
by the same token, no beginning could be made without using 
violence, without violating. The first recorded deeds in our biblical 
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and our secular tradition, whether known to be legendary or 
believed in as historical tradition, have travelled through the 
centuries with the force which human thought achieves in the rare 
instances when it produces cogent metaphors or universal 
applicable tales. The tale spoke clearly: whatever brotherhood 
human beings may be capable of has grown out of fratricide; 
whatever political organisation men may have achieved has its 
origin in crime (Arendt 1990:20).  
Most developed forms of society developed from crime. Ultimately the 
legitimate society and the nation are example of successful organised crime. As 
Tilly (1997:165) puts it: 
If protection rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, 
then war making and state making – quintessential protection 
rackets with the added advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our 
largest example of organised crime. 
While the idea of legitimacy has been mystified by juridical and moral 
discourse, legitimacy essentially is the probability that one powerful warlord or 
gangster will confirm the legitimacy of another powerful warlord or gangster. 
Obviously mutual confirmation and respect will be given if each warlord or a 
state institution has substantial military force because non-confirmation of 
legitimacy would leave one open to retaliation (cf. Tilly 1997:168). In other 
words, warlords, gangsters and heads of state recognise others, equally 
powerful players, and preserve the balance of power among themselves.  
The prevailing belief among many social thinkers that killing is always a crime is 
derived from a misunderstanding of the Biblical commandment Thu salt not kill 
and the Christian injunction to love your neighbour. The Biblical prohibition is 
against “murder” and not on “killing”. Prohibition against murder is a form of 
internal social control operating within a clan or social group but does not apply 
to external or foreign members from outside the community. Early tribal 
societies were bonded by blood kinship and the success of all societies was 
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due to their ability to unite for war of offense and defence. As Norbert Elias 
notes, the ancient family (ancient families were always extended families or 
clans related by blood) is a survival unit, a “unit of defence” and “unit of attack” 
(cf. Fletcher 1997). Thus there exists a dual moral code: one for the in-group 
members and one for out-groups. Killing members of the clan was a crime but 
killing strangers was a virtue and demonstrated courage; it was also a rite of 
passage into manhood and affirmation of individuality (cf. Davie 2003:18). It is 
not only permissible but also an obligation to kill someone who is trying to kill us 
(cf. Gelven 1994:141). The soldier defending his homeland kills – but does not 
murder – the enemy soldier. Indeed, “it is morally wrong to allow or abet the 
enemy’s destroying what is ours” (Gelven 1994:142). 
Contrary to most contemporary assumptions killing and rivalry do not 
necessarily destroy a community but may make it stronger, as an Arab proverb 
seems to allude to the cohesion induced by enmity: “Me against my brother, me 
and my brother against our cousins, us and our cousins against the world” 
(Murawiec 2008:28). Internal conflicts are suspended and the antagonists unite 
when confronted by a new common enemy that threatens both. The enemy 
sometimes can be a brother, as Enzensberger (1994:11) claims, the most 
enjoyable fighting is in a civil war because to one fights an enemy one knows 
well. Such fights are recorded throughout history, for example, St Augustine 
reports such familial brawl:  
For it was not fellow-citizens merely, but neighbours, brothers, 
fathers and sons even, who, divided into two factions and armed 
with stones, fought annually at a certain season of the year for 
several days continually, everyone killing whomsoever he could 
(Salazar 2009:33).  
A similar fighting custom was recorded among the Koreans:  
Every spring, leave is granted to the people to fight with stones, 
and the men (and even boys) proceed to open spaces where there 
are plenty of stones. There they form sides – usually town versus 
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country – and have regular pitched battles. Every year quite a 
large numbers are killed, and the wounded are legion (Davie 
2003:149).  
While St Augustine may have been puzzled by the senselessness of such 
behaviour, behind such violence one finds clear reasons, for example, the 
Korean fighting custom is motivated by the rivalry between town and country. 
All civil wars are re-enactments of social and racial division. As Foucault notes, 
the social body is made up of two groups of people of different ethnic origin that 
were brought together by conquest and these groups always remain in conflict. 
According to Cramer (2006a:283–284) and Kalyvas (2006) civil war makes 
perfect sense and the violence is not pointless, random or irrational. In the 
words of an Italian writer:  
Civil war is not a stupid thing, like war between nations ... civil war 
is something more logical, a man starts shooting for the people 
and things he loves, for the things he wants and against the people 
he hates; no-one makes mistakes about choosing which side to be 
on ... (Sciascia in Cramer 2006a:1). 
The common types of social killing are the patricide and fratricide. The patricide 
expresses the way a social succession is enacted. The myth of Oedipus 
narrates such a rivalry between the generations, the son or a band of brothers 
gang up on the primal father, kill the father and take his position of power and 
leadership. By extension, the fratricide is a continuation of the power struggle 
among brothers and lays the foundation for social hierarchy.  
The nation state can be considered as being in a permanent state of warfare: 
“The state is nothing more than the way that the war between the two groups ... 
continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms” (Foucault 2003:88; see 
also Howard 2001; Tilly 1975, 1990, 1997, 2003a, 2003b).  




Essentially, France owes the consciousness of its national unity 
only to its fight against England, and the Moorish war made the 
Spanish region into one people ...The United States needed the 
War of Independence; Switzerland, the fight against Austria; the 
Netherlands, rebellion against Spain; the Achaean League, the 
struggle against Macedonia; and the founding of the new German 
Empire furnished a parallel to all these instances (Simmel 
1966:100). 
The way an individual's identity is established by violence and killing is 
admirably described by Hegel’s story of the primordial battle to the death 
between two (not yet complete) human beings; their humanity will emerge 
through their mutually pressing a demand on one another to be recognised as 
human being. This primordial battle for recognition inaugurated human history 
(cf. Fukuyama 1992). For Hegel it is the ability of man to risk his life in battle for 
pure prestige that distinguishes the human being from other animals. The aim is 
not simply to endanger life in order to die, but to test oneself against a worthy 
opponent and kill him, or be killed in such battle.  
More fundamentally, the act of killing is pivotal for the emergence of self-
consciousness. Seeing a dead body on the battlefield leads to realisation that it 
is not I, and hence develops a sense of consciousness. But as the dead body 
cannot acknowledge my victory therefore it leaves the sense of consciousness 
incomplete. What is needed is that the enemy stay alive, acknowledge defeat 
and confirm the superiority of the victor. By such action of submission the victor 
becomes self-conscious and his value as a superior human being is 
acknowledged. Therefore, it is that a human being declares his humanity by 
proclaiming: “I kill, therefore I am” (cf. Murawiec 2008:9, 17). What makes the 
human is the ability to kill and this ability also lays the foundation for 
consciousness and self-consciousness. According to Hegel 
To speak of the "origin" of Self-Consciousness is necessarily to 
speak of a fight to the death for "recognition". Without this fight to 
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the death for pure prestige, there would never have been human 
beings on earth ...  
The "first" anthropogenetic action necessarily takes the form of a 
fight: a fight to the death between two beings that claim to be men, 
a fight for pure prestige carried on for the sake of "recognition" by 
the adversary (Kojève 1980:11–12). 
Such battle for recognition is re-enacted throughout history and in the 
contemporary world the battle for recognition is much in evidence in African 
decolonisation. Following on Hegel’s description of the battle for recognition, 
Fanon (1973; 2008) and Sartre (1973), contend that violence and killing are the 
proof of being human because the African's identity was initially constructed by 
the violence and killing of the colonial conquest. Subsequently, the oppressed 
can only gain his humanity by killing and annihilating the oppressor. This seems 
to be a universal characteristic of humanity because such cycles of victory and 
defeat are an eternal phenomena and the position of domination and 
submission are forever reversed (cf. Schivelbusch 2004). The oppressor and 
oppressed attained their sense of humanity through the violence of conquest 
and the oppressed in turn will rise in revolt. The colonised attained identity by 
the violence of colonisation and in turn their independent identity and new life 
"can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler" (Fanon 
1973:73). The colonised thus makes violence against the white settler his "only 
work" and it invest his character with "positive and creative qualities" (Fanon 
1973:73). As Sartre (1973:19-20) notes the colonised African first gains identity 
by the violence inflicted by the oppression of colonial conquest and being “a 
child of violence ... he draws from it his humanity.” Resistance adds to the 
sense of humanity. According to Sartre (1973), the “rebel’s weapon is the proof 
of his humanity.” The historical cycle of domination and repression is reversed: 
if at first by colonial conquest “we were men at his (the native's) expense” now 
by his resistance “he makes himself man at ours” (Sartre 1973:20). Indeed, for 
Fanon and Sartre the act of killing is central in establishing postcolonial identity: 
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To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to 
destroy an oppressor and the man he oppressed at the same time: 
there remain a dead man, and a free man (Sartre 1973:19). 
Fanon's concept of killing is influenced by a mixture of Islam and Marxism. As 
Murawiec (2008:9) notes, such expression of humanness is presumed to have 
been an injunction from god, where the warrior proclaims:  
This, O Muslim brothers, is who we are; we slay for our God, our 
God demands the slaying. I kill; therefore I am. 
The experience of pleasure associated with killing is also well documented in 
modern Western warfare (Bourke 1999:358; Ferguson 1999:360–364, 447). 
Moreover, there is a new search for personal pleasure in modern warfare 
despite its having become more instrumental and the act of killing has become 
impersonal. Disregarding such reality the combatants in modern and 
postmodern warfare insist on asserting their pride in their own active agency 
and demand to take responsibility for the killing. As Bourke (1999:xviii, 360) 
documents, because modern military technology prevents the combatants 
seeing the effects of their weapons on the enemy, they now use their 
imagination to conjure face-to-face encounters, and fantasise about the deadly 
effect of their weapons on the enemy.  
The process of personalising the enemy enables the combatants to kill and thus 
validate their own moral agency. The intimate act of killing is central to 
experience of war throughout history and affirms that war is not experienced as 
hellish trauma. For many participants the element of risk makes war 
pleasurable, and shows that warfare is equally about sacrificing others as well 
as being sacrificed. Thus for many men and women, this is precisely what 
makes it “a lovely war” (Bourke 1999:364). 
Regardless of all the recorded evidence of the bloody history some scholars 
insist on imagining that human individual and social identities are imaginatively 
constructed. According to Anderson (1983) identities are fostered by the use of 
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national language and national narratives which make the individual experience 
inclusion in an imagined community. But as against such imagined community 
the social bond proves to be a real bond of blood and sacrifice (cf. Marvin & 
Ingle 1996:773; Marvin & Ingle 1999:27). As Marvin and Ingle (1996:773) 
argue,  
not textual communities but communities of blood unite their 
members sacrificially. The holiest religious holidays do not 
celebrate literature but blood symbolically framed as birth or death. 
Texts may describe blood sacrifice and may be useful instruments 
in the formation of national consciousness for that reason. But 
textual communities do not physically fight for their members. Only 
communities bound by blood do this. 
A social group's or a nation's identity is not simply constructed by linguistic 
abstraction, but is the “body-sourced and face-to-face" encounter that 
"connects language to the nation understood as a community of bodies” 
(Marvin & Ingle 1999:26).   
Not by accident, ceremonies of nationalism are about death and 
not literature, though literature may remodel blood sacrifice. When 
armies assemble as fighting forces, their members are deployed in 
loyal, close-knit groups. Effective armies are not faceless 
bureaucracies in which soldiers apprehend their comrades at the 
distance of the written word, but countless small bodies of men 
and women tightly bound in mutual comradeship. A textual 
community does not fight. An army is not a textual community, but 
an organisation of hunting groups (Marvin & Ingle 1999:27).  
In other words, it is the blood sacrifice and war that constructs both community 
and the text for the imagined community. Indeed, as Renan (in Anderson 1983) 
notes, a national identity is always linked to the memory of a distant massacre 
and terrible bloodletting. The process of social construction involves a rite that 
is transformed into a ritual. According to Durkheim (Richards 2006:651) a rite is 
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a repetition of action that is believed as being able to cause a desired effect in 
the real world. War is originally a rite, repetition of acts of fighting and killing 
with the added advantage that it has a real effect in reality. The more often it is 
re-enacted the more result it brings. Such re-enactment becomes a ritual that 
re-creates the emotions and beliefs originally constructed by war (cf. Richards 
2006:651). In other words, war is firstly a utilitarian and instrumental activity that 
is necessary for the preservation of life. Ultimately such instrumental activity 
becomes symbolic: it becomes a way of life and defines the warrior’s existence 
and gives meaning to the life and death of the individual and unites a 
community.  
3.10  Conclusion 
The chapter traced the experience of war and killing as they are expressed in 
philosophical discourse. It has shown how war is the central defining 
characteristic of humanity and the foundation for individual and social identities. 
War thus is both the individualising and collectivising human institution. While 
war is a social and collective activity at its core is the action of fighting and 
killing that require interpersonal engagement, and this is the source of identity 
and meaning for human existence. The humanising aspect of war is manifest at 
the moment the animal is transformed to a human being and this transformation 
quires the risking of life which shows that the human can transcend the mere 
animal survival instinct, and by an act of will power, replace it with immaterial 
values. Such transition is captured by Hegel's notion of the primordial battle at 
the beginning of history from which consciousness, self-consciousness and 
social ranking order emerge. The role of pain and killing were seen as central 
humanising aspects. Thus war since the time of the ancient Greeks war has 
been the model for human life and the foundation for communication.  
The next chapter will continue the review and reading of texts in order to 
reconstruct the way war and killing provide the foundation for language and 









POETRY IS IN THE KILLING6:  
BLOODY ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION 
 
Polemos and Logos are the same – Heidegger (Fried 2000:33) 
War is the father of all good things; war is also the father of good prose – 
Nietzsche (2009:90) 
Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political thought? ... 
The Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which 
fights battles instead of writing notes – Clausewitz (1985:402, 406) 




The review and reading of literature in the previous chapter revealed the close 
interlink between war and killing as the source of human consciousness and 
identity. Because human identity is closely linked with language and 
communication it is possible to suggest that war, death and killing could also be 
related to their origin. Indeed, Heraclitus is one of the first philosophers to 
suggest such paternity (Kahn 1979:67). Following Heraclitus, Nietzsche, 
Clausewitz and contemporary media scholars such as Virilio (1997) and Kittler 
allude to war as constitutive of communication. 
                                             




The aim of this chapter is to trace how social thinkers represented the 
relationship between war, and considered death and killing as the central force 
to the formation of language. The chapter will trace the way war is assumed to 
incite speech, how the act of fighting is considered as the primordial model of 
human dialogue and death and killing as foundation for the construction of 
abstract concepts. Informed by a different understanding of war that will be 
gained from this and the previous chapter a close reading and interpretation of 
the role of war in the texts of selected twentieth century communication 
theorists, such as Huizinga, Schmitt, Foucault, McLuhan and Lyotard will be 
undertaken to provide a new and comprehensive understanding of war and 
communication in the contemporary world.  
4.2  Language, death and killing 
There seem to be an unquestionable and widely accepted belief that 
communication is intrinsically a peaceful activity. Such a view is 
paradigmatically expressed by Habermas’s (1981:314) claim that  
what raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we 
know: language. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the 
intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.  
Habermas assumes that a priori, humanity is unified and humans by their 
natural inclination always seek peaceful resolution to all conflicts. From this it 
follows that communication must naturally be a pacifying and unifying force. It is 
assumed that communication – defined as the symbolic activity of transmitting 
of messages and, sharing of meaning – promotes peaceful cooperation and 
social cohesion (cf. Habermas 1981:314). In communication theory this 
relationship is expressed in the Habermasian traditional alternatives premised 
on the assumption that the prevalence of violence results in "manipulatory 
speech and unilateral transmission of messages" while the lack of violence lead 
to "free expression and dialogue" (Lyotard 1984:16). Moreover, war, conflict 
and violence are assumed to increase misunderstanding because they 
supposedly disrupt communication and reduce all language to silence. This is a 
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popular belief that assumes the existence of a clear dichotomy between pure 
violence on the one hand, and pure communication on the other. As Dawes 
(2002:2) puts it, the belief that violence terminates communication because it 
reduces language to silence, and conversely, communication prevents violence 
because it transmits information are unquestionably accepted as if self-evident 
truth. 
Underpinning such a view is a theological foundation that links the concept 
communication with the idea of a spiritual communion. Also included in the idea 
of communion is not only a desire to establish contact with other living human 
beings but as Peters (1999) documents, also a desire for contact and 
communion with the spirits of the dead, and such desire was an important 
impetus for development of early communication technology, and scholarly 
interest in, and scientific study of communication. 
But such assumptions disregard the idea that conflict may have a unifying force 
and that the dissensus – the agreement to disagree – may hold society 
together. Indeed, it is the view of Heraclitus that war and conflict hold human 
society and the whole cosmos together. This perspective is affirmed in Martin 
Heidegger's and Jan Patočka's reading of Heraclitus: according to them it is the 
polemos that brings the enemies together to engage in face-to-face fight and 
thus unites them in their mutual contention (cf. Derrida 1995:17–18; Fried 
2000:23–24). Bourdieu (1998:78) contends that the opposing warriors have 
investment or mutual interest in contending for the common object. Thus it is in 
war and in the tension and contention of the conflict that form a foundation for a 
community: a community distinguished by differences between individuals and 
groups, yet united in their investment in the common object of interest.  
This chapter suggests that war and killing could be considered as the 
generative origin of communication. Because killing and warfare are central to 
humanity their manifold traces can be seen everywhere in speech, language 
and communication. To locate such traces the starting point is the ancient 
Greek society and its oral and agonistic social interaction. 
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4.3  Polemos and logos are the same: the bloody origin of language and 
communication 
Suggestively Nietzsche locates speech and communication in war finding 
justification for his claim in Heraclitus’ original assertion that war is the father of 
all things. According to Nietzsche (2009:90), if “war is the father of all good 
things" then it is possible to assume that "war is also the father of good prose.” 
Following on Hegel, Nietzsche also suggests that war is the originator of the 
human spirit. Hegel (1910) contends that “war is the spirit and form” that 
provides the foundation on “which self-consciousness ... and every kind of 
existence is manifestly confirmed and realised.” Influenced by Hegel, even the 
ardent pacifist philosopher such as Buber (1970) argues that the primordial 
bloody encounter between ancient warriors provides the foundation for meaning 
and human spiritual development: 
Primal man’s experiences of encounter were scarcely a matter of 
tame delight; but even violence against a being one really 
confronts is better than ghostly solicitude for faceless digits! From 
the former a path leads to God, from the latter only to nothingness 
(Buber 1970:75). 
For Buber a true human encounter is experienced through real violence and it 
is this intensity of feelings that acknowledges the existence of the other human 
being, however, a peaceful evasion of confronting the other human being is an 
act of negation of the other’s humanity and existence.  
Indeed, the philosophers' and social thinkers' conception of war as competitive 
agonistic human interaction is supported by data from biology, psychology and 
social research (Keegan 2004a; Keeley 1997). This is summarised in the words 
of an eminent British historian: 
Archaeological, anthropological, as well as all surviving 
documentary evidence indicates that war, armed conflict between 
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organised political groups, has been the universal norm in human 
history (Howard 2000:1).  
All forms of social interaction and communication of primitive societies develop 
from the bloody and hostile encounters between warring groups; in the ancient 
world “war is almost the only form in which contact with alien groups is brought 
about at all” (Simmel 1966:32-33). The initial conflict leads to other forms of 
encounter and opens the possibility for co-existence and communication. That 
war and conflict open contact and channels of communication where they did 
not exist before is affirmed by sociologists (cf. Himes 1966). 
The direct link between communication and war is assumed to be the result of 
the agonistic character of ancient societies whose primary mode of 
communication was oral (cf. Ong 1982:43). The characteristic social interaction 
in oral society is face-to-face encounter that is antagonistic and agonistic. This 
antagonism is reflected in the style of verbal interaction. As Ong (1982:45) 
notes, “when all verbal communication must be by direct word of mouth" they 
are closely "involved in the give-and-take dynamics" of everyday life and 
contain both attractions and antagonism. Both the physical and verbal 
interactions follow the same manoeuvres and resemble duels, exchange of 
blows and contests of wits (cf. Ong 1982:68). Thus verbal interaction is a form 
of "flyting" or verbal combat and the verbal duel is in many instances a prelude 
to battle. A verbal duel is also itself a form of battle that can be fought as a 
substitute to the real contest by arms or war (cf. Pagliai 2009:61; Pagliai 
2010:87; Parks 1986; Parks 1990; Ong 1982; 1989).  
More fundamentally George Herbert Mead (1965) locates the original human 
speaking encounter – the dialogue – takes the form of an exchange of blows, a 
boxing match or a dog fight. Dialogue, like all forms of hand-to-hand combats is 
derived from a primordial “conversation of gestures” where each combatant 
responds and anticipates the other’s moves (cf. Bushman 1998). For Mead the 
social antagonistic actions precede the deliberate symbolic communication (cf. 
Mead 1965:129). As Mead (in Meltzer, Petras & Reynolds 1980:36) puts it, “the 
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blow is the historical antecedent of the word." The result is that consciousness 
develops first from the violent exchange of blows and thus Mead (1965:162) 
concludes that the human "mind arises through communication by conversation 
of gestures in a social process or context – not communication through mind." 
In other words, mind developed as consequence of material and physical 
actions. As Ong (1989:29) puts it: “Agonistic activities and structures developed 
in the noetic world in ways complexly related to their development elsewhere” in 
the real material world. Such development was already prepared by inherited 
biological conditions: the animal and human mind is already biologically primed 
for war: it responds to danger in a binary pattern of either fight or flight (cf. Ong 
1989:15–18).  
In a manner similar to Machiavelli’s (1968:52) contention that beliefs are 
inculcated by the use of force, Althusser (1971) proposes that Pascal 
demonstrated how body gestures construct ideas and beliefs in the mind. 
According to Althusser (1971:168–169) Pascal explains that religious beliefs 
develop from pure action. Pascal notes that if one want to acquire religious 
beliefs, all that is required is to “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you 
will believe.” Althusser (1971) comments that Pascal's interpretation exposes 
the scandal that underlies the manufacture of all spiritual beliefs. In other 
words, religious beliefs do not originate in a rarefied sphere of the gods but in 
the mundane world of human practice. Of course, Althusser follows Marx's 
materialism whereby consciousness is assumed to be the product of social 
conditions. For Marx (1972:119), "life is not determined by consciousness, but 
consciousness by life." The human spirit is the product of mater and co-evolved 
with mater, and "language is as old as consciousness, language is practical 
consciousness" (Marx 1972:122). This is in turn summarised by Wittgenstein’s 
(1988:178) statement that “the human body is the best picture of the human 
soul." Following on this argument it is possible to assume that Hegel's 
exclamation on seeing Napoleon after the battle of Jena that he has seen "the 
world soul on horseback" (Hook 1962:60), could explain the military and 
material origin of Hegel's philosophical concept of historical Spirit. Thus 
Napoleon, the great warrior is the primary inspiration and the model for 
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spirituality. For Marx it follows that the whole system of ideas expressed in 
language has its origin in the material social condition: "The production of 
ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the 
material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life" 
(Marx 1972:118). The material construction of ideas and beliefs is confirmed by 
Richards’ (2006) study of the way war constructed a religious cult in Sierra 
Leone. War provided members of the cult with a way of life, a sense of 
community, identity, and a set of beliefs and concepts. In other words, this also 
provides the groups with concepts, language and ways of speaking. The 
primacy of action means that ideas, beliefs and concepts are not the cause of 
war but are the effects of war. Contrary to the idealist assumption that beliefs in 
people’s heads are the cause for war, Richards (2006) shows that wars “cause 
beliefs”. The reason for this is that because  
people with different basic collective interests come into contention 
over those interests while expressing differences of organisation 
as differences of belief. War is not a product of clash of 
civilisations but clash of civilisations is a product of war (Richards 
2006:651). 
Hegel already speculatively summarises the way concepts arise from war and 
more specifically from an act of killing. According to Kojève's (1980:186) 
interpretation of Hegel, discourse arises from the dialectical confrontation in the 
primordial fighting encounter at the beginning of history. As Kojève puts it: 
"Hegelian discourse is dialectical to the extent that it describes the real Dialectic 
of Fighting and of Work, as well as the 'ideal' reflection of this Dialectic in 
thought in general and in philosophical thought in particular" (Kojève 1980:190).  
If thought develops in battle, then conceptual understanding can be considered 
as the equivalent of murder or killing (cf. Kojève 1980:140). This is so because 
as long as the meaning or the concept is embodied in an empirically existing 
living entity, the meaning, concept and the actual entity's life are one and the 
same and there is no place for assigning an abstract or general concept. In 
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order to become an abstraction the concept must detach itself from the 
particular living entity. Such detachment occurs by the act of killing the 
particular living entity. As Kojève (1984) explains: 
For example, as long as the Meaning (or Essence) "dog" is 
embodied in a sensible entity, this Meaning (Essence) lives: it is 
the real dog, the living dog which runs, drinks, and eats. But when 
the Meaning (Essence) "dog" passes into the word "dog" – that is, 
becomes abstract Concept which is different from the sensible 
reality that it reveals by its Meaning – the Meaning (Essence) dies: 
the word "dog" does not run, drink, and eat; in it the Meaning 
(Essence) ceases to live – that is, it dies. And that is why the 
conceptual understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a 
murder (Kojève 1980:140). 
In other words, the concept or meaning is only possible because it can detach 
itself from the real entity; because the entity is mortal and finite it is only when it 
is killed and dies that it becomes an abstract concept. Hegel’s idea of meaning 
construction is shared by Vološinov’s (1998:9) idea that “a physical body equals 
itself, so to speak; it does not signify anything but wholly coincides with its 
particular, given nature” in order to become a concept or signify meaning it 
needs to be converted into a sign or artistic-symbolic image.  
For the ancient Greeks the reality of bodies and action on the battlefield provide 
a vocabulary for the subsequent development of abstract thought, as Havelock 
(1982:301) explains: the image of “this corpse on the battlefield” in the artist’s 
epic poem becomes a concept to describe a “body anywhere and everywhere.” 
As a result “the combats of Homeric heroes found themselves being translated 
into battles between concepts, categories, and principles” (Havelock 1982:304). 
Acquisition of meaning is a process of transition from concrete to abstraction, 
from a state of physics to metaphysics:  
Physics: discourse dealing with the ideal structure of bodies, 
mixtures, reactions, internal and external mechanisms; 
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metaphysics: discourse dealing with the materiality of incorporeal 
things – phantasms, idols, and simulacra (Foucault 1988a:170). 
And in this transition from concrete to abstract the role of death is central: 
Death supplies the best example, being both the event of events 
and meaning in its purest state. Its domain is anonymous flow of 
speech; it is that of which we speak as always past or about to 
happen and yet it occurs at the extreme point of singularity 
(Foucault 1988a:174). 
In order to consider an event it needs to become metaphysical and lose its 
physical substance and become an abstraction. The difference is that physics is 
concerned with causes but the event arises as effects of cause that do not 
belong to the same level of reality.  
The event – a wound, a victory-defeat, death – is always an effect 
produced entirely by bodies colliding, mingling, or separating, but 
this effect is never of a corporeal nature; ... The weapons that tear 
into bodies form an endless incorporeal battle (Foucault 
1988a:172–173).  
The abstraction is a progression that transforms a physical object into an object 
of thought. As Foucault (1988a) demonstrates: 
"Marc Antony is dead" designates a state of things; expresses my 
opinion or belief; signifies an affirmation; and, in addition, has a 
meaning: "dying". An intangible meaning with one side turned 
toward things because "dying" is something that occurs, as an 
event, to Antony, and the other toward the proposition because 
"dying" is what is said about Antony in the statement. To die: a 
dimension of the proposition; an incorporeal effect produced by a 
sword; a meaning and an event; a point without thickness or 
substance of which someone speaks and which roams the surface 
of things (Foucault 1988a:173–174).   
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In Western tradition death is assumed as the foundation of knowledge. For 
example, Foucault (1989) shows the birth of modern medical knowledge in the 
19th century was derived from death: for centuries inquires about disease 
looked at external signs and symptoms and could only offer a blind guess about 
its nature and cause but ultimately it was death and the dissection of dead 
bodies – primed by killing and dismembering men and bodies on the battlefield 
– that inaugurated modern medical knowledge: by cutting open the human 
corpse the invisible was made visible. As a nineteenth century doctor writes: 
"Open up a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness that 
observation alone could not dissipate" (Foucault 1989b:146). Foucault notes 
that this shows how the "living night is dissipated in the brightness of death" 
(Foucault 1989b:146). Death became the key to understanding life: "Death left 
its old tragic heaven and became the lyrical core of man: his invisible truth, his 
visible secret" (Foucault 1989b:172). Thus in Western culture the first scientific 
discourse concerning the individual passes through death: 
Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes as an object 
of science ... only in the opening created by his own elimination ... 
From the integration of death into medical thought is born a 
medicine that is given as science of the individual. And generally 
speaking, the experience of individuality in modern culture is 
bound up with that of death ... the individual owes death a meaning 
that does not cease with him (Foucault 1989b:197). 
Finally, another death is the death of living speech killed by the invention of 
writing: it is as if to inscribe something in writing is to kill it, dismember it, to 
embalm and entomb it in material substance. Speech is always lively, 
conflictual and action-oriented while writing is more detached, static and 
contemplative. And of course, written text from past generations can be 




To see the role of killing and death it is useful to look at the ancient Greeks. For 
the ancient Greeks war, death and killing were integral aspects of life in the 
ancient world. As a consequence war and killing in battle were the primary 
topics and inspiration for the ancient Greek poets and for all subsequent 
generations of poets, writers, artists and thinkers. The ancient Greeks’ 
experience made them realise that war is a way of life (cf. Havelock 1972) and 
provides the language and conceptual framework for thinking and 
understanding the world: 
War was good to think with in the ancient world. ... Greeks and 
Romans frequently used ideas connected to war to understand the 
world and their place in it. War was used to structure their thought 
on other topics, such as culture, gender and the individual. War 
was pervasive in classical thought (Sidebottom 2004:16). 
For the Greeks war was “the master text" and provided the ontology by which 
"they knew themselves better” and defined their humanity (cf. Coker 2002:37). 
The principle of war: adversity, is the eternal principle of identity distinction 
between “us” and “them”, or between “enemy” and “friend” (cf. Gelven 1994; 
Sidebottom 2004; Schmitt 1976). 
The Greek artists, such as Homer in the Iliad, described in detail the exploits of 
battles, blood and slaughter and such scenes were familiar from direct 
experience to both artists and audience. The audience delighted in such bloody 
details of savagery because they were enjoyable (cf. Nietzsche 1997:37; 
Vermeule 1981:96). Ancient Greek writers and philosophers had first-hand 
experience of battle and like all war veterans throughout history "return to their 
experience in combat to clarify or broaden their thought on whatever subject 
they were discussing" (Hanson 2000:45). Moreover, Homer’s representation of 
war, killing, and slaughter has subsequently delighted readers throughout the 
ages until the present (cf. Vermeule 1981:97; Seaton 2005). From the time of 
the ancient Greeks, Homer’s epic poem the Iliad provided the paradigm of a 
warrior for thought and action and inspired philosophers, politicians, artists and 
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warriors for three millennia (cf. King 1991:xi; Lynn 2004:26; Manguel 2007:2). 
According to King (1991:219) the enduring interest in the Iliad was the result of 
war being the central concern of societies and the heroic warrior figure of 
Achilles could be “fruitfully manipulated for poetic, political, and philosophical 
ends.” As King (1991:220) puts it:  
The Iliad’s military hero is used to make profound statement about 
the human condition. Because Achilles is not only superlative in 
prowess and physical beauty but also superlatively complex – 
possession skills of a healer, the uncompromising principles of an 
idealist, the self-knowledge of a philosopher, the artistry of a poet – 
readers are emotionally engaged with him as a completed human 
being.  
Homer’s heroic war paradigm continued its influence throughout the centuries 
and is still felt in the present as war and battle is the unconscious model at the 
heart of all speaking and logical discourse (cf. e.g. Bryant 1996; King 1991; 
Manguel 2007; Weil 2005). This is why Xenophanes credits Homer's epic poem 
as the source of human thought, as he says: "All men's thoughts have been 
shaped by Homer from the beginning" (Hawkes 1972:148). This would indicate 
that acts of warfare, killing, and suffering have an affinity with the human ways 
of being and are resonant with the structure of the human mind and cultured 
soul.  
Death was infused with meaning because death in battle was valued as a 
contribution to the security and continuous existence of the community. Thus 
not only had it a utilitarian function but such death in the service of the 
community also gains meaning as an honourable death and becomes a popular 
theme to be memorised by being represented in Greek art (cf. Vermeule 
1981:84). The warrior’s acts of killing and own death are meaningful because 
they are good acts of killing and good deaths and in turn it is a beautiful death 
to inspire and be represented in art. The bad and shameful death is that of the 
coward fleeing the battlefield and so presenting his back for enemy attack, the 
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result is that the coward is laying dead face-down with the enemy's spear 
sticking from his back. The poet Tyrtaios describes such death as a "shameful 
sight when a dead man lies in the dust there, driven through from behind by the 
stroke of an enemy spear" (Hanson 2000:182). The good death is the warrior 
lying face-up, sword in hand and clutching the body of his dead enemy whom 
he killed while dying himself. Xenophon describes such a scene of heap of 
bodies of friends and enemies after the battle of Koroneia:  
Where they had fallen in with each other the earth was red with 
their blood, corpses of both friend and enemy were lying with each 
other, shields smashed, spears snapped, swords drawn from their 
scabbards, some of which were thrown to the ground, some fixed 
in their bodies, others still in the hands of the dead (Xenophon in 
Hanson 2000:198). 
After the battle there was fascination with the dead, "almost an urgent need to 
look upon the dead as they lay, before the bodies were carted away and the 
enormity of the scene was lost" (Hanson 2000:202). Indeed, the melee and 
confusion of the fighting ended and allowed curious large groups of spectators 
a sight-seeing tour of the undisturbed aftermath of the battle. It was also the 
standard practice that the victorious commander inspects the dead on the 
battlefield. The carnage was recorded by artists who sculptured and painted the 
death scenes on vases in minute details, while poets inscribed the heroic 
images in their words (cf. Hanson 2000:202–203). The way a warrior kills his 
enemy is a sign of his worth: in the Iliad Homer describe the first-rank fighter's 
act of slaying as displaying mastery and slaying the enemy in a quick and easy 
ways while the second-rank fighter is cumbersome and struggles and his act of 
slaying is brutal and grisly (Fenik 1968:15). Thus here is a clue to both moral 
and elastics evaluation: death in battle was noble and good and the good death 
in battle is also a beautiful death for moral edification by being aesthetically 
represented in visual art and in discourse. Through discourse and 
representation brave warriors and their acts remain alive in human memory.  
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Homer's descriptions in the Iliad of "wounding and killing are copious and 
exquisitely detailed" (Tatum 2003:116). But this is expected because the Iliad is 
war poetry and battles take a primary role while all other themes are secondary 
or have their beginning in the acts of killing on the battlefield. Even if for the 
pacifist modern reader the Iliad is used as reflection beyond the spilling of 
blood, nevertheless, "blood and guts, in fact, mean everything" and they are 
"told in precise details" because they are integral to the poem (Tatum 
2003:117).  
In the Iliad, gruesome death becomes poetry and is transformed into graceful 
death by the mutual exchange of words between the combatants praising each 
other's courage that are also heard (or read) by the audience (cf. Tatum 
2003:118). "Killing one's enemies can be carried out with as much craft and 
studied variation as any other art", and in a war poem the "poet's song and 
warrior's song blend into single melody" that "turns killing itself into poetry" 
(Tatum 2003:118–119). Tatum (2003:119) puts it thus: the poet finds poetry in 
the action on the battlefield and the "war's poetry is also to be found in the 
killing." It is a paradox that the worst murderous situation in war can artistically 
be the best inspiration because the "artist can patiently convey war's 
inhumanity, by an exquisite design and attention to details" (Tatum 2003:132–
133). The description of wounding and killing performed by Achilles as "he 
stabbed with his sword at the liver", and the "liver torn from its place, and from 
its black blood", and then he strikes another opponent with a "pike at the ear, so 
the bronze spearhead pushed through and came out at the other ear", and 
again hitting with "the hilted sword" against the head of another "so all the 
sword was smoking with blood", and having "transfixed with bronze spearhead" 
through the arm, then with his sword he strikes at the neck "and the marrow 
gushed from the neckbone" (Tatum 2003:119–120). Tatum (2003:119–120) 
notes that apart from all these details, 
what impresses us is Achilles' ingenuity – and the poet's. Neither 
of them wades into a killing the same way twice: a sword to the 
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liver, a pike in the ear, a sword into the head, and finally, the 
climax of a double mortal blow.  
With Homer a whole aesthetics of the battle opens up and satisfies the curiosity 
of the listener or reader. Moreover, the detailed descriptions of putting the 
"spear through his forehead", killing by stabbing with "a spear beside the right 
nipple, inflicting a mortal "wound to the groin" and thrusting a "spear to the head 
that runs through one temple and comes out the other", all these acts of giving 
blows and receiving counter blows, a tit-for-tat reciprocal action (Tatum 
2003:123), is a great dialogue of gestures and words that runs through the 
poem. Indeed, the "prestigious mode of combat" in the form of "fighting with 
weapons face-to-face" happened where blows are intermingled with verbal 
exchange of insults and praises between the combatants. Such personal 
involvement in the action on the battlefield changes the nature of "the simple 
pleasure of seeing an enemy on the other side get his just deserts" into a 
personal relation of respect for the bravery and humanity of the dead enemy 
combatant (cf. Tatum 2003:125). In the Iliad before being struck and killed the 
particular warrior's genealogy is told and his individuality is constructed, so that 
the listener or reader should know the dead warrior personally, and his death is 
experienced as a sacrifice and the warrior's spilt blood gives vitality to the 
community of the reader of the poem as much as it gave to the original (or 
mythical) community of warriors (cf. Tatum 2003:121). Moreover, the aesthetic 
experience and the pleasure of reading war literature and poetry is derived from 
the pervasive curiosity about war's mysteries: for those readers who look 
forward to war the literature provides a powerful stimulus to see if the 
experience of battle will be as terrible or as enlightening as it is described by 
the poet (cf. Tatum 2003:126–127).  
According to Foucault (1988a:53) "it is quite likely, as Homer has said, that the 
gods send disasters to men so they can tell of them." Acts of speaking and 
writing are there so as not to die, but to be analysed and immortalised, as is 
seen in the power of discourse (figuratively) to stop an arrow in flight. An 
example of such violent and brave deeds generating words and communication 
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is seen in the first recorded epic poems; the Iliad and the Odyssey affirm the gift 
of language arising from death:  
The gods send disasters to mortals so that they can tell of them, 
but men speak of them so that misfortune will be averted in the 
distance of words, at the place where they will be stilled in the 
negation of their nature (Foucault 1988a:53–54). 
Subsequently, all self-conscious warriors recorded their actions in words of epic 
poetry and later in prose narrative. For example, in the lines of the medieval 
Song of Roland (Vance 1980:380) a brave warrior proclaims: 
Now let each man take care to deal great blows, 
Lest a bad song be sung of us.  
Vance (1980:383) notes that history stages itself around acts of massacre that 
are then communicated and memorised as narratives. The process of 
communication is associated with, or demands “some act of mutilation or 
immolation” (Vance 1980:385). Therefore, “without war, there could be no hero, 
no history, no song, no jongleur, and no audience” (Vance 1980:386). For 
Hanson (2004) perceptively notes that wars and battles leave their influence on 
humanity: it is the “ripples of war” that are felt throughout the centuries and 
“plays, poems, and novels are written because of a day’s fighting" and art is 
commissioned and "philosophy born” (Hanson 2004:15). Warfare inspired 
language and thought and provided a paradigm for speaking and acting, thus 
according to Chan (2005:18) “with the technology of destruction had come the 
technology of thought.”  
The ancient poet and the warrior have the same aim: to kill the enemies – 
literally and metaphorically – and to immortalise the killing and death of the 
brave warriors. As Vermeule (1981:94) writes about Homer’s Iliad:  
The goal of a good epic poet, in a battle song, is to kill people with 
picturesque detail, power and high spirit. Homer does it 
extraordinarily well. The Iliad begins with corpses burning in an 
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alien plain and ends with a gallant corpse burning in prelude to the 
city’s burning. The verses are studded with corpses in between, 
pierced and collapsing in a panorama of pictorial conventions, and 
gestures of ferocity held in check by formula and rhetoric which, as 
they killed, still invoked a more general life cycle through images of 
animals, planted fields and wild forests, storms and seas. 
In Homer’s Iliad and the ancient Greek's works of art contemplation of death is 
the single motivation for immortality, therefore it is the cause of achievement 
and creativity (cf. Vermeule 1981:94). While mortality is acknowledged "the 
perpetual threat of death" is confronted "with the energy and humour of life” 
(Vermeule 1981:96). Thus literary work such as the Iliad is not a poem of death 
but of immortality and mortal accidents (cf. Vermeule 1981:97). And for mortals 
death is one of life's accidents from which language was born, as Foucault 
(1988a:55) puts it, "death is undoubtedly the most essential of the accidents of 
language (its limit and its centre)." 
The progression of action and thought about war are evident in the literary 
transition from Homer’s epic poetry to historical prose of Herodotus and 
Thucydides. Homer's Iliad sings praise for the fighting where men win glory 
(Dawson 1996:53), Herodotus’ prose narrates the sequence of action and 
reaction, the reciprocal tit-for-tat exchange of gifts and injuries in war (cf. 
Dawson 1996:74), subsequently Thucydides introduces a reversal and in his 
analytical thought words are followed by action: "Herodotean narrative is a 
series of actions; Thucydidean narrative becomes a series of debates followed 
by actions" (Dawson 1996:87). 
War provides the exemplary tactics for speaking. Public arguments are 
considered as combats, wrestling matches and duels that one could learn by 
imitation in the same way that one learnt to wrestle. Indeed, fighting and speech 
were thought in the gymnasium (cf. Hawhee 2002a; 2002b; 2005). Public 
argumentations are structured in the form of a battle, a duel of questions and 
answers in an eristic encounter. The aim of such public argumentation was to 
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win, but winning an argument, as in winning a war was not guaranteed a priori 
but depended on skill and an element of chance. The verbal duelling, like a real 
battle depended on the combatants’ and speakers’ ability to demonstrate 
excellence and mastery. The speakers’ ability to dramatise their presentation 
helped win favourable judgments form the public. To gain favour from the public 
the ancient philosophers and sophists used Homer’s panoply of vivid battle 
scenes as a case-book from which to draw appropriate examples, to memorise 
them and to use them in appropriate and specific situation to support 
arguments. Success or failure depended on acts of memory and the ability of 
the narrator to dramatise the presentation. The aspiring word warrior had to 
learn by heart a whole repertoire and select a particular war imagery to apply as 
required by his situation. This exposed the limitation of the sophists' rhetorical 
art: they taught tactics and not a general strategy; they "taught arguments: not 
how to argue” (Ryle 1966:200).  
Strategy for discourse was developed by old experienced warrior philosophers 
such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Socrates and Plato distilled a formal 
method for argumentation by identifying the abstract principles as the 
underlying “strategy and tactics” of battle, and so “the combats of Homeric 
heroes found themselves being translated into battles between concepts, 
categories, and principles” (Havelock 1982:304). Socrates draws his philosophy 
from his own battle experience and Nietzsche (1978:32) notes that not only did 
Socrates draw on his personal experience but also draw his philosophy from 
the general spirit of the Greek experience of life as war and the agonistic 
character of the ancient Greek society. According to Nietzsche (1978:32), 
Socrates introduces a crucial innovation as he “discovered a new kind of agon” 
and this gave him an advantage against the Sophists and he becomes “the first 
fencing master”. For Nietzsche (1978:32), Socrates “introduced a variation into 
the wrestling-matches among the youth” because his method of asking 
substantial questions and expecting rational answers disturbed the natural 
“agonal instinct of the Hellenes” that until now was based on dazzling display. 
Extending on Socrates, Aristotle finally provided a complete art of verbal 
warfare in his theory of rhetoric, as Ryle (1966:18) puts it:  
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Here Aristotle develops the methodology of the rule-governed 
battles of wits of which Plato’s elenctic dialogues gives us 
dramatised specimens. Aristotle is the Clausewitz to Plato’s 
Napoleon. 
Aristotle extends Plato’s strategy and tactics of the eristic dialogic combat and 
Homer’s heroic narratives of battle to construct a theory of logic and rhetoric.  
The close link between speaking and war is central to the ancient Greek 
society. The Greek society and culture grew from war: the Greek Polis or city-
state was originally a military fortification (cf. Berki 1984:43; Mumford 1962), 
established and defended by its free-citizen-warriors. The centre of Athenian 
democracy, the agora was originally a war council were issues of war were 
debated and contested. Public debate itself resembles warfare as it is an 
exchange of words, instead of blows between contending adversaries. Thus it 
is indicative that the agora and agon share the same etymology: the agon of 
contestation on the battlefield is reflected in the political debates in the agora 
(cf. Huizinga 1971:68–69).  
Because war is the primary social institution on which all others depend, human 
ways of thinking and speech seems to reflect the structure of war. The 
individual’s thinking and reasoning is modelled on public procedures of 
adversarial debates used to adjudicate conflicts and deliberations in the tribal 
war councils (cf. Hampshire 2000:7–9; Hampshire 2002:637–638). Ultimately, 
the ability to talk and manner of thinking is the result of the experience of living 
in the physical and natural environment and the human mind is a product of 
action and interaction whereby gesture and "social acts precede the symbol 
proper and deliberate communication" (Mead 1965:129). From such experience 
all basic concepts are derived and go on to become metaphors for elaboration 
of further concepts. It is thus conceivable that all basic concepts are directly 
related to strategy and tactics of living in a world of struggle, fighting and war. 
Considering such evidence Lakoff and Johnson (1980) conclude that many of 
the metaphors to describe reality and social practice of speaking and 
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argumentation are based on the adversarial model of war. For Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980:5) “argument is war” is not simply a metaphor but the literal way 
of talking and arguing in Western society.  
4.4  Traces of war in speech: unity of polemos and logos  
The idea that traces of war are reflected in language and discourse have been 
suggested by a number of thinkers. According to Nietzsche: 
Primeval states echoed in speech. In the way men make 
assertions in present-day society, one often hears an echo of the 
times when they were better skilled in arms than in anything else; 
sometimes they handle assertions as poised archers their 
weapons; sometimes one thinks he hears the whir and clatter of 
blades; and with some men an assertion thunders down like heavy 
cudgel (Nietzsche 2004:183). 
Walter Benjamin claims that "our linguistic usage is a marker of the depth to 
which the texture of our being is permeated by winning or losing a war; it makes 
our whole lives richer or poorer in representation, images, treasures" (Benjamin 
in Coker 1994: 36). Clausewitz (1985) suspects that there is a direct link 
between war and communication when he asks,  
is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political 
thought? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not 
peculiar to itself ... The Art of War in its highest point of view is 
policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing 
notes (Clausewitz 1985:402, 406). 
In other words, communication could be understood as war because war 
provides the model for all human phenomena. Hegel maintains that war 
provides a frame for thought and the criteria for truth. According to Hegel: 
History is, if you please, a long, “discussion” between men. But this 
real historical "discussion" is something quite different from a 
111 
 
philosophic dialogue or discussion. The “discussion" is carried out 
not with verbal arguments but with clubs and swords or cannon on 
the one hand, and with sickles and hammers or machines on the 
other. If one wants to speak of a "dialectical method" used by 
History, one must make clear that one is talking about methods of 
war and of work (Kojève 1980:185). 
For Heidegger (Fried 2000) this shows that life itself is war (polemos), and 
therefore the social life of human beings as political animals endowed with 
speech reflects such reality. For Heidegger the essence of the polemos is 
evident in a symbolic world because all interpretations are polemical: “Dasein is 
polemos because Dasein’s existence is hermeneutical, and all interpretation is 
polemical.” This is so because there are always different and conflicting 
interpretations (cf. Fried 2000:52; Curtis 2006:15). In other words, 
interpretations and responding to other texts is always a confrontation, and a 
challenge. In this sense human interpretation is unique.  
In the most general way any form of animal life depends on "interpretation", that 
is, the ability to respond and evaluate an external stimulus such as when 
recognising danger. However interpretation for human being is more complex 
because of the development of symbolic language, reason, imagination, etc., 
which comprise a "second reality" or the symbolic universe, or numerous 
realties which they construct and in which humans live and need to interpret. 
But what does it mean to interpret? The traditional assumption is that 
interpretation is uncovering some essential truth, or exposure of original hidden 
meaning. But as Nietzsche and Foucault showed, there is no original meaning, 
"no original signified" because  
words themselves are nothing but interpretations, throughout their 
history they interpret before being signs, and ultimately they signify 




Interpretation is thus an imposition of meaning. For Foucault interpretation is 
thus "violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules" and to use them 
to dominate those who originally made these rules and interpretations (Foucault 
2000a:378).  
Therefore, if life is a battle then thought itself is battle and philosophy as the 
search for knowledge and truth are crucial for survival, truth is implicated in the 
straggle for life. As Caputo, commenting on Heidegger's conception of power 
philosophy, explains that for Heidegger 
Philosophy is a battle because life is a battle. A being whose being 
is itself a battle thus demands a philosophising that knows how to 
do battle (Caputo in Curtis 2006:13).  
Caputo's (1993) comment on Heidegger is not intended as praise but as 
criticism of Heidegger's revolutionary project and his involvement with German 
National Socialism for which he earned condemnation from most Western 
liberal philosophers. However, while Caputo's attempt to demythologise 
Heidegger and subvert him by reading Heidegger against himself (cf. Caputo 
1993:39) – which is already an act of warfare – nevertheless implicit in Caputo's 
criticism is recognition of the value of war-like philosophising. This is similarly 
expressed by Nietzsche’s (1978:21) idea of philosophising with a hammer. 
Thus it is possible to concede that knowledge is related to warfare, as Huizinga 
(1971:180–181) puts it: "All knowledge – and this includes philosophy – is 
polemical by nature." 
The polemic nature of knowledge was already recognised by Socrates and 
Plato in their understanding of the unity of philosophy and warfare. One needs 
to win in war the same way as one has to win the battles for social survival. And 
for victory in war and rhetoric one needs knowledge. For Plato the search for 
knowledge is a hunt: to know is to kill because all knowledge is useful for 
survival and the efficient killing of prey animals for food. Thus knowledge and 
science from the very beginning are linked with war and struggle for mastery 
(cf. Harari 1980:48). This is evident in the history of philosophy: "Moving from 
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combat with prey outside the species to killing inside the species, knowledge 
now becomes military, a martial art" (Serres 1980:276). With Bacon science 
becomes a game of strategy: "Baconian physics made science into a duel, a 
combat, a struggle for domination: it gave it an agonistic model, proposing a 
form of ruse for it so that the weak one would triumph" (Serres 1980:268). But 
as the agonistic game is open to contingencies and winning is not certain, it is 
transformed by Descartes who seeks means to win at every move (cf. Serres 
1980:268). Descartes brings his military experience and "like many other 
philosophers, Descartes pursued his military calling in metaphysics" (Serres 
1980:275). Science as the ultimate form of knowledge guarantees the best 
winning strategy because the logic or reason of the stronger is always the best, 
and conversely the best reason is the strongest as it guarantees winning. As 
Serres (1980) concludes, for Western thought, knowledge is always interrelated 
with death and killing: 
From Plato and a tradition which lasted throughout the Classical 
age, knowledge is a hunt. To know is to put to death ... To know is 
to kill, to rely on death (Serres 1980:276). 
Indeed, winning is central to the working of knowledge and scientific discourse 
as Thomas Kuhn (1970) and Bruno Latour (1987) have shown. Central to all 
theorising and scientific work is a war-like contest that consists of battles 
between various opponents and opposing positions and winning the battle is 
almost the only thing that matters because it guarantees funding and prestige. 
In the battles between scientists there is a general wining strategy that can be 
discerned: to 
 weaken your enemies, paralyse those you cannot weaken ... help 
your allies if they are attacked, ensure safe communication with 
those who supply you with disputable instruments ... oblige your 
enemies to fight one another (Latour 1987:37).  
Latour (1987:172) notes that wining in the scientific proof race is similar to the 
winning in the "arms race" and this similarity "is not a metaphor". 
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Foucault (1988a:154) following Nietzsche's discovery of the will to power in the 
will to knowledge notes that because logic or reason was born from the will to 
power, it is a disguise for power and hence "knowledge is not made for 
understanding" but "it is made for cutting." But this is already evident in the 
ancient Greek world were most philosophers had a first-hand experience of 
cutting bodies on the battlefield (cf. Hanson 2010:45; Lynn 2004). 
There should be no surprise then that Socrates stood in the ranks 
at Delium or that the dramatist Aeschylus chose to be remembered 
on his tombstone not for his plays but for the fact that he fought at 
Marathon. The link between philosophy, art, and combat is also 
part of the ever-present legacy of Greek warfare in the Western 
military tradition (Lynn 2004:27).  
For Plato (1973:109) the defence of the community requires suitably trained 
warriors/soldiers as guardians (cf. Plato 1973:175). The reason that the warrior 
is suitable for leadership is because the warrior’s skills combine all the right 
virtues such as courage, knowledge and wisdom (cf. Plato 1973:224–225). For 
Plato the philosopher-king is a warrior. The experienced hunter or warrior is the 
pillar of the community. The close interlink between war, philosophy and 
creativity leads Ruskin to conclude that great art can only be created by a 
nation of warriors (cf. Huizinga 1971:124). It is not a coincidence that in Greek 
mythology the goddess Athena is the goddess of both wisdom and war, 
indicating a common origin. Thus as Heidegger concludes: “polemos and logos 
are the same” and man is a warrior – a Homo Polemos (Fried 2000:33).  
The basic manifestation of the polemos as logos is seen in the structure of 
philosophical inquiry. Socrates inaugurates the question and answer dialogic 
method as the paradigm of Western philosophy. This benign dialogue of polite 
questions and answers should lead to enlightenment or understanding. But as 
Huizinga (1971:174) notes, real dialogue is playful and an agonistic battle of 
wits, thus Plato's presentation of Socratic dialogue is a fiction "for obviously real 
conversation, however polished it may have been with the Greeks, could never 
115 
 
have the gloss of the literary dialogue." Socrates demonstrates only a 
semblance of dialogue:  
Socrates speaks. The listener, each time more edified, only 
intervenes from time to time to punctuate with respectful approval 
the dazzling developments of the master. This second voice only 
takes the part of pauses when the virtuoso must catch his breath. 
If authentic dialogue means to work together on an equal footing, 
Socrates, who takes over the dialogue, seems more like a person 
in monologue. If it were not for that, he would not be the father of 
philosophy, for one characteristic of the great philosopher is 
precisely his inability to reach agreement with others (Gusdorf 
1979:102). 
The method of dialogue in philosophy is a fiction only inscribed in a literary work 
and produced by a single philosopher-author demonstrating his own 
knowledge. The reality of philosophical discourse is different from its idealised 
representation in literary fiction. As against the presupposition of a rational 
discourse, disinterested polite sequence of question and answers the reality is 
different. 
... when the philosopher encounters another philosopher who asks 
him to justify himself, the result is almost inevitably a dialogue 
between deaf men... The continual experience of philosophical 
societies would be proof enough, if it were called for, of the fact 
that the thinker is almost always a man who speaks alone and 
doesn't listen to what is said to him (Gusdorf 1979:102) 
But this show of dogmatic mastery should not be surprising because 
philosophical dialogue brings into confrontation matured 
personalities for whom the game is already up. They limit 
themselves to expressing a consolidated thought which they can't 
deny without denying themselves. Now, conversations are rare. 
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True dialogue presupposes an open and receptive attitude, as 
opposed to sterile discussions in which each participant limits 
himself to restating his convictions, without ever giving an inch, 
and in which, as a last resort, he ends up by playing hide-and-seek 
or by hurling insults in a desperate effort to have the last word 
(Gusdorf 1979:103). 
Thus one needs to look deeper into the nature of dialogue and the art of 
questioning. To question is to want to know something. But in intellectual 
discourse under the pretence of asking questions one attacks the speaker. "To 
question then takes on its police sense: to question is to challenge, to 
interpellate" (Barthes 1986:319), and to attack. The person being questioned 
must reply to the content and not to the manner in which a question is asked. 
Therefore, dialogue is a game of disputations and contests that are coded and 
masked (cf. Barthes 1986:319–320). Canetti (1981:331) contends that all 
questioning is a form of forceful intrusion, an instrument of power that is used 
like a knife to cut into the flesh of the victim. To the questioner it gives a feeling 
of power and every answer received demonstrates an act of submission on the 
part of the one being questioned (cf. Canetti 1981:332). The answer given also 
restricts the freedom of movement of the one who gives it because he has to 
abide by it and is forced to take a fixed position while "his questioner can shoot 
at him from anywhere, changing his position as it suits him" (Canetti 1981:333).  
While logos and polemos have the same aim and structure, it should not be 
assumed that language and speech are by themselves forms of pure violence. 
Such claims would manifest the old belief in the magical power of words. For 
the primitive people language seemed as if it was a weapon so when they were 
verbally challenged they duck their heads or dive to the ground in order to avoid 
being hit by the verbal insult that was assumed to be a projectile (cf. Hughes 
1998:8–9; Hughes 1988). The remnants of such magical beliefs are evident in 
the common and intellectual discourses that uncritically accept claims that 
words kill. Accepting such claims empowers some social agents to exert social 
domination and repression of language.  
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The polemos is always the primary force and the hidden hand behind the logos, 
language and discourse. Indeed, the proper and limited power of words is 
recognised by Hobbes (1958:139) when he observes that covenants without 
the sword are but empty words as they do not have the power to keep men in 
awe and tie them to their commitments. Machiavelli (1968:99) is aware of the 
limited power of discursive battle when he notes that there are two forms of 
fighting suitable for humans: one fights by the use of words, persuasion and the 
law or, alternatively one fights by the use of force. While fighting by the use of 
law seems proper to man it often proves inadequate, hence one needs to resort 
to the use of force. Using force requires one to combine the power of the lion 
with the cunning and deception ability attributed to the fox. It is clear that the 
lion and the fox have the same aim: to win and prevail but because of their 
difference in physical strength they do so by different means and this 
demonstrates that the strength of the lion needs to be supplemented by the 
cunning of the fox. Indeed, according to Sun Tzu the essence of war is 
deception: to deceive, to convince or persuade the enemy to surrender and 
thus gain an easy victory. This similarity is evident to New Rhetoric theorists 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971:55) who claim that rhetorical 
argumentation and war have the same goal: "One can indeed try to obtain a 
particular result either by the use of violence or by speech aimed at securing 
the adherence of minds." Securing adherence of mind is a form of conflict 
resolution and it is the ultimate aim of both war and speech to resolve conflict 
between the antagonistic parties. The similarity between war and speech is also 
obvious to Clausewitz, as he notes: war is continuation of policy by other 
means. "This is because physical conflict is itself already rhetorical, already a 
kind of symbolic action, already understood in terms of argument" (Crosswhite 
1996:128). Indeed, language itself is the field of combats, battles and duels (cf. 
Barthes 1986: 350), and discourse – as an act of speaking and language use – 
only moves by clashes: it emerges always against some preceding doxa, and it 
is always opposing some orthodoxy (cf. Barthes 1986:317).  
While the logos may seem equally as powerful as the polemos, nevertheless 
the power of language comes from outside, from the power of the people using 
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the language. According to Bourdieu (1977a:21) “the constitutive power which 
is granted to ordinary language lies not in the language itself but in the group 
which authorises it and invests it with authority.” As Carl Schmitt concludes: 
One of the most important manifestations of humanity's legal and 
spiritual life is the fact that whoever has true power is able to 
determine the content of concepts and words. Caesar dominus et 
supra grammaticam. Caesar is also lord of grammar (Schmitt in 
Mouffe 2005:87).  
Thus ultimately the meaning of words is derived from social power. True social 
power that confers meaning on the world and the words used to describe the 
world has its origin in war. As Foucault (1987:308) suggests, one can hear the 
“distant roar of battle” in all social relations.  
Individuals, groups, societies and nations are never totally at war or totally at 
peace and there can be no absolute dichotomy between war and peace. 
Indeed, throughout history war was felt as being the context against which the 
everyday life is experienced (cf. Favret 2005). As Cuomo (1996:42) puts it: 
The consciousness of war is always part of the everyday life. War 
is a presence, a constant undertone, white noise in the 
background of social existence, moving sometimes closer to the 
foreground of collective consciousness in the form of direct combat 
yet remaining mostly as an unconsidered given.   
Such conscious and unconscious experience is the underlining aspect of 
civilisation embedded in human discourse and expressed in culture. It 
originates in Homer’s heroic war paradigm and continued its influence 
throughout the centuries and is still felt in the present as war and battle is 
experiences as being at the heart of all speaking and logical discourse (cf. e.g. 
Bryant 1996; King 1991; Manguel 2007; Weil 2005). Margaret Mead (1964) 
summarises this aptly: 
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Warfare is here, as part of our thought; the deeds of warriors are 
immortalised in the words of our poets; the toys of our children are 
modelled upon the weapons of the soldier; the frame of reference 
within which our statesmen and our diplomats work always contain 
war (Mead 1964:132). 
The influence of war and the power-play of social relations imply that the 
meanings of words are socially constructed and are not peaceful impositions.  
4.5  Social construction of meaning: the bigger stick makes meaning 
stick 
As the review in the previous sections demonstrated it is likely that language 
originates from bodily gestures and is interlinked with the business of war. For 
Berger and Luckmann (1979) play of power and combat are primary activities 
that operate within a society and could be considered as constituting the pre-
theoretical knowledge that everyone understands (Berger & Luckmann 
1979:83–84). Such knowledge is embodied and internalised in a social learning 
process when language and meaning are acquired.  
On the most basic level the use of violence on the human body may force it to 
produce sounds in the form of verbal cries of pain while the administration of 
blows may be followed by vocal sound of pleasure. More developed systems of 
vocal signs or words are metaphors that translate such basic physical 
experience. Thus the vocal sign, like the physical sign of a clenched fist elicits 
response in the participants in the social action. The word or vocal sign 
functions as if the real object were present and so elicit the same response 
(Berger & Luckmann 1979:54–55).  
The language of gestures that gives rise to vocal signs eventually develops 
more complex meanings and such meanings are institutionalised by 
“habitualisation”, that is, actions that are repeated frequently and cast into 
recognisable pattern and recognised as imaginatively recreating the original 
situation (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1979:70–71). Both the gestures and vocal 
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signs and demonstrate as if stating "this is how things are done", or put 
differently, the reality of the sign becomes a symbolic reality representing real 
actions (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1979:70–71, 77). 
On such foundations a system of signs and meaning of the world develops and 
such system explains why things in social reality are as they are. This is a 
"social definition of reality": the way society is structured and the explanation 
and meaning of such structure are defined by the socially powerful agents and 
groups in the society. The meaning of social definition of reality is that to a large 
extent reality is what people decide what it is. Ultimately, the meaning and 
definition of reality that "will be made to stick" and accepted as the commonly 
accepted meaning is determined by the power of the agents who wield "the 
bigger stick" (Berger & Luckmann 1979:126–127). In other words, social power 
legitimates and imposes meaning. The social construction of meaning is 
internalised by the individual and the process is described by Freud as social 
repression of instinct that in turn creates the human mind.  
The definition of reality by agents of power is not a peaceful process but can be 
violent because of resistance. In a confrontation over two competing visions 
and versions of reality the alternative views of the world challenge one another 
and each side will resort to stronger support to propagate their frail power of 
argument, the means used include "such as getting the authorities to employ 
armed might to enforce one argument against its competitors" and potential 
competitors are physically liquidated or assimilated as soon as they appear (cf. 
Berger & Luckmann 1979:139). Which of the two views of the world or theories 
will win depends more on the social power that each contestant can marshal in 
support rather than on the pure theoretical or empirical merit they may have. 
Discussion on the merits of contending theories or world views are less likely to 
be decided by some imagined rational arguments. Instead, they are decided  
on the less rarefied level of military might. The historical outcome 
of each clash of the gods was determined by those who wielded 
the better weapons rather than those who had the better 
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arguments. The same, of course may be said of the intrasocial 
conflicts of this kind. He who has the bigger stick has the better 
chance to impose his definition of reality (Berger & Luckmann 
1979:127).  
Human reason and understanding is no doubt interrelated with power. John 
Donne elucidates this clearly when he compares heavy firearms as being 
reason itself. Donne, referring to the use of artillery in war says that "by the 
benefit of this light of reason" wars have become shorter (cf. McLuhan 
1969:362). Donne implies that the power of the weapon convinces or makes 
people see “reason” and be persuaded, as it were. And ultimately, it is power 
that constructs reason. The wielding of weapons or holding social power to 
define what a situation is may be evident from the fact that "many social 
situations are effectively controlled by the definitions of imbeciles" (Berger 
1980:101); these definitions are accepted as legitimate regardless of their 
content because of the real or assumed power of the definers. Therefore, to  
understand the state of socially constructed universe at any given 
time, or its change over time, one must understand the social 
organisation that permits the definers to do their defining (Berger & 
Luckmann 1979:134).  
Nietzsche aptly summarises the role of social power as being the origin of 
language and meaning:  
The lordly right of bestowing names is such that one would almost 
be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an expression 
of the rulers' power. They say “This is that or that”; they seal off 
each thing and action with a sound and thereby take symbolic 
possession of it (Nietzsche 1956:160).  
Similar point is strongly made by Lewis Carroll's (1985:269) narration of the 
conversation between Humpty Dumpty and Alice:  
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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a scornful tone, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean 
so many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – 
that's all.” 
In other words, Humpty Dumpty thinks that society produces a vocabulary of 
"empty signifiers" and one in a position of power can fill them with meaning 
without much opposition. But in reality the "empty signifiers" are filled with 
temporary signified or meaning. And these meanings are always contested (cf. 
Laclau 2007:35). As Alice points out to Humpty Dumpty, the existence of empty 
signifiers is only possible at some imaginary beginning of language, or it exists 
as abstractions in a dictionary. In reality a signifier, a word or concept is always 
already related to other signified or meaning that have been imposed by some 
powerful group at some stage in history. Therefore, any definition or redefinition 
of concepts and reality is always contaminated by previous historical 
signification or meanings. Such meaning or signified always come into play and 
a series of contradictions arise because signifiers can have varieties of 
meanings that make them equivocal and ambiguous (cf. Laclau 2007:36).  
Words have a history and as Marcuse (1970:147) says, that history is the 
hidden dimension of meaning in everyday speech. According to Bourdieu 
(1977a:25) "the meaning of a linguistic element depends at least as much on 
extra-linguistic as on linguistic factors," that is, on the context and situation in 
which it is used. Therefore, construction of meaning ex nihilo by a totalitarian 
imposition as envisaged by Orwell's creators of Newspeak or to direct 
communication as attempted by the Nazi regime (cf. Mueller 1976:24–25), are 
never entirely successful because of the sedimented meanings that resist a 
totalitarian imposition.  
The social character of language and meaning implies that the individual has a 
more limited space for freedom and self-expression. The individual speaks the 
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language of his group and acquires the habits of speech and thought of his 
group that limit the range of words and meaning considered as acceptable and 
provide the framework for what can be thought and is either taboo or un-
thought for lack of words and meaning (cf. Mannheim 1979:2). Social mode of 
thought and individual thought are not entirely uniform or monolith but shaped 
by the diverse social groups to which the individual belongs. 
Men living in groups do not merely coexist physically as discrete 
individuals. They do not confront the objects of the world from the 
abstract levels of a contemplating mind as such, nor do they do so 
exclusively as solitary beings. On the contrary they act with and 
against one another in diversely organised groups, and while doing 
so they think with and against one another (Mannheim 1979:3). 
Social groups are political organisations and politics is conflict within and 
between groups. Groups and political parties are fighting organisations and 
their conflict is a life-and-death struggle. The political discussions reflect this 
struggle and the aim of discussions is not to show that one is right but to 
"demolish the basis of its opponent's social and intellectual existence" 
(Mannheim 1979:34).  
Political conflict, since it is from the very beginning a rationalised 
form of the struggle for social predominance, attacks the social 
status of the opponent, his public prestige, and his self confidence 
(Mannheim 1979:34).  
Political talk is a sublimation and substitution of discussion for the weapons of 
war and direct use of force, but in essence the aims of both "weapons" are the 
same: the one aims for physical annihilation and the other for psychic 
annihilation. As Schmitt (1976:28) notes politics originates in war: at the end of 
war the two parties to conflict exchange their military contention for political 
confrontation and contestations, the change means that the enemy becomes a 
political adversary. Following Schmitt, Mouffe (1993; 2000) suggests that the 
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warring antagonist enemy becomes a political debating agonist. (A more 
extended discussion of Schmitt’s concepts is presented in Chapter 5). 
The social definition of meaning and the transformation of war relation to social 
power relation and to symbolic relation show the origin of culture in war. In 
Bourdieu's words (1989:21) symbolic or cultural power is nothing other than the 
economic or cultural capital, but this power is mis-recognised; and its origin in 
violence and power are concealed. In turn, symbolic relations – symbolic 
violence – reinforce social power relations as they provide the narrative to 
justify and legitimate the power of the dominant group and its view of the world. 
In this sense cultural power is a hegemonic domination, as described by 
Gramsci. The ruling group and its cultural domination always generate 
resistance and come under symbolic attack. This is so because the existing 
social order constructs the world in discourse and justifies itself discursively, 
therefore it can be discursively resisted, attacked, challenged and contested by 
new groups attempting to impose new meaning. Discourse is not only a 
medium for the representation and narration of social conflicts but it is itself an 
object of desire and the very object over which conflict arises, it is the thing for 
which, and by which conflicts are fought (cf. Foucault 1971:89).  
The grammar of power in the symbolic order implies that culture – as a field of 
meaning – is always contested and is an object of contestation and war. That 
an element of war is present in all culture is noted by Walter Benjamin's 
(1973:258) observation that “all cultural treasures are the spoils of war that 
each victorious conqueror takes over triumphantly from the defeated.” 
Therefore, for Benjamin (1973:258) "there is no document of civilisation which 
is not at the same time a document of barbarism, barbarism taints also the 
manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another." Nietzsche 
(1989:40–41) locates a formative element of war at the beginning of all culture 
where “one cannot fail to see at the bottom of all the noble races the beast of 
prey ... even their highest culture betrays a consciousness of it and even a 
pride in it." From ancient times war and cultural refinements were the primary 
occupations of the warrior classes: "The heroes of the epics again served as 
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paradeigmata for those princes of war were also men of developed aesthetic 
refinements" (Bryant 1996:82). For example Achilles is noted for his ferocity in 
battle, delightful singing and skilful play of the lyre, and the chivalrous knights of 
medieval Europe framed their murderous occupation with ennobling harmonies 
of musical art (cf. Bryant 1996:82). Likewise European military elites of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were culturally refined "officers, gentlemen 
and poets" (Bell 2008:21). 
Such genealogy, according to Edward Said (1994:xiv) means that culture can 
be considered as a battlefield on which different meaning and different groups 
fight one another for mastery over meaning of the world and narration of their 
identity and history:  
Culture is a sort of theatre where various political and ideological 
causes engage one another. Far from being a placid realm of 
Apollonian gentility, culture can even be a battleground on which 
causes expose themselves to the light of day and contend with 
one another (Said 1994:xiv).  
As the fate of their identity and veracity of their historical narratives are decided 
in the narratives themselves, the "power to narrate, or to block other narratives 
from forming and emerging, is very important to culture” (Said 1994:xiii). 
Indeed, as the study by Huizinga (1971:96) shows, the "agonistic basis" of 
culture and civilisation was there from the beginning. If culture is a battlefield, 
then real battlefield is itself a form of culture and a form of education: firstly by 
giving compulsory education to the enemy (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:122), 
then stimulating scientific progress and technical and cultural production form 
literature to clothing and fashion (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:126; White 2002, 
2005). Ultimately, war has been, and still remains the stimulus for the enemy to 
study the resources and characteristics of his attacker while the attacker tries to 
understand the enemy: 
Alexander the Great and Caesar and Napoleon were accompanied 
on their campaigns by crowds of scholars and linguists to advise 
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them on every aspect of the enemy's patterns of culture and, of 
course, to loot any cultural treasures of the enemy that could be 
conveniently seized (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:125–126).  
The same erudition exists in the contemporary wars as the "generals and their 
staff discuss and mediate on every aspect of the enemies' psychology, studying 
their cultural histories and resources and technologies, so that today war, as it 
were, has become the little red schoolhouse of the global village" (McLuhan & 
Fiore 1968:125).  
4.6 War as the ontological and epistemological foundation of 
communication  
A review of the possible inspiration force of war may uncover that from Stone 
Age cave paintings to modern cinema and cyber-age computer games, war is 
the most popular theme for visual representations and an important theme in 
poetry and literature in almost all known cultures (cf. e.g. Brosman 1992:85; 
Havelock 1972; Perlmutter 1999; van Creveld 1991; 2002). As a study by 
Brosman (1992) concludes: 
Of arms and the man I sing. From the days of the Greeks, the 
Romans, and the Hebrew chroniclers, epic poetry, drama, and 
historical accounts have repeatedly been inspired by, and often 
centered around, war, which Heraclitus called father of all, and 
king of all. The role played by ... war ... in the whole of ancient 
Western literature is so central that it can be considered the single 
most important topic of the body of literature inherited from early 
Western civilisation. ... much of the oral tradition of non-Western 
peoples, ... affirm[s] the near-universality of war as a subject for – 
and doubtless often an impetus to – song, drama, and narrative, 
oral and written (Brosman 1992:85). 
The increase in communication about war in the mass media has consistently 
attracted large audiences (cf. Hallin & Gitlin 1993). Thus war’s “ability to 
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entertain, to inspire, and to fascinate has never been in doubt” (van Creveld 
1991:226). For many thinkers throughout history assumed that war is the 
measure of all things, as Clausewitz (1985:212) writes, war is “a wonderful 
trinity” involving: The human instincts of hatred, grounded in biological origins; 
the play of chance that is a free activity expressive of the human soul and 
spirituality; and a political instrument that belongs to the sphere of reason. 
Clausewitz inadvertently describes the way war emerges in the real world and 
then is transformed and becomes spiritualised. The spiritualisation of war 
according to Coker (2004:6) it is a process of transformation from the utilitarian 
to signifying practice: war is firstly an instrumental way of using force to gain an 
objective, and being successful in attaining instrumental goals it gains an 
existential value and becomes a way of life and culture for successful warriors, 
and in turn success in war defines the identity of the warrior and as such was 
becomes metaphysical because it gives meaning to death and to life itself.  
The review of the humanising and identity conferring aspects of war in the 
previous chapter and the review in this chapter of the way war may be a 
possible foundation for communication and its central place and meaning in 
human life can be used to evaluate the implications for understanding 
communication and communication theory. 
4.7  Conclusion 
Following on the reviews and careful interpretative reading of literature in 
Chapter 3 that revealed how social thinkers since the time of the ancient 
Greeks understood the way war and killing are central forces in the construction 
of the human identities, this chapter offered a reading of the literature to trace 
the way war and killing are shown as the foundation of language and the way 
war and killing transform concrete bodies into abstract concepts imbued with 
meaning. The central significance of war for the human being is described by 
Hegel's conception of the battle that inaugurated human history. The symbolic 
significance of this primordial battle is its allusion to the manner that the human 
animal becomes a full human being. The transformation from animal life to 
128 
 
human life is based on the conscious willingness to risk the animal's life: by 
disregarding its own survival in order to pursue an abstract and immaterial 
reward which is valued more than life inaugurates the new species of human 
beings. This battle and contest expressive of human life is constantly re-
enacted in wars so as to confer human meaning. From the assumed primacy of 
war language was born from re-enactment of exchange of blows in the dialogue 
of gestures. Beginning with Homer, poets, writers, philosophers and artists 
recorded the tragic sense of life and transformed it into an aesthetic experience 
that confers immortality to mortal human beings.  
Having outlined a new general theoretical understanding of war this 
understanding will inform a close reading of the way war structures the thought 
and theories about communication of selected twentieth century thinkers. The 
next chapter will offer a reading of Johan Huizinga's theory of play that 
represents an early twentieth century theoretical foundation for understanding 
media entertainment and its relation to Carl Schmitt's theory of the political and 





PLAY IS BATTLE AND BATTLE IS PLAY: 
WAR AS CULTURAL FOUNDATION IN THE THOUGHT 
OF HUIZINGA AND SCHMITT 
Play is battle and battle is play – Huizinga (1971:61) 
Ever since words existed for fighting and playing, men have been wont to call 
war a game – Huizinga (1971:110) 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The previous two chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) traced war as it is represented in 
Western tradition and demonstrated how from the time of the ancient Greeks 
war was assumed as the conscious and unconscious model for human thought. 
Ever since the time Heraclitus, Homer and Hesiod conceived "war as a way of 
life" (Havelock 1972:21), the battlefield has been the natural and pervasive 
metaphor, as well as a literal image of human life. Such understanding of war 
will inform a close reading of a number of theorists in this and the following 
chapters. 
This chapter will trace the way war appears in the thought of European scholars 
of the 1930s. The particular aim of this chapter is to uncover the idea of war as 
a neglected and central dimension in the works of Johan Huizinga who is better 
known for his writing on the play element in culture. A close reading and 
interpretation of Huizinga's theory of play will also show that it is war, rather 
than play, that animates Huizinga's thoughts and writing. The reading also 
uncovers Huizinga's critique of Carl Schmitt, a contemporary leading German 
legal scholar known for his concern with the idea of a state of emergency and 
show how his theory is structured by an intricate view of war. Both Huizinga's 
and Schmitt's concepts of war will be contrasted and extended.  
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5.2  Johan Huizinga: Homo Ludens 
5.2.1  The agon: culture as battle-play 
In his book Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, originally 
published in 1938 Johan Huizinga (1971:18) proposes to show "how far culture 
itself bears the character of play." Huizinga's stated hypothesis is that the play 
element forms and structures culture, and in turn the characteristic and 
structure of play manifest themselves in all spheres of human culture. Thus 
culture emerged from the primordial playfulness of human beings. According to 
Huizinga (1971:23, 66), human culture originates in play and is always played-
out and "civilisation arises and unfolds in and as play" (Huizinga 1971:17). 
Moreover, it is neither a "rhetorical comparison" nor "a conscious metaphor" to 
view culture as "sub specie ludi" (Huizinga 1971:23, 61).  
Subsequent to the publication of Huizinga's book in 1938, it has become a 
reference point and stimulated development of academic literature on the 
concept of play (cf. Anchor 1978:63; Ehrmann 1968:31). However, contrary to 
Huizinga's stated aim, and against the unquestioned assumption that Huizinga 
primarily produced a theory of play (cf. e.g. Anchor 1978; Caillois 1980; 
Stephenson 1967), this chapter will demonstrate Huizinga's (1971) unstated 
actual hypothesis, and show that culture arose not in play but in agonistic 
battle, and that all fields of human culture bear the character and formative 
structure of battle and war. As will be demonstrated, for Huizinga play is 
identical and interchangeable with the agonistic or polemical: play is a war-like 
activity. The battle and play are indivisible and constitute a single primary 
structure – the "battle-play" as the foundation of human culture and civilisation.  
5.2.2  From battle to play: agonistic character of life 
Huizinga begins his argument by proposing that in addition to the two traditional 
images of man as the rational thinker named Homo Sapiens, and man as the 
toolmaker designated Homo Faber, we ought to add a third image of man as 
the game player, the Homo Ludens (cf. Huizinga 1971:17). Moreover, Huizinga 
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(1971) argues that the human being is primarily a Homo Ludens, and that 
human civilisation and culture developed on the basis of the play instinct: 
culture arose in and through the phenomenon of play (cf. Huizinga 1971: 23, 
66). According to Huizinga (1971:23) all the elements of civilised life, such as, 
law, commerce, art and craft, poetry, knowledge and science "are rooted in the 
primeval soil of play." Thus culture can be considered as "sub specie ludi," 
because play is the primary generative force for human cultural development 
(cf. Huizinga 1971:23).  
In order to define play Huizinga proposes that play is identified as the antithesis 
of seriousness and then he enumerates its specific characteristics as: play is 
free and enjoyable activity; is experienced as stepping outside of ordinary life; is 
voluntary and spontaneous; is contained within its own spatial and temporal 
boundaries; is regulated by rules; and constructs a play community (cf. 
Huizinga 1971:32).  
However, after enumerating the characteristics of play Huizinga concludes that 
all these formal elements of play can be grouped under two basic aspects, 
namely, play as being "a contest for something" or as a contest for "a 
representation of something". Furthermore, even these two aspects can be 
condensed and united into the single idea that the "game 'represents' a contest, 
or else becomes a contest for the best representation of something" (Huizinga 
1971:32). Thus for Huizinga play is singularly competitive and "represents a 
combat or a contest" (Huizinga in Ehrmann 1968:36). From this it will become 
clear that Huizinga inadvertently identifies and locates the primary aspect of 
play in its competitive and agonistic character. That is, for Huizinga, the real 
element from which culture emerged is the agonistic, polemical, and war-like 
element that subsumes playfulness. Huizinga's image of man is not the Homo 
Ludens but the playful agonistic Homo polemos. 
The competitive nature of play, according to Huizinga (cf. 1971:66), means that 
culture arose in agonistic war-like play. In other words, because play is identical 
to the agon or strife means that agon (contest and battle) rather than play, is 
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the primary generative force of culture. To put it differently, the central agonistic 
and competitive nature of play means that play is ultimately a form of armed 
strife and can be represented on a continuum that encompasses a whole range 
of activities from the "most trifling games to bloody and mortal strife" (Huizinga 
1971:60). In short, play "represent a combat or a contest" (Ehrmann 1968:36); 
the play, agon and polemos form a unity and are almost identical. While 
Huizinga's stated aim is to reveal and trace the play element as formative force 
of cultural development, his study inadvertently traces play as a sub-species of 
the more fundamental phenomenon of agon – contest and war. Thus, because 
battle and play are indivisible, Huizinga's central them is war and battle or as he 
notes, it is the "battle-play" as such (cf. Huizinga 1971:60). This dual antithesis 
of contending playful adversarial forces is a model of culture. Here Huizinga 
may be influenced by Nietzsche's (1978:21) notion that war is "a joyful 
occasion".  
Despite the emphasis on the agon, most scholars assume that Huizinga's 
enumeration of the characteristic of play is the model he applies in his own 
analysis, and following suit they use the list of elements for their own cultural 
analysis to identify how cultural forms manifest the characteristics of play (cf. 
Anchor 1978:79). Huizinga's classification and model of play has been modified 
by Caillois (1980) and has been applied with limited success by Stephenson 
(1967) to study of mass media. In the field of communication theory Huizinga's 
idea of play does not attract much interest. Huizinga was subsequently 
criticised by pacifist-inclined thinkers for his single emphasis on the competitive 
and agonistic aspect of play and culture (cf. Anchor 1978:80; Caillois 
1980:152–162). Caillois (1980:158) objection is based on his condemnation of 
the agon as a perversion of culture, because according Caillois, it returns the 
human being to the brutality of the law of the jungle (cf. Ehrmann 1968:51–52). 
Tannen (1998), from a feminist perspective, condemns agonism as it is 
manifest in Ong's (1989:10) writing and by implication it would apply to 
Huizinga as well. Nevertheless, Huizinga's emphasis on the agon and polemos 
remains correct (cf. Ong 1989:25, 45).  
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Indeed, Walter Ong (1989:18) offers the singular and perceptively observation 
that Huizinga's important contribution is to focus attention on the adversarial 
and "the pervasiveness of the agonistic activity in the form of play through the 
entire human world" and the civilising and conscious-constructing effects of 
adversarial activities. According to Ong (1989:25), Huizinga's work "with 'play' 
was relevant, but his insights have to be refined and redirected ... by thinking in 
terms of 'contest' rather than of 'play' as such." But as Ong (1989:45) 
acknowledges, such direction was already inadvertently offered by Huizinga's 
insistence on the unified identity of play and contest. As Ong (1989:15) argues, 
contest and adversativeness are part of human life everywhere and have 
"provided a paradigm for understanding our own existence: in order to know 
myself, I must know that something else is not me and is (in some measure) set 
against me, psychologically as well as physically" (Ong 1989:15–16).  
The emphasis on the generative primacy of play, which is in essence agonistic 
play, places Huizinga within two traditions of Western thought, both dating back 
to antiquity and claim original paternity in Heraclitus. This was reviewed in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
First, Huizinga's central emphasis on play as the defining human characteristic 
has a long philosophical lineage. Man as Homo Ludens originates in Heraclitus' 
idea that "the course of the world is a playing child moving figures on a board." 
This view is extended in Plato's conception of man as the "plaything of God" 
and in Schiller's contention that man is only human when he is at play. Similar 
views are shared by Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and other modern 
philosophers (cf. Anchor 1978:63). 
Second, Huizinga's emphasis on the agonistic, polemical, and war-like 
character of play links him to another tradition also originating in Heraclitus who 
placed the polemos as the primordial original principle of the cosmos. 
Heraclitus, like Hesiod, considered both war as a lethal contest between 
societies and strife within a society as a manifestation of the same competitive 
agonistic spirit of the twin goddesses Eris. Huizinga is inspired by Nietzsche, 
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who was himself inspired by the value of agonistics in the ancient Greek 
tradition (cf. Huizinga 1971:177; Nietzsche 1997). Thus, all life is agon, play 
and polemos, and ultimately as Heraclitus proclaimed: war is the father of all 
things. 
5.2.3  Indivisibility of playing and fighting: not a metaphor 
The replacement of the concept play with "battle-contest" or agon – 
competition, strife and battle – becomes evident as Huizinga’s study 
progresses. The element of play is identical to the agonistic polemos and this 
means, according to Huizinga (1971) that polemos rather than play is the prime 
civilising force: the “agonistic basis of civilisation is given from the start” and 
culture developed "in play-like contest" and is not separate from it (cf. Huizinga 
1971:95–96). 
The proof that play and agon are unified and have the same identity is provided 
by the linguistic habits of various cultures where the concepts for fighting and 
playing are used interchangeably. Such linguistic usage provides the "evidence 
of identity between agonistic and the play principle" (Huizinga 1971:55). All the 
evidence shows that play, contest and serious strife (polemos or war) constitute 
one single sphere of life (cf. Huizinga 1971:63, 93). The equation and 
interchange of play and fight demonstrates that "it is more than a rhetorical 
comparison" to consider culture as sub specie ludi (Huizinga 1971:23). 
Moreover, the equation of "playing and fighting" shows that it is not a 
"conscious metaphor" but represents a reality. This is so because in the act of 
playing the distinction between "belief" and "make-believe" dissolves and the 
"one has become the other", as for example, in a magic dance the native 
tribesman experiences an altered-state of mind and in his magical dance he is 
the animal he plays (cf. Huizinga 1971:44). 
The non-metaphorical character of the ancient understanding of play and battle 
is related to their link with real-world experience. Nietzsche (1989:31–32) 
explains such relation thus: “All the concepts of ancient man were rather at first 
incredibly uncouth, coarse, narrow, straightforward and altogether unsymbolic 
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in meaning.” The pre-metaphorical nature of the ancient world considered 
words and things not as being separate, but as constituting a single domain of 
human communal life. According to Arendt (1998a) human social life is in the 
political sphere and consists of two primary activities, that of "action and 
speech." In pre-Socratic thought, action and speech belong together, and such 
an exemplary unity is manifest in Achilles "the doer of great deeds and the 
speaker of great words." According to Arendt (1998a:25), 
speech and action were considered to be coeval and coequal, of 
the same rank and the same kind; and this originally meant not 
only that most political action, in so far as it remains outside the 
sphere of violence, is indeed transacted in words, but more 
fundamentally that finding the right words at the right moment, 
quite apart from the information or communication they may 
convey, is action (Arendt 1998a:26). 
Foucault (1989b) explains that the pre-metaphor state was "the region where 
'things' and 'words' have not yet been separated, and where – at the most 
fundamental level of language – seeing and saying are still one" (Foucault 
1989b:xi). In the ancient world the merging and interchange of the concepts 
battle and play, meant that both were experienced and performed in the same 
manner; in playing a game, as in fighting a battle, one can lose or win a game 
or a battle.  
5.2.4  Play is battle and battle is play: agon as foundation of culture 
To understand the formative function of the agonistic play, Huizinga turns to the 
ancient Greeks and finds that for them "the whole of life was play" consisting of 
agonistic competitive activities (cf. Huizinga 1971:50). In Greek, the concepts 
play, contest, and matches are expressed by the word agon. According to 
Huizinga (1971:49) "we can well say that an essential part of the play-concept 
is concealed in the field of operation of the agon."  
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The agon in Greek life, or the contest anywhere else in the world, 
bears all the formal characteristics of play and, as to its function, 
belongs almost wholly to the sphere of the festival, which is the 
play-sphere. It is quite impossible to separate the contest as a 
cultural function from the complex play-festival-rite (Huizinga 
1971:50). 
Here Huizinga shows that play is a subcategory of the agon, which is another 
way of saying that it is the polemos. Indeed, Huizinga designates this unity by 
the concept "battle-play" (Huizinga 1971:60). 
In ancient Greece the contest reigned supreme "as the life-principle of society" 
and was the source of cultural and social developments (cf. Huizinga 1971:93). 
The "significance of the agonistic principle for culture" means that  
there was no transition from “battle to play” in Greece, nor from 
play to battle, but a development of culture in play-like contest. In 
Greece as elsewhere the play-element was present and significant 
from the beginning (Huizinga 1971:95, Originl emphasis). 
Indeed, linguistic evidence shows that in the whole ancient world play and fight 
were experienced as one single sphere of life and designated by the concept 
agon or agonia (cf. Huizinga 1971:55, 60). Subsumed in the concept agon are 
the activities of play, challenge, danger, risk, feat, and in all these there is 
always something at stake. In the ancient world the "play-terms are regularly 
applied to armed strife" and it is literally a "battle-play" (Huizinga 1971:60). To 
understand such experience,  
we have to feel our way into the archaic sphere of thought, where 
serious combat with weapons and all kinds of contests ranging 
from the most trifling games to bloody and mortal strife were 
comprised, together with play proper, in the single idea of a 
struggle with fate limited by certain rules. Seen in this way, the 
application of the world “play” to battle can hardly be called a 
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conscious metaphor. Play is battle and battle is play (Huizinga 
1971:60–61).  
For the Greeks play and battle were indivisible, even when "play may be deadly 
yet it still remains play" (Huizinga 1971:61). Indeed, because "the majority of 
Greek contests were fought out in deadly earnest is no reason for separating 
the agon from play, or for denying the play-character of the former" (Huizinga 
1971:69). It should not be forgotten that at "the Olympics there were duels 
fought to the death" (Huizinga 1971:69). These contests between armed men 
were characterised as playful agon – the proof for this is the depiction of flute-
players at such deadly contests, thus indicating the playful attitude. 
Likewise, in ancient Israel, as noted in the second book of Samuel a "fight to 
the death between two groups was still called 'playing'" which links it to the 
sphere of laughter. Most clearly the equation between agon and play is 
manifest in warfare.  
Ever since words existed for fighting and playing, men have been 
wont to call war a game ... Language everywhere must have 
expressed matters in that way from the moment words for combat 
and play existed (Huizinga 1971:110). 
Huizinga (1971:61, 95) concludes that play and agon are indivisible and 
"polemics cannot be divorced from agonistics" (Huizinga 1971:180–181). 
Combat and play were blended absolutely in the minds of the ancients where 
"war-making parties regard themselves and each other as antagonists 
contending for something to which they feel they have a right" (Huizinga 
1971:111). 
In order to win competitors will use all possible means; even cheating is an 
acceptable part of the contest. The use of trickery to gain advantage in war or a 
game is a legitimate and innovative way for social recognition, and as such it 
gives rise to a new form of competition among the tricksters themselves (cf. 
Huizinga 1971:72–73). Evidence of the equation of play with series strife is 
138 
 
widespread in most languages. Play and strife have common characteristics of 
a contest: there is always something at stake; they involve the idea of winning 
against an opponent who is a partner to the contest; and there is a desire to 
dominate and to excel over others so as to gain honour (cf. Huizinga 1971:70). 
Winning a contest results in gaining honour, virtue, and glory and social rank 
(cf. Huizinga 1971:86). A contest is the most effective way to maintain dignity 
and respect, especially when "blood flows, honour is vindicated and restored" 
(Huizinga 1971:116).  
Since ancient times the nobility always demonstrated their virtue by feats of 
strength in war, tournaments, and contest of words. Since ancient Greece 
contest of words were considered to be equal with contests using weapons. 
Ancient military battles were a mixture of exchanging physical blows and 
exchanging of words: "pitched battle is a confused melee of boasts, insults, 
altruism, and compliments" (Huizinga 1971:86).  
The civilising function of agon and contest is manifest in giving the practical 
activity of fighting a spiritual or symbolic significance. This transformation, or 
spiritualisation is evident in ancient societies where even activities aimed at 
immediate satisfaction of needs, such as hunting, were experienced as play 
forms (Huizinga 1971:66). Thus, while war has utilitarian motives, these tend to 
be concealed and the spiritual aims over-emphasised. According to Huizinga 
(1971:111), “even when sheer hunger moves to war ... the aggressors will 
interpret it, and perhaps sincerely feel it, as a holy war, a war of honour, divine 
retribution, and what not."  
Even the intimate erotic activities are not exempt from the structuring forces of 
the agon, contest, and battle. Love is a contest that shows all the elements of 
playful battle where one overcomes obstacles, competes against other suitors, 
wins or loses the object of desire, and finally conquest and victory are manifest 
in the act of copulation (cf. Huizinga 1971:63). Representing love through 
military vocabulary, that considers the "bed as battlefield" was a popular theme 
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in Roman literature, masterfully expressed in the poetic work of Ovid (cf. 
Cahoon 1988).  
Warfare as a test of divine justice belongs to both the agonistic as well as ritual 
spheres. Characterisation of war as being agonistic and ludic are found 
everywhere: fighting war wholly as a form of contest, considering war as noble 
game, and seeing war as sport (cf. Huizinga 1971:117–120). The creation of a 
playful warrior community is part of the civilising force of the agon. The contest 
or war creates a social order: at the beginning of civilisation rivalry for first rank 
was a formative and ennobling factor, cultural forms developed in these sacred 
contests and "in them the structure of society will unfold" (Huizinga 1971:123). 
The link between war and cultural development leads Ruskin to claim that great 
art can only be produced by a nation of soldiers and  
that all great nations learned their truth of word, and strength of 
thought, in war; that they were nourished in war, and wasted by 
peace; taught by war, and deceived by peace; trained by war, and 
betrayed by peace – in a word, they were born in war, and expired 
in peace (Huizinga 1971:124–125). 
Ultimately  
in all these ceremonial and ritual usages as recorded by tradition 
from all parts of the world, we see war clearly originating in that 
primitive sphere of continuous and eager contest where play and 
combat, justice, fate, and chance are intimately commingled 
(Huizinga 1971:121). 
5.2.5  Origin of knowledge and philosophy in the battle-play 
The ancients believed that knowledge was power because it was advantageous 
in war or in a contest to know the secret names of the gods or the workings of 
the cosmic order (cf. Huizinga 1971:127). Contests, battles and competition 
demand knowledge in order to be won. Moreover, combat activities demand 
knowledge and skills to produce weapons, art, and music.  
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The marks of the agon are evident in knowledge in the ancient world. 
Demonstrations of knowledge take the form of a riddle-contest. The riddle-
contest originally was not a benign game, because the player's life was at 
stake: "You either solve or forfeit your head" and the riddle-contest with life at 
stake was common across ancient cultures (cf. Huizinga 1971:127). Closely 
linked to riddle-contest and developing on the same structure are the 
philosophical and theological interrogative discourses, in the form of a question 
and answer (cf. Huizinga 1971:134–135). These developed in a gradual 
transition from the sacred riddle-contest with the catch-questions and life at 
stake, to philosophical and theological disputations in the form of dialogic 
inquiry. Thus the man of knowledge is born from a challenge and the battle-play 
of contestations.  
The philosopher, from the earliest times to the late Sophists and 
Rhetors, always appeared as a typical champion. He challenged 
his rivals, he attacked them with vehement criticism and extolled 
his own opinion as the only true one with all the boyish 
cocksureness of archaic man. In style and form the earliest 
samples of philosophy are polemical and agonistic (Huizinga 
1971:138). 
For Huizinga the structure of thought reflects society: the antagonistic 
antithetical structure of archaic society is projected as if it were the antithetical 
structure of the cosmos. Ancient philosophies are "pervaded by a strong sense 
of the agonistic structure of the universe" and "life and cosmos are seen as the 
eternal conflict of opposites which is the root-principle of existence" and 
typically reflected in Heraclitus contention that "strife was 'the father of all 
things'" (Huizinga 1971:139). Huizinga concludes that just as social structure 
was shaped by the agonistic contest and is reflected in human mind, the 
converse is also true: 
It is no accident that the antithetical trend of archaic philosophy 
was fully reflected in the antithetical and agonistic structure of 
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archaic society. Man had long been accustomed to think of every 
thing as cleft into opposites and dominated by conflict. Hesiod 
recognised a good Eris – beneficial strife – as well as a destructive 
Eris (Huizinga 1971:139). 
The origins of ancient Greek philosophy are grounded in the battle-play and 
contest ultimately culminates in the art of sophistry and the poetics of ritual and 
riddle-contests. The representation of the Sophists as linked with ritual in the 
ancient culture, typically describes the Sophist as a prophet, medicine-man, 
poet, whose primary business is to "exhibit his amazing knowledge", and to 
stage a spectacle of battle-play where he can "defeat his rival in public contest" 
(Huizinga 1971:170). The Sophist is a nomad performer, and on visiting a town 
he gives a magnificent spectacle demonstrating his skills: 
He was gaped at like a miraculous being, likened to the heroes of 
athletics; in short, the profession of sophist was quite on a par with 
sport. The spectators applauded and laughed at every well-aimed 
crack. It was pure play, catching your opponent in a net of 
argument or giving him a knock-out blow (Huizinga 1971:171). 
Thus for the sophists' there is no clear distinction between play, sport, and fight. 
The Sophists' art is also related to the riddle-contest, described as "a fencer's 
trick" (Huizinga 1971:172). Likewise the philosophical art of Socrates and Plato 
is aptly described as play and as battle (cf. Huizinga 1971:171). The sporting 
and agonal character of sophistry was not lost with the rise of philosophy. The 
agonal and sporting elements are central to subsequent philosophy which was, 
as a matter of fact, thought in a gymnasium together with boxing and wrestling 
(cf. Hawhee 2002a; 2002b).  
The posing of a problem for the philosophical riddle was a form of challenge 
one throws at another's feet while at the same time it was like placing a shield 
in front of yourself for self defence. The questions thrown at the opponent were 
there to catch and ensnare him (cf. Huizinga 1971:172). The philosophical 
dialogue of Plato is carried in the same spirit of agon, as it "is sometimes 
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playing with purely childish tricks of grammar and logic, and sometimes verging 
on the profundities of cosmologies and epistemology" (Huizinga 1971:173). But 
Plato's presentation of Socratic dialogue as if it were systematically structured 
is a fiction: "For obviously real conversation, however polished it may have 
been with the Greeks, could never have had the gloss of the literary dialogue" 
(Huizinga 1971:174). This is so because of the strong spontaneous and 
agonistic character of ancient Greek oral society that enters every the 
conversation (cf. Huizinga 1971:175–176).  
The agonistic character of dialogic communication is acquired from the 
agonistic character of society. The primacy of contests and the way it shapes 
culture is interlinked with the dominant form of communication in ancient 
society. Therefore according to Walter Ong (1982) the particular agonistic 
character of ancient society is derived from its face-to-face interaction which is 
agonistic and conflictual. The oral encounter in a face-to-face communicative 
interaction takes place in the “arenas where human beings struggle with each 
other.” For primitive people language is mode of action, it is performance 
oriented rather than information oriented; it is a way of doing something to 
someone (cf. Ong 1982:171, 177). For example, 
proverbs and riddles are not used simply to store knowledge but to 
engage others in verbal and intellectual combat: utterance of one 
proverb or riddle challenges hearers to top it with more apposite or 
contradictory one (Ong 1982:44).  
The habit of bragging about one’s own prowess, verbal tongue-lashing and 
reciprocal name-calling in which one opponent tries to outdo another are 
standard practices, and verbal communication is a stylised art form based on 
the model of combat (cf. Ong 1982:44). 
Changes in mode of communication, such as the invention of writing and print 
which became widely diffused in society also changed behaviour and thought 
from oral to literate modes. Subsequently philosophical dialogue lost its 
agonistic character and its power declined. Intermittent revivals of controversies 
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have interrupted philosophy's slumber. During times of conflict and controversy 
the "agonistic element inevitably comes to the fore" and philosophy once again 
returns to its lively agonistic origin. For example, in the Middle Ages, once 
again, to "beat your opponent by reason or force of word becomes a sport 
comparable with the profession of arms" (Huizinga 1971:179). The revival of 
philosophical and theological disputations in the Middle Ages, gave some 
philosophers the opportunity to exchange their military profession and weapons 
of war for weapons of dialectic. Such a "mixture of rhetoric, war, and play can 
be also found in the scholastic competitions of the Muslim theologians" 
(Huizinga 1971:180).  
It is such competition that inspires cultural growth, and the modern education 
system developed from the agonistic, ludic and ferociously competitive spirit of 
the medieval scholars (cf. Huizinga 1971:179–180). But controversies and 
restoration of the agonistic character to philosophy are condemned by 
contemporary scholars. For example, according to Huizinga (1971:177) "some 
of Nietzsche's biographers blame him for having re-adopted the old agonistic 
attitude of philosophy." But in Huizinga’s estimation restoring agonism to 
philosophy is a positive development, and if Nietzsche restored the agon, then 
he "has led philosophy back to its antique origins" (Huizinga 1971:177). 
Huizinga significantly concludes that "all knowledge ... is polemical by nature, 
and polemics cannot be divorced from agonistics" (Huizinga 1971:180–181).  
5.2.6  The battle-play as structure of law 
Agon and battle-play manifest themselves in all cultural fields because these 
fields are produced and structured by the force of agon and polemos. Law, the 
idea of justice, and jurisprudence have their origin in the contest. In ancient 
Greece litigation was considered as an agon, characterised as a contest, and 
governed by rules and sacred formula. Such formative structure continues to 
inform the juridical process to the present (cf. Huizinga 1971:97).  
The modern lawsuit still remains a verbal battle, as it was in antiquity and all 
possible means are used to undo the other party to the lawsuit (cf. Huizinga 
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1971:99, 105–106, 109). The lawsuit is correctly "regarded as a game of 
chance, a contest, or a verbal battle" because its outcome is uncertain and 
depends of chance pronouncement by a judge (cf. Huizinga 1971:99). All the 
proceedings before a judge are motivated by the agonistic desire to win: “The 
style and language in which the juristic wrangling of modern lawsuit are 
conducted often betray a sportsmanlike passion for indulging in argument and 
counter argument” (Huizinga 1971:99). In ancient society central to the lawsuit 
“is not so much the abstract question of right or wrong" but what occupies the 
archaic mind was "the very concrete question of winning or losing” (Huizinga 
1971:100). And "winning as such is, for the archaic mind, proof of truth and 
rightness” (Huizinga 1971:103). In ancient society the final decision in a legal 
suit, as all decisions in war and games of chance were assumed to manifest 
divine judgement, and ultimately the "test of the will of the gods is victory or 
defeat" (Huizinga 1971:112). Therefore, to gain quick decision instead of trying 
out one's strength in contest, or throw of dice, or consult the oracle "or disputing 
by fierce words – all of which may equally well serve to elicit the divine decision 
– you could resort to war" (Huizinga 1971:112). Winning a war was itself proof 
of being in the right. Thus Nietzsche's Zarathustra is correct in proclaiming that 
"it is the good war that hallows every cause" (Nietzsche 1969:74). As Huizinga 
explains: 
In order to understand these associations we have to look beyond 
our customary division between the juridical, the religious, and the 
political. What we call “right” can equally well, archaically speaking, 
be “might” – in the sense of “the will of the gods” or “manifest 
superiority”. Hence an armed conflict is as much a mode of justice 
as divination or a legal proceeding (Huizinga 1971:112).  
The complexity of these ideas can be seen in the practice of the "single 
combat" in ancient culture. The single combat demonstrates a variety of 
purposes, from showing personal courage, or used as a pre-battle test, where 
the bravest warriors challenge their opposite numbers. As the battle is a testing 
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of fate, the outcome of a single combat of champions sometimes replaced a 
battle by large armies (cf. Huizinga 1971:113). 
5.2.7 The battle-play as structure of poetry, art and politics 
The art of poetry originates in the battle-play sphere, sacred play of religion, 
festive play of courtship, martial contest, disputations, bragging, mockery, and 
play of wit (cf. Huizinga 1971:152). In the archaic culture the function of poetry 
was social and liturgical; it combines ritual, entertainment, artistry, riddle-
making, doctrine, persuasion, sorcery, soothsaying, prophecy, and competition 
(cf. Huizinga 1971:142). Poetry's link with contest is evident in the rivalry 
among the poets and story-tellers. Indicative of such association with contest is 
the fact that the majority of poetry and literature have strife and war as their 
main theme (cf. Huizinga 1971:155). Likewise, theatrical drama and comedy 
was originally produced for public competition and their subject matter itself is 
the agonistic conflict (cf. Huizinga 1971:168). 
Competition is also integral to production of music, as is demonstrated by the 
mythological battle of Marsyas and Apollo. The fierce contests between 
composers, players, and singers are well known throughout history and 
competition also sustains musical development in contemporary society (cf. 
Huizinga 1971:188). Throughout the ages music and military practice were 
closely associated; music playing always accompanied troops marching into 
battle. Thucydides records the use of music before the battle: 
The Spartans now began to sing their war-songs, reminding each 
other of the glorious actions in which they had all shared .... Then 
the armies closed in. The Argives and their allies rushed forward in 
a violent fury, but the Spartans moved slowly to the measured 
music of a band of pipers. This is not done for any religious 
reason, but to make sure they keep in step while they're advancing 
and to stop the whole formation disintegrating, as so often 




Production and use of plastic and visual art is interrelated with war and 
agonistic play. Art is related to artisanship and used for decoration of weapons 
(cf. Huizinga 1971:188–192), an original example is found in Homer's 
description of the blacksmith decorating Achilles' shield. Art production is itself 
a contest and battle: 
The agonistic impulse, which we found to be powerfully operative 
over so many fields of culture, also comes to fruition in art. The 
desire to challenge a rival to perform some difficult, seemingly 
impossible feat of skill lies deep in the origin of civilisation 
(Huizinga 1971:194). 
There is distinctive similarity between Huizinga's description above and 
Hesiod's description of the rivalry between competing artisans and their desire 
to challenge rivals, to demonstrate their superiority in skills, and excel over their 
competitors. 
Competition is the driving forces behind plastic arts, and architecture. The 
master-pieces and demonstration of skill in plastic art do for the artist and 
architect "what the sacred riddle-contest did for philosophy", and "it is next to 
impossible to distinguish absolutely between the contest in making and the 
contest in excelling" (Huizinga 1971:194). Ultimately the origin of all art is a 
contest against death: 
The great cultural heroes, so the mythologies tell us, invented all 
the arts and skills which are now the treasures of civilisation, as a 
result of some contest, very often with their life at stake ... If 
competitive artisanship is an ever-recurrent theme in myth and 
legend it has played a very definite part in actual development of 
art and techniques (Huizinga 1971:195). 
Even behind the practical objectives of producing utensils "there always lurks 
the primordial play-function of the contest as such" (Huizinga 1971:197).  
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Huizinga (1971:198) concludes that it was not difficult for him to have 
demonstrated the spirit of "playful competition" as being the fundamental form 
of social life and that civilisation arises "in and as play and never leaves it." 
Indeed, in his conclusion Huizinga (1971:198) singles out the "agon" and not 
simply "play" as the formative and driving force of social and cultural 
development. It is not simply "play" but "a certain play-factor" that was 
"extremely active all through the cultural process", and this specific factor is 
"playful competition" which shows that the agonistic factor is older than culture 
and "pervades all life" (Huizinga 1971:198). For Huizinga (1971:66), as for his 
contemporary intellectuals, such as Nietzsche, Schmitt, Simmel and Heidegger, 
and subsequent generations of thinkers such as, Norbert Elias, and Foucault, 
the agon and polemos – contest and battle – are the primary civilising forces 
ever present in culture and society. 
5.2.8  Huizinga's social critique: decline of agonistic spirit and 
seriousness that kills 
Having identified the agonistic and playful elements as the basic structure of 
culture, Huizinga wonders whether this playful-battle-contest spirit still 
manifests itself in the contemporary culture of his time (the 1930s). To answer 
this question, Huizinga takes a brief look at the historical development of the 
distinction between play and seriousness since the antiquity.  
Compared with the playful agon of ancient Greece, the Roman antiquity at first 
appearance seems more austere and less playful. Looked at more closely, the 
agonistic-ludic element reveals itself in rituals that were appropriately named 
ludi. The Roman state itself, despite its claim to utility, was not purely a 
utilitarian institution. The agonistic element is manifest in numerous activities 
such as triumphal processions, laurels, and martial glory, and all these activities 
obviously are not purely means to an end. The Roman Triumphal procession is 
more than a solemn celebration of martial victory; it is rather a means to re-
experience well-being. And while Roman wars were made for self-preservation, 
the impulse to make war is primarily agonistic, "envy of and lust for power and 
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glory rather than hunger or defence" (Huizinga 1971:202). Indeed, the agonistic 
element is most visible in the concept "panem et circenses" (bread and circus). 
This is not simply a demand to be feed, but it is a demand for entertainment by 
the bloody gladiatorial spectacles: feeding of body and spirit are indivisible. This 
demonstrates that Rome could not live without competitive games, and the 
game/battle is as necessary for existence as is bread (cf. Huizinga 1971:202–
203).  
The medieval world inherited the Roman culture and the agonistic contest, and 
battle remained paramount (cf. Huizinga 1971:205). Indeed, in his early study 
The Waning of the Middle Ages, Huizinga (1972:39) already notes the central 
importance of the battle-contest in the Middle Ages. The importance is evident 
from the statement by a medieval chronicle, Chastellain, who notes that "after 
the deeds and exploits of war, which are claims to glory ... the household is the 
first thing ... most necessary to conduct and arrange well." That is, first there is 
the public duty of war and only then comes the private duty of household 
management. 
Compared with playful agonism of antiquity as well as with the utilitarian Middle 
Ages, the contemporary twentieth century modern world and its culture seem to 
have stopped being "played" out. Playfulness is being banished and replaced 
with morbid seriousness, while intellectual life becomes dominated by the 
grotesque Marxist misconception that the world is singularly motivated by 
economic and material interests (cf. Huizinga 1971:218). Huizinga (1971) notes 
that a central trend of the contemporary world is a reversal of values of 
seriousness and play.  
Sport and athletics showed us play stiffening into serious business 
but still being felt as play; now we come to serious business 
degenerating into play but still being called serious (Huizinga 
1971:226).  
Yet even this reversal reveals that the playful agonism has not been entirely 
eradicated. Moreover, the agonistic spirit is encouraged by the new technology, 
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propaganda and mass communication that promote competitive spirit on a large 
scale. It is as if, play has taken over the utilitarian considerations of the 
economy. The result is that "business becomes play” and “play becomes 
business" (Huizinga 1971:226–227). The trend of making business into a 
playful battlefield continues further. McLuhan (1969:250) reports that in the 
1960s it had become the latest fashion among Japanese businessmen to have 
taken to the study of classical military techniques of Sun Tzu and apply them in 
business. The same trends continues today with the attempts to apply 
Clausewitz's war principles to business (cf. e.g. Ries & Trout 1986), and the 
use of general war strategies as inspiration for business (cf. e.g. Greene 2007). 
In Huizinga’s estimation the playful contest element has also kept parliamentary 
politics of the 1930s alive with its sense of fair-play and gentlemen's 
agreement. The competitive spirit of fellowship "would allow the bitterest 
opponents a friendly chat even after the most virulent debate", and it is this 
contest-play element that eases social tension. For Huizinga (1971:234) the 
playful agonistic nature of humour keep society alive, but "it is the decay of 
humour that kills." 
5.2.9  Huizinga confronts Carl Schmitt  
For Huizinga the decay of humour is exemplified by the writing of the German 
legal scholar Carl Schmitt. In the last section of his book, Huizinga (1971) 
briefly takes issue with Carl Schmitt's conception the political. According to 
Huizinga (1971:236) Schmitt considers war as the natural relation between 
nation-states therefore war is a serious business devoid of its ancient agonistic 
play element. Huizinga (1971:236) rejects Schmitt's idea that all true relation 
between national-state are warlike and are based on the principle distinction 
between friend and enemy, whereby other nations or social groups are either 
friends or enemies. For Huizinga, this represents a barbarous mode of thought, 
because the enemy is not an equally respected rival or adversary, but is simply 
a stranger or foreigner that is in the group's way and needs to be eliminated. 
For Huizinga, Schmitt's conception removes all the agonistic competition from 
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politics, and is a sad "fall from human reason" and is an "inhuman" and 
"barbarous" delusion (Huizinga 1971:236). 
Huizinga's condemnation of Schmitt is derived from an ideological difference 
between Dutch and German intellectuals, as well as Huizinga's humanist 
historian’s perspective, as against Schmitt's legalistic approach. Huizinga's 
rejection of Schmitt is also based on not being able to see how close Schmitt's 
formulation of the distinction of friend-foe is to Huizinga's own view of the agon. 
Schmitt's characterisation of the friend-enemy antithesis is an attempt to 
identify the particular and irreducible character of the political sphere (discussed 
in the next section). But the use of antithesis is also central to Huizinga' search 
for the unique and irreducible character of play. Furthermore, the antithesis 
itself is agonistic: it is a contrast and contest between extreme opposites. For 
example, for Huizinga (1971:24) there is always a tension between the 
antithesis of play and seriousness. The antitheses relevant to other cultural 
fields do not apply to the characterisation of play:  
Play lies outside the antithesis of wisdom and folly, and equally 
outside those of truth and falsehood, good and evil. Although it is a 
non-material activity, it has no moral function. And valuation of vice 
and virtue do not apply here (Huizinga 1971:25). 
This is precisely the spirit and procedure in which Schmitt approaches his 
search for a unique characterisation of the political sphere, as will be shown in 
the next section.  
Huizinga also fails to realise that the enemy-friend dichotomy is the eternal "we-
them" antithesis that is an "a priori existential rule that governs the way we must 
think about the meaning of our existence" (Gelven 1994:134).  
Huizinga believes that Schmitt is assuming war to be a serious business, and 
so denies it its agonistic playful character. According to Huizinga (1971:236) 
Schmitt is mistaken to take such a view because "it is not war that is serious, 
but peace." For Huizinga "war and everything to do with it remain fast in the 
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daemonic and magical bond of play" and this is the element of agonistic contest 
and a sense of fair-play in both war and politics that makes both war and 
political contest human (Huizinga 1971:236). In this sense, according to 
Huizinga, even modern warfare still contains an element of the old agonistic 
"attitude of playing at war for the sake of prestige and glory" (Huizinga 
1971:237). And it is evident that,  
the methods by which war-policies are conducted and war-
preparations carried out still show abundant traces of the agonistic 
attitude as found in primitive society. Politics are and have always 
been something of a game of chance; we have only to think of the 
challenges, the provocations, the threats and denunciations to 
realise that war and the policies leading up to it are always, in the 
nature of things, a gamble (Huizinga 1971:237).  
Huizinga (1971:238) concludes that "civilisation cannot exist in the absence of a 
certain play-element." This is another way of affirming that civilisation cannot 
exist without the agon and polemos, on the basis of which the logos – culture, 
symbolic activity and language – are developed and thrive. Thus for Huizinga 
and many European intellectuals of the 1930s, as for Nietzsche some decades 
earlier, war is an expression of human spirit and provides a welcome antidote to 
an increasing life of boredom in a peaceful society. Thus even the mechanised 
ferocious slaughter of the First World War, inspired great art and was 
experienced as a "jolly good sport" (cf. Eksteins 1989:219). 
As will be seen in the next section, Schmitt concurs with Huizinga's conclusion 
that banishment of war and imposition of the seriousness of peace are insidious 
means of destruction. Ultimately, the reason Huizinga is critical of Schmitt's 
idea of war as the central formative force of politics, is due to Huizinga's 
blindness to his own positioning of war, or battle-play as the central structuring 
force of the cultural spheres. 
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5.3  Carl Schmitt: the concept of the political 
5.3.1  War makes the state, and the state makes war 
The question animating Schmitt's inquiry in his book The Concept of the 
Political (Schmitt 1976) is the nature of the human association: the modern 
state. In conventional understanding the state is the political association of 
people within a territorial unit (cf. Schmitt 1976:19). From the various 
descriptions of the state it is always linked with the political, therefore, Schmitt 
concludes (1976:19) that "the concept of the state presupposes the concept of 
the political." The political is prior to the state and is its foundation. To 
understand the state there is a need to understand the political. 
The state as an organised political sphere can be distinguished from other 
forms of social organisation, while the political sphere can also be contrasted 
against other spheres of social life such as, the economy, morality, and law (cf. 
Schmitt 1976:20). Thus characteristically, the political is always presented as 
an antithesis of these other spheres, such as the religious, cultural, economic, 
legal and scientific (cf. Schmitt 1976:23). However, the political stands above all 
other spheres of human life and embraces them all because of the political 
sphere's link with the state's monopoly of power, use of violence, and legitimacy 
to decide on issues of life-and-death (cf. Schmitt 1976:24–25, 32). Schmitt 
contends that such definitions only describes the political negatively, as being 
an antithesis of other spheres, but do not provide a clue as to the particular 
essence or character of the activities that go on in the political sphere (cf. 
Schmitt 1976:20).  
For Schmitt, a definition and understanding of the political can only be gained 
by identifying its unique characteristics or "criteria" of operation relevant to the 
political field in contrast to the particular criteria of evaluation applicable in other 
social fields. The definition of "the political" must therefore rest on identification 
of its own unique and specific criteria (cf. Schmitt 1976:25–26). For this purpose 
Schmitt first identifies the particular criteria functioning in the various human 
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spheres. The fundamental character of these criteria is the act of classification 
and evaluation relevant to the respective field.  
Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are 
between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in 
economics profitable and unprofitable (Schmitt 1976:26).  
The distinctive criteria and the "specific political distinction to which political 
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy" 
(Schmitt 1976:26). This means that the particular activities taking place in the 
political sphere of a sovereign state relate to the decisions on whether or not to 
declare war because an enemy has been identified.   
This function of identifying and distinguishing between an enemy and a friend in 
the political field is independent from any of the criteria functioning in the other 
fields of human action. The distinction between enemy and friend is made by 
the participants in the political action, independently of any judgement of 
outsiders, because only the actual participants can recognise whether the 
enemy intends to threaten their way of life and needs to be repulsed so they 
can preserve their own existence (cf. Schmitt 1976:27). Thus using only political 
criteria, the political enemy is not morally evil, aesthetically ugly, or an 
economic competitor, but he is "the other, the stranger" (Schmitt 1976:27). The 
enemy is "existentially something different and alien" and in extreme cases 
"conflicts with him are possible" (Schmitt 1976:27). This is so because the 
enemy can threaten the existence of the political group.  
From this analysis it follows that Schmitt's original thesis that the state 
presupposes the political, is itself dependent on another prior presupposition: If 
the primary action within the political field is to identify friends and enemies, and 
if war is always the extreme possibility, then it implies that the political 
presupposes war. In other words, because war is the primary and constant 
independent variable, Schmitt is saying more or less, that firstly, war makes the 
state, and secondly, the state makes war, and thirdly, that political activity is 
war by other means.  
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Indeed, Schmitt's consideration of war as the formative element of the state, 
and as being the reality, as well as being the constant potential threat of war is 
confirmed by the historical studies of European state-making from 900 to 1900 
by Charles Tilly. For Tilly, the whole of history of European state-making can be 
characterised by the statement: "War makes the state and the state makes war" 
(cf. Tilly 1975; 1990; 1997). 
5.3.2  Enemy and friend: not a metaphor 
For Schmitt the concepts "friend and enemy" must be understood in their 
"concrete and existential" sense because these are "not metaphors or symbols" 
(Schmitt 1976:27). According to Schmitt (1976:28) it  
is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it 
an atavistic remnant of barbaric times when nations continue to 
group themselves according to friend and enemy … distinction. 
Such criteria are not abstractions or normative ideals but are based on reality, 
and the real ability of a political group to identify an enemy and a friend. The 
concepts friend and enemy refer to the eternal political distinction and drawing 
of boundaries between groups. It is a border between "us" and "them" that is 
the source of all human identity. The reason the distinction is not metaphorical 
is that, in the domain of politics people do not confront each other as 
abstractions but as politically interested and determined persons (cf. Schmitt in 
Mouffe 2000:41). 
The important characteristic of the political enemy is that he is not simply a 
competitor, a partner to a general conflict, nor is he a "private adversary whom 
one hates" but the enemy is a "public enemy".  
The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of 
conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one 
hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting 
collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is 
solely the public enemy, because everything that has a 
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relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole 
nation, becomes public by virtue of such relationship (Schmitt 
1976:28). 
According to Schmitt (1976:32), "for the enemy concept belongs the ever-
present possibility of combat" and all "peripherals must be left aside from this 
term." The word combat does not mean "competition" or "intellectual 
controversy" nor "symbolic wrestling" which is a symbolic general 
understanding of life as a constant struggle in which every human being is 
symbolically a combatant. Schmitt (1976:33) notes that the word "combat" must 
be understood in its existential sense: 
The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real 
meaning precisely because they refer to real possibility of physical 
killing ... War is the existential negation of the enemy. It is the most 
extreme consequence of enmity (Schmitt 1976:33).  
For Schmitt the public nature of the enemy means that the enemy is hostis not 
inimicus, and it is only in the private sphere that it makes sense to "love the 
enemy" (Schmitt 1976:29). The distinction between private and public is 
important because the enemy does not have to be personally hateful. 
Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and 
Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend 
Europe out of love toward the Saracens or Turks (Schmitt 
1976:29). 
The state and the political arise from the clash of "one fighting collectivity of 
people confronts a similar collectivity" (Schmitt 1976:28). The state and the 
political arena are the result of the original battle, and as the battle ends the 
combatants are transformed into adversary oppositional political groups. Thus it 
is clear that for Schmitt war is at the foundation of the political and the state. 
The political battle is not metaphorical because, in the first instance the political 
sphere was established in a real historical battle. Moreover, like a real battle, 
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the political battle is not metaphorical because one can lose or win a political 
battle. This perspective places Schmitt in the a long philosophical tradition 
originating in Heraclitus, and more specifically traced back to Plato's and 
Aristotle's political writing, and finds its modern manifestation in Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, and in Germany, in Hegel's view of the state and Clausewitz's 
conception of warfare. Indeed, war as a real experience and as an idea was 
central in the thoughts of European intellectuals of the 1930s. War is a general 
Zeitgeist of European society since the nineteenth century, whereby military 
and martial influences are integrated into everyday social and intellectual life 
(cf. Bell 2008; Keegan 2004a, 2004b). Thus for Schmitt, as it was for Huizinga 
(1971), war is the formative element and the model for culture and political life. 
For Schmitt, as Leo Strauss (1976:92) notes, "the political is a basic 
characteristic of human life and in this sense, politics is destiny; therefore man 
cannot escape from the political." The inescapable affirmation of the political 
and the need to make real political decisions is also an affirmation of fighting 
and war (cf. Strauss 1976:102–103). 
5.3.3  Politics as war by other means; war as politics by other means 
Schmitt claims not to share Clausewitz's commonly represented view that war 
is continuation of politics by other means. According to Schmitt (1976:33-34) 
"the military battle itself is not the 'continuation of policies by other means' as 
the famous term of Clausewitz is generally incorrectly cited." Like Clausewitz, 
Schmitt considers war to be subordinate to the political: war "does not have its 
own logic" and always "politics remains its brain." This is so because identifying 
enemies and friends, and deciding on war are ultimate political decisions and 
not purely military ones. Schmitt approvingly quotes Clausewitz that war always 
assumes the characteristics of politics (cf. Schmitt 1976:34). For Schmitt war 
and politics must not be directly confused because war is not the aim, purpose 
or content of politics, but war is only a potential, and it is war and the "real 
possibility of physical killing" that shape the activity in the political sphere. As 
Schmitt puts is:  
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War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content 
of politics. But as an ever-present possibility it is the leading 
presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human 
action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political 
behaviour (Schmitt 1976:34).  
And again:  
The political does not reside in the battle itself ... But in the mode 
of behaviour which is determined by this possibility (Schmitt 
1976:37). 
This indicates that Schmitt considers war as the formative forces of the political, 
and war determines the modes of action and thought in the political sphere. As 
he confirms "only in real combat" the experience of enmity is revealed and 
"from this most extreme possibility human life derives its specifically political 
tension" (Schmitt 1976:35). In other words, Schmitt says that political action, i.e. 
the "political behaviour" is war-like because it was forged in, and by war, and is 
even determined by the imagination of a possible war, has the characteristics of 
war and can become a war. Having constructed the political and imparted to it 
war-like character war always is a mode of thought and the extreme possibility.  
Schmitt seems to have diverged from his original alignment with Clausewitz's 
view that politics determines war. Now Schmitt seems to say that war 
determines the political. This points to a contradiction in Schmitt's discussion of 
the relation of war and politics. First he claims primacy for the political as final 
arbiter in matters of war, however, at the same time, Schmitt also claims that 
war and the potential of war determines the political action and political 
behaviour, which implies a circular argument.  
Schmitt's contradiction is derived from his acceptance of Clausewitz's definition 
of modern war as if it were the only definition of warfare. For Clausewitz war is 
subordinate to the political, and as such it is an extension, and an instrument of 
political action (cf. Schmitt 1973:3). Here Schmitt limits his consideration of war 
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within Clausewitz's definition of modern war that assumes that war can only be 
engaged by a legitimate state. But Clausewitz has a much wider conception of 
war. For Clausewitz (1985:121) war is "chameleon-like in character" as it 
changes according to circumstance. Primarily, for Clausewitz "war is nothing 
but a duel on an extensive scale", it is the "countless number of duels which 
make up a war." For Clausewitz war can best be represented by imagining "two 
wrestles"' and each "strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to 
his will" (Clausewitz 1985:101). And Clausewitz (1985:171) continues: "War in 
its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the 
manifold activity which in a wide sense is called war." Clausewitz characterises 
the activity of fighting: “War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; 
as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action” 
(Clausewitz 1985:103). All this implies that war can be characterised on a 
continuum: form the duel of two individual wrestlers to the clash of mass armies 
of modern nation-states.  
Moreover, while Clausewitz is aware of the influence of war on politics, he also 
recognises that in turn, war shapes the political sphere, and influences political 
action. Clausewitz realises that there is a mutual reversibility between war and 
politics. As Clausewitz (1985:108) remarks:  
Even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be 
regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a 
passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of 
political combinations. 
What Clausewitz implies, is that while it is true that modern war is an instrument 
of policy, it is equally true that politics is a continuation of war by other means. 
Thus, ultimately Schmitt cannot escape Clausewitz's agonistic conception of 
war and politics. Indeed, Schmitt seems to acknowledge the reversibility of war 
and politics, when he notes that "the politician is better schooled for the battle 
than the soldier, because the politician fights his whole life whereas the soldier 
does so in exceptional circumstances only" (Schmitt 1976:34). (In later 
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publications Schmitt extends his consideration of war, but a discussion of these 
works is beyond the scope of this chapter as it is only concerned with his work 
from the 1930s and as it relates to Huizinga's criticism.) 
Schmitt's view of the political seems to indicate the primacy of war and battle as 
its structuring structure and foundation. This is reminiscent of Hegel's notion of 
the primordial battle at the beginning of history, or a historically recorded battle 
that reminds a national group of the origin of its identity. Following from 
Clausewitz's analysis, the political is formed when the military battle ends and 
the fighting is transformed into the political arena. Schmitt's emphasis on the 
potential war as the limit of the political indicates that, following from 
Clausewitz's analysis, he realises that the political can be reversed into a real 
battle once again. War remains a potential backdrop in two senses: (a) the 
primary functioning of the political is to make decisions regarding real war with 
identifiable enemy groups, and (b) war remains a possibility, the extreme end of 
the political and the last resort when the political action fails. 
To understand the dynamic of war in the operation of the political Elias Canetti 
(1981) offers a clear explanation of the reversibility of war and politics. 
According to Canetti (1981:220) the modern parliamentary system is based on 
the "psychological structure of opposing armies." At the termination of the real 
war the two fighting adversary groups remain and continue to fight, but the fight 
takes a different form and excludes direct killing. According to Canetti 
(1981:220), "the two factions remain; they fight on, but in the form of warfare 
which has renounced killing." Thus on the political battlefield killing is 
exchanged for the vote: the final victory and defeat is decided by the act of 
taking a vote, while death and killing have been renounced as instruments of 
decision-making (cf. Canetti 1981:222). The similarity between the political and 
war is seen in that whereas in real battle the army with the largest number of 
combatants will prevail over the adversary, in the political battle numbers have 
the same importance: 
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A parliamentary vote does nothing but ascertain the relative 
strength of two groups at a given time and place ... It is all that is 
left of the original lethal clash and it is played out in many forms, 
with threats, abuse and physical provocation which may lead to 
blows or missiles. But the counting of the vote ends the battle 
(Canetti 1981:220). 
The political battle is a confrontation, "it is will against will as in war", and each 
adversary is convinced of the rightness of his conviction; it is this spirit of will 
and conviction that keeps the contest alive, and in turn, the contest keeps the 
will and conviction alive (cf. Canetti 1981:221). Each member of the outvoted 
political party accepts the voting decision, and concedes defeat, but unlike 
defeat in real war, here life is not at stake, and there is no punishment for 
having opposed the winner. However, what the defeated anticipates "is future 
battles, and many of them; in none of them will he be killed" (Canetti 1981:221). 
This implies that the combatants in political parliamentary battles have immunity 
from death, and the conflict must stop before actual killing can take place. 
Ultimately, in the parliamentary battle "there are, and can be, no dead" (Canetti 
1981:221). The difference between warfare battle and political battle is this: 
War is war because the dead are included in the final reckoning. 
Parliament is parliament only so long as the dead are excluded 
(Canetti 1981:221). 
The renunciation of death and killing as means of decision making implies that 
the voting and their results as sacred:  
Every single vote puts death, as it were, on the side. But the effect 
of killing would have had on the strength of the enemy is 
scrupulously put down in figures; and anyone who tampers with 
these figures, who destroys or falsifies them, lets death in again 
without knowing it (Canetti 1981:222). 
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This interchangeability is expressed in Marx's notion of the permanent class 
war (cf. Schmitt 1976:37). Significantly, this reversibility of war and politics is 
taken up by Foucault (2003) who considers it as the central characteristic of the 
formation and operation of a society. Following Schmitt, Mouffe (1993; 2000) 
proposes that the warring antagonist enemy is transformed into a political 
debating agonist. (This is discussed in the next chapter).  
Ultimately, Schmitt has a double vision: the political decides on issues of war, 
but at the same time, war is the generative paternity and formative force of the 
political and social order. As Schmitt states:  
For only in real combat is revealed the most extreme consequence 
of the political grouping of friend and enemy. From this most 
extreme possibility human life derives its specifically political 
tension (Schmitt 1976:35).  
Schimtt's conception of war shares in the dominant view of war and politics of 
European intellectuals of the early twentieth century. Schmitt positions himself 
within the German spirit of the times. German justification of war acknowledges 
war's horrors, but contends that it is an edifying struggle with purifying moral 
effect; what is important is the "readiness to sacrifice and not the object of 
sacrifice" (Fukuyama 1992:332). This affirms Nietzsche's contention that war 
and struggle "demonstrated one's inner strength and superiority to materialism 
and natural determination" and are the source of human freedom and creativity 
(cf. Fukuyama 1992:332). 
Weber and Simmel, among others, consider war as playing the central role in 
state formation. Indeed, Joas (2003:156–157) notes the resemblance of 
Schmitt's view of war to Simmel's consideration of war as existential condition. 
According to Simmel (1966:109), war as armed conflict is a primary human 
condition. Thus "in early stages of culture, war is almost the only form in which 
contact with alien groups is brought about at all ... war is the only sociological 
relation between different groups” (Simmel 1966:33). The convergent relations 
among people as wholes, especially in earlier times, existed only for purpose of 
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war, while other relations, such as trade and commerce, hospitality, and 
intermarriage, only concerned individuals (cf. Simmel 1966:107). Simmel 
(1966:87) suggests that war and conflict are the main forces that constitute 
society and shape each social group's identity. War, conquest, victory or defeat 
provides a social group with its particular dynamics. For Simmel ending a war 
by conquest means that  
it is almost inevitable that an element of commonness injects itself 
into the enmity once the state of open violence yields to any other 
relationship, even though this new relation may contain a 
completely undiminished sum of animosity between two parties 
(Simmel 1966:26).  
But the conquest and the relationship between the antagonists forge some 
element of convergence of internets and community, thus divergence "and 
harmony became inextricably interwoven" and the animosity is a foundation of 
future commonness (Simmel 1966:26). This implies, according to Simmel, that 
peace is a situation of "a diffuse, imperceptible, or latent form" and ultimately 
emerges into open and direct fight (cf. Simmel 1966:109–110). The unity that is 
established for the purpose of war can maintain itself beyond the period of 
original struggle and the unity becomes the foundation for a national group. For 
example,  
Essentially, France owes the consciousness of its national unity 
only to its fight against England, and the Moorish war made the 
Spanish region into one people ... The United States needed the 
War of Independence; Switzerland, the fight against Austria; the 
Netherlands, rebellion against Spain; the Achaean League, the 
struggle against Macedonia; and the founding of the new German 
Empire furnished a parallel to all these instances (Simmel 
1966:100). 
For a human collectivity war and conflict are the central dynamics of intra-, and 
inter-group relations. When a group enters into antagonistic relations with a 
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powerful group outside of itself, its internal relations among its members will 
become more cohesive and unified; while each element within the group may 
have its own opponent, nevertheless they all unite to face a single external 
enemy (cf. Simmel 1966:91–92).  
5.3.4  Peace kills 
The emphasis on war as the primary factor in inter-state relations is condemned 
by some liberal and pacifists scholars who promote the idea of a world without 
war. But, according to Schmitt, such conception of the world is unrealistic: 
A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a 
completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction 
of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics. It is 
conceivable that such a world might contain many very interesting 
antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind, 
but there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could 
be required to sacrifice life, authorised to shed blood, and kill 
human beings (Schmitt 1976:35).  
According to Derrida (2005:130) for Schmitt a world without enemies is also a 
world abandoned by its friends and hence is no longer a human world but a 
"dehumanised desert." Ultimately political and human life cannot be understood 
without real possibility of war and bloodshed. Derrida notes that for Schmitt, 
"war always has a meaning” and “no politics, no social bond qua social bond 
has meaning without war, without its real possibility" (Derrida 2005:132). For 
Schmitt it is not possible to escape the political, if a state decides to disarm 
itself and decide not fight wars, the world will not become depoliticised, but 
simply politics will be disguised as economics or morality.  
If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the 
sphere of politics, then other people will appear which will assume 
these trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby 
taking over political role. The protector then decides who the 
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enemy is by virtue of the eternal relation of protection and 
obedience (Schmitt 1976:52).  
The world consists of different and contending political groups, and no group 
can acquire a sense of identity without defining an adversary (Schmitt 1976:57). 
Schmitt concludes that the eternal political conflict is the essence of life, "the 
political world is a pluriverse, not a universe" (Schmitt 1976:53). 
Schmitt also exposes the war-like inclination of the anti-war liberals and 
pacifists. The centrality of war-making is evident in the pacifist’s war-like 
disposition: If the pacifists' hostility to war drives them to wage war against non-
pacifists "in a war against war" this proves that pacifists have political energy 
because they are able to group people according to the friend-enemy principle. 
“If, in fact, the will to abolish war is so strong that it no longer shuns war, then it 
has become a political motive, i.e., it affirms, even if only as an extreme 
possibility, war and even reason for war” (Schmitt 1976:36). Ultimately, the 
pacifists' inspired war is inhuman because they degrade their enemy by 
defining him as morally inferior and making him a monster that must not only be 
contested and defeated, but the enemy must be utterly destroyed (cf. Schmitt 
1976:36). The pacifists thus expose their fraud: they condemn war as homicide 
but they demand war to be waged, and that men die and kill so as to 
permanently end war, which is a utopian impossibility (cf. Schmitt 1976:48).  
Likewise some religious communities have taken it upon themselves to decide 
on matters of war, or to forbid their members from engaging in war. In such 
situations the religious group becomes a political entity, and by forbidding its 
members to participate in a war it is "decisively denying the enemy quality of a 
certain adversary" (Schmitt 1976:37). Waging war is a form of recognition of 
being human and it is also recognition of the enemy's humanity. Being fought 
by humans, the battle is played-out as a fair-game because that war will end 
when the enemy retreats into his own border and is no longer a treat. As 
against the fair-play and agonistic character of warfare, the pacifists’ pretence 
to speak for humanity is a fraud. The pacifists' seriousness in demanding to 
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pacify the globe leads ultimately to a total destruction of human beings. Schmitt 
contends that prevention of war and neutralising conflict by nonviolent and 
"peaceful" measures such as economic boycotts, are more insidious and brutal 
than any war could be, because the competitor has no alternative and "will be 
left to starve if he does not voluntarily accommodates himself" (Schmitt 
1976:48).  
Politics based on economic consideration are not "essentially unwarlike"; on the 
contrary, the application of economic pacification is more brutal (Schmitt 
1976:78).  
War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, 
pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and 
measures to assure peace remain. The adversary is no longer 
called an enemy but disturber of peace and is thereby designated 
to be an outlaw of humanity ... But this allegedly non-political and 
apparently antipolitical system serves existing or newly emerging 
friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of the 
political (Schmitt 1976:79). 
The attempts to escape the political and the assumption that replacing politics 
with economic interest will result in a more peaceful world are illusions. If peace 
is a form of warfare, then it is clear that pacifism and liberal ideology have 
increased the antagonistic attitude, as is evident from their desire to depoliticise 
life and their antagonism toward the state.  
The political concept of battle in liberal thought becomes 
competition in the domain of economics and discussion in the 
intellectual realm. Instead of a clear distinction between the two 
different states, that of war and that of peace, there appears the 
dynamic of perpetual competition and perpetual discussion 
(Schmitt 1976:71–72).  
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The liberals and pacifists are exposed as frauds: asking men to die for a 
general and abstract principle does not justify killing, only the existence of a real 
enemy and real threat to existence can provide justification for war and killing: 
"The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of 
justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy" (Schmitt 1976:49). 
Simultaneously the liberal bourgeois also wants to remain safe in the private 
domain without the danger of entering the conflicts and war the public domain 
of the political community: “He wants to be spared bravery and exempted from 
the danger of violent death” (Schmitt 1976:62–62). 
Schmitt’s defence of the political against its destruction by liberal 
depoliticisation is in itself an agonistic and combative stance. The readiness to 
do battle is essential because the liberals’ depoliticisation is a mode of political 
battle disguised as non-political behaviour; depoliticising is concealment of 
politics (cf. Sartori 1989:71–72). The liberals’ and pacifists' desire to reach 
"agreement and peace at any price" means that substantive and real issues of 
principle over which there may be conflict must be discarded to achieve 
consensus. For the liberals and the pacifists the only concern is finding the 
correct "technological means" to gain the objectives of a peaceful life. For 
Schmitt such attempts are dehumanising.  
Agreement at any price is possible only as agreement at the price 
of the meaning of human life, for such agreement is possible only 
when man abandons the task of raising the question regarding 
what is right, and when man abandons this question, he abandons 
his humanity (Strauss 1976:101).  
Thus, for Schmitt to affirm the political is affirmation of human life itself, 
because the political is the essence of human life. Here Schmitt follows on 
Weber's analysis of the disappearance of politics which both see as the 
disappearance of the human (cf. Schmitt 1976:79; Schmitt 2005:65; Strong 
2005:xxii). It follows, that the affirmation of the political is also an affirmation of 
war as a real existential possibility. As Strauss puts it: "The affirmation of the 
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political as such is affirmation of fighting as such, regardless of the object of the 
fighting" (Strauss 1976:102). Such affirmation of the political also affirms 
respect for all those who are willing to fight (Strauss 1976:103). Ultimately, 
Schmitt sees politics-as-war and all political activity is war-like.  
Schmitt’s description of the dullness of life in the liberal warless world predates 
a similar conclusion reached by Fukuyama (1992) as the twentieth century was 
coming to a close. For Fukuyama (1992) the warless world is the “end of 
history” as it is the ultimate victory of liberal ideology and capitalist economy. 
The end of history would mean the end of wars and bloody 
revolutions. Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes 
for which to fight. They would satisfy their needs through economic 
activity, but they would no longer have to risk their lives in battle 
(Fukuyama 1992:311). 
But human existence without war and struggle becomes meaningless and no 
“metaphorical wars” can satisfy the young inhabitants of the economically 
comfortable Western world. They, like young generations since antiquity need 
existential life-and-death challenges to prove their human value (Fukuyama 
1992:328–329). Ultimately some men in the post-historical world will confirm 
their humanity by extreme sporting contest as substitutes for war, others will 
join real wars that are still waged in the “historical” third world and for many 
others 
they will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in 
other words, out of a certain boredom: for they cannot imagine 
living in a world without struggle. And if the greater part of the 
world in which they live is characterised by peaceful and 
prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle against that 




5.3.5 Schmitt and Huizinga: war as the language of life 
Against Huizinga’s assertion that Schmitt has no agonistic imagination 
(discussed in section 5.2.9 in this chapter), a faint sense of agonistic play is 
visible behind Schmitt's facade of seriousness. Schmitt's agonism is derived 
almost naturally from the central importance he attributes to war, battle and 
fighting. Schmitt's belief in the serious nature of war does not mean it has lost 
its agonistic aspect, as Huizinga (1971:235) notes, the seriousness of a bloody 
battle does not deny its being a form of agonistic battle-play. Huizinga's (1971) 
accusation that Schmitt has an inhuman view, and his view of war has no 
conception of playful agonism, cannot be entirely supported. In principle, 
Schmitt positions himself in support of political antagonism and the vitality of 
political and war contests against the morbid liberal-democratic and pacifist 
trends of "the age of neutralisations and depoliticalising." Schmitt's places 
himself in opposition to the anti-political ideology that desires to eliminate 
political contestation form decision-making. Schmitt acknowledges that political 
antagonism has a spirit of fighting and battle which ultimately is agonistic. 
Schmitt's support for the political is already support for contests and 
contestations, so is his condemnation of the seriousness and lack of agonistic 
spirit in liberal-democratic politics. As Schmitt (1976:53) notes: the world 
consists of diversity of conflicting views: "The political world is pluriverse, not a 
universe." Schmitt approvingly acknowledges Machiavelli's agonistic spirit and 
intellectual contribution when he notes that Machiavelli's observation of the play 
of human passions allowed him to derive a fundamental law of political life (cf. 
Schmitt 1976:59). As against the liberal-democrats’ praise of the honesty of the 
economic sphere and condemnation of politics as evil, filthy, and criminal, 
Schmitt contends that politics can be equally pronounced "as the sphere of 
honest rivalry" while economic exchange can be grounded in deception (cf. 
Schmitt 1976:77). Schmitt acknowledges the lively dynamics of antagonistic 
confrontation: the "double-structure" antithesis has a "polemical punch" 
(Schmitt 1976:74). Ultimately, Schmitt may concede the truth in Huizinga’s 
(1971:236) pronouncement that "it is not war that is serious, but peace." 
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Against the morbid liberal pacifism Schmitt (1976:67) suggests that 
identification of actual enemies is the highest form of politics. Because the 
political is the central sphere of social activity “war becomes the highest form of 
human behaviour” (cf. Neocleous 1996:52). This would imply that war is an 
expression of life, and in turn human life acquires meaning from war: when an 
enemy has been identified, life becomes existentially meaningful, because 
there is an awareness of treat and challenge from a real enemy. Beyond its 
utilitarian value war also has its own justification: it is fought "for its own sake, 
for the meaning it brings to the political" (Neocleous 1996:51). The meaning of 
human life is not given by rationality or reason, but it "emerges from a state of 
war by those who are inspired by great mythical images to join battle" (Schmitt 
in Neocleous 1996:51). Ultimately the mere existence of war is also a 
justification of war (cf. Schmitt 1976:49, Neocleous 1996:52). This is another 
way of anesthetisation of war and making it an end in itself and a form of art. 
Like the practice of “art for art’s sake” so war can be practiced for its own sake. 
Neocleous (1996:51) and Wolin (1992) conclude that Schmitt shares with Ernst 
Jünger a vitalistic view of war that affirms war as calling out authentic passions 
in real situations of life-and-death. For Schmitt conception of politics-as-war 
demands war-like behaviour and an agonistic spirit for fighting. Therefore, 
Schmitt contends that the human being, society and politics can be understood 
through the perspective of war and by the use of military vocabulary.  
Against the often heard complaint that the growth of modern technology has 
dehumanised war, Schmitt defends the humanising value of technology in war. 
For Schmitt technology is a weapon, and the use of new technology signals the 
return of the political (Neocleous 1996:53). According to Schmitt this is so 
because technology "is always an instrument and weapon" and because the 
instruments and weapons have become more useful, "the probability they bring 
becomes that much greater" (Neocleous 1996:53). As Neocleous (1996:53) 
concludes: "Only by being used for political purpose can technology be imbued 
with soul" and the "growth of technology consolidates war and politics." 
Ultimately, Schmitt seems to be in agreement with Huizinga that technological 
modern warfare has retained its agonistic spirit. 
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5.3.6  Schmitt in Hobbes's theatre 
Schmitt's position on the place of war in the political sphere is reminiscent to 
Hobbes's conception of the primordial state of nature war of all against all. 
Hobbes assumes that such a war does not take place but is only an imagined 
potential that shapes the political. Ultimately, the war is always averted by the 
social contract and the battle remains a bloodless political battle. Similarly 
Schmitt (1976:35) writes: "What always matters is the possibility of extreme 
case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or 
has not arrived." While in Hobbes’ imagination the permanent war of "every 
man against every man" rages on relentlessly, Schmitt realises that war is a 
clash of human collectivities. Indeed, as against Hobbes, life in the state of 
nature may have been brutal but it was never lonely.  
A close reading of Hobbes's description reveals no specific manifestations of 
the generalised war. Indeed, Hobbes acknowledges, as does Schmitt, that war 
does not consist in battle, or in the act of fighting, but in manifesting a will to 
contend battle, and in showing intention and assuming a fighting position 
(Hobbes 1958:106–107). Leo Strauss (1973:87) compares Schmitt's 
formulation to Hobbes'. According to Strauss, in Hobbes' terminology it is not 
war itself but the potential for war: "The nature of war consisteth not in actual 
fighting, but in the known disposition thereto." Following Hobbes, Schmitt puts 
this in his own vocabulary thus: "The political lies not in conflict itself ... but in 
behaviour determined by this real possibility" (Strauss 1973:87). As for Hobbes, 
so for Schmitt it is the disposition for war that is the political unconscious. Thus, 
Foucault concludes for Hobbes there is no war, it is merely a theatrical 
dramatisation: 
There are no battles in Hobbes's war, there is no blood and there 
are no corpses. There are presentations, manifestations, signs, 
emphatic expressions, wiles, and deceitful expressions; there are 
traps, intentions disguised as their opposite, and worries disguised 
as certainties. We are in a theatre where presentations are 
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exchanged, in a relationship of fear in which there are no time 
limits; we are not really involved in a war (Foucault 2003:92). 
Similarly for Schmitt it is theatrical representation of war as the ever-present 
backdrop and is inspired by Hobbes's imagined war in the state of nature. 
Inspiration by war reached full expression in the Fascists' aestheticism of 
politics, and making warfare and death into a spectacle (cf. Krimmer 2010:75–
76). Similarly, postmodern scholars imagine new wars as being unreal “post-
modern wars” (Gray 1997), or “virtual wars” (Ignatieff 2001), taking place in 
distant localities and mediated to the warriors themselves via computer and 
video images, while mass public enjoys the mediated spectacle on television 
and its re-enactment in video games. These wars are experienced by the mass 
media audiences as if they were viewing cinematic production and entertained 
by another war movie (cf. Žižek 2002a). The increase in the importance of 
mediated experience of life, and of life lived in the symbolic sphere leads 
Baudrillard (1995), for example, to the speculation that the “Gulf War will not 
take place”, and to insist, even after the actual war against Iraq has taken place 
that no war has taken place. Baudrillard’s claim that “the Gulf War did not take 
place” does not mean that there was no war, but that for the majority of media 
spectators, and even to the warriors themselves, it was experienced as the 
unreality of a cinematic fiction, or as a constructed media event – the ultimate 
Gulf War movie (cf. Baudrillard 1995). Baudrillard’s pronouncement is not 
original but follows an earlier intellectual escape from reality by the French 
writer Jean Giraudoux who, just as Hitler was preparing for war produced a play 
“The Trojan war will not take place”, a modern re-enactment of Homer’s Iliad in 
which a character proclaims the belief that the Trojan War will not take place 
(cf. Manguel 2007:206). This is in turn reminiscent of Hobbes potential war that 
does not take place.  
5.4  Conclusion: aesthetics of a beautiful war  
The aim of this chapter was to offer a close reading of Huizinga's theory of play 
and show how play is interchangeable with war and is the formative foundation 
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for culture and communication. Throughout human history war as an activity 
and as an abstract idea has been the formative unconscious and foundation of 
culture. Close and personal experience of war in the ancient world has 
gradually been displaced as the modes of warfare became democratised, 
mechanised and impersonal. In response to the dehumanisation of war, many 
participants attempt to regain the personal sense of meaning and construct 
imaginary experiences of interpersonal acts of killing as expression of their free 
will and demonstrate their sense of active human agency (cf. Bourke 1999).  
As against the assumed non-agonistic and lack of a ludic element of modern 
twentieth century mechanised mass warfare, participants as well as scholars, 
such as Huizinga, still find the agonistic element animating the battlefield and 
structuring whole life experience. The increasing distanciation from the 
battlefield has resulted in the emergence of "Romantic Militarism" that sees war 
as a way for self-expression (cf. Rosenblum 1982). The ultimate expression of 
this romantic spirit is in Fascism’s anesthetisation of politics. For a group of 
artists known as Futurists, war provided the "principles of aesthetics" for new 
poetry, literature and graphic art (cf. Benjamin 1973:244). For the Futurists, 
Fascist Italy's colonial war in Ethiopia was considered as an inspiration, as 
Marinetti writes in a manifesto: 
War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the 
subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying 
megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful 
because it initiates the dreamt-of metalisation of the human body. 
War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the 
fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it 
combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, 
and the stench of putrefaction into symphony. War is beautiful 
because it creates new architecture, like that of big tanks, the 
geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning 
villages, and many others (Marinetti in Benjamin 1973:243–244) 
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According to Benjamin, Marinetti and the Futurists expect modern "war to 
supply the artistic gratification of sense perception that has been changed by 
technology." From Benjamin's Marxist perspective, war is a distraction because 
"instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of 
trenches" and drops bombs from airplanes instead of seeds (cf. Benjamin 
1973:244). But war always provided human with sensibilities and seen in 
historical perspective, the modern war is a continuation of the ancient and 
eternal sensibilities provided by war. Even Benjamin admits the value of war 
when he notes that in Homer's time mankind at war was the object of 
contemplation for Olympian gods, while in the present mankind has reached 
self-consciousness and contemplates itself, and experiences its own 
destruction as an aesthetic pleasure (cf. Benjamin 1973:244). But this as 
Eksteins (1989:83) discovers in the literature of the early twentieth century "the 
fascination with violence represented an interest in life" and "destruction” was 
considered as an act of creation."  
At the end of the millennium, and at the beginning of the twenty first century, 
the ancient spirit of war is much alive. The Futurists and anarchists of the 1930 
provide new inspiration for their postmodern counterparts. Being far removed 
from real battlefields, postmodern anarchists are declaring "symbolic war" 
against meaninglessness, and against democracy. But it is more than symbolic 
war because ancient military text and tactics and strategies derived from real 
historical wars provide the inspiration and the models for violent confrontations 
(cf. Juris 2005). 
To understand culture and the essential political character of human life, there 
is a need to understand war, as was demonstrated by Huizinga and Schmitt. 
War has always been the cultural and political unconscious, and since the time 
of Heraclitus, war is the father of us all. The next chapter will offer a reading of 
the work of Foucault that extends on the Huizinga's and Schmitt's 
understanding of war and contributes to a better understanding of war as a 







WAR AS ORGANISING PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY: 
FOUCAULT'S ANALYTICS OF WAR 
I would like to try to see the extent to which the binary schema of war and 
struggle, of the clash between forces, can really be identified as the basis of civil 
society, as both the principle and motor of the exercise of power – Foucault 
(2003:18) 
Life is the consequence of war, and society is a means to war – Nietzsche 
(1968:33) 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Foucault is known for his contribution to the study of power. What is less well 
known is that central to his theorising power is the model of war as the 
formative blue-print for society and the analytical model that shows how power 
fabricates individuals and societies. Thus human subjects arise in battle and 
play their part on the battlefield of life. Foucault's concept of war and its relation 
to the political extends on the discussion on Huizinga and Schmitt in the 
previous chapter. More than Schmitt, Foucault places war as a central matrix of 
power relations and shows how war and the political are interchangeable.  
Foucault's central emphasis on power and social practices moves the 
understanding of society from the idea that it is like a language as proposed by 
the structuralist theories to a more firm basis in a reality of discursive practices 
and power relations. The structuralists and post-structuralists assume that 
language constructs man and society; human beings presumably live in a 
prison house of language. Foucault places his theory against the modern 
idealistic conceptions of society and the individual as if constituted by, and in, 
language and discourse. This solipsism is shattered by Foucault's introduction 
of the idea of power, discursive practice and ultimately the overarching role of 
war. Foucault restores the balance between words and deeds, identified by 
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Arendt (1998a) as being the complete human sphere of life. Such an approach 
places Foucault within the long tradition dating back to Heraclitus, whereby war 
is seen as the central driving force of human history. The aim of this chapter is 
to trace the idea of war in Foucault’s writing, to show how he interprets social 
power relations as war-like relations and explicates how the model of war can 
provide a heuristic model for understanding of individuals and society. 
6.2  Power: warlike relations of force 
For a long time social power was ignored by social and communication theory. 
Not only was power as a phenomenon overlooked but there may still be a 
general prohibition against critical considerations of power relations (cf. Niebuhr 
1960). For social theorists imbued with democratic and egalitarian ideology 
power seems to be an embarrassment:  
At times it is as if power were a social obscenity, whose naked 
limbs need to be chastely covered ... theorists have even 
reinterpreted the history of philosophy so that drapes can be 
placed over the form of power (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton & Radley 1989:147).  
Evasion of power is evident in American social theory inspired by democratic 
idealism and pragmatism. The reason for such evasion is derived from a naive 
primary assumption about human nature: 
It seems that the basic supposition is that people are essentially 
good. An engagement with power threatens to undo this because 
power implies that one person is in a position over another. It 
disrupts the peaceable relationships between subjects that most 
pragmatists assume. So, the question of power has been ignored 
by pragmatism (Garnar 2006:348).   
It is no coincidence that in social theory and philosophy the idea of power is 
absent. The discourses of science and philosophy are the products of power, 
and have been set up by relations of power and are used to justify the exercise 
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of power. Foucault (1980:131) points outs that each "society has its régime of 
truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true." Power can operate and is tolerated only when it 
conceals and masks itself (cf. Foucault 1981b:86). Foucault (1980:115) 
acknowledges his own initial difficulty in approaching the study of power which 
"was an incapacity linked undoubtedly with the political situation we found 
ourselves in."  
Moreover, the dominant structural linguistic model used to describe man and 
society does not allow much consideration of social power relations. From 
sociological to psychoanalytic theories the common assumption is that the 
human being is the product of language and exists in a symbolic universe of 
signs, symbols and language:  
Because all the practices that make up a social totality take place 
in language, it becomes possible to consider language as the 
place in which the social individual is constructed. In other words, 
man can be seen as language, as the intersection of the social, 
historical and individual (Coward & Ellis 1986:1). 
Scholars using structuralists, semiotics, and hermeneutics theories to 
understand society considers it as if it were language and as such only needs 
to be interpreted. Social groups, such as nations, for example, are assumed to 
be imagined communities "conceived in language, not in blood" (Anderson 
1983:145). It is as if nations were purely cognitive and ideological undertakings 
and idealistically arose in “the relatively bloodless business of imagining” 
(Ehrenreich 1998:196). Such views neglect the facts that historians have 
shown: societies and national groups are linked intimately, in theory and in 
practice, with the idea of spilling blood and war (cf. Ehrenreich 1998:196; 
Marvin & Ingle 1996; Marvin & Ingle 1999; Tilly 1990). 
Foucault notes that to the extent that power is considered in social theory, it is 
mostly conceived as a negative quality: power is repression, it is the great force 
that makes prohibitions. But if power were only a negative repressive 
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mechanism, as is assumed by the theorists, then it would be a poor resource: if 
power had only the force of the negative on its side, a power that only prohibits 
and sets limits then it would be basically an anti-energy. This would imply that 
power “is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates 
incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do” 
(Foucault 1980:119; Foucault 1981b:85). This view extends into political 
theories where power is seen as a commodity that is possessed and 
transferred within the social body; power is held legitimately in the hands of the 
king, prince, sovereign, parliament or the State. The problem with these views 
of power is that they consider power as negative and something that is 
secondary, a “functional subordination” rather than as a primary social 
phenomenon on its own (cf. Foucault 2003:14). 
To escape the irritation of the moralising discourses on power and the idealism 
of the prison house of language, Foucault proposes to link power with social 
practice and the use of the human body as the co-constitutive elements of 
society (cf. Sonderling 1994a). Thus as against the negative conception power 
Foucault suggests that power makes itself acceptable because firstly, it masks 
and conceals its operations (cf. Foucault 1981b:86). Secondly, power becomes 
acceptable because it produces things: "it induces pleasures, forms of 
knowledge, produces discourse"; power is "a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body" (Foucault 1980:123). And more importantly, 
power produces reality, and the individual human subject is the primary product 
of power (cf. Foucault 1987:194). 
Power in the substantive sense, as a possession vested in a fixed social centre 
does not exist (cf. Foucault 1980:198). Thus, rather than being a possession, 
power only exists when it is exercised in a multiplicity of diffused centres in 
society. Such multiple relations of power permeate, and constitute the whole 
social body (cf. Foucault 1980:93). Power is everywhere and comes from 
everywhere. Power is understood as 
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the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which 
they operate and which constitute their own organisation; as the 
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, 
transforms, strengthen, or reverses them; as the support which 
these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a 
system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions 
which isolate them from one another (Foucault 1981b:92–93). 
Indeed, to the extent that power becomes centralised, it can only do so 
because it is dependent on the pre-existence of local relations of forces which 
are consolidated into larger strategic alliances. Power is coextensive with the 
whole social body and everyone is always "inside power and there is no 
escaping it or a position that is outside power relation" (Foucault 1981b:95).  
A characteristic of relations of power is the fact that where power is exercised 
there is also resistance. The point of resistance is the point of application of 
power relations, a point where two forces meet; it is a point where two forces 
meet in antagonism of strategy and are interlocked (cf. Foucault 1983:211). 
Thus power “is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a 
particular society” (Foucault 1981b:93). Power relations are strategic relations 
which imply reciprocity of action: 
Every time one side does something, the other one responds by 
deploying a conduct, a behaviour that counterinvests it, tries to 
escape it, turns the attack against itself, etc. Thus nothing is ever 
stable in these relations of power (Foucault in Reid 2003:4). 
Foucault's definition of the dynamic nature of power relations resembles 
Clausewitz's definition of war. For Clausewitz (1985:103) war is an act of 
violence which leads to reactions and mutual interaction whereby "one side 
dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action." War 
consists of numerous battles and each battle demands mutual understanding, 
agreement and consent from the contestants (cf. Clausewitz 1985:327). 
Likewise for Foucault power relations are everywhere and a state of permanent 
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conflict exists in society where the multiple relations of forces stimulate "a 
plurality of resistances" (Foucault 1981b:96). Power relations and resistance 
are expressed as social and historical struggles. What is at stake in these 
struggles is the ability to win positions of dominance and control. Power 
relations are agonistic, reciprocal incitations and struggles and take the form of 
a combat in which an opponent develops strategies of reaction to the action of 
the other as in a boxing match (cf. Foucault 1983:222). The dynamic agonistic 
reciprocity and interplay of power relations and the construction of resistances 
means that power "is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they 
are free" (Foucault 1983:221). This means that slavery is not a power relation 
but merely one of physical relation of constraint. Power is exercised on 
"individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in 
which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments 
may be realised" (Foucault 1983:221). In other words, the exercise of power 
allows freedom of choice in selecting a possible reaction and hence "freedom 
may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power" (Foucault 
1983:221). Hence power is a form of "agonism" which is a "reciprocal incitation 
and struggle", a "permanent provocation" that does not paralyse both sides 
(Foucault 1983:222). Power relationships involve a dynamic contest, a constant 
play of forces challenging one another, winning and losing, and positions of 
domination and submission. Thus at the very heart of the power relationship, 
and constantly provoking it is a relationship of agonism: a reciprocal incitation 
and permanent provocation. 
The source of power relations is violence: violence is "its primitive form, its 
permanent secret and its last resource" (Foucault 1983:220). But power 
relations differ from violence: violence is a force that acts directly on the body 
and things, while power relation refers to "an action upon an action." Thus 
bringing into play power relation does not exclude the use of violence or 
consent and it can never do without them (cf. Foucault 1983:220). 
Foucault notes that when people speak about power they almost naturally 
describe it as a struggle or battle:  
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It’s astonishing to see how easily and self-evident people talk of 
war-like relations of power or class struggle without ever making it 
clear whether some form of war is meant and if so what form 
(Foucault 1980:119).  
As Foucault asks, what is the meaning of struggle here? Is it a war? "Is civil 
society riven by class struggle to be seen as a war continued by other means?" 
(Foucault 1980:208). Therefore, Foucault asks: 
Isn't power simply a form of warlike domination? Shouldn't one 
therefore conceive all problems of power in terms of relations of 
war? Isn't power a sort of generalised war which assumes at 
particular moment the form of peace and the state? Peace would 
then be a form of war, and the state a means of waging it 
(Foucault 1980:123). 
Here Foucault follows Nietzsche and suggests that power could be more 
appropriately described as a war-like relationship of forces, or warfare (cf. 
Foucault 2003:13–17). For theorising power Foucault (2003:16) proposes to 
use "Nietzsche’s hypothesis" where power relations are assumed as a warlike 
clash of forces. Power is the war-like relation of forces, and is based in the 
physical aspect of the human body and has its origin in the primitive form of 
violence. Foucault follows Nietzsche's insight that life is a single drama is 
manifest in an endless play of domination (cf. Foucault 2000a:377).  
Central to Foucault's thinking is the assumption that power is exercised on the 
individuals and they are the basic units for the formation of social groups and 
societies. The individual's body is a nodal point for the application and exercise 
of power. The individual human being is the product, or the effect of power. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:109) describe Foucault’s vision of the world thus: 
The social world resembles a field or clearing in the forest created by the 
operation of anonymous forces; "this field or clearing is understood as the result 
of long term practices and as the field in which those practices operate." The 
social field is the result of battles and is the space where constant battles keep 
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the space open and define it. In this sense only one drama is ever staged in this 
space: eternal play of domination (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983:109–110). From 
Foucault's Nietzschean genealogist's perspective, the play of forces also 
constructs the human individual; the human subject is fabricated on the 
battlefield of life: 
Subjects do not first preexist and later enter into combat or 
harmony. In genealogy subjects emerge on a field of battle and 
play their role, there and there alone. The world is not a play which 
simply masks a truer reality that exists behind the scenes. It is as it 
appears (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983:109). 
6.3  Fabrication of the disciplinary individual in perpetual battle 
In his approach to power Foucault follows Nietzsche's (1968:33) insight that 
"life is the consequence of war, and society is a means to war." For Foucault 
(2003:18) "war is the historical principle behind the working of power" and one 
of the products of the working of power is the fabrication of the individual 
human subject. 
Power is exercised through networks and individuals are in a position to submit 
and to exercise power (Foucault 2003:29). Foucault notes that as agents of 
power "we all have some element of fascism in our heads", or at a more basic 
level "we all have some element of power in our bodies" (Foucault 2003:30). 
Power is a technique of domination directed at, and applied to, individuals' 
bodies (Foucault 2003:34–36).  
Contrary to the belief that the individual human being exists prior to power 
relations and is dismantled and oppressed by power:  
It is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, 
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual 
is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of 
forces and bodies (Foucault 1987:217).  
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The individual is constructed in the field of power relations: the power relations 
"permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual" (Foucault 1987:308). Power 
inscribes itself on the human body: power relations have a hold on the body, 
they "invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform 
ceremonies, to emit signs" (Foucault 1987:25). More specifically according to 
Foucault (1987) it is the application of a "political technology of the body" that 
constructs individuals and a social group. Power is applied and it inculcates 
"dispositions, manoeuveres, tactics, techniques, functioning" on bodies 
(Foucault 1987:26). It is through application of meticulous procedure of 
inquisition, punishments and torture refined over centuries, that have ultimately 
fabricated an appropriate individual subject to suit the needs of the 
contemporary social conditions (cf. Foucault 1987:19, 194). Moreover, the 
micro-physics operations of power networks and the application of punitive 
measures have produced the modern human soul. The soul is not something 
that is destroyed by power and domination but on the contrary the soul is the 
product of a "certain technique of power over the body"; the soul is born "out of 
methods of punishment, supervision and constraint." The "soul is the effect and 
instrument of a political anatomy" and ultimately "the soul is the prison of the 
body" (Foucault 1987:29–30), because it comes to control the body. This is the 
result of gradual change in the application of methods of punishment: whereby 
the physical confrontation was replaced with intellectual struggles between the 
criminal and the judicial investigator (cf. Foucault 1987:69). 
6.3.1 The central role of killing 
The common factor behind the fabrication of individuals and formation of 
society is the act of violence, killing and associated with death and warfare. Or 
more accurately, the ability to inflict pain, and the fear of death expressed in the 
dual effects of imposing discipline and punishment. The ability to kill as the key 
to fabrication of individual human beings was considered by Hobbes as the 
natural right possessed by every individual when defending his life by kill those 
attacking him (cf. Foucault 1981b:135).  
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In ancient societies killing was linked to family and clans. "The blood relation 
long remained an important element in the mechanism of power, its 
manifestations, and its rituals." In early primitive societies "in which famine, 
epidemics, and violence made death imminent, blood constituted one of the 
fundamental values" that ensured survival. The value of blood was both 
instrumental and symbolic: 
It owed its high value at the same time to its instrumental role (the 
ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs 
(to have certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to 
risk one's blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, 
subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly 
corrupted) (Foucault 1981b:147).  
In such "society of blood" power spoke through blood and "blood was a reality 
with a symbolic function." But in modern society mechanisms of power are 
addressed to the body, to life and to the control and administration of sex as the 
cause for proliferation of life. This is a change from "a symbolics of blood to an 
analytics of sexuality" (Foucault 1981b:147-148). This is essentially derived 
from or is based on a change from the visible and direct killing to a more 
diffused and hidden killing, or killing indirectly by exposing to death some 
elements of the population. 
The origin of the right to kill was the right of the head of the household to 
dispose of the lives of his children and slaves as expressed in Roman law (cf. 
Foucault 1981b:135). This right was later usurped by the ancient sovereign's 
claim to have the right "to decide life and death." The sovereign showed his 
power only by "his right to kill, or refrain from killing, which means that the 
power of life and death actually is more limited to "the right to take life or let 
live" (Foucault 1981b:136). This regime was gradually modified by introduction 
of disciplinary techniques that eventually limited the sovereign's right of direct 
killing but afforded him an indirect "power to foster life or disallow" it (Foucault 
1981b:138). The right to kill by the sovereign is manifested in two directions: (a) 
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in defending the sovereign's authority against internal rebellion he was 
empowered to impose the death penalty, and (b) the sovereign as a guardian of 
the social body was empowered in case of external military treats to mobilise 
the citizens for military duty and thus exposing them indirectly to possible death 
(cf. Foucault 1981b:137). These two are united symbolically in the ancient 
sovereign's "right of the sword" which included the power to make war outside 
society and impose the death penalty within society (Foucault 1981b:137). The 
unification of modes of killing was made possible by the transformation of war 
into politics: "The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be 
capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines 
the strategy of state" (Foucault 1981b:137). Foucault alludes here to the 
historical development whereby warfare gradually became monopolised by the 
state, as he puts it:  
It is one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force 
relationships which for a long time had found expression in war, in 
every form of warfare, gradually became invested in the order of 
political power (Foucault 1981b:102). 
Indeed, this long reciprocal process of war-making and state-making in 
European history is documented by Tilly (1990). 
6.3.2 The soldier as ideal model for the human being 
The disciplinary methods derived from war and the military were transferred into 
society, and ultimately fabricated the modern individual subject. As Foucault 
puts it: "One should take as its model a perpetual battle" rather than the model 
of social contract (Foucault 1987:26). Thus while the model of the battlefield is 
a metaphor for life, for many the army is a model for society, and in the age of 
Enlightenement for many Europeans the army, and in particular the army of 
Frederick the Great serves as an model for civilian society (Bell 2008:37). Thus 
by extension the proper measure of the human being, and the ideal model for 
the fabrication of the modern individual is the soldier (Foucault 1987:135).  
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Until the early seventeenth century the soldier is considered as someone 
possessing natural talent and the appropriate body structure that was 
developed and perfected in actual fighting and in military training thus 
inculcating "a bodily rhetoric of honour" (Foucault 1987:135). However, by late 
eighteenth century it is assumed that anyone could be made into a soldier. 
Through the application of meticulous training methods correct body posture, 
habits and dispositions could be inculcated in anyone and it is as if "out of 
formless clay" one could manufacture a human machine (cf. Foucault 
1987:135). 
The new methods of training made possible meticulous control over the 
functions of the body, impose discipline, and training the body in "docility-utility". 
Such methods were considered superior to slavery because they inculcated 
obedience without the need for violent domination (cf. Foucault 1987:137). As 
Foucault (1987:138) notes, discipline has a double function: constructing docile 
subjection of the body for increased economic usefulness, while at the same 
time diminishing political resistance and increasing obedience. All these were 
the result of improved organisation of institutions of control: primarily the 
expansion and restructuring of the military and "militarisation of the large 
workshops", hospitals and schools (Foucault 1987:138). The expansion in the 
application of techniques of power and discipline over individuals is attributed to 
the work of the army and its meticulous techniques of training that produced 
docile bodies that were at the same time well trained and obedient to 
commands (Foucault 1987:135, 141). The army becomes a "matrix of 
organisation and knowledge" (Foucault 1980:77). 
A general expansion of military barracks throughout Europe to accommodate 
the large peace-time armies lead to the developments and perfection of training 
modes (Foucault 1987:140–142, 218), and "massive projection of the military 
methods onto industrial organisation" also enforced a division of labour 
(Foucault 1987:221). Military organisation of space, rank and movement 
provided the fundamental disciplinary model. Monastic orders and schools were 
organised and operated based on a binary internal division that was 
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simultaneously a unified model of a military camp consisting of two competing 
units: 
The general form was that of war and rivalry; work, apprenticeship 
and classification were carried out in the form of the joust, through 
the confrontation of two armies; the contribution of each pupil was 
inscribed in this general duel; it contributed to the victory or the 
defeat of the whole camp; and the pupils were assigned a place 
that corresponded to the function of each individual and to his 
value as a combatant (Foucault 1987:146). 
It thus can be seen that war is central inspiration for the institutions, their 
organisation and methods of learning. But such link is already articulated by 
Plato's conception of inquiry as hunt (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). While in 
ancient society formal organisation of learning was more limited, the 
organisation of individuals and institutions in the modern world was inspired by 
the model of Roman society: 
One should not forget that, generally speaking, the Roman model, 
at the Enlightenment, played a dual role: in its republican aspect, it 
was the very embodiment of liberty; in its military aspect, it was the 
ideal schema of discipline. The Rome of the eighteenth century 
and of the Revolution was the Rome of the Senate, but it was also 
that of the legion; it was the Rome of the Forum, but it was also 
that of the camps. Up to the empire, the Roman reference 
transmitted, somewhat ambiguously, the juridical ideal citizenship 
and the technique of disciplinary methods. In any case, the strictly 
disciplinary element ... came to dominate the element of joust and 
mock warfare (Foucault 1987:146) 
The organisation of men and training in coordination of movement has 
simplified modern warfare and armies could become larger and also easier to 
move and to lead in battle and in display formation on the parade ground 
(Foucault 1987:148). Military discipline was achieved through uniform 
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imposition of rhythmic control and to organise activity according to a strict time-
table and surveillance and control of the smallest of details (cf. Foucault 
1987:150). From control of activities and the efficient use of time the disciplinary 
training moved to coordinate the body and gestures. Imposing a series of 
particular gesture and their correlate manipulation of objects such as the 
efficient loading and firing of a rifle (Foucault 1987:152–154). Confirming 
Foucault observation, Mumford (1962:81) notes that the soldier had exerted a 
positive influence on the development of technology and society: 
The improvement of the instruments of war have been constant ... 
the shambling peasant with ... his wooden club has ... been 
replaced with the bowman and the spearman, these had given way 
to the musketeer, the musketeer had been turned into smart, 
mechanically responsive infantryman, and musket itself had 
become more deadly in close fighting by means of a bayonet, and 
the bayonet in turn had become more efficient by means of drill 
and mass tactics, and finally, all the arms of the service had been 
progressively co-ordinated with the most deadly and decisive 
arms: the artillery (Mumford 1962:83). 
Each development of weapons and military training in turn improved the 
soldier's self-esteem: 
With the increase in the effectiveness of weapons, came likewise a 
growing sense of superiority in the soldier himself: his strength, his 
death-dealing properties had been heightened by technological 
advance. With a mere pull of the trigger, he could annihilate an 
enemy: that was a triumph of natural magic (Mumford 1962:85). 
The well-trained soldiers operate in coordination and the military becomes a 
well constructed machine which maximised its effects: "Discipline is no longer 
simply an art of distribution of bodies, of extracting time from them and 
accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine" 
(Foucault 1987:164). Such development is also recorded by Mumford: 
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The general indoctrination of soldierly habits of thought in the 
seventeenth century was, it seems probable, a great psychological 
aid to the spread of machine industrialism. In terms of the 
barracks, the routine of the factory seemed tolerable and natural. 
The spread of conscription and volunteer militia forces throughout 
the Western World after the French revolution made army and 
factory, so far as their social effects went, almost interchangeable 
terms. And the ... characterisations of the First World War ... a 
large-scale industrial operation has also a meaning in reverse: 
modern industrialism may equally be termed a large scale military 
operation (Mumford 1962:84). 
Thus thinkers imagined a society as a military machine covering the whole 
territory of the nation where "each individual would be occupied without 
interruption." The military organisation of society provided Marx with a model to 
describe the social division of labour (Foucault 1987:163). The military 
discipline and training methods laid the foundations for modern mass education 
(cf. Foucault 1987:165). The result was a double fabrication of individuals and 
collectivities, "disciplinary tactics is situated on the axis that links the singular 
and the multiple" (Foucault 1987:149).  
In other words, organising individual bodies that combine to work in concert 
with other bodies and form the "social body". This was the "birth of meticulous 
military and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces 
was exercised within states" (Foucault 1987:168). According to Foucault 
(1988b:146), "through some political technology of individuals, we have been 
led to recognise ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as part of a 
nation or of a state." The fabrication of the individual was carried on two levels: 
(a) the external relationship between individuals, and (b) the internal 
relationship of the individual with his inner-self.  
The fabrication of the individual's sense of self has a long tradition dating back 
to Classical Greece and is intimately linked with the conception of war, battle 
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and conflict. As Foucault (1988d:67) uncovers: "The long tradition of spiritual 
combat, which was to take so many diverse forms, was already clearly 
delineated in classical Greek thought." For the Greeks the individual's relation 
with the self was associated with the idea of self-knowledge, self-control and 
self-mastery. The individual was imagined as consisting of "stronger" and 
"weaker" parts of the self, also expressed in Plato's idea of two parts of the 
soul. The self-mastery was essential as the individual relation to the self was 
considered in terms of conflict, struggle and resistance and the individual has to 
dominate himself and master himself. As Foucault (1988d:65) notes, 
domination "implies agonistic relation", the individual had to fight against 
formidable forces of temptation, to combat them as if they were formidable 
enemies and defeat them and remain armed and vigilant against them (cf. 
Foucault 1988d:66–67). The conception of battle with the self is a reflection of 
social relations of war, combat and agonism in ancient Greek society. 
According to Foucault, "this combative relationship with adversaries was also 
an agonistic relationship with oneself" and was "revealed in metaphors such as 
that of battle that has to be fought against armed adversaries", or as being able 
to defend oneself against attacks. Such "a 'polemical' attitude with respect to 
oneself" was conceived as a "wrestling and running contest" and its resolution 
was expressed as impressive victory over the self (Foucault 1988d:67–69). 
Ultimately, the individual had to "set up the government of his soul" based on 
the paradigm of the well-governed city (Foucault 1988d:71). 
For Foucault, the individual gains a sense of identity through the application of 
techniques of torture, pain, punishment and discipline and "technologies of the 
self" as practice of self-inflicted torture and discipline. Secondly, through the 
application of techniques of power the individuals are combined to form a social 
group. "Discipline 'makes' individuals" as it is a technique of power that 
considers the individual as its object and as the instrument of its exercise 
(Foucault 1987:170). The ideal model to instil discipline in the whole society 
was the military camp where power could be exercised through close 
observation and supervision of individuals (Foucault 1987:171). The disciplinary 
training of individuals entails "a whole technique of human dressage, by 
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location, confinement, surveillance, the perpetual supervision of behaviour" and 
ultimately these "procedures for training and exercising power over individuals 
could be extended, generalised, and improved" (Foucault 1988c:105). The 
continuous application of disciplinary methods to individuals and social groups 
resulted in normalisation and homogenisation and ultimately in modern society 
"prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble 
prisons" (Foucault 1987:228).  
According to Foucault (1987) "ultimately what presides over all these 
mechanisms is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but 
the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy" and therefore, within society 
we can still "hear the distant roar of battle" (Foucault 1987:308).  
Foucault concludes that a model of war or perpetual battle is an appropriate 
model to describe society (Foucault 1987:26). And in any case the model of the 
Roman legion that served as the blueprint for the construction rational modern 
society (cf. Foucault 1987:146). Thus, as against the belief that society is a 
peaceful unity, the real inspiration was the military model: 
Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society 
to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there 
was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference 
was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated 
cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to 
permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely 
progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to 
automatic docility (Foucault 1987:169).  
6.4 The war apparatus as model for society  
For Foucault (2003:47) the phenomenon of war could “be regarded as primary 
with respect to other relations." War is primary a human condition and under its 
general form, we can group phenomena such as antagonism, rivalry, 
confrontation, and struggles between individuals, group and classes (cf. 
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Foucault 2003:47). War is a primal and basic state of affairs and “all 
phenomena of social domination, differentiation, and hierarchialisation [can] be 
regarded as its derivatives” (Foucault 2003:266). Thus war could as well be a 
model of life. 
War is a primary factor in human history and relations of power express 
themselves primarily as war (cf. Foucault 1981b:102). The forces that operate 
in history do not obey predetermined destiny or superior regulative mechanisms 
that give directions and lead towards progress as is envisaged by some 
religious thinkers or the philosophers of the Enlightenment. These forces 
operate on the principle of chance and luck of victory or defeat in battle (cf. 
Foucault 2000a:381).   
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until 
it arrives at universal reciprocity, where rule of law finally replaces 
warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules 
and proceeds from domination to domination (Foucault 
2000a:378).  
And following Nietzsche, Foucault further contends that the will to power is the 
primary explanation of history: 
The success of history belongs to those who are capable of 
seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to 
disguise themselves as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and 
redirect them against those who had initially imposed them, they 
will make it function in such a way that the dominators find 
themselves dominated by their own rules (Foucault 2000a:378). 
Simply stated, the facts of human history are war, violence, plunder and 
conquests, and the constant changing fortunes. Taking a realistic view of 
history without moral or religious idealisation, history appears as eternal cycle 
of struggles and dominations. Throughout history it was victory in battle and the 
power of the conqueror that defined the just and the legitimate.  
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For Foucault power relations are warlike relations therefore one could 
understand society and analyse it in terms of a model of war. Therefore, if 
power is simply a form of warlike domination, then  
Shouldn't one therefore conceive all problems of power in terms of 
relations of war? Isn't power a sort of generalised war which 
assumes at particular moments the forms of peace and the State? 
Peace would be a form of war, and the state a means of waging it 
(Foucault 1980:123).  
As for the social struggles,  
should one, or should one not, analyse these "struggles" as 
vicissitudes of a war, should one decipher them according to a grid 
which would be one of strategy and tactics? Is the relation of 
forces in the order of politics a relation of war? (Foucault in 
Davidson 2003:xvii–xviii).  
Further reflection on power in terms of the model of war discloses that politics 
and war, or war and peaceful society are not clear-cut categories. If power is a 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate, and 
power is a name for a complex strategical situation in a particular peaceful 
society (Foucault 1981b:92–93), then the link is direct: politics is war and 
understood as war. Foucault describes this relationship by reversing 
Clausewitz's well-known pronouncement that war is continuation of politics 
conducted by other means. Thus Foucault is looking at social power relations 
from a perspective of war, which is seemingly opposed to Clausewitz's interest 
in war as being subordinate to politics. Clausewitz considers war as being 
subordinate to politics while for Foucault politics is subordinate to war because 
war is the generative force that brings social power relations into existence. But 
the distinction is not permanently fixed but is flexible and interchangeable.  
Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics 
is war pursued by other means? If we still wish to maintain a 
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separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate 
rather that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded – in part 
but never totally – either in the form of "war," or in the form of 
"politics"; this would imply two different strategies (but the one is 
always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these 
unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations 
(Foucault 1981b:93). 
At the heart of the matter is the incorporation of war relations into society and 
their translation into political relations. Indeed, a long historical process in 
Western societies was at work transforming warfare into political power 
relations (cf. Foucault 1981b:102). Foucault realises that to say that politics is 
war by other means is as true as saying that war is politics by other means. 
This is so because war is the generative principle constructing society and 
politics, and provides the appropriate model for constructing and analysing 
society. But this transfer of war into politics is not a one-way process; it is 
reversible and has its correlate when politics becomes extended into war. 
Hence, the two are always liable to interchange (Foucault 1981b:93).  
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it 
must not be forgotten that “politics” has been conceived as a 
continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the 
military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. 
Politics as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to 
implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined 
mass, of docile useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the 
field, on manoeuvres and on exercises. In the great eighteenth-
century states, the army guaranteed civil peace no doubt because 
it was a real force, an ever-threatening sword, but also because it 
was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project their 
schema over the social body (Foucault 1987:168).  
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More clearly, this means that if one wants to make a distinction between war 
and politics then  
it is strategy that makes it possible to understand warfare as a way 
of conducting politics between states; it is tactics that makes it 
possible to understand the army as a principle for maintaining the 
absence of warfare in civil society (Foucault 1987:168).  
In other words, power is a generalised war that assumes at a particular moment 
the form of peace" (Foucault 1980:123). 
While much ink has been spilt to praise Foucault's presumed "reversal" of 
Clausewitz's aphorism, nevertheless, Foucault stays true to Clausewitz's 
understanding of war and politics. While Clausewitz is aware of the influence of 
war on politics, he also recognises that in turn, war shapes the political sphere, 
and influences political action. For Clausewitz (1985:121) war is chameleon-like 
as it changes to some degree in each particular case. Clausewitz is also aware 
that there is a mutual reversibility between war and politics: 
Even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be 
regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a 
passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of 
political combinations (Clausewitz 1985:108). 
However, Clausewitz and Foucault have different interests in their approach to 
politics and war. Clausewitz as a military man locates politics as the primary 
controller of the military and in waging war politics provides the "logic", direction 
and rational for war while war has its own "grammar” or modes of operation (cf. 
Clausewitz 1985:402). Clausewitz’s discussion on war and politics is also a 
particular German response to the French Revolution and also motivated by his 
own military interests. First, Clausewitz dislikes the French, second, his theory 
is a response to specific political relations of power in Prussia which began to 
be challenged by the infusion of French ideologies of liberty and democracy (cf. 
Keegan 2004a:17). The difference between France and Prussia was that “in 
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France during the Revolution, politics had been everything; in Prussia politics 
had been and very largely remained even after Napoleon’s defeat nothing but 
the whim of the king” (Keegan 2004a:17). Realising that the strength of the 
French military was largely derived from the popular revolutionary fever, 
Clausewitz would like to see the Prussian military practice warfare with the 
same passion as the armies of the French Republics and Napoleon’s troops, 
but without the politics of revolution. In an attempt to preserve the power of the 
Prussian king against increasing demands for participation in politics, 
Clausewitz is faced with the problem of “how might one have popular warfare 
without a popular state” (Keegan 2004a:17). For such a purpose, Clausewitz 
would like to persuade the Prussian army that warfare is a form of political 
activity. By making the army more disciplined and professional and by 
inscribing the ideals of the Prussian regimental culture of total obedience, 
single-minded courage, self-sacrifice, and honour. Clausewitz assumes that by 
making the soldier a professional “the Prussian soldier could be safely left in a 
state of political innocence” and fight as if "the fire of politics flowed in his veins” 
(Keegan 2004a:16-17).  
As against Clausewitz, Foucault is interested in the way war infuses and directs 
politics from the beginning. Indeed, Foucault's interest is to discover "if military 
institutions ... are ... the nucleus of political institutions" and "how, when, and 
why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power 
relations is war?" (Foucault 2003:47). Looking on society from this perspective 
is an inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism and thus Foucault asks:  
Who, basically, has the idea of inverting Clausewitz's principle, 
and who thought of saying: “It is quite possible that war is the 
continuation of politics by other means, but isn't politics itself a 
continuation of war by other means?” (Foucault 2003:47-48).  
But ultimately Foucault concludes that it is not important to find who inverted 
Clausewitz's principle but, rather, whose "principle Clausewitz inverted", 
because the principle that war is a continuation of politics by other means 
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existed a long time before Clausewitz inverted it (cf. Foucault 2003:48). 
According to Foucault, 
the reason Clausewitz could say one day ... that war was the 
continuation of politics by other means is that, in the seventeenth 
century, or at the beginning of the eighteenth, someone was able 
to analyse politics, talk about politics, and demonstrate that politics 
is the continuation of war by other means (Foucault 2003:165).  
Thus for Clausewitz the idea of war as politics was prepared a hundred years 
earlier by a French historian Boulainvilliers, and two hundred years earlier by 
English historians. And of course there was also Machiavelli's similar 
understanding of war and politics. Machiavelli sees the art of politics in military 
terms (cf. Wood 2001:lvii). The military commander is for Machiavelli a model 
for a statesman because he is capable of handling supporters and is apt in the 
use of tactics against domestic political enemies. The analogy goes further 
because the aim of political struggle is power, and likewise the aim of the 
military commander is victory and gaining power over the enemy (cf. Wood 
2001:lxiv). However, Foucault misses these points because he only refers to 
Machiavelli's The Prince (1968) and neglects Machiavelli's other book: The art 
of war (Machiavelli 2001).  
The link between war and politics is also developed by other discourses that 
considered the existence of a perpetual war of races, thus the race war inspired 
Marx to translate this into his conception of a permanent class war. Indeed, as 
was shown in previous chapters, the principle that war, politics and life are a 
perpetual battle have been in existence from the ancient times of Heraclitus and 
before. 
A whole tradition that considers war as formative force is uncovered by 
Foucault. For Foucault the exposure of power as the basic structure in 
individual and social life implies that we need a model of war to understand and 
analyse society. Moreover, the warlike image of society means that the model 
of language that normally is used as an analogy for society and as a model for 
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social analysis is inappropriate. The new approach demands that its "point of 
reference should not be the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to 
that of war and battle" (Foucault 1980:114). Therefore, 
from this follows a refusal of analysis couched in terms of symbolic 
field or the domain of signifying structures, and a recourse to 
analysis in terms of the genealogy of relations of forces, strategic 
deployments, and tactics (Foucault 1980:114). 
According to Foucault human history does not resemble its representation on 
the model of language (langue) as is claimed by structuralism and idealised by 
hermeneutics. Of course it is possible to read human action as if it were a text, 
as suggested by Ricoeur (1977) but there is a need for a much more elaborate 
interpretation of action and practice. For Foucault provides the model for 
historical understanding of society.  
The history which bears and determines us has a form of war 
rather than language: relations of power, not meaning. History has 
no “meaning”, though this is not to say that it is absurd or 
incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be 
susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail – but this in 
accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategy and 
tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor 
semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the 
intrinsic intelligibility of conflict. Dialectic is a way of evading the 
always open and hazardous reality of conflicts by reducing it to a 
Hegelian skeleton, and semiology is a way of avoiding its violent, 
bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form 
of language and dialogue (Foucault 1980:115). 
A model of war is as an appropriate tool for social analysis because forces are 
relations laid bare and become visible as a matrix for techniques of domination 
(cf. Foucault 2000a:46). Foucault proposes that a heuristic understanding of 
society is provided by "the binary schema of war and struggle, of the clash 
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between forces, can really be identified as the basis of civil society, as both the 
principle and motor of the existence of political power" (Foucault 2003:18). 
Foucault suggests that 
war can possibly provide a principle for the analysis of power 
relations: can we find in the bellicose relations, in the, model of 
war, in the schema of struggle or struggles, a principle that can 
help us understand and analyse political power, to interpret 
political power in terms of war, struggle, and confrontations? 
(Foucault 2003:23). 
The analyses of power could be done “first and foremost in terms of conflict, 
confrontation and war”, because social relations are "continuation of war by 
other means” (Foucault 2003:15). The appropriate analytical concepts to be 
used are binary schema of war and struggle, battle and resistance, tactics, 
strategy, relations of force (cf. Foucault 2003:18). This provides a number of 
suggestive ways of understanding society (Foucault 2003:15): 
• The individual human subjects are constructed by violence and battle. 
• The distinction between strategy and tactics can define external relations 
between states and internal relations between individuals and social 
groups within the state. 
• Power relations in a society are "anchored" in relations of force that were 
"established in and through war at a given historical moment." In other 
words, the structure of society is established by war. This is so because 
political power ends war and establishes peace in a society; however, 
this does not suspend the effects of power, nor eliminates the 
disequilibrium existing at the conclusion of the last battle. Political power 
perpetually wages a silent war and inscribed the unequal relations of 
power in social institutions: "Politics, in other words, sanctions and 
reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifest in war" (Foucault 
2003:16). The victorious force on the battlefield dominates society in 
times of peace.  
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• The political struggles within the society in a state of "civil peace" and the 
shifting balance of forces in the political system could be reinterpreted as 
a continuation of war. These could be considered as episodes in an 
ongoing war. In other words, the history of peace is in fact the history of 
the last war, or stated differently it is a disguised form of a civil war 
(Foucault 2003:16). 
• The power relations in society are in constant flux and undergo a change 
of fortune. Ultimately, permanently fixing these shifting power relations 
can only be done by war, "by trial of strength in which weapons are the 
final judges." Therefore the last battle ends politics and suspends the 
exercise of power (Foucault 2003:16).  
6.5  War makes society and society makes war 
Foucault’s explication of the relations between war and peace and the 
transformation of war into politics and vice versa illuminate Schmitt’s views on 
the role of war in relation to the political discussed in Chapter 5 above. By 
confronting Clausewitz’s statement with its reversal external relations between 
states and internal relation within states becomes intelligible: 
It is strategy that makes it possible to understand warfare as a way 
of conducting politics between states; it is tactics that makes it 
possible to understand the army as a principle for maintaining the 
absence of warfare in civil society (Foucault 1987:168). 
These two statements and the distinction between strategy and tactics are 
useful to describe external and internal use of the military and war in the 
formation of the state and politics within the state. Moreover, one of the 
important implications of Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s statement is its 
ability to question the prevalent assumptions about the existence of social order 
and challenge the liberal-democratic theory of society. Clausewitz takes for 
granted the legitimacy of the nation-state and politics, and such legitimacy is 
extended to war as a means of conducting politics among nation-states. 
Likewise, democratic theory assumes that legitimate politics can only take place 
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within the law. By reversing Clausewitz’s statement Foucault uncovers the pre-
legal situation of domination which the law simply codified and legitimised and 
war and its transformation into politics within the state thus demystifies the 
operation of the law.  
6.6 War as politics: strategy as foundation for external relations 
between states and societies 
According to Foucault (1987:168), "it is strategy that makes it possible to 
understand warfare as a way of conducting politics between states." From the 
perspective of strategy war is the continuation of politics between nation-states. 
The military is the foundation that provides a group of people or the state’s 
ability to define itself against other groups and defend its sovereignty.  
The relation between independent states or social groups is one of war, and 
war is the final arbiter in resolving conflict. For example Machiavelli contends 
that the head of state or prince “should have no other object or thought, nor 
acquire skills in anything, except war, its organisation, and its discipline” 
(Machiavelli 1968:87). Arendt (1973:188) points out that international conflict 
can ultimately be settled only by war because there is no other form of conflict 
resolution and “there is no alternative to victory.”  
6.7  Politics as war: tactics as the internal organising principle of 
societies 
According to Foucault (1987:168) "it is tactics that makes it possible to 
understand the army as a principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in 
civil society." Foucault’s conception of war within society is based on the 
assumption that war is prior to society and is the formative force of the political 
order.  
Power relations as they function in any society are essentially anchored in 
certain relationship of force established in and through war at a given specific 
historical moment. While political power puts an end to war, and establishes a 
reign of peace in civil society, but this is not done in order to suspend the effect 
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of power or neutralise the disequilibrium that was revealed in the last battle of 
the war (cf. Foucault 2003:15). The victorious war party installs itself in power 
and the relations of disequilibrium of forces continue the unfinished battles of 
the last war within society by “other means” provided now by politics (cf. 
Foucault 1980:90–91). In other words, the position of conqueror and 
conquered, victor or loser, are transformed into respective position of within the 
field of political power relations which provide the nucleolus of political and 
social relations. The military institutions and their practices and the techniques 
used in fighting a war are directly and indirectly the nucleus of political 
institutions in society (Foucault 2003:47).  
More fundamentally, war within society resembles Hobbes's idea of war of 
everyman against everyman. Indeed, Foucault conceives the permanent war 
within society as being a war of "all against all ... we all fight each other. And 
there is always within each of us something that fights something else" 
(Foucault 1980:208). Hobbes, for example, sees an abstract primitive pre-social 
struggle or war that ends when society is formed. This generalised war is, in 
part, based on the idea of an ancient pre-state social reality: war of individuals 
tied to familial clans. The war in society relates to the ancient mode of dispute 
resolution: two warriors contend one another to determine who is right and who 
is wrong, the decision is gained by battle and the winner naturally proves his 
rightfulness (cf. Foucault 2002:32–33). This form of dispute resolution as a 
game or contest exists in many early cultures (Some examples were discussed 
in the section on Huizinga in Chapter 5). For example, in ancient Germanic 
tribal society, the victim challenges the one who wronged him with the support 
of the whole family clan. "What characterised a penal action was always a kind 
of duel, an opposition between individuals, families, or groups" without the 
intervention by some higher authority which did not exist in any case (Foucault 
2002:35). Justice was a private war: 
A kind of private, individual war developed, and the penal 
procedure was merely the ritualisation of that conflict between 
individuals ... law was a special, regulated way of conducting war 
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between individuals and controlling acts of revenge. Law was thus 
a regulated way of making war (Foucault 2003:35).  
In cases of murder the judicial practice was to seek revenge, and thus "entering 
the domain of law meant killing the killer, but killing him according to certain 
rules, certain forms", such as cutting him to pieces or cutting his head off and 
placing it on a stake, which were acknowledged as ritualised revenge forms 
(Foucault 2002:35).  
In pre-state societies the military model provides a blueprint for the construction 
and functioning of politics as the field of power within a society. Power as a 
warlike relationship means that these relationships could manifest themselves 
either in the form of war or in the form of politics, “but the one is always liable to 
switch into the other” (Foucault 1981b:93). Initially keeping the civil order and 
the absence of war within society was the work of the army that applied tactics 
to discipline the masses into coordinated docile troops. The army could 
guarantee the peace because it was a real force, but more importantly, 
because "it was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project their 
schema over the social body", this was the birth of "meticulous military and 
political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was 
exercised within states" (Foucault 1987:168). Military men contributed to the 
construction of the civil society, for example, General Guibert advises that 
"discipline must be made national" and the state must have simple and reliable 
controlled administration that "will resemble those huge machines, which by 
quite uncomplicated means produce great effects" (Foucault 1987:169). 
What is implied is that the civil order is an order of battle and the civil peace is a 
form of civil war. Political power does not begin when war ends, the structure of 
society is not constructed after the clash or arms ceases – war presides over 
the birth of the state, peace, laws which are born in the mud and blood of battle, 
victories, massacres and conquests (Foucault 2003:50). The social order is the 
result of war and the antagonism is transferred into politics. Politics sanctions 
and reproduces the unequal relations of forces manifest in the war: 
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The role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war 
to re-inscribe the relationship of force, and to re-inscribe it in 
institutions, economic inequalities, language and even in bodies of 
individuals (Foucault 2003:16).  
This means that “we are always writing the history of the same war, even when 
we are writing the history of peace and its institutions” (Foucault 2003:16).  
If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority, beneath the 
calm order of subordinations, beneath the State and State 
apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and 
discover a sort of primitive and permanent war? (Foucault 
2003:46–47). 
There is a sort of uninterrupted battle that shapes peace, and that the civil order 
is basically an order of battle, thus in the final analysis war provides the 
principle that allows us to understand order, peace, the State and institutions 
and the entire history of human societies. That is, Foucault points to the fact 
that violence is always the ontological condition of power and at the heart of 
social and political identity and encoded into all social norms (cf. Newman 
2004:580–581).  
Civil "society itself is based on conflict” and “the enemy can be found within 
society" and " therefore what is seen as the idyllic relationship of exchange 
within society “is nothing other than a less bloody, but no less dramatic 
transformation of war" (Battistelli 1993:193). War is the motor behind social 
institutions and order and peace is waging a secret war, peace is a “coded 
war”:  
We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs the 
whole society, continuously and permanently, and it is this 
battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no 
such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s 
adversary (Foucault 2003:51). 
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There are no neutral positions in a society, the subject who speaks, is the 
subject that is fighting a war. All forms of communication and the productions of 
knowledge in a society are produced to be used as weapons in the war. Truth 
and knowledge can be deployed in combat from the particular perspective or 
position of the fighting group and the sought-for victory and ultimately the 
survival of the human subject (cf. Foucault 2003:52). Truth and knowledge are 
thus socially produced and constructed; there is no single truth or neutral 
knowledge, truth is an instrument in the battle – a weapon within relations of 
force – truth is an additional force; truth is used to perpetuate victory (cf. 
Foucault 2003:55),  
In turn the defeated party is motivated by desire for revenge and desire to 
reverse their position of subordination and to turn their defeat into victory by 
other means (cf. Schivelbusch 2004:2). Thus ultimately, 
we really do have to become experts on battles, because the war 
has not yet ended, because preparations are still being made for 
the decisive battles, and because we have to win the decisive 
battle. It is not reconciliations and pacifications that will bring war 
to an end but rather the victory of one side (Foucault 2003:51). 
The relations of dominations are inscribed in rituals, in procedures that impose 
rights and obligations and rules, “such rules are not designed to temper 
violence but rather to satisfy it” (Foucault 2000a:377). The rules and laws in a 
society are “the calculated pleasures of relentlessness, it is the promised blood 
or revenge of the victorious group” and permit perpetual instigation of new 
domination (Foucault 2000a:378).  
The political structure of society is so organised that some can 
defend themselves against others, or can defend their domination 
against the rebellion of others, or quite simply defend their victory 
and perpetuate it by submitting others (Foucault 2003:18).  
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While the social structure is organised in such a manner that some groups can 
take advantage over others, paradoxically in a complete totalitarian regime 
power becomes once again more diffused and war of individuals or war of 
everyman against everyman becomes more manifest. An example is the 
German Nazi society that the "power to kill, ran through the entire social body" 
(Foucault 2003:259). Not only the state had the power to kill but specific groups 
and individuals also were granted the privilege. Ultimately, as Foucault explains 
everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his 
or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, 
which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or 
having them done away (Foucault 2003:259). 
6.8 War as communication: communication as war 
Foucault's replacement of the linguistic model of society with the model of war 
has some implication for the understanding of communication. Foucault 
proposes that communication has a particular relationship with power. To 
identify the specific character of power Foucault proposes that, 
it is necessary also to distinguish power relations from 
relationships of communication which transmit information by 
means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic 
medium. No doubt communicating is always a certain way of 
acting upon another person or persons. But the production and 
circulation of elements of meaning can have as their objective or 
as their consequence certain results in the realm of power; the 
latter are not simply an aspect of the former (Foucault 1983:217–
218). 
Foucault insists that while communication has its particular relationship with 
power and productive activities, these are not entirely three separate domains. 
"It is a question of three types of relationships which in fact always overlap one 
another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mutually as 
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means to an end" (Foucault 1983:217–218). Foucault insists that power 
relations have a distinct character and have nothing to do with relations of 
communication: "Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals. 
Such relations are specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, 
production, communication, even though they combine with them" (Foucault 
1988c:83). Foucault seems rather indeterminate when it comes to identify the 
specific nature of communication and its relation to power, but suggests that in 
modern disciplinary society communication has come to be more intimately 
linked with surveillance: the exercise of power thought communication means 
that control is exercised through the use of the word and the increased use of 
communication, information, and communication technology for surveillance 
(Foucault 2003:223).   
The relation between war and communication is theorised by Clausewitz, and a 
reading of Clausewitz could illuminate Foucault's ideas on communication and 
war. Clausewitz (1985:402) notes that it is a general belief that war breaks off 
communication between groups and nation. Against such belief Clausewitz 
contends that war is continuation of communication: "War is nothing but a 
continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means." Political 
intercourse does not stop with war, does not change to something different but 
continues. Moreover, it is "the chief lines on which the events of War progress, 
and to which they are attached" (Clausewitz 1985:402). When war begins the 
diplomatic exchanges of notes between the warring parties do not stop but are 
transformed and war becomes "merely another kind of writing and language for 
political thought" (Clausewitz 1985:402). War is not separate from politics and 
thus the exchange of diplomatic missives is replaced with the exchange of 
missiles. As Clausewitz puts it (1985:406): "In one word, the Art of War in its 
highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles 
instead of writing notes." War and discourse thus are interlinked: "War, in its 
great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the 
pen" (Clausewitz 1985:410). Thus Clausewitz has a view of war and 
communication that is similar to Austin’s (1984) idea that speaking and the use 
of language can be real forms of action. 
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To show Foucault’s understanding of the relation of war and communication it 
may be useful to reinterpret some of his earlier work on discourse through the 
model of war. As Foucault asserts, "history constantly teaches us (that) 
discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse 
is the power which is to be seized" (Foucault 1981a:52–53). Foucault 
(1981a:62) notes that that "exchanges and communication are positive figures 
working inside complex systems of restriction, and probably would not be able 
to function independently of them." 
6.8.1  Discourse as weapon in battle for power and knowledge  
Discourse is not simply a medium for the representation of social conflicts and 
systems of domination. Discourse is itself an object of man's desire and the 
very object over which conflict arises, it is the thing for which, and by which 
conflicts are fought (cf. Foucault 1971:89).  
Discourse as an object of practice is an asset over which a struggle for political 
power is waged (cf. Foucault 1986:120). Discourse is also a tactical instrument, 
a weapon of attack and defence in the relations of power and knowledge and 
social battles are fought "among discourses and through discourses" (Foucault 
1978:xxi). These are battles of great consequence because they define social 
reality. 
Discourse is of primary importance in the exercise of power because relations 
of power cannot be established, consolidated or implemented without "the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of discourse" (Foucault 
1980:93). This implies that power and knowledge are joined together in 
discourse (cf. Foucault 1981b:100). "There is no knowledge without a particular 
discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the 




In any society, there are manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these 
relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated 
nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation 
and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise 
of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which 
operates through and on the basis of this association. We are 
subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot 
exercise power except through the production of truth (Foucault 
1980:93). 
Indeed discourse is under social control and each "society has its régime of 
truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true" (Foucault 1980:131). The inscriptions of violence 
ultimately manifest themselves as the rules and norms governing discourse.  
In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain 
number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its 
dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
awesome materiality (Foucault 1971:8).  
Social regulation of discourse, based on relations of power control the functions 
of discourse and authorise the use of legitimate language, define the legitimate 
objects of discussion, legitimate knowledge and the legitimate speakers and 
listeners (cf. Foucault 1971:8; Foucault 1988a:199). This implies that "the 
subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge 
must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of 
power/knowledge and their historical transformations" (Foucault 1987:27–28). 
What is at stake in these struggles is the monopoly over positions of authority, 
legitimacy and power.  
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6.8.2  Meaning inscribed by power and the outcome of battle 
Discourse brings into existence a reality for human beings. Discursive practices 
are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" 
(Foucault 1986:49). There is no pre-existing natural order of things waiting 
patiently to be discovered (cf. Foucault 1986:44–45). The world does not have 
prior signification but it is a mere disorder (cf. Foucault 1971:22). For human 
consciousness the existence of things depends firstly on their being objects of 
discourse (cf. Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983:50), because there is no direct access 
to a raw reality, no unmediated perception can distinguish differences and 
similarities between things without a culturally constructed discursive grid of 
intelligibility. The grid consists of  
fundamental codes of culture – those governing its language, its 
schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, 
the hierarchy of its practices established for every man, from the 
very first, the empirical order with which he will be dealing and 
within which he will be at home (Foucault 1989a:xx).  
To the extent that human beings see an ordered reality, such an order is the 
imposition of discourse and power.  
We should not imagine that the world presents us with a legible 
face, leaving us merely to decipher it; it does not work hand in 
glove with what we already know; there is no pre-discursive fate 
disposing the world in our favour. We must conceive discourse as 
a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we 
impose upon them (Foucault 1971:22).  
The objects of discourse are the real or imaginary references of discourse – 
that is, the things one can know, may speak about, name, analyse, classify, 
explain and challenge within a particular discourse (cf. Foucault 1986:46).  
The objects of discourse are not formed once and for all but are constantly 
modified and changed through discourse (cf. Foucault 1986:47). New objects 
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arise not because of continuous progress, revolutionary scientific discoveries, 
construction of superior means of observation and the refutation of errors. New 
objects of discourse are the result of a reorganisation of knowledge and a shift 
in the use of discourse which defines the objects that are to be known (cf. 
Foucault 1989a:x). The objects of discourse emerge from a set of complex 
social relations established within the discursive practice and determined in 
historical and social conditions. An object of discourse is constructed in 
particular social institutions, by individuals who are authorised to talk about 
such specific objects according to particular accepted procedures which are 
used to define and classify such objects (cf. Foucault 1986:41–42). The 
emergence of the objects of discourse is also related to the speaking individual 
making statements. Like the objects of discourse the subjects are assigned 
roles within the discourse. 
6.8.3  Individuals are constructed in discursive battles 
Discourse provides a particular role that may be filled by different individuals 
(cf. Foucault 1986:93–95). While, seemingly, discourse provides a place for 
anyone to speak, speaking is not a free activity. It is obvious that "we are not 
free to say just anything that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like 
or where we like; not just anyone finally, may speak of just anything" (Foucault 
1971:8). To speak implies that one is in a position of power to speak. For 
example,  
medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, 
efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, 
their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from 
the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and 
to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death 
(Foucault 1986:51). 
In order to speak with power of authority the speaker needs to acquire an 
institutionalised position. Such a position requires a whole complex of rules and 
conditions that the speaker must satisfy. These conditions for entering into 
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discourse include educational qualifications, membership of social groups and 
adherence to available theoretical doctrines, et cetera (cf. Foucault 1986:122). 
The individual may only speak about specific objects that are collectively 
established as legitimate objects of discourse. In order to speak with any 
authority and credibility the individual must produce statements that are 
considered true otherwise he is totally ignored and his statements are 
considered to be meaningless (cf. Foucault 1971:16–17). The position and 
power of the individual producing discourse is defined in relation to other 
positions available within the institutions. Different historical periods provide 
different conditions for discourse and positions to the speaking subjects. 
Different discourses also position human subjects differently, for example  
according to a certain grid of explicit or implicit interrogations, he is 
the questioning subject and, according to a certain programme of 
information, he is the listening subject; according to a table of 
characteristic features, he is the seeing subject, and according to a 
descriptive type, the observing subject (Foucault 1986:52).  
However, these conditions must not be considered as imposing a rigid limitation 
on the initiative of the speaker, but rather provide the possibilities in which the 
individual's initiative can operate (cf. Foucault 1986:209). The power of the 
speaker and his institution is determined by the social hierarchy and distribution 
of power in the discursive practice.  
More specifically the roles for the subjects can be identified according to a grid 
of (a) the specific individual who is accorded the right and status and is qualified 
to use such discourse; (b) the institutional site from which the individual makes 
his discourse and from which the discourse derives its legitimacy; (c) the 
legitimate position that the speaking individual must take in relation to the object 
of his discourse (cf. Foucault 1986:50–52). From such a complex matrix, the 




6.8.4  Discourse as battlefield 
Discursive practices consist of making statements. Statements are functions of 
discourse and can be located by reference to the objects and subjects of 
discourse (cf. Foucault 1986:87). A statement is always part of an enunciative 
field and is related to, surrounded by and interacts with other statements in 
discourse (cf. Foucault 1986:97, 106). There is no statement that does not re-
actualise other statements and serves as a point of reference for subsequent 
statements which may follow.  
At the very outset, from the very root, the statement is divided up 
into an enunciative field in which it has a place and a status, which 
arranges for it a possible relation with the past, and which opens 
up for it a possible future ... a statement always belongs to a series 
or a whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving 
support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it is always 
a part of a network of statements in which it has a role (Foucault 
1986:99). 
The meaning of a statement is not its grammatical, semantic or logical 
meaning, nor is it linked to the existence of a real referent. The meaning of a 
statement is defined by its use and function in the discursive practice (cf. 
Foucault 1986:90). In other words, the meaning of a statement is derived from 
the fact that it was actually made and from its function. The meaning of a 
statement is its value within discourse, “a value that is not defined by their truth, 
that is not gauged by the presence of secret content; but which characterises 
their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of 
transformation” (Foucault 1986:120). The statement is a commodity that people 
can "manipulate, use, transform, exchange, combine, decompose and 
recompose, and possibly destroy" (Foucault 1986:105).  
Thus the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or 
prevents the realisation of a desire, serves or resists various 
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interests, participates in challenge and in struggle, and becomes a 
theme of appropriation or rivalry (Foucault 1986:105). 
Human thought manifest in discourse is not simply theoretical reflection but it is 
a certain mode of social action. “As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, 
attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites; it cannot help but liberate and 
enslave (Foucault 1989a:328). According to Foucault (Gordon 1980:245), 
discourse defines its object simultaneously as a target area for intervention and 
as a reality to be brought into existence. Discourse is a tactical instrument, a 
weapon of attack and defence in the relations of power and knowledge, and 
social battles are fought "among discourses and through discourses" (Foucault 
1978:xxi). Thus, if a certain object or domain has become an area of 
investigation,  
this was because relations of power had established it as a 
possible object; and conversely if power was able to take it as a 
target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures 
of discourse were capable of investing it (Foucault 1981a:98).  
By producing discourse on particular objects a whole regime of power-
knowledge-pleasure comes into existence. Such a regime empowers some 
groups that are able to control discourse to dominate other groups. Discourse is 
both an instrument and the effect of power and a hindrance and starting point of 
opposition to power (Foucault 1981b:101). Indeed, one aspect of the operation 
of power is that it encounters resistance. Discourse of power and authority is 
always confronted by a counter-discourse of resistance (cf. Foucault 
1988a:209).  
Because discourse is used strategically and tactically in order to be able to 
capture the complex relationships that are involved, Foucault suggests the use 
of a heuristic model – the apparatus (dispositif) – for analytical diagnostic of 
discursive practices (cf. Foucault 1988a:139; Gordon 1980:244). The apparatus 
as a grid of intelligibility brings together the discourse and its social context and 
eliminates the traditional dichotomy that conceptualises texts as 
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representations existing apart from the real world (cf. Dreyfus & Rabinow 
1983:121). As Foucault contends, the apparatus is  
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions in short, the said as much as 
the unsaid (Foucault 1980:194).  
The aim is to make sense of these practices and to decipher what is going on 
and rediscover "the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, play of 
forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary” (Foucault 
1991:76). Such an analysis should reveal the effects of power generated by 
what is said, the links between discourses, effects of power and pleasure 
invested in them and the knowledge formed from such linkages. For example,  
a particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of 
an institution, and at another time as a means of justifying or 
masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary 
reinterpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of 
rationality (Foucault 1980:194–195). 
Thus the discursive apparatus and the way discourse operates in society are 
congruent with the model of war. 
6.9  Conclusion 
The historical primacy of war means that man and society can not be 
interpreted by the use of a model of language but rather, the model of war 
makes society perectly understandable. War is a natural fact of our culture, and 
hence our culture is a war-culture and ultimately "you have to understand war in 
order to understand our culture" (Hallin 2008). Hardt and Negri (2006) adopting 
Foucault’s idea of war contend that the contemporary world needs to be 
understood in terms of global war and can provide the matrix to understand all 
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power relations (Hardt & Negri 2006:13). Following Foucault, the model of 
language is not the most appropriate for understanding communication, and it 
could be replaced by the model of war. Man and society are not texts to 
understand, but are subject who act and fight. War with its strategy and tactics, 
use of power and resistance, battles and offensives is an eternal way of acting 
and communicating as acknowledged by both Clausewitz and Foucault.  
Foucault realises that struggle is perpetual and there is always a need to fight. 
Here Foucault is influenced by "Nietzsche's glorification of struggle in the face 
of nihilism" and proposes a "Nietzschean agon", an agonistic imperative (Thiele 
1990:909). In this sense Foucault offers a tragic sense of life: the inescapability 
of power, struggle and death. And in these struggles knowledge is important, as 
Nietzsche points out, "knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for 
cutting" (Foucault 1988:154). Thus Foucault offers intellectual tools of critique 
that should be useful instruments "for those who fight, those who resist and 
refuse what is" (Foucault 1991:84). Foucault realises that life has no meaning 
apart from fighting and thus would agree with Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt 
that "what is important is not what we fight for, but how we fight" (Huyssen 
1993:10). But being a realist Foucault adds unequivocally that "one makes war 
to win, not because it is just" (Foucault 2006:51). In other words, it does not 
matter what we fight for but existentially we must always be on the winning 
side. 
The centrality of war and struggles mean that the symbolic and communication 
systems acquire different meanings and function: the mere symbolic nature of 
communication needs to be devalued in order to see the reality behind the 
symbolic. With such new clarity it is now realised that 
our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the 
surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great 
abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete 
training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the 
supports of an accumulation and centralisation of knowledge; the 
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play of signs defines the anchorages of power (Foucault 
1987:217). 
But this as Foucault had shown, is the culmination of a process in the 
transformation of power and replacement of the utility of the sword with 
eloquent speech and symbolic representations, which was already begun in the 
Ancient Greek polis. Here public speaking and argumentation replaced the 
sword as means of political decisions making in the war council or agora. More 
intense transformations were underway since the Middle Ages whereby the rise 
of the courtly society leads to the decline of the old warrior way of life. As 
Norbert Elias writes (1982): in the competition for prestige in the court of the 
king the sword no longer played a central role as a tool for decision-making, it 
was replaced with intrigues, and conflicts were contested and settled with 
words. But ultimately the symbolic representation and its dissemination through 
communication conceal the disciplinary actions of power on the human and the 
social body. To understand contemporary society an understanding of the logic 
of war is still indispensable, as offered by Foucault.  
The next chapter will offer a reading of Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the media 
and how technology is interrelated with war and is developed and implemented 
by the needs of war. McLuhan’s theory of the media contributes to Foucault's 








WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:  
WAR IN THE MEDIA THEORY OF  
MARSHALL MCLUHAN 
War is accelerated social change – McLuhan (1969:376) 
The weapon, even when it is not used to inflict death, is nevertheless a means 
for enforcing a pattern of human behaviour – Mumford (1962:84) 
War ... is itself the principal basis of organisation on which all modern societies 
are constructed – Report from Iron Mountain (Lewin 1996:93) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Marshall McLuhan is best remembered as the 1960s flamboyant media guru 
and for having popularised expressions such as "the medium is the message", 
and the "global village". His theoretical claim that the various media 
technologies and formats are the primary force responsible for cognitive and 
social changes, are mostly dismissed as being technologically deterministic and 
utopian.  
The voluminous literature produced on McLuhan since the 1960s deals almost 
exclusively with his media theories and no references are made to the idea of 
warfare, that are scattered in his various books and articles. As against such 
disregard, this chapter will demonstrate that war is McLuhan's unconscious and 
later a conscious frame of reference and the context that structures his thought 
on the effects of technology on individuals' psychology and social structure. A 
perceptive scholar, MacDonald (2006) suggests that even McLuhan's method 




McLuhan knew how to exploit the ballistic properties of the 
aphorism, a genre whose speed of delivery and sudden, decisive 
impact rival that of a “projectile hurled by a vigorous arm” 
(Seneca). Like Nietzsche, who likens the aphorism to an arrow or 
explosive charge, McLuhan deploys the aphorism as a war 
machine. Just as the surrealist “shock effect” launches the artwork 
beyond aesthetics and into ballistics, McLuhan's aphorisms ... are 
verbal missiles (MacDonald 2006:509). 
The primacy of war is evident in McLuhan's first 1951 book, the Mechanical 
Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (McLuhan 1967) where the Second World War 
was still alive in memory and openly acknowledged thus providing the Zeitgeist 
for much of the thinking, politics, media narratives and advertising art of the 
period. Thus McLuhan uncovers this underlying structure of war and social 
power relations and this structure then becomes the foundation for his own 
thinking and writing. The primacy of war in McLuhan's thought is again evident 
from one of the first statements he makes in his book The Gutenberg Galaxy, 
published in 1962 on the origin of media technology as an extension of human 
sense. McLuhan notes that the origin of all human progress is derived from 
technological extensions of the human body linked with the necessity of 
warfare: "The evolution of weapons begins with teeth and the fist and ends with 
the atom bomb" (McLuhan 1971:4). As McLuhan develops his arguments, it 
emerges that war is mostly the unconscious reflection of the general Zeitgeist of 
the 1960s Cold War and gradually as the Vietnam war intensifies, the idea of 
war gains prominence in McLuhan's 1964 publication Understanding Media 
(McLuhan 1969), and ultimately he concludes the book with a chapter on 
weapons as forms of media. And in his 1968 book War and Peace in the Global 
Village (McLuhan & Fiore 1968), war is the central theme. 
McLuhan's interest in war is the result of the influence of Harold Inns' idea that 
communication media historically facilitated the military expansions on the basis 
of which social, economic and cultural progress was made possible. McLuhan 
also adopts ideas from Lewis Mumford's linking of technological development to 
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warfare. For example, discussing the invention of the wheel McLuhan 
(1969:197) notes that "the wheeled vehicle makes its appearance at once as a 
war chariot, just as the urban centre, created by the wheel, makes its 
appearance as an aggressive stronghold". McLuhan also extends on the 
insights gain from his encounter with the historical studies of Lynn White on 
military technology and social development, and John U Nef's book War and 
Human Progress, published in 1950. Moreover, McLuhan's increased reference 
to war reflects the intensification of, and growing interest in, the Cold War and 
the Vietnam War.  
This chapter traces the role of war and how it structures McLuhan's thought and 
theoretical development. 
7.2  The mechanical bride: between "hot" and "cold" wars 
In the preface to his 1951 book The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial 
Man (McLuhan 1967) McLuhan notes that social domination and tyranny are 
manifest today not through brute force but by propaganda and use of mass 
media to manipulate the mind: "Today the tyrant rules not by club or fist, but, 
disguised as a market researcher, he shepherds his flock in the ways of utility 
and comfort" (McLuhan 1967:vi). Because domination is pervasive, McLuhan's 
aim is to uncover and expose these techniques of control and manipulation by 
applying means of art criticism to society. As McLuhan notes: "Ever since 
Buckhard saw that the meaning of Machiavelli's method was to turn the state 
into a work of art by rational manipulation of power" it has become possible to 
apply methods of art analysis to critical evaluation of society (McLuhan 
1967:vi). Thus McLuhan is aware of the centrality of power in social relations 
and the way art is used to manipulate and enhance social control: "The 
Western world, dedicated since the sixteenth century to the increase and 
consolidation of the power of the state, has developed an artistic unity of effect 
which makes artistic criticism of that effect quite feasible" (McLuhan 1967:vi). 
Taking note of the centrality of social power and domination McLuhan is also 
aware – consciously and unconsciously – of the continued influence of the 
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Second World War that ended in 1945 and still manifests itself in news stories 
and is being transformed into the "Cold War". All such references to war feature 
prominently on the front pages of the newspapers that resemble a symbolist 
landscape represented in surrealist modern painting. As McLuhan shows, on a 
front page of a 1948 newspaper there is a mosaic of stories about the Second 
World War, the Cold War, political wars and social and personal dramas and 
heroism (cf. McLuhan 1967:6). Such symbolist art on the front page of a 
newspaper presents an "X-ray drama of the common passions of the human 
heart", the past and present wars, and the battles and dramas of daily life 
(McLuhan 1967:5).  
In this turbulent world the press is posing as the brave representative of the 
little man "facing giants and ogres" and every day the press warns about the 
dangers the little man faces as big interest groups are plotting against him. The 
press thus claims to heroically search for the public enemies and "find them 
and kill them" (McLuhan 1967:5). "By posing as a Jack-the-Giant-Killer, the 
press gives the ordinary reader a heroic image of himself as capable of similar 
feats" and the "newspaper invites reader participation in its triumphs" (McLuhan 
1967:5). The press transforms the news of the world into a "romantic novel 
filled with cloak-and-dagger episodes and fascinating intrigues hatched in 
various chancellories" and the news of the day is unified by focus on great 
leaders, dramas and wars.  
For the press the two great wars of the twentieth century "were magnificent 
displays of what international industry and technology could do" and the wars 
lead to acceleration of technological development (McLuhan 1967:7). Indeed 
war has fundamentally shaped the press, for example the  
headline is a feature which began with the Napoleonic Wars. The 
headline is a primitive shout of rage, triumph, fear, or warning, and 
newspapers have thrived on wars ever since. And the newspaper, 
with two or three decks of headlines, has also become a major 
weapon (McLuhan 1967:7).  
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Today the "speed of communication" enables the movements of facts as well 
as that of "international armies" and "news gathering" on a "world scale" and 
the national press keeps "mobilising the passions of whole populations year 
after year until the moment comes for blows." Through the "prolonged stirring of 
passion by means of the press" a "world war" can be launched and maintained 
(McLuhan 1967:7). McLuhan concludes that without the press or means of 
rapid communication it would be impossible to imagine war between Russia 
and the West (McLuhan 1967:7).  
Thus the press is used to stimulate emotions leading up to a crescendo that 
requires a resolution of tension – a catharsis – which is found in the form of "a 
blood-bath". And indeed, the "actual outbreak of the Second World War was a 
visible relief to many after years of tense waiting" (McLuhan 1967:7). Moreover, 
even the pacifist attempt to replace war with sports competition ultimately 
incites to war, while in "peacetime" the feeling of large populations are kept 
bellicose that are conducive to promotion of commerce while the dramatic 
newspaper headlines result in good newspapers sales; thus emotions drive the 
sales of goods, and "wars and rumours of wars are the merchandise" the press 
sales successfully on the market (McLuhan 1967:7).  
Death is also an important aspect of news. McLuhan exhibits a 1950 news story 
with the headline: "See selves on video, then two die in chair". The story tells of 
two condemned murders had seen themselves on a newsreel and few hours 
later died on the electric chair (McLuhan 1967:4). McLuhan notes that  
This situation is a major feat of modern news technique. Hot spot 
news with a vengeance. What a thrill these men must have got 
from being on the inside of a big inside story. Participating in their 
own audience participation, they were able to share the thrill of the 




McLuhan concludes that "violence, mayhem, and death" with the addition of 
sex are the staple features found on the news pages of the press and in 
advertisements (McLuhan 1967:11).  
War is also an important theme in commercial advertising. McLuhan provides a 
sample of text accompanying an advertisement for a movie magazine that tells 
a story of combat, death and fantasy about a famous female movie star 
gleaned from a soldier's letter:  
Somewhere in the South Pacific ... We were moving up in an 
armored job - we came up where a few kids had been holding off 
some Japs – just as we arrived, we saw a soldier double up – 
heard him say 'Goodbye, darling ... We got every one of the fifteen 
Japs, and then we hustled to move this kid, but it was too late ... 
We pried open his hand, and it held this picture of you – the bullet 
had gone through it (McLuhan 1967:11–13).  
McLuhan notes that the story sums up the meaning of "war and the glory of 
death" and a soldier who had fought and died accompanied by a fantasy of 
being in a relationship with a movie star. The power of such narratives in 
advertisements moves the readers and sells products but it also degrades the 
valour and human dignity (McLuhan 1967:13). As McLuhan (1967:11) ironically 
notes: "You didn't know what a hero's last words should be? Let the movie 
magazine tell you." Entertainment and war are interlinked as is seen from the 
fact that the "Hiroshima bomb was named 'Gilda' in honour of Rita Hayworth" 
(McLuhan 1967:99).  
For the media death and murder have become central themes of entertainment. 
Popular are magazines with erotic covers that bear titles such as "Bury me 
deep ... I.O.U. – One Grave, Half Past Mayhem, Two Can Die, Dying Room 
Only, Murder On My Mind, Wrong Way Corpse, and Dead Men Talk" (McLuhan 
1967:14). But if in the industry of fictional violence and the reality of news 
reports death is openly discussed, in the advertisements for real managers of 
death such as morticians and burial services the words referring to death are 
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muffled (cf. McLuhan 1967:14). Death that is brought within the sphere of the 
consumer world is neutralised. Likewise, neutralisation of death is achieved in 
the meat industry through mechanisation of killing in the abattoirs where killing 
is performed on a mechanical assembly-line and the death cries of animals are 
drowned and confused with the sound of machinery, thus death cries and 
mechanical noise have become unified.  
McLuhan notes that killing has been entirely naturalised and that "scientific 
techniques of mass killing are applied with equal indifference in the abattoirs, in 
the Nazi death camps, and on the battlefields" (McLuhan 1967:15). And 
techniques of war are transferred to the life of industry, and when the war ends 
"the computers that direct guns might also direct machines" (McLuhan 
1967:34). This implies that the logic of science and technology are derived from 
warfare: "It promises trips to the moon by means of discoveries which, already 
geared to the war machines, will first reduce the number of available 
passengers to the vanishing point" (McLuhan 1967:92).  
The logic of automation and interchangeability shows the "murderous violence" 
of knowledge and the happy result of the target of automation would be as 
happy as "the recipient of a bomb or shell" (McLuhan 1967:34). McLuhan notes 
that industrial production, business and commerce have for a long time "been 
thinking in military terms" in order to "smash public resistance" with carefully 
planned "barrages" of propaganda and are followed by "shock troops of 
salesmen" (McLuhan 1967:34). McLuhan points out that "the American citizen 
lives in a stage of siege from dawn to bedtime. Nearly everything he sees, 
hears, tastes, touches, and smells is an attempt to sell him something" and it is 
as if advertisers have resorted to the use of "Chinese water-torture method" 
(McLuhan 1967:88). Advertising has become a kind of social ritual and if one 
can understand it one can understand the society. For McLuhan the underlying 
logic of advertising is social competition and rivalry: if you "understand rivalry" 
then "you understand America" (McLuhan 1967:113). Society is founded on 
real and "spirit of rivalry" (McLuhan 1967:115). Indeed, McLuhan realises that 
rivalry, battle, competition and fight are the central defining themes of the 
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industrial society (McLuhan 1967:123), and are symbolically represented by the 
logic of the "law of the jungle" that teaches competitiveness and survival skills 
(McLuhan 1967:125).  
The competitive aspect of life is found everywhere; in particular it is expressed 
in sport. McLuhan observes that "naturally the imagery of competitive sport is 
linked to much of our thinking and feeling" and more than any other form of 
entertainment "competitive sport is a direct reflex of the various motives and 
inner dramas of society" (McLuhan 1967:135). The competitive aspect is not 
limited to popular sports that draws mass audiences but is also expressed in 
private and personal competitive games such as chess or card games. 
Competitive sport is magical art and is a central ritual that "seems most 
necessary to social functioning and survival in any given group" (McLuhan 
1967:135). The high social value of sports such as football and baseball 
remains intact and they have maintained their positions even during the Second 
World War because through these sports people in military service could keep 
in touch with ordinary social and business life. Moreover, "war games, business 
games, and sport" share a common frame of reference while there is a "close 
relation between competitive sport and competition of war" (McLuhan 
1967:137). 
The centrality of warfare and war-like social competitiveness is acknowledged 
by members of society, and advertising, mass media and literature promote 
toughness: "No mollycoddling and encouragement of milksops" (McLuhan 
1967:125). Acquiring toughness and learning self-defence techniques are 
popular pursuits of weak individuals and there are ample teachers advertising 
their classes or offering self-thought courses. Thus, like the "terror inspired by 
wild beasts, which led tribal societies to get psychologically inside the tribal 
totem animal" so in the contemporary society people who are "confused or 
overwhelmed by a machine world" are encouraged to become "psychologically 
hard, brittle, and smoothly metallic" (McLuhan 1967:141). McLuhan notes that 
as the sense of helplessness among the urban masses grows so does the 
"hero worship" introduced in the writing of Thomas Carlyle during the 19th 
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century. The hero worship continued to spread with the popular enthusiasm for 
Napoleon and is reflected in the modern "rise of the superman in theory, 
practice, and fantasy simultaneously" (McLuhan 1967:141). These values were 
expressed in military hero worship of the Germans, Boys Scout movement, 
gangsters, literary heroic characters, and Hollywood produced movie star 
heroes (cf. McLuhan 1967:144–145). Hero worship, competition and war are 
informal forms of education. But as against the informal tradition today's formal 
education is being degraded by pacifism. McLuhan quotes a university student 
bemoaning the futility of formal education that has become pacifist because 
what is needed is an education that sharpens competitiveness and cultivates 
the killer instinct in order to become successful in society and business 
(McLuhan 1967:125). War has a driving effect promoting success and 
innovation similar to that provided by education.  
Modern warfare is another point of vantage which enables the 
observer to note how the mere logistics of the war machine cause 
the spread of technology and specialist education (McLuhan 
1967:126).  
The modern mechanised or total war also promotes prosperity and economic 
well-being:  
As the creator of wealth and opportunity for all, war has put peace 
to shame in our time. War has provided higher education and 
higher consumer standards for more people than peace ever did 
(McLuhan 1967:128).  
McLuhan insists that by such presentation of war he is merely exposing "the 
central realty of our world" (McLuhan 1967:128). But the reality has also 
changed, according to McLuhan, it is no longer a world of real physical 
toughness of the personal Neanderthal power and Darwinian melodrama but 
the power of abstract logistics, control and manipulation as a kind of "post-
Darwinian brand of abstract toughness" (McLuhan 1967:131). Thus in the 
mechanical mass society and industrial age individuals are powerless and only 
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gain power by conforming to the group. The result is that the "smaller and 
meaner the man" the more he desires to posses unlimited power, and attain 
superhuman power (McLuhan 1967:128).  
The Second World War exposed the difference between the old style heroism 
and modern mechanised killing, and the different styles of killing are indicators 
of different human personalities, and as civilisation progresses the civilised 
have lost their animal killer instinct and toughness. The real toughness has 
been transformed from the “personal Darwinian melodrama” to “abstract 
toughness” and the difference can be seen when the fighting spirit of the 
German and British are compared and it is evident that the civilised British 
Army shows a lack of “killer urge” (McLuhan 1967:131). 
The German Afrika Corpse defeated the Eighth Army because it 
had speed, anger, virility and toughness. As soldiers in the 
traditional sense, the Germans are punk, absolute punk. But 
Marshall Erwin Rommel and his gang are angry men, they are 
tough to the point of stupidity. They are virile and fast, they are 
thugs with little or no imagination. They are practical men, taken 
from a most practical and hard life to fight practically: Nazis are 
trained to kill. The German commanders are scientists, who are 
continually experimenting with and improving the hard, 
mathematical formula of killing. They are trained as 
mathematicians, engineers and chemists facing complicated 
problems. There is no art in it, there is no imagination. War is pure 
physics to them. The German soldier is trained with a psychology 
of daredevil track rider. He is a professional killer, with no 
distinction. He believes he is so tough, and can be beaten soundly 
and quickly by a foe using the same ruthless speedy methods he 
uses ... The British soldier is the most heroic on earth, but do not 
confuse that with military toughness. He has the toughness of 
determination but he has not the toughness which makes him 
scientifically kill his enemy (McLuhan 1967:131).  
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As McLuhan concludes, clean scientific killing has replaced the brutality of 
killing: the human quality expressed in killing was eliminated and killing 
becomes mechanical and ultimately even the mere animal quality in killing was 
replaced by clean killing performed by technology (McLuhan 1967:131). All 
these make up the folklore of the modern industrial man.  
7.3  Gutenberg galaxy: from dragon's teeth to armed men 
In the introduction to his 1962 book The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1971), 
McLuhan proposes that the book can be considered as a complementary work 
to a book by Albert Lord that is in turn a continuation of Milman Parry's study on 
the nature of oral poetry in Homer's Iliad and how it differs from the written 
poetry.  
McLuhan in the Gutenberg Galaxy (1971) does not refer to the fact that warfare 
is the central theme of Homer's great epic poem. Indeed as Tatum (2003) 
notes, most modern "peaceful readers" of the Iliad skip over the numerous 
detailed descriptions of battles and killings and focus their attention on the 
presumed more edifying narrative of friendship and sorrows (cf. Tatum 
2003:116). It is only in his 1967 book The Medium is the Message (McLuhan & 
Fiore 1971) that he notes that "Homer's Iliad was a cultural encyclopedia of pre-
literate Greece, the didactic vehicle that provided men with guidance for the 
management of their spiritual, ethical, and social, lives" (McLuhan & Fiore 
1971:113). However, reading the Gutenberg Galaxy, it gradually emerges that 
war is the unconscious background in McLuhan's work as he shows how the 
historical change in technology and media formats, such as the change from 
speech to writing, resulted in changing the forms of human thought and social 
organisation (cf. McLuhan 1971:1–2). The principle effect of the media is not its 
message content but the media's technological form that influences human 
thought patterns and social organisation. Every technology is an extension of a 
particular human sense organ and extending and strengthening one particular 
sense effects change in all the other senses because the relationship between 
the senses is rearranged: "Man the tool-making animal, whether in speech or in 
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writing or in radio, has long been engaged in extending one or another of his 
sense organs in such a manner as to disturb all his other sense and faculties" 
(McLuhan 1971:4). McLuhan explains this further by quoting anthropologist 
Edward T. Hall's contention that man has developed extensions for practically 
everything to do with his body, and that the primary development of such 
extensions was inspired by the needs of warfare: "The evolution of weapons 
begins with the teeth and the fist and ends with the atom bomb" (Hall in 
McLuhan 1971:4).  
For McLuhan all such extensions of the senses and their influence on human 
sensibility and social organisation can be explained by reference to the principle 
operation of metaphor that translates and transfers an experience from one 
domain to another domain. The dominant medium of communication during a 
particular historical epoch, for example speech, is the first technology to shape 
human thought and pattern of social organisation, because language and 
speech are tools that allow man to accumulate experience and knowledge and 
transmit it (McLuhan 1971:5). As McLuhan adds, the extensions translate 
experience in the way metaphor translates one experience into another: 
"Language is metaphor in the sense that it not only stores but translates 
experience from one mode into another" (McLuhan 1971:5). And conflict is the 
central and primary human experience that is translated into all other aspects of 
life. Here McLuhan refers to Shakespeare's King Lear as his example of conflict 
and division of power that is central to human existence (cf. McLuhan 
1971:11).  
The most significant contemporary change is the change from print-dominated 
human sensibility to that of new forms of organic sensibility caused by the 
return to oral culture due to the expansion of the electric or electronic media. 
The replacement of print media with the audiovisual electronic media is 
assumed to have returned the human being to an ancient oral communication 
stage that existed before the invention of writing. McLuhan illustrates his idea of 
the complex social change induced by changing technology and media by 
reference to Harold Innis' narration of the myth of King Cadmus who introduced 
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the Phoenician or phonetic alphabet into Greek society. For Innis, and 
McLuhan, Cadmus' introduction of the alphabet into society seems akin to 
having sown the dragon's teeth and "they had sprung up armed men" 
(McLuhan 1971:25).  
Harold Innis, in Empire and Communications, was the first to 
pursue this theme and to explain in detail the simple truth of the 
Cadmus myth. The Greek King Cadmus, who introduced the 
phonetic alphabet to Greece, was said to have sown the dragon's 
teeth and that they sprang up armed men. (The dragon's teeth 
may allude to the old hieroglyphic forms.) Innis also explained why 
print causes nationalism and not tribalism; and why print causes 
price systems and markets such as cannot exist without print. In 
short, Harold Innis was the first person to hit upon the process of 
change as implicit in the form of media technology (McLuhan 
1971:50).  
McLuhan adds that his own book, The Gutenberg Galaxy "is a footnote of 
explanation" to the work of Harold Innis (McLuhan 1971:50). For McLuhan the 
influence of print media technology is such that the "citizen armies" that arose 
with Cromwell and Napoleon "were the ideal manifestation of the new 
technology" (McLuhan 1971:222). It is the uniformity induced by Gutenberg’s 
book-printing technology that provides the means to construct the concept of 
common nationality, extended it into the "nation in arms", and then with the 
French Revolution the ideas of "liberty, equality and fraternity found their most 
natural ... expression in the uniformity of the revolutionary citizen armies" 
(McLuhan 1971:223). Constructing fraternity is not a benign process but 
characterised by the Jacobin’s use of force and terror to stamp out foreign 
language and dialects and force every French citizen to use the common 
language (McLuhan 1971:224).  
While the idea of war is much in the background of McLuhan's wide ranging 
"mosaic" presentation of media effects, the idea of war gradually comes to the 
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fore, in response to the intensification of the Cold War and growing war-related 
discourse in response to America's increasing military involvement in the 
Vietnam. In McLuhan's subsequent book Understanding Media (McLuhan 
1969) he returns to the myth of Cadmus and unpacks its significance as an 
explanation for the intimate interlink between military power and media 
technology. 
7.4  Understanding media: implosions and explosions in the global 
village  
In his 1964 book Understanding Media (McLuhan 1969), technology of warfare, 
weapons and the military begin to gain more prominence in McLuhan's thought 
on media. McLuhan introduces his concept of technological and media-induced 
revolutions in terms of the concepts "explosion" and "implosion", as he puts it: 
"After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and 
mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding" (McLuhan 1969:11). 
What McLuhan means by this is that the technology of writing and printing has 
distanced people from one another in the same manner as an explosion 
scatters objects, while the invention of electronic media creates an oral 
interactive society and brings people together, just as implosions compact 
matter into close contact. Subsequently, most of McLuhan's discussion and 
examples are taken, as if naturally and in an unconscious manner, from war 
and military.  
According to McLuhan (1969) despite three thousand years of technology 
extending man's body, affecting sensibility, and changing social ways of living, 
these effects have not been noticed or acknowledged. What has not been 
recognised is the fact that the medium of communication is more influential than 
the content, thus what is important to acknowledge is that "the medium is the 
message" (McLuhan 1969:19).  
The lack of attention to the influence of media formats is pervasive. For an 
example, McLuhan (1969) quotes General David Sarnoff expressing a belief 
that media are neutral but their value is determined by the way they are used. 
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McLuhan then argues that such a claim ignores the nature of the medium itself 
and is as perverse as if one were to suggest that "firearms are in themselves 
neither good nor bad; it is the way they are used that determines their values" 
(McLuhan 1969:19). According to McLuhan (1969) this is similar if one were to 
say: "If the slugs reach the right people firearms are good", and by the same 
logic "if the TV tube fires the right ammunition at the right people it is good" 
(McLuhan 1969:19). Later McLuhan adds that with television the viewer 
becomes the screen and "is bombarded with light impulses that James Joyce 
called the 'Charge of the Light Brigade'" (McLuhan 1969:334). Here the light of 
television is a pun on the epic military cavalry charge of the British Light 
Brigade.  
McLuhan credits Napoleon as being one of the first to notice the effects of the 
medium. "Cardinal Newman said of Napoleon” that he understood the grammar 
of gunpowder. Napoleon was also aware of the ability of other media such as 
the "semaphore telegraph that gave him a great advantage over his enemies" 
(McLuhan 1969:21). Napoleon also noted the power of communication media 
and warned that "three hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a 
thousand bayonets" (McLuhan 1969:22). Similarly De Tocqueville was aware of 
the power of print media in homogenising the French people and facilitating the 
Revolution, while in England the oral character of culture and limited diffusion of 
the new visual print media prevented an English revolution because there was 
no media to unify the people (cf. McLuhan 1969:22). For McLuhan, ultimately 
"any medium has the power of imposing its own assumption on the unwary" 
(McLuhan 1969:23). And different media characterise different cultures, thus 
the alphabet and literacy of the West induce a sequential logic and rationalism, 
as against the nonlinear logic of oral culture that is viewed by the West as 
irrational. In similar manner, the prevalence of speech and images in the 
electric media are experienced as irrational by literate society because these 
media do not conform to the sequential logic of print dominated bias. The 
change from literate print media to electric oral media is experienced as 
"conflict between sight and sound, between written and oral kinds of perception 
and organisation of existence" (McLuhan 1969:24).  
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Neglecting to pay attention to the medium and its power to induce a particular 
"cultural bias" makes the contemporary person look like those British politicians 
of the 1930s who did not want to recognise the danger of Hitler and the 
possibility of war, because they could only think of appeasement (cf. McLuhan 
1969:26). In similar manner the present literate culture is threatened by electric 
technology but is oblivious to the treat: 
The treat of Stalin or Hitler was external. The electric technology is 
within the gates, and we are numb, deaf, blind, and mute about its 
encounter with the Gutenberg technology, on and through which 
American way of life was formed (McLuhan 1969:26).  
The conventional response to new media is like the incomprehension of doctors 
listening to Louis Pasteur telling them that "their greatest enemy was quite 
invisible" (McLuhan 1969:26). According to McLuhan (1969) the most 
significant "effects of the technology do not occur at the level of opinion or 
concepts, but alter the sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and 
without any resistance" (McLuhan 1969:27). The influence of technology and 
media on the senses is explained as if by extending one particular sense it will 
be strengthened, while simultaneously causing a correlative amputation of 
another sense. As McLuhan explains:  
Battle shock created by violent noise has been adapted for dental 
use in the device known as audiac. The patient puts on 
headphones and turns a dial raising the noise level to the point he 
feels no pain from the drill. The selection of a single sense for 
intense stimulus, or of a single extended, isolated, or "amputated" 
sense in technology, is in part the reason for the numbing effect 
that technology as such has on its makers and users (McLuhan 
1969:54). 
The effect of media needs to be recognised because of the profound social 
change it brings and because "a man is not free if he cannot see where he is 
going, even if he has a gun to help him get there" (McLuhan 1969:29). 
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For each of the media is also a powerful weapon with which to 
clobber other media and other groups. The result is that the 
present age has been one of multiple civil wars that are not limited 
to the world of art and entertainment (McLuhan 1969:29).  
Regarding war McLuhan inserts a quotation from John U Nef's book War and 
Human Progress to say that the "total wars of our times have been the result of 
intellectual mistakes" because the "formative power of the media are the media 
themselves" (McLuhan 1969:29–30). In turn this formative power can be 
classified in terms of cold or hot degree of intensity and levels of data the media 
can carry (cf. McLuhan 1969:31).  
Changes in media technology are disruptive as is evident from the introduction 
of the steel axe by missionaries into Australian native society. The introduction 
of the steel axe resulted in the collapse of the indigenous culture that was 
based on stone axe possession. While the stone axe was scarce, as well as a 
sacred and an important male status symbol, the infusion of the more powerful 
steel axes that were also distributed in abundance to women and children 
destroyed male domination and male dignity (cf. McLuhan 1969:33). Thus the 
use of one particular media has heating effects on society while the use of 
another medium can cool emotional tempers (cf. McLuhan 1969:37). The 
effects are like the "cool war and the hot bomb scare" (McLuhan 1969:40). In 
similar manner the effects of speech and writing are of different intensities 
whereby in oral culture "the sound of a man's name" can be "a numbing blow" 
(McLuhan 1969:41).  
What has been the source and driving force of technological extension of man? 
In his book The Gutenberg Galaxy McLuhan (1971) quotes anthropologist 
Edward T Hall’s explanation that man has developed extensions for practically 
everything to do with his body and that such extension began with warfare: 
"The evolution of weapons begins with the teeth and the fist and ends with the 
atom bomb" (Hall in McLuhan 1971:4). McLuhan reaffirms and elaborates this 
statement in his book Understanding Media: (McLuhan 1969) "War and the fear 
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of war have always been considered as the main incentives to technological 
extension of our bodies" (McLuhan 1969:57). However, more than preparation 
for war, it is the aftermath of war and invasion that is "a rich technological 
period" because the conquered culture has to adjust to the invading culture and 
from the "intensive exchange and strife of ideas" release of social energies and 
new technologies develop (McLuhan 1969:57). War as source of energy for 
innovations have become permanent influences in our lives because of the 
expansion of media of communication: "For most of our lifetime civil war has 
been raging in the world of art and entertainment" and  
Most of this civil war affects us in the depths of our psychic lives, 
as well, since the war is conducted by forces that are extensions 
and amplifications of our beings. Indeed, the interplay among 
media is only another name for this "civil war" that rages in our 
society and our psyches alike (McLuhan 1969:58).  
The technologies that extend man become active factors for social change, and 
they are the active "agents" that make things happen. Commodities such as 
coal, steel and cars have changed social arrangements of daily life. "In our time 
... the medium of language itself" is "shaping the arrangements of daily life, so 
that society begins to look like a linguistic echo or repeat of language norms" 
(McLuhan 1969:59). The interaction of different media, and different cultures 
such as the literate and tribal cultures, release energy and seem like an atomic 
fission and fusion; like "'A' bomb" and "'H' bomb" (McLuhan 
1969:60). McLuhan's allusion to military and combative examples and the use 
of military language is becoming clearer. 
The challenge of infusion of new technology is similar to that of a culture 
becoming captive by military conquest, and innovation may not be a novelty but 
"annihilation" (McLuhan 1969:80). To understand the influence of technology 
and find a way to accommodate it rather than to be annihilated "the artist can 
show us how to 'ride with the punch,' instead of 'taking it on the chin'." 
(McLuhan 1969:77). Further McLuhan provides an example of accommodation 
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by reference to Toynbee's discussion of "how the lame and the crippled 
respond to their handicaps in a society of active warriors." The ideal response 
strategy is adopted by Vulcan, the "smith and armourer" who became an 
indispensable specialist. In the same manner a whole community should adapt 
when it is "conquered and enslaved".  
The same strategy serves them as it does the lame individual in a 
society of warriors. They specialise and become indispensable to 
their masters (McLuhan 1969:80).  
McLuhan refers to Toynbee's contention that rapid technological change, or 
"times of trouble" produce militarism and lead to territorial expansion and 
empire. Again, McLuhan refers to the Greek myth of King Cadmus who sowed 
dragon teeth, and they sprung armed men, and he explains that this indicates 
that "the alphabet produced militarism ... phonetic alphabet was the greatest 
processor of men for homogenised military life that was known to antiquity" 
(McLuhan 1969:83). "Militarism is a kind of visual organisation of social 
energies that is both specialist and explosive ... it creates large empires and 
causes social breakdowns" (McLuhan 1969:83). Militarism is a form of 
industrialism as it concentrates homogenised energies into production. An 
example of early industrialisation is the military:  
The Roman soldier was a man with a spade. He was an expert 
workman and builder who processed and packaged the resources 
of many societies and sent them home. Before machinery, the only 
massive work forces available for processing material were 
soldiers or slaves (McLuhan 1969:83).  
McLuhan seems to be repeating Lewis Mumford's (1962) assertion that "the 
Roman soldier, indeed, conquered through his spade as well as his sword" 
(Mumford 1962:87). Indeed, the influence of Mumford is discernible throughout 
McLuhan work (cf. Carey 1981:162). McLuhan’s central claim about the 
formative role of technology on human sensibilities and on social formation are 
derived from Mumford as much as they are derived from Harold Innis (cf. 
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Cooper 1981:153). Indeed, McLuhan acknowledges the influence of Mumford 
and Innis and therefore, Mattelart (1994) contends, that to understand McLuhan 
it is necessary to see the crucial influence of Harold Innis and Lewis Mumford 
on his work, and in turn the influence of Kropotkin, and Geddes on Mumford's 
work (cf. Mattelart 1994:227–128).  
Mumford's (1962:81–83) observation that the needs of the hunter and the 
soldier have driven technological developments as extension of senses and 
extension of human organs into weapons is echoed by McLuhan. The idea of 
balance of the senses and over-determination of one sense by the use of a 
particular technology was already described by Mumford who attributes it to the 
activity of the hunter: in performing his task the hunter  
is a beast of prey, and the needs of his appetite as well as the 
excitement of the chase cause him to inhibit every other reaction – 
pity or esthetic pleasure – in the act of killing ... Trained in the use 
of a weapon, killing becomes his main business (Mumford 
1962:82).  
Mumford goes to note the primary role of war and military technology as 
shapers of sensibilities and social structure, and he puts it thus: "The weapon, 
even when it is not used to inflict death, is nevertheless a means for enforcing a 
pattern of human behaviour" (Mumford 1962:84). 
Continuous improvements in the means of war-making extended the power of 
empires but at the same time also caused decline because specialised slaves 
and foreign mercenaries – the "rootless parasites" – gradually displaced the 
indigenous populations (cf. McLuhan 1969:84). Thus for McLuhan the myth of 
Cadmus (which he already introduced in his previous book) again provides a 
significant power to explain the way technology is interlinked with military power 
and determines social change and cultural progress through military conquests 
and expansion of empires. As McLuhan (1969:92) notes, the Greek myth about 
King Cadmus introducing the phonetic alphabet into Greek society was like 
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sowing of the dragon's teeth and "they sprang up armed men" who replaced the 
ruling class: 
Like any other myth, this one capsulates a prolonged process into 
a flashing insight. The alphabet meant power and authority and 
control of military structure at a distance. When combined with 
papyrus, the alphabet spelled the end of the stationary temple 
bureaucracy and the priestly monopolies of knowledge and power 
(McLuhan 1969:92).  
The alphabet that was easy to learn and master, and the papyrus that was 
cheap and transportable effected the transfer of power to the military class (cf. 
McLuhan 1969:92–93). The process of change provides new technology to 
extend the ability to give and receive verbal commands at a distance. This is so 
because the marks of the ink on the papyrus, or on paper are "trapped words" 
and trapped thoughts, and anyone who could master the technique could 
decipher the words and thought entrapped in the symbols and free them again 
into speech (McLuhan 1969:91). As McLuhan notes, "all this is implied in the 
myth about Cadmus and the dragon teeth, including the fall of the city states, 
the rise of empires and military bureaucracy" (McLuhan 1969:93). And as 
McLuhan comments in an interview: "Whenever the dragon teeth of 
technological change are sown, we reap a whirlwind of violence" (McLuhan 
1997:242–243). Technological changes bring pain of adjustment and violence 
and war. However, the violence and war are normal components through 
which, and by which, humans construct their identity, as McLuhan (1997) notes, 
violence and war is "the normal stigmata of the identity quest" and new society 
rises from the ashes of the old (McLuhan 1997:263). Later McLuhan will 
elaborate on the role of pain as conferring identity. 
McLuhan suggests that as an indicator of man's extension the myth of the 
dragon’s teeth has another significance elucidated by Elias Canetti's 
observation that teeth are agents of power in man and beasts:  
240 
 
That the power of letters as agents of aggressive order and 
precision should be expressed as extension of the dragon's teeth 
is natural and fitting. Teeth are emphatically visual in their lineal 
order. Letters are not only like teeth visually, but their power to put 
teeth into the business of empire-building is manifest in our 
Western history (McLuhan 1969:93). 
The introduction of phonetic alphabet changed social structure and habits of 
thought, and the lineal sequence of writing extended into the idea of logic, while 
the habit of reading introduced individual independence and personal freedom 
and liberated the individual from domination by the family and clan. The 
individual freedom manifested itself most significantly in the ancient military:  
Careers are open to talent in Republican Rome, as much as in 
Napoleonic France ... The new literacy had created an 
homogeneous and malleable milieu in which mobility of armed 
groups and of ambitious individuals, equally, was as novel as it 
was practical (McLuhan 1969:98).  
Technologies are extension of physical and nervous human systems and were 
developed to increase "power and speed". As indeed, the motivation to 
increase power and speed drives all development (cf. McLuhan 1969:99). The 
increase in speed of transportation of goods, as well as the transportation, or 
communication messages also provides new means for increased control to be 
exercised from a distance; ultimately increase in speed provides for military 
control (McLuhan 1969:100). The same idea is elaborated by the founder of 
modern cybernetic science, Norbert Wiener (1956:97) who notes that "where a 
man's word goes, and where his power of perception goes, to that point his 
control and in a sense his physical existence is extended."  
The result of increase in speed provided an opportunity for a socially powerful 
class to centralise and consolidate their power (cf. McLuhan 1969:101). As 
McLuhan puts it: "A speed-up in communications always enabled a central 
authority to extend its operations to more distant margins" (McLuhan 
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1969:106). The introduction of the alphabet and papyrus extended the Roman 
road system for military movement, and in the Roman city "broad straight 
avenues" were used "to speed military movements, and to express the pomp 
and circumstance of power" (McLuhan 1969:110). Correspondingly, the 
shortage of papyrus in Rome due to the loss of Egypt meant a decline of the 
military and a decrease in military traffic on the roads of the empire. Ultimately 
this lead to the collapse of the Roman power and the corresponding military 
ascendency of the Muslim empire (cf. McLuhan 1969:111).  
In Rome the army was the "work force" and the main "mechanised wealth-
creating process" as the "military made and delivered the goods" and naturally 
"trade followed the legion" and therefore the "legions were the industrial 
machine." Likewise, in a later historical epoch "Napoleon's armies" were "the 
industrial revolution" (McLuhan 1969:111). The Napoleonic wars were a 
technological "catching up" of France with England; the First World War was a 
final phase in the industrialisation of Germany and America. As indeed the 
industrialisation of America begun during the civil war where the railways 
"raised the art of war to unheard-of intensity" (McLuhan 1969:113). As 
McLuhan notes: 
War is never anything less than accelerated technological change 
... and ... militarism is itself the main route of technological 
education and acceleration for lagging areas ... War is certainly a 
form of emphasis that delivers many a telling touch to lagging 
social attention (McLuhan 1969:113).  
In other words, war is the main cause of social change and provides the drive 
and education for change. New media and new war open new possibilities: the 
electric technology has extended the human nervous system and with it "the 
field of battle has shifted to mental image-making-and-breaking" (McLuhan 
1969:113).  
The effect of the printed word has been paradoxical: on the one hand it created 
individualism and separated people, but on another level it provides the 
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technology to homogenise people. Thus this process has been gradually 
increasing and the power of the printed world created "mass mind" and the 
"mass militarism of citizen armies" (McLuhan 1969:117). And the increase and 
amassing of people placed the previously isolated literate individual in the 
crowed and provided him with new delightful experience (cf. McLuhan 
1969:120). Increase in amassing of people developed the idea of numbers as a 
technology for counting and became a necessity for military tasks and at the 
same time the replacement of the Roman numerals with Arabic digits increased 
efficiency:  
Before the advent of ordinals, successive, or positional numbers, 
rulers had to count large bodies of soldiery by displacement 
methods. Sometimes they were herded by groups into spaces of 
approximately known area. The method of having them march in 
file and of dropping pebbles into containers was another method 
(McLuhan 1969:126).  
The typographic extension of man constructed nationalism, mass markets, 
universal literacy and detached the individual from traditional groups "while 
providing a model of how to add individual to individual in massive 
agglomeration of power ... and ... led other men to create giant corporations, 
both military and commercial" (McLuhan 1969:184).  
Ultimately print, literacy and numeracy gave the West power and knowledge 
because it provided means for the dissociation of thought and action, with the 
result that man "could act without reaction or involvement" and this "dissociation 
of action from feeling" and emotions afforded greater efficiency in warfare 
where man could disregard danger and drive himself into action saying: "Damn 
the torpedoes. Full steam ahead" (McLuhan 1969:191).  
The press was already acknowledged as weapon by Napoleon who was semi-
literate, and again the power of the press as a form of weaponry is 
acknowledged by Oriental oral culture such as the Russian Communist party. 
For Lenin the newspaper was a "collective agitator" and an organiser; Stalin 
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called the newspaper "the most powerful weapon of our party", and Khrushchev 
valued it as "chief ideological weapon" in the battle to transform tribal and oral 
Russian society into a uniform nation (cf. McLuhan 1969:229). As McLuhan 
notes the power of the print is the visual effect of seeing printed letter and 
words, and "Gutenberg made it possible to 'see' the mother tongue in uniform 
dress" (McLuhan 1969:229). 
While there are many references to the value technology of war, and war being 
the unconscious structuring framework of his book, nevertheless, McLuhan at 
times neglects to locate the origin of some media in their warrior milieus. For 
example, discussing clothing as a private extension of the individual skin, 
McLuhan neglects to conclusively link clothing with armour. However, this 
omission is corrected later and in his subsequent book. Similarly, in discussing 
the clock McLuhan only notes its function as a time keeping machine in the 
civilised world, and writes that in primitive societies it is a status symbol visibly 
worn in public just like the sword (cf. McLuhan 1969:157). In discussing the 
photograph and the telegraph McLuhan (1969:203) ignores much of their 
military link. He only briefly refers to effects caused by the photograph and the 
telegraph when used to report from the Crimean war "which created the image 
and role of Florence Nightingale" (McLuhan 1969:214). In other words, the 
telegraph, photograph and the newspaper brought news at an increasing speed 
from the distant warfront and a sensitive person such a Florence Nightingale 
"began to pick up human-distress signals" in these reports and photographs 
and shaped a role for herself as caregiver for wounded soldiers (cf. McLuhan 
1969:269). McLuhan briefly notes that the telegraph wire provided means for a 
newspaper reporter to become the first war correspondent. Of more profound 
military value was the increased speed in modes of transportation and the 
corresponding "speed-up" of delivery of information by newspapers (cf. 
McLuhan 1969:219). 
McLuhan notes that the interlinking and interaction between various 
technologies and media show that the greatest social effects and 
consequences are seldom noticed and mostly dismissed by scholars. This 
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omission is the result of debilitation caused by the scholars' print-dominated 
logic and work in isolated fields of specialised study. As a corrective 
perspective McLuhan points to the innovative work of historian Lynn White 
whose study of medieval technology and social change illuminates how "the 
feudal system was a social extension of the stirrup" that was introduced by 
mounted warriors invading Europe from the East (cf. McLuhan 1969:192). 
With the stirrup came mounted shock combat that called into 
existence a new social class. The European cavalier class had 
already existed to be armed, but to mount a knight in full armour 
required the combined resources of ten or more peasant holdings. 
Charlemagne demanded that the less prosperous freemen merge 
their farms to equip a single knight for wars. The pressure of the 
new war technology gradually developed classes and economic 
system that could provide numerous cavaliers in heavy armor. By 
about the year 1000 A.D. the old world miles had changed from 
"soldier" to "knight" (McLuhan 1969:192).  
Moreover, the development of technologies related to horsemanship were 
interlinked with development of the wheel and caused profound social changes 
in transportation during the Middle Ages (cf. McLuhan 1969:193). The 
combined extension of power effected by the wheel and the written and printed 
word advanced centralisation of power and expansion of empires; invention of 
electric technologies and fast transport further extend power to the margins of 
empires (cf. McLuhan 1969:198–199).  
The infusion of the stirrup and the heavy armoured knight in the medieval world 
were "expensive yet so mandatory ... for shock combat" and this brought into 
being a whole new economic arrangement such as the "cooperative feudal 
system" in order to pay for the military equipment and waging war. New 
technology changed the battlefield and society: during the "Renaissance 
gunpowder and ordnance ended the military role of the horse mounted knight 
and returned the city to the pedestrian burgess" (McLuhan 1969:232-233).  
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7.4.1  War games 
According to McLuhan (1969:238) modern technology equalises society, for 
example Gutenberg print technology and literacy "created the first classless 
society in the world." But it is warfare that had the greatest levelling and 
equalising effect: the experience of "mud and blood baths of the Western Front 
... fraternised and tribalised" the soldiers and on their return home new 
legislation to prohibit alcohol drinking were introduced in order to limit the 
fraternisation and reduce the threat to the "individualist society" (McLuhan 
1969:249).  
War and games are extensions "of social man and of the body politics" and 
provide ways of adjusting to strain of change and relief from the stress of the 
daily world of work. The use of war games has been incorporated into the 
culture of work in Japan where it has become a fashion for businessmen to 
study classic military strategy and tactics and apply them to their business 
operations (cf. McLuhan 1969:250). In the print-dominated world of 
individualism games are used to detribalise the individuals and to 
accommodate them to the new world of oral electric media, while in primitive 
parts of the world still dominated by their oral culture, "war games" are an 
integral part of daily life. This is evident from the life of a primitive tribe in New 
Guinea where, on a weekly basis, two tribes "arrange a formal battle at one of 
the traditional fighting grounds" (McLuhan 1969:251). The formal battle seems 
like a game or "more like a dangerous field sport than true war" (McLuhan 
1969:251). The battle lasts one day, ends before nightfall, and the playful 
warriors are experts at evading injury. However, while the formal battle is more 
like a game, the lethal part of this primitive warfare is the sneak raid and 
ambush where men, women and children are slaughtered. War and the killing 
are integral to the spirit of game and war. These tribal people "fight because 
they enthusiastically enjoy it" and for them it is "a vital function" of being a 
complete human being.  
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These people, in short, detect in these games a kind of model of 
the universe, in whose deadly gavotte they can participate through 
the ritual of war games (McLuhan 1969:251).  
For the primitive people the game is a model of the universe, as for example, 
the Olympic Games dramatically re-enacted the agon or the "cosmic struggle" 
(McLuhan 1969:252). The war and games are forms of interpersonal 
communication and are an extension and public dramatisation of inner social 
life and provide release from tension. Thus the war for the primitive man and 
the game of sport for civilised man are popular art forms and offer means of 
participation in the full life of their societies (cf. McLuhan 1969:253). Games 
provide satisfaction, and like war express all aspects of the human 
characteristics, and it is for this reason that "war has been called the sport of 
kings" (McLuhan 1969:255). Indeed, McLuhan acknowledges the role of force 
and brutality in both war and games as identity conferring element, as he puts 
it: "Brutality used in sport may humanise under some conditions" (McLuhan 
1969:40). 
Politics is another form of a game that characterises a society. For example, the 
British parliament is a contest game for two teams derived from battle as is 
seen from the seating arrangement of benches opposing one another. This can 
be contrasted with the French Parliament that prefers centralism that is 
reflected in the semicircle seating arrangement all facing the central chair of a 
leader. Thus, while the British politician visibly and physically is positioned to 
play and fight together with his team rather than play a private game, the 
French uniformity of seating arrangement offer opportunity for private intrigues 
and multiplicity of games can be played which result in anarchy (cf. McLuhan 
1969:257).  
The value of games is their imaginative simulation of learning and translation of 
experience. Games provide a creative learning to prepare for future possibilities 
"ahead of their times." Thus the game and works of art create live models for 
situations that will arise in the future and so prevent a person from seeing the 
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present through the spectacles of the past, like the "General staffs [that] are 
always magnificently prepared to fight the previous war" (McLuhan 1969:259).  
But the new communication technology speed-up information transfer and 
change warfare and social relations. For example, the introduction of electric 
media into German society changed the nature of military commands and 
hierarchy within the military, sometimes with unintended consequences:  
The telephone, the teleprinter and the wireless made it possible for 
orders from the highest levels to be given directly to the lowest 
levels, where, on account of the absolute authority behind them, 
they were carried out uncritically (McLuhan 1969:263).  
Not only military order could be communicated directly from top to bottom, but 
military information from the battlefields became almost instantly diffused 
among the civilian publics by the introduction of the telegraph and newspaper. 
For example, in traditional British military experience battlefield disasters were 
assumed to be a normal part of warfare and became public knowledge only 
long after the battle ended, but with the introduction of the telegraph, war 
correspondents and newspapers could make such information available almost 
instantaneously to the civilian audiences for whom it was a novelty and offered 
them means of involvement. Thus, the first mass media reporting on the 
Crimean war disaster changed public participation: 
For the first time in history, through reading the dispatches of 
Russell, the public had realised “with what majesty the British 
soldier fights.” And these heroes were dead. The men who had 
stormed the heights of Alma, charged with the Light Brigade at 
Balaclava ... had perished of hunger and neglect. Even horses 
which had taken part in the Charge of the Light Brigade had 
starved to death (McLuhan 1969:269).  
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And with such information becoming available, sensitive people like Florence 
Nightingale "began to pick up human stress signals" and find a position for 
themselves as social reformers and activists (cf. McLuhan 1969:269).  
The invention of the typewriter by Remington (the fact that Remington was also 
a leading gun manufacture goes unacknowledged by McLuhan) has introduced 
changes into military and business organisation with the result that the 
typewriter became indispensable in warfare and business.  
A modern battleship needs dozens of typewriters for ordinary 
operations. An army needs more typewriters than medium and 
light artillery pieces, even in the field, suggesting that the 
typewriter now fuses the functions of the pen and the sword 
(McLuhan 1969:276). 
While technology developed for military use, in turn technology developed by 
the military on the battlefield becomes available for civilian use, for example, 
"the Braille system of dots-for-letters had begun as a means of reading military 
messages in darkness, then was transferred to music, and finally to reading for 
the blind" (McLuhan 1969:287). Conversely, new technology is adapted for 
military needs, such as installation of radio telephones in "mobile panzer 
divisions" revolutionised traditional army structure and command systems 
(McLuhan 1969:289). 
The way war and military technology shape society is seen in the style of social 
activities such as music and dance. McLuhan (1969) notes that the age of 
Napoleon invented the waltz. The waltz is a manifestation of the mechanical 
age, with emphasis on the mechanical and repetitive movements that no doubt 
were demanded by new military technology such as loading and firing a rifle (cf. 
McLuhan 1969:298). As McLuhan (1969:298) explains, "for a waltz to yield its 
full meaning, there must be military dress." Indeed, waltzing was part of military 
life; Lord Byron records the waltzing before the battle of Waterloo. Moreover, 
the waltz was also suitable for the citizen’s army consisting of individuals 
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liberated from the feudal courtly hierarchies: "The waltzers were all uniform and 
equal, having free movement in any part of the hall" (McLuhan 1969:298). 
7.4.2  Weapons and war of the icons 
Towards the end of his book McLuhan (1969) introduces weapons as forms of 
media and notes their relations to the new communication media that are being 
used as weapons in the Cold War. The mass media provide new means of 
conducting warfare between the West and Communist Russia where real 
weapons are replaced by media images and icons in the intensifying "Cold 
War" that now seems as "the war of the icons" (McLuhan 1969:361). Fighting 
the Cold War battles consists in eroding the collective image and dignity of the 
enemy and "ink and photo are supplanting soldiery and tanks” and as a 
consequence the “pen daily becomes mightier than the sword" (McLuhan 
1969:361).  
The term "guerre des nerfs" coined by the French some decades earlier has 
come to describe the "Cold War". It is now "an electronic battle of information 
and of images" that replaced the "industrial hardware" weaponry of the previous 
generation's "hot" wars. The difference is that in the "hot wars of the past" the 
weapons eliminated enemies individually and even the "ideological warfare of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded by persuading individuals to 
adopt new points of view, one at a time" (McLuhan 1969:361). However, as 
against the old weapons the new weapons are used to destruct and distract en 
mass: the new weapons of electric persuasion, the photo, movie, and television 
are "dunking entire populations in new imagery" (McLuhan 1969:362). This 
merely illustrates that the latest technology is always used for warfare. 
McLuhan (1969:362) notes: that "if the cold war in 1964 is being fought by 
informational technology, that is because all wars have been fought by the 
latest technology available in any culture." And McLuhan adds that because the 
media are weapons, one needs to develop and train defence against such 
weapons: "Just as we now try to control atom-bomb fallout, so we will one day 
try to control media fallout", and he envisages that education will become the 
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civil defence against "media fallout" (McLuhan 1969:326). McLuhan also 
imagines a future ability to program and control an entire culture's sensory life 
and to stabilise the bellicose temperament by raising or lowering the emotional 
"temperature", and for this purpose the "computer can be used to direct a 
network of global thermostats to pattern life" (McLuhan 1997:263). As McLuhan 
(1997) puts it: "We could program five hours less of TV in Italy to promote the 
reading of newspapers during an election, or lay on an additional 25 hours of 
TV in Venezuela to cool down the tribal temperature raised by radio the 
preceding month" (McLuhan 1997:263). 
McLuhan notes that warfare technology has always been the technology of 
thought, as demonstrated by John Donne acknowledging "the blessing of heavy 
firearms" and he sees the artillery as the "light of reason" because it can be 
used effectively to convince the enemy to end a war sooner. McLuhan (1969) 
adds that Donne seemed to realise that the "scientific knowledge needed for 
the uses of gunpowder and boring of cannon" is "the light of reason" itself 
(McLuhan 1969:362). The psychic and social effects of technological extension 
of man are particularly closely related to the developments and changes in the 
technology of warfare, as documented by John U Nef in his book War and 
Human Progress (cf. McLuhan 1969:362–363). The effects of weapon 
technology on thought and cultural development are evident from King 
Amanullah exclamation: "I feel half an Englishmen already", after having fired a 
torpedo (McLuhan 1969:363). A similar idea is expressed by a schoolboy telling 
his father: 
Dad, I hate war, 
Why, son? 
Because war makes history, and I hate history (McLuhan 
1969:363). 




The technique developed over centuries for drilling gun-barrels 
provided the means that made possible the steam engine. The 
piston shaft and the gun presented the same problem in boring 
hard steel. Earlier, it had been the lineal stress of perspective that 
had channelled perception in paths that led to the creation of gun 
fire. Long before guns, gunpowder had been used explosively, 
dynamite style. The use of gunpowder for propelling of missiles in 
trajectories waited for the coming of perspective in the arts 
(McLuhan 1969:363). 
The visual perspective on space provided by the arts is intimately interrelated to 
performance of military skills. For example, "nonliterates are generally poor 
shots with rifles" because of their experience with "the bow and arrow" which 
requires them to be in close proximity to the game but does not prepare them 
for shooting accurately at a distance, demanded by the use of the rifle (cf. 
McLuhan 1969:363). The different weapons extend different senses: "If the 
arrow is an extension of the hand and the arm, the rifle is an extension of the 
eye and teeth" (McLuhan 1969:363). The relation between literacy and 
marksmanship is historically evident in the ability of the "highly literate 
Bostonians" to outshoot the mostly illiterate "British regulars" during the 
American War of Independence. Marksmanship was also not a skill of the 
Native American or woodsman but was a distinctive skill of the literate colonist. 
It is assumed that "gunfire" is intimately linked artistic modes of representation 
such as "with the rise of perspective and with the extension of the visual power 
of literacy" (McLuhan 1969:364).  
In the Second World War single-shot accuracy of the literate marksman was 
replaced by "automatic weapons fired blindly in what were called 'perimeters of 
fire' or 'fire lanes' and this spraying of the air with bullets was efficient at night 
and did not demand sighting the enemy” (cf. McLuhan 1969:364). Such a 
change of weapons is analogues to the change form print to electric media, 
whereby the man schooled in the use of literacy cannot easily adapt to the oral 
sensibility of the new medium: "This is why the transition from mechanical to 
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electric technology is so very traumatic and severe for us all. The mechanical 
techniques with their limited powers, we have long used as weapons" and now 
the new weapons create new sensibilities (cf. McLuhan 1969:365). According to 
R Buckminster Fuller "weaponry has been a source of technological advance 
for mankind because it requires continually improved performance with ever 
smaller means." By paying attention to the weapon technology Fuller has 
shown that war produces new inventions, induces progress, and improves 
technological hardware that allow humans to gain more power with less 
material input and physical exertion (cf. McLuhan 1969:365). Thus McLuhan 
(1969:376) concludes that "war is accelerated social change." 
McLuhan returns to a discussion of clothing and military fortification he begun 
earlier in the book. He notes that historical changes are evident in the 
development of cities: "The city, itself, is traditionally a military weapon, and is a 
collective shield or plate of armour, an extension of the castle of our very skins" 
(McLuhan 1969:366). McLuhan acknowledges that Mumford's study of the city 
shows its origin as a fortress (cf. McLuhan 1969:197). However in the 
information age the city becomes obsolete, as it was in primitive time when 
humans were nomadic hunters and food-gatherers. Like the ancient hunter the 
modern human being is in a psychical and social state of nomadism and "it is 
called information-gathering and data processing" which have become global 
and ignore the national borders and the walled defences of the city have 
become useless against them (cf. McLuhan 1969:366). 
The city, like a ship, is a collective extension of the castle of our 
skins, even as clothing is an extension of our individual skin. But 
weapons proper are extensions of our hands, nails, and teeth, and 
come into existence as tools needed for accelerating the 
processing of matter (McLuhan 1969:366–367).  
In this sense, "all technology can plausibly be regarded as weapons" (McLuhan 
1969:367). By the use of technology of weapons and war – or militarism – 
civilisation has expanded:  
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By militarism, Rome extended civilisation or individualism, literacy, 
and lineality to many oral and backward tribes. Even today the 
mere existence of a literate and industrial West appears quite 
naturally as dire aggression to nonliterate societies (McLuhan 
1969:367).  
Indeed, McLuhan perceptively explains much of the mixture of envy and anti-
Western hate expressed by many non-Western societies culminating in the 
twentieth century’s "clash of civilisation" (cf. Huntington 1998). McLuhan notes 
that "today we appear to be poised between two ages – one of detribalisation 
and one of retribalisation" and Orientalisation (cf. McLuhan 1969:367). 
McLuhan in a magazine interview explains that the "global village", despite 
homogenisation and standardisation will not be a peaceful place because the 
global reach makes for "maximum disagreement and creative dialogue 
inevitable" (McLuhan 1997:259). While "uniformity and tranquillity" are 
supposed to be the characteristics of the global village, it is however more likely 
that "conflict and discord as well as love and harmony" will prevail, just as is 
was in "the customary life mode of any tribal people" (McLuhan 1997:259). 
War itself can be viewed as the "processing of difficult and resistant materials 
by the latest technology" to create uniformity and is part of "a process of 
achieving equilibrium among unequal technologies" (McLuhan 1969:367).  
The effects of new weapons and new technologies are always ambiguous: 
On the one hand, a new weapon or technology looms as threat to 
all those who lack it. On the other hand, when everybody has the 
same technological aides, there begins the competitive fury of the 
homogenised and the egalitarian (McLuhan 1969:367).  
In other words, weapons are the driving force that shape society. Changes in 
weapon technology increase their power to shape the human mind and society. 
For example “mechanical technology as extension of parts of the human body 
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has exerted a fragmenting force, psychically and socially, this fact appears 
nowhere more vividly than in mechanical weaponry" (McLuhan 1969:368).  
But with the new electric technology and "information as a weapon" human 
unity and fraternity are becoming more visible. But in turn, the new equality 
drives people to establish new differences and acquire more power than others 
so as not be dominated. However, maintaining the balance of power with 
modern weapons poses a dilemma because "as an instrument of policy, 
modern war has come to mean 'the existence and end of one society to the 
exclusion of another" and ultimately the modern nuclear weaponry becomes "a 
self-liquidating fact" (McLuhan 1969:368). 
McLuhan concludes the book with the realisation that warfare and weapons are 
the media and the message and have been central to the psychological, social 
and cultural development throughout human history. The theme of war 
becomes central in his next book: War and Peace in the Global Village 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968).  
7.5  War and peace in the global village  
McLuhan's aim in his 1968 book War and Peace in the Global Village 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968) is to decipher the effects of new technology on the 
order of human sensory life. In this book McLuhan claims to follow James 
Joyce, the Irish author of Finnegans Wake, who was the first to have 
discovered "that all social changes are effects of new technologies ... on the 
order of our sensory lives." Consequently, every technological innovation 
causes pain, upheavals, and disturbs the human psychological balance. This 
necessarily results in aggression and "wars" which are attempts to regain the 
comforting sense of the old and familiar world (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:5). As 
McLuhan explains, new technologies cause constant change and the 
occupants of the new technological environment attempt to adjust so as to 
escape the pain of change (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:13, 16).  
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While people constantly attempt to adjust and make sense of their new 
environment, this becomes a difficult task because their ability to understand 
the world is determined by their pre-existing knowledge based on old 
technologies. In other words, they cannot see something new of which they 
have no knowledge, so they tend to see the new technological and media 
landscapes as if through a rear-view mirror of the old. As McLuhan puts it, 
"people are always adjusted to the preceding environment, much as the 
General Staff is always superbly prepared to fight the last war" (McLuhan & 
Fiore 1968:12). 
7.5.1  Weapons make the man 
The primary technology to shape consciousness and social structure is the 
dominant communication technology used by a society. Thus McLuhan notes 
that the phonetic alphabet was a technology that made man rational and 
invented a perception of space that is continuous. In other words, such rational 
and pictorial space is the result of writing and printing (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:7). Invention of new electric media creates a new sense of environment 
dominated by spoken words and sounds. By the use of technology the human 
being extends his body's reach into the world, thus writing and printing were 
mechanical technologies that extended a single human sense at a time, 
however the new electric media technology are extensions of the whole 
nervous system (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:19–20). To explain the 
technological extension of the body's interaction with the world McLuhan refers 
to the idea of clothing and fashion as being weaponry (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:21).  
Clothing as weaponry had become a primary social factor. 
Clothing is anti-environmental, but it also creates a new 
environment. It is also anti- the elements and anti-enemies and 
anti-competitors and anti-boredom (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:22).  
In other words, clothing provides protection against the elements or the weather 
and protection against enemies so it isolates the human from the environment. 
256 
 
It is not only protection but clothing can also be used as assault weapon to be 
used against (anti) enemies and competitors. McLuhan quotes Ashley 
Montague who (erroneously) believes that technological advancement of 
civilisation has made man more, rather than less, violent and warlike, while the 
pre-historic man is assumed to have been more peaceful (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:23). McLuhan seems to accept Montague's belief that civilisation drives 
man to war thus McLuhan asserts that "civilisation, [is] the mother of war" 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:24). Here McLuhan contradicts his position as 
expressed in his 1951 book The Mechanical Bride (McLuhan 1967:131) where 
he seems to accept the view that civilised man has lost his killer instinct 
(Discussed in section 7.2 above). Accepting the assumption that civilisation 
corrupts man links well with McLuhan's claim that "civilisation is entirely the 
product of phonetic literacy” that made man more violent, but such bellicosity 
“dissolves with the electronic revolution and we rediscover a tribal” sensibility 
that makes people more peaceful (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:24–25). Thus the 
idea of the Nobel Savage is discernible in McLuhan’s pronouncement. 
McLuhan's assumption that the increase in human aggression is the result of 
better warfare technology and efficient means of transport and mobile 
communication technology is adapted from Harold Innis (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:25). For McLuhan, such an assumption makes sense because military 
technology provides the foundation for cultural and social developments and in 
McLuhan's hands provides a whole explanation of historical development. Thus 
the Roman military found the alphabet most useful:  
Wedded to the phonetic alphabet, papyrus was the means of 
creating their huge network of straight roads which gave a special 
character to their military activities. Papyrus meant control and 
direction of armies at a distance from a central bureaucracy ... The 
Roman roads ensured high speeds of military maneuvers and 
made possible the carrying of large quantities of supplies on 
campaigns. When papyrus ceased to be available ... the Roman 
roads fell into disuse and the Roman Empire fell apart ... Having 
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their straight and even roads, the Romans did not have the same 
need for mounted men who could traverse uneven terrain. 
Perhaps this was why they relied on the chariot rather than cavalry 
for those who wore heavy armor. With the disappearance of the 
roads and the chariots, a radical new substitute had to be devised 
for those who had need of heavy armor in battle. That substitute 
was the stirrup (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:26). 
The stirrup, introduced into the West from Oriental sources in the early eighth 
century made it possible for a man in heavy armour to be mounted on a horse. 
Moreover, the production of heavy armour required skilled labour of craftsmen 
which proved expensive and resulted in rearrangement of the economy. Fitting 
a warrior knight with a suit of armour also required additional expense such as 
horses and squires which necessitated change in land ownership, agriculture 
production and social structure (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:27). McLuhan refers 
to the writing of the historian Lynn White who explains the changes induced by 
the stirrup. According to White, "inherent in this ... was the recognition that if the 
new technology of warfare were to be developed consistently, military service 
must become a matter of class" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:28). The result was the 
creation of a chivalric class dedicated to fighting. Military obligations were the 
primary social relationships of the Middle Ages and anyone who could not fulfil 
the knight's war duty lost his property. Ultimately the "vassal class created by 
the military mutation of the eighth century became for generations the ruling 
element of European society" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:29).  
The demands of the new fighting style of the horse "mounted shock combat" 
was not a suitable occupation for amateur warriors but demanded long 
technical training and dedicated skilled professional warriors (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:31). As battles becomes fiercer armour becomes heavier and the knights 
were unrecognisable beneath their carapace. Thus there arose a need for 
means of identification on the battlefield and markings on shields, pennons and 
hereditary arms were introduced in Europe. The stirrup and the knight's armour 
proved their superiority against psychologically stronger militaries but less 
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advanced technologically, as was seen from the victory of William the 
Conqueror over the English (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:31). Ultimately this history 
shows that the weapons construct the human identity, and war technology 
shapes the individual and society: 
It is not playing tricks with semantics to insist that the feudal knight 
himself, and his society, knew who he was in terms of his arms. 
The exigencies of mounted shock combat, as invented by the 
Franks of the eighth century, had formed both his personality and 
his world (White in McLuhan & Fiore 1968:31).  
Thus the simple invention of the stirrup had a "catalytic an influence on history": 
The requirements of the new mode of warfare which it made 
possible found expression in a new form of western European 
society dominated by an aristocracy of warriors endowed with land 
so they might fight in a new and highly specialised way. Inevitably 
this nobility developed cultural forms and patterns of thought and 
emotion in harmony with its style of mounted shock combat and its 
social posture (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:33).  
The new mode of warfare introduced a new cultural sensibility of chivalry. The 
psychological, cultural and social development is obviously the result of modes 
of warfare, or simply it was "impossible to be chivalrous without a horse" and 
ultimately with the new technology the warriors become the masters of Europe 
and the New World. That all this historical change was the result of the simple 
stirrup was a great feat (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:33). More innovations 
followed and the diffusion of new military technologies kept changing society. 
The invention of gunpowder made the knight's armour obsolete and the feudal 
system becomes redundant (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:34). But the knight's 
armour left an enduring legacy: the medieval armour was an amalgam of 
technology, clothing and weaponry, and affected "the institutional clothing of 




Having noticed the direct changes caused by technology McLuhan claims to 
see similar technological change being driven by the computer which he claims 
to be "by all odds the most extraordinary of all the technological clothing ever 
revised by man" because it is not an extension of single sense but an extension 
of the entire central nervous system (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:35). McLuhan 
bases his claim on the assumption that all technology extend human body and 
senses, for example the "wheel is an extension of the foot, the computer is an 
extension of our nervous system" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:53). And since the 
new information environment is the direct extension of the nervous system it is 
more profound than the "natural environment" because it is a "form of clothing 
that can be programmed at will to produce any effect desired", and it supplants 
the evolutionary function of biology as proposed by Darwin (cf. McLuhan & 
Fiore 1968:37).  
For McLuhan innovation in military and communicational technology have been 
the primary driving forces throughout history. Military and warfare technologies 
are of prime importance as they are the catalysts and interact with other 
technologies. The centrality of warfare in history is evident from the fact that 
historical periods are demarcated by their major wars, as McLuhan explains it:  
Technologically, the principal developments between the battle of 
Hastings and the battle of Naseby were gunpowder and Gutenberg 
revolutions. Both of these revolutions are still resonating in our 
daily lives. Perhaps full credit has not been given to the gunpowder 
principle in relation to the motor car. Exploding gunpowder in a 
cylinder is the main principle of the internal combustion engine, 
which had a very archaic aspect even in its beginnings. The 
electric circuit added to the musket, as it were, was the hybrid that 
produced the motor car. At the battle of Naseby (1645) most of the 
medieval technology was present and dominant. Cromwell, 
however, had created a new regimental structure of his foot 
soldiers, transferring the Gutenberg principle of lineality to human 
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organisation. His Ironsides were sort of simulation of individual 
medieval armor in corporate form (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:37–38).  
Gutenberg's invention of the movable type introduced mechanical repetitions 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:54) and these were transformed into repetitive military 
drill, mechanical handling of weapons and meticulous battle tactics introduced 
by Gustavus Adolphus (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:40–43). However, despite the 
central and decisive role of military technology's influence on human 
sensibilities most military historians have ignored and downplayed the role of 
military and media technological innovation on the course of history. Rather 
than follow technological details historians are fond of "making a romantic 
landscape" and in similar manner to Hollywood movie producers they describe 
the general deployment of forces in the field. However, even such descriptions 
contain indicators of technological changes and their effects on warfare, and on 
the human institutions and psyche (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:38–39, 44). 
McLuhan provides an example in an extensive quotation form John Morley 
writing about Cromwell and the English civil war. Morley begins with the 
characteristic descriptive epic of the historian:  
The temper of the time was hard, men were ready to settle truth by 
blows ... The cavalier was hot, unruly, scornful, with all the feudal 
readiness for bloodshed ... sustained by the thought of the heroes 
of the Old Testament who avenged ... Men lived and fought in the 
spirit of the Old Testament and not of the New (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:40).  
McLuhan shows that as Morley's discourse progresses he begins to include 
references to technology almost against his will, as he notes: "it is not within my 
scope to follow in detail the military operations of the civil war" because in his 
judgment military operations for "many months" were "a series of confused 
marches, random skirmishes" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:40). But then he slips in 
an observation that "soldiers appeared on both sides who had served abroad" 
and "the great changes in tactics made by Gustavus Adolphus quickly found 
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their way into operations of the English war" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:40–41). 
These include changes in cavalry formations, and placement of "platoons of 
foot and light field-pieces" that improved mobility. But Morley believes that 
these new continental European military innovations had little use for the two 
warring English bands who "drew up in front of one another" and then 
"hammered one another" and "who hammered hardest ... won the day" 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:41). But here again description of technological 
changes slip in, as Morley narrates that armour falls into disuse because of the 
introduction of firearms and because it hindered the wearer from fighting. 
Important technological changes sometimes have no immediate effect, an 
example is the much lauded introduction of firearms. Long after the invention of 
gunpowder and the appearance of the musket on the battlefield, the bow and 
arrow still dominated the field. The reason for this was that the musket was still 
inefficient while the arrows did more damage to the enemy and "the whiz of the 
arrow ... kept the horses in terror" and likewise had effect on the warriors as the 
"flight of the arrows" had "demoralised" those who "watched them hurtling 
through the air" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:42). However, gradually even the 
initially ineffective artillery pieces were "causing a change in fortifications" that 
went "from wall to earth works" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:43). 
The way technology changed the human character is particularly noticeable 
with the introduction of mechanical technologies into warfare. These resulted in 
loss of the human spirit and the virtues that were constructed on the battlefield 
over the centuries. Thus as Tom Macaulay laments that "the age of chivalry is 
gone" and "sophisters, economists and calculators have succeeded; and the 
glory of Europe is extinguished forever" and with it "heroic enterprise is gone" 
and so have "honour" and "courage" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:51). 
The interlinking of needs of warfare and communication is evident in the 
evolution of human symbolism and verbal communication: the biblical 
description of Adam's first action as giving names to things and animal is 
assumed to have been designed so as he could control them. Likewise, the 
origin of symbolism is also intimately connected with magic: "a word gives 
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power over the thing named" or it is a form of manipulative magic whereby the 
manipulation of an image or clay figure of the enemy – sticking a needle into it – 
one can kill the enemy from a distance (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:59). Thus word 
magic could be considered as military technology because one could disarm 
the enemy from a safe distance. War and robbery are also akin to magic as 
techniques to get something for nothing (cf. Mumford 1962:83). And as the 
improvement of weapons made them more effective and efficient means for 
killing at a distance, so a soldier "with a mere pull of the trigger ... he could 
annihilate an enemy” and “that was triumph of natural magic" (Mumford 
1962:85). Virilio (1989) suggests that war produces magical spectacle of 
immolation of the sacrificial victims and is associated with spiritual force (cf. 
Virilio 1989:7–8). 
Central to McLuhan's thinking about war and media is the idea of pain and both 
pain and war are forms of education. McLuhan identifies pain as a distinct 
human sense, in addition to the five senses (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:13). 
McLuhan assumes that any new technology, including new media create pain 
because they displace the old technologies and disrupt the established balance 
among the senses that was the source of confort (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:16). 
Adjusting to new technological environment means an attempt to evade pain 
and restore the old sense of balance. There are two ways for escaping the pain 
of technological change: (i) fighting war to restore balance, or (ii) escaping from 
reality into drugs-induced imaginary peace. 
7.5.2  Escape from mechanical universe into drug induced pacifism and 
primitive technology 
McLuhan seems to accept Montagu’s claim that civilisation corrupts and 
increases human aggression, making man more bellicose and violent 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:23). McLuhan summarises this in a footnote, thus: 
"Civilisation, the mother of war" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:24). Thus McLuhan 
contends that after experiencing "two centuries of mechanical environment” that 
were “inspiring a lust for violence as compensatory feedback" it should not be 
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surprising that human beings are violent (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:76). 
Responding to this pain caused by the environmental change from the peaceful 
organic life of primitive oral culture to the harsh mechanical environment 
induced by writing and print, man as if naturally strikes out in violence and war, 
or he escapes into drug induced hallucination (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:73). 
Drugs provide a phantasy world of peace and make the drug user believe that 
life is "too precious, that we must not kill unless we are being invaded" 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:76). McLuhan claims that a similar sense of euphoria of 
cosmic peace is being induced by the new electronic media, particularly by 
television (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:76–77). McLuhan notes that like drugs, the 
electronic "environment itself constitutes an inner trip, collectively, without 
benefit of drugs” and the “impulse to use hallucinogens is a kind of empathy 
with the electric environment" and both entail a rejection of the old mechanical 
world (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:77). The pacifying effect of drugs and the 
passivity induced by them is also noted by Roland Barthes (1986). According to 
Barthes (1986), as against the aggressive effect of legally sanctioned use of 
alcohol, a sense of "general goodwill" is induced by smoking cannabis: the 
movement slows down, only few words are spoken, and "the whole relation of 
the bodies (though a relation that is motionless and remote) is relaxed, 
disarmed (thus, nothing in common with alcoholic intoxication, the legal form of 
violence in the West)" and the space seems to be produced by "subtle ascesis" 
and everything in this space is "floating" (Barthes 1986:331). 
The similar effect of drugs and the electronic environment convinces Western 
youth to reject their own culture, which they experience as nihilistic and 
meaningless, and their lives as filled with "a feeling of nothingness" and a 
sense of everyday drabness (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:82). McLuhan seems to 
hint that the loss of meaning is the result of the lack of a need to fight, as 
McLuhan comments: "It will soon be impossible to entice any reasonably awake 




As against the pacifying effects of drugs on Western culture the new electronic 
environment has a different effect on primitive and oral cultures that have not 
experienced the painful experience of literacy. For them there is no need to 
overcome the mechanical bias of literacy and as they have retained some of 
their warrior sense they can beat the West and "conquer the white" world 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:79). Their victory may be easy because the West is 
disarmed by the new electronic media. McLuhan believes that the new electric 
oral media and in particular television undermine the rationality and logic of 
Western culture that was introduced by the technology of writing and 
Gutenberg's typographic technology; the loss of such logic will lead to the 
"decline of the West" and "its rapid Orientalisation" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:97).  
The new electronic media, combined with the drug culture drive people to 
renounce the Western mechanical culture and strive to return to some imagined 
romantic simple life in "nature". Such rejection and undermining of Western 
culture are not only conscious acts but are also the effects of new technology 
produced by the "integral and organic character of electric technology" itself 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:97–99). 
7.5.3  War and pain as means for conferring human identity 
McLuhan assumes that pain is a natural accompaniment of technological 
innovation and is intimately linked to war. Moreover, pain relates to war 
because war is a form of education and education is supposedly always painful 
(cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:97). McLuhan is close to Nietzsche’s (1989) 
argument that pain is a means for education because inflicting pain creates 
memory, and makes something stay in memory, so "pain is the most powerful 
aid to mnemonics" and historically it is evident that to create a memory for 
himself man could not do without spilling of blood, torture, sacrifice, and 
ultimately pain constructs a sense of identity (Nietzsche 1989:61). It follows that 
when the pain caused by the new technology threatens an individual's or a 
corporate's body sense of identity they lash out in self-defence: "When our 
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identity is in danger, we feel certain that we have a mandate for war" because 
the old self-image "must be recovered at all cost" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:97).  
On the relationship between media and identity McLuhan refers to Fanon's 
discussion of the use of radio in Algeria since 1956. For Fanon, the infusion of 
radio into society was not simply an example of adoption of new modern 
technology through which to gain French identity, but it was the only means of 
"entering into communication with the Revolution" and living with it (Fanon in 
McLuhan & Fiore 1968:99). In this manner the radio was a means of resistance 
and a technology for the Algerians for forging a common independent identity 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:102). Colonialism and new technology caused pain and 
in response the individual and society strike out and go to war to regain their old 
identity. In this sense "war itself is a quest for the recovery of identity and 
respect" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:127). Similarly it was was also seen in 1914 in 
the German reaction to the industrialisation of its neighbours (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:127). Another example of war conferring identity is the way modern 
warfare made use of the technology of the railways during the American civil 
war. Here the mass involvement of people and industrial technology for mass 
transport were extended to the military transportation of people and "as every 
citizen had become a worker" which also meant that "every citizen became a 
soldier" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:129). In the Second World War the radio 
restored the old shared tribal identity and gave strength to masses of people 
(cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:132–134). 
7.5.4  War as education – education as war 
Introducing the idea of "war as education" McLuhan discusses Napoleon as a 
prime example of an educator because not only was he an educator but he saw 
"war as educator" and this is manifest in Napoleon's life through his own 
education and in the manner of training his military recruit (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:102–103). Napoleon's important educational contribution was to teach his 
troops the value of time and speedy movement. The important legacy left by 
Napoleon was his understanding of the military value of time and the advantage 
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of speed that culminated in his introduction of driving on the right-hand side of 
the road to improve the efficiency of transport (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:106). 
The ability of Napoleon's military to move fast was the first instances of 
Blitzkrieg (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:108). The Germans perfect it in the twentieth 
century with the introduction of radios in their panzer tanks.  
To show the positive value of war McLuhan turns to discuss the book Report 
from Iron Mountain, published in 1967 (i.e. Lewin 1996). For McLuhan the first 
lesson from reading the Report from Iron Mountain is that war is a primary 
phenomenon as "it is itself the principle basis of organisation on which all 
modern societies are constructed" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:116). Thus because 
war is an autonomous system, it is a requirement of the system itself that 
"periodic armed conflict" should be engaged and enacted, and thus "readiness 
for war characterises contemporary social systems" (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:116). According to McLuhan, to say that readiness for war is a 
characteristic of the social system is to say, as did Ortega y Gasset, that war as 
a ritual is similar to the handshake being a remnant of an "ancient ritual of war" 
that both regulated and limited warfare (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:116).  
Unknown to McLuhan and other commentators at the time (i.e. 1967), the 
Report from Iron Mountain (Lewin 1996) was a political satire of the ways 
thinking of the Cold War nuclear deterrence strategists (cf. Lewin 1996:119). 
However, the satire provides insights based on solid historical and philosophical 
data that are more real than the musing of the contemporary anti-war idealists 
(cf. Arendt 1973:84). As Hannah Arendt (1973:84) perceptibly notes, "the satire 
... is probably closer to reality ... than most 'serious' studies." The main 
argument of the Report from Iron Mountain is that war is essential to the 
functioning of society and cannot be abolished unless it is replaced by more 
murderous means of dealing with problems, and this is vindicated by historical 
facts (Arendt 1973:84–85, note 4). According to Arendt (1973:88) the authors of 
the Report from Iron Mountain claim that the "war-making potential" is the 
primary principle force that structures society, and that the economic, political, 
philosophical and juridical systems serve the war system, rather than war 
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serving these systems, therefore they conclude that "war itself is the basic 
social system" containing other modes of social organisations. For Arendt such 
conclusions are more reasonable and veritable than Clausewitz's claim that war 
is subordinate to the state (cf. Arendt 1973:88).  
Even more conclusive than this simple reversal proposed by the 
anonymous author of the Report from Iron Mountain – instead of 
war being “an extension of diplomacy (or of politics, or of the 
pursuit of economic objectives)”, peace is the continuation of war 
by other means – is the actual development in the technique of 
warfare (Arendt 1973:88). 
Arendt (1973) adds that the persistence of warfare has nothing to do with a 
secret "death wish" or irrepressible aggressive instinct but attests to the simple 
fact that there is no substitute for war as the "final arbiter in international 
affairs", because as was already noted by Hobbes, covenants without the 
sword are but words (Arendt 1973:84–85). Moreover, there is no substitute for 
war if people desire to maintain their "freedom from foreign rule" and have 
national self determination (Arendt 1973:85). McLuhan, like Arendt, notes that 
the "old men from Iron Mountain" emphasis on the primacy of war means that 
war is an inseparable feature of the economic establishment, because war 
drives the economy of each society (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:118). War 
accelerates research and technological development (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:120).  
While there is a general misconception that war is subordinate to state policy, 
McLuhan notes that its own important functions such as “to defend a nation 
from military attack by another, or to deter such an attack; to defend or advance 
a 'national interest' – economic, political, ideological; to maintain or increase a 
nation's military power for its own sake” (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:120). 
According the McLuhan (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:120) there are even other 
more profound functions for war in modern society of which the "old men from 
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Iron Mountain" had no inkling, for example, war persists because it is "a quest 
for that identity that is always threatened by technological innovation."  
McLuhan notes the paradox and synergy between war and technological 
development: while research and technological development are accelerated by 
war, at the same time the innovations resulting from such war-driven research 
destroy identity and promote war in turn (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:120). There 
is no escape from progress because it is driven by war and "war has always 
provided the basic incentive" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:122). 
War is the principle motivational force for the development of 
science at every level, from the abstractly conceptual to the 
narrowly technological ... it is historically inescapable that all the 
significant discoveries that have been made about the natural 
world have been inspired by the real or imaginary military 
necessities of their epochs (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:122). 
The men from "Iron Mountain" also enumerate the positive psychological and 
philosophical functions of war: "War as an ideological clarifier" demonstrates 
that the dualism of traditional dialectic used in philosophy and politics "stem 
from war as the prototype of conflict" and this is so because there cannot be 
more than two sides to a question, as "there cannot be more than two sides to 
a war" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:123). Further, war is the foundation for mutual 
understanding between nations: "War as the basis for international 
understanding" shows how before the development of modern communication 
war provided the means and the incentive for "the enrichment of one national 
culture with the achievements of another" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:123). 
McLuhan uncovers more functions for war, for example, war is a source of 
general employment and increases the individual human being's sense of 
value. War is a form of education and it accelerates the process of education 
and provides a "compulsory education" for the enemy (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:124). The education function is seen in any war where the antagonists 
study all aspects of their opponents, such as psychology, cultural history, 
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resources and technology, to the extent that war "has become the little red 
schoolhouse of the global village." But the educational factor has always 
existed throughout history whereby the great generals were accompanied by 
crowds of scholars and linguists to advise on all aspects of the enemy and "loot 
any cultural treasure" they found (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:124–125). 
McLuhan observes that the new electronic technology has generalised war and 
that "we are now in the midst of our first television war" and television 
constructs a "total environment" and hence the war is also total war (McLuhan 
& Fiore 1968:134).  
The television war has meant the end of the dichotomy between 
civilian and military. The public is now participating in every phases 
of the war, and the main actions of the war are now being fought in 
the American home itself (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:134).  
It is impossible to escape war in the electronic age because "the age is one of 
communication and Cold War" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:91–92). The new 
electronic media technology is effective for the Cold War between the two super 
powers. Through the "vast web of communication" they can "receive 
information and transmit commands", and the Cold War provides great 
opportunities to exploit the new technologies (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:92). For 
example, television war is both "hot" and "cold". McLuhan explains this in his 
1967 short book The Medium Is the Message (McLuhan & Fiore 1971):  
Real, total war has become information war. It is being fought by 
subtle electric information media – under cold conditions, and 
constantly. The cold war is the real war front – a surround - 
involving everybody – all the time - and everywhere. Whenever hot 
wars are necessary these days, we conduct them in the backyard 




In the shadow of the Cold War this is a reminder that violence is a quest for 
identity and manifests itself in different cultures (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:139).  
However, in the nihilistic and meaningless Western youth culture of drugs and 
electronic television, violence has become self-directed asceticism, an exercise 
of self-inflicted pain and self-denial. In an attempt to find meaning in life some 
Westerners have become "apostolate of pain" as they seek new adventures 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:84–85). Expressive of such state is Hermann Hesse's 
story of Siddhartha that serves as a "way of discovering one's own inner 
boundaries" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:139). But such turning inward is an action 
of the coward and the drop-out, who does not want to participate in life or the 
war and claims to be a peaceful man.  
But violence and war are natural ways of being human and even the young 
generation raised on drugs stages its own violent anti-war protests as 
alternative forms of warfare and so can establish its identity. McLuhan 
concludes that the link between pain and war shows "war as education", and 
conversely "education as war" and a realisation that information is a weapon 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:149). This is important because the use of education as 
war and information as weapon usually go unnoticed.  
Perhaps less obvious is the aggressive and military character of 
sending medical missionaries ... to India to implement birth control 
campaigns. In the information age it is obviously possible to 
decimate populations by the dissemination of information and 
gimmickry (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:149).  
In other words, the strict division between war and peace cannot be maintained. 
McLuhan reminds the reader that "war has always been a form of compulsory 
education for the other guy, but even the greatest ravagers of mankind never 
dreamed of destroying as many people as those educators hope to do" 
(McLuhan & Fiore 1968:153).  
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Adverting is another way by which war is conducted on the community of 
customers where it is used as "an educational onslaught" (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:153). That education is war becomes clear from the fact that pain is 
central to any education: inflicting pain in the process of learning to adapt to the 
environment is integral to education (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:150–151).  
From education McLuhan returns to consider clothing as a form of weaponry 
and that modern fashion has become a substitute for war, or a kind of boredom, 
a "Bore War" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:153). Example of clothing used as 
weapon is provided by Fanon’s discussion of the Algerian revolutionary war 
whereby unveiling of the Arab woman was a painful and disorienting experience 
but allowed her to dress in European cloths to go unnoticed and plant bombs in 
the territory of the European settler community (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:157).  
The original idea for using clothing as weaponry is derived from the need to 
combat a hostile environment (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:160). The use of 
clothing as military uniform originates among members of tribal societies 
wearing the same costume, and similarly, in modern societies military uniform 
was used to unify a group into a corporate body (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:161). Fashion originates from armour used in battle (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:163), and the military origin and influence is still seen in contemporary 
fashion: in the variety of neckties, the "starched harnesses", and rugged 
"military fashion" of the "trench style" coats (cf. McLuhan & Fiore 1968:166–
167). The influence of warfare on dress and social organisation and rituals is 
widespread, and war is the primary paradigm for society.  
When the Duke of Wellington said that the battle of Waterloo had 
been won on the playing fields of Eton, he was drawing attention to 
the role of sport as a sort of capsule or live paradigm of any 
society ... To simulate one situation by means of another, to turn 
the whole working environment into a small model, is a means of 




An important ritual linked to war is play, examined by Johan Huizinga (McLuhan 
& Fiore 1968:170). The role of play is central to development of human vocal 
communication considered as a form of "verbal play" and is one among the 
many forms of human playing such as "fighting, sexual play, and any other 
older categories."  
Speaking is a form of a war play that provides means to talk about situations 
that don't exist, are not present, or as are anticipated in the future, or occurred 
in the past, and this creates a habit of being imaginatively prepared for any 
eventuality and "is very much like carrying a weapon when there is no 
immediate need for it" (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:170). Thus one speaks and 
plays at having to deal with uncertainties (McLuhan & Fiore 1968:173), and 
such uncertainties multiply in the "post-industrial time" of the present (McLuhan 
& Fiore 1968:184). Uncertainties increase because "all media or technologies, 
languages as much as weaponry, create new environments or habitats, which 
become the milieux for new species or technologies" (McLuhan & Fiore 
1968:190). Like McLuhan, White (2005:9) concludes his historical study of how 
war drives technological innovation with the observation that there “will always 
be a new enemy, a new reason to develop weapons, medicine, transportation 
systems and communication networks.” 
7.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter the role of war was traced in McLuhan’s texts. It was shown how 
the influence of the Second World War was the general Zeitgeist – the social 
and cultural unconscious – of the period and influenced McLuhan's theoretical 
writing. Subsequntly as the Cold War and the Viet Nam war intensified, so the 
place of war in his thought becomes more visible and a structuring principle. 
McLuhan shows how war is a form of communication, and communication is a 
form of war.  
McLuhan’s emphasis on the role of the medium itself as being the message 
seemed a novel way of considering the effect of communication. However, such 
an idea was already a well-established way of thinking about media messages 
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among the early communication scholars, such as Shannon, Weaver and 
Norbert Wiener whose work was driven by the need of war. Wiener (1956:21) 
explains that "messages are themselves a form of pattern and organisation ... 
the information carried by a set of messages is a measure of organisation."  
Indeed, the general structuring importance of war can be seen in retrospect, as 
Ignatieff (1999) suggests: 
We forget that the Cold War made sense of the world for us: it 
gave an apparent rationale to the wars of the Third World; it 
explained the sides; it identified whose side we should be on 
(Ignatieff 1999:98).  
The link between war and technology has a long history. Technology has 
always been linked with death and killing because it is the means that 
guarantees survival. This link is beautifully illustrated by the invention of the 
electric chair. In August 1890 the electric chair was used for the first time to 
execute a prisoner in New York. The execution by use of electric current was 
hailed by one of the witness, a Dr Southwick as the "culmination of ten years of 
work and study" and as signifying great progress so that "we live today in a 
higher civilisation from this day" (White 2002:137). However, the execution did 
not go smoothly and the prisoner remained alive after the first attempt of 
running electric current through his body. Realising that the prisoner in the 
electric chair was still alive, another doctor, Edward Spitzka implored the 
warden, as the only man in the room carrying a gun: "For God's sake kill him 
and be done with it" (White 2002:136). Ultimately, the prisoner was killed after 
literally being fried, cooked and burnt in the electric chair. Dr Southwick, 
speaking to the media after the execution spectacle concluded that the killing 
was "the grand success of the age" and predicted that "this is a grand thing, 
and is destined to become the system of legal death throughout the world" 
(White 2002:137).  
Death and technology seem to be interlinked. In similar manner communication 
technology, death and killing are closely linked: For Plato writing is seen as 
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dead speech. While war is the major drive for innovation in communication 
technology, the drive for modern development of communication technology 
and the scholarly study of communication is found in the desire for immortality: 
to embalm speech in wax through recording it, and to desire to find 
technological means to communicate with the dead motivated Thomas Edison 
to invent the telephone (cf. Peters 1999).  
McLuhan's pioneering insights on media and communication technology and 
their relations to war inspired a few others to follow and extend such studies. 
Studies by Paul Virilio (1989) affirm the primary role of war in the progress of 
the media. As communication is becoming global it has become the paradigm 
for the new global society, thus Mattelart (1994:viii) inquiring into the 
ascendancy of communication to globality shows that it is intimately interrelated 
with war. "Communication serves first of all to make war" from which progress 
and culture emerged (Mattelart 1994:xiii). This is so because there can be no 
war without means of representation and therefore, like communication media 
"weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of perception" (Virilio 
1989:8). Following Virilio, German media theorist Friedrich Kittler's study of the 
complex historical relationship between war and media technology confirms 
"war as the father of all media" (Winthrop-Young 2002:828). Moreover, as 
Kittler's (1999) historical studies show, media are military technologies and 
ultimately the use of media that is not for military and warfare purposes, is an 
abuse of military equipment. Thus historically "the entertainment industry is, in 
any conceivable sense of the word, an abuse of army equipment" (Kittler 
1999:96–97; Winthrop-Young 2002:832). 
The next chapter will offer a close reading and explication of Lyotard’s writing 
on the postmodern condition. A review of his conceptions of war, language, 
communication and war will offer new insights and understanding of life and 






TO SPEAK IS TO FIGHT: 
WAR AS STRUCTURE OF THOUGHT AND SOCIETY IN 
LYOTARD'S POSTMODERN CONDITION 
 To speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts – Lyotard 
(1984:10) 
Making thought a war machine – Deleuze & Guattari (1986:44) 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the work of McLuhan that linked technology, 
media and warfare as fundamental to culture and in turn how the media 
technology and media practices are kinds of warfare that have become more 
prominent in the Global Village or the postmodern discursive world. In this 
chapter an understanding of the contemporary world is provided by a prominent 
postmodern thinker, J-F Lyotard’s identification of communication and war as 
central characteristics of the postmodern condition. Against the hegemony of 
the textualist bias of structuralist and poststructuralist theories and in line with 
Foucault, Lyotard returns language to its pragmatic origin – to its agonistic form 
of action – within social reality. The chapter will also show, how by using 
Lyoratd’s insights the contemporary world can be understood as a return of the 
Middle Ages, as the postmodern condition comes to resemble the conflictual 
spirit of a Neo-medieval world of war and conflict.  
By acknowledging society's eternal agonistic and conflictual nature, Lyotard 
offers new insights for social theory and communication studies. However, 
while Lyotard offers a postmodern perspective to locate the role of verbal duels 
as primary communication encounters, he seem to remain in the idealism of 
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linguistic abstraction and somehow neglects the character of real conflict and 
warfare while his postmodern posture of indeterminacy does not provide 
sufficient indication on how to analyse the progress of battles, identify warriors 
and decide on victories and defeats.  
8.2  War and communication in the postmodern condition 
Social theorists have been attempting to find an appropriate way to understand 
the contemporary society and culture, most notably described as "the 
postmodern condition", assumed as a kind of new social formation whereby the 
developed Western societies enter the "post-industrial age" and cultures the 
"postmodern age", and the whole configuration of the postmodern condition is 
noted for its communicational or discursive characteristics (cf. Lyotard 1984:3).  
The prominent postmodern theorist J-F Lyotard (1984) proposes that an 
understanding of the communicational postmodern condition requires a 
communication approach that will acknowledge the peculiar discursive 
characteristics of postmodernity. But while Lyotard (1984) identifies 
communication as central characteristics of the postmodern condition, he also 
discerns the coexistence of a characteristic conflictual diversity. According to 
Lyotard (1984), because communication and information are becoming 
commodities and of central importance to the capitalist global economy, 
it is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control 
of information, just as they battled in the past for control over 
territory, and afterwards for control of access to exploitation of raw 
materials and cheap labour (Lyotard 1984:5).  
For Lyotard the postmodern condition opens up a new field of action that 
combines "industrial and commercial strategies" on the one side, and "political 
and military strategies" on the other (Lyotard 1984:5). Lyotard is of course not 
the first to identify information and media with war, McLuhan (1969) outlined the 
relationship between development of media and warfare (McLuhan was 
discussed in Chapter 7). Mattelart’s (1994) study of international 
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communication since the nineteenth century notes that "communication serves 
first of all to make war ... War and its logics are essential components of the 
history of international communication and of its doctrine and theories, as well 
as its uses" (Mattelart 1994:xiii). Thus war is the frame of reference for 
development of communication technology and communication theories 
(Mattelart 1994:xiv). Lyotard thus implies that there is a need to understand 
communication from a conflictual perspective. 
8.3  Communication agonistics: to speak is to fight 
The postmodern condition can be understood from a communication 
perspective. For Lyotard however, communication must be understood as 
reflecting its social nature: that is, its eternal agonistic dynamics that 
characterises all living human societies throughout history. However, it is 
unfortunate that the traditional communication and information theories miss 
this agonistic aspect of society because of their biased emphasis on consensus 
as if it was the natural norm. As Lyotard (1984) notes, the postmodern condition 
can be best understood from within the conceptual framework of linguistics, and 
communicational agonistics, whereby the emphasis is on the pragmatic aspects 
of language and communication (cf. Lyotard 1984:9). This implies that 
communication should be understood as a form of speech act or language 
game. The underlying principle of such an understanding of communication is 
that "to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech act [that] fall within 
the domain of a general agonistics" (Lyotard 1984:10). Here Lyotard extends 
and modifies Wittgenstein's conception of the social usage of language as if it 
were a game of chess whereby each act of speaking is akin to a move in the 
game and the game is defined by its rules (cf. Lyotard 1984:37). Lyotard 
suggests that language and language games can provide a way to understand 
society because it is possible that "the entirety of social relations" are primarily 
linguistics relations. But even if not all social relations are linguistic relations, 
nevertheless, "language games are the minimum relation required for society to 
exist" (Lyotard 1984:15).  
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Moreover, because of the increasing prominence and centrality of language 
and communication in society "both as a reality and as an issue" of contentions, 
it would "be superficial to reduce" the significance of communication "to the 
traditional alternative between manipulatory speech and unilateral transmission 
of messages on the one hand, and free expression and dialogue on the other" 
as is done by Habermas (Lyotard 1984:16). This is also reflected in the 
dominant communication and information theories. Considering language and 
communication from within a simple cybernetic information theory perspective 
neglects and obscures "the agonistic aspect of society" whereby language 
games are always dynamic and conflictual relations of strategic actions and 
responses taking place within the field of social power (cf. Lyotard 1984:16).  
The dynamic nature of the world and society means that these can be 
considered as complex systems that are always in the process of conflict that is 
an eternal and permanent condition. Hence this can be theorised in terms of 
Heraclitus’ contention that "conflict, the father of all things” is the single and 
prime "causative process" or principle (Lyotard 1984:59). From this it follows 
that speaking is akin to fighting (Lyotard 1984:10).  
The reason Lyotard insists on placing the conflict and dissensus as the starting 
point for understanding society is his realisation that such an understanding is 
derived from Western tradition dating back to the ancient Greeks. But against 
such traditional understanding Lyotard concludes that contemporary systems 
and administrative theories condemn conflict and posit consensus as if the only 
valid principle. Lyotard contends that to represent social reality as if it were 
stable and amenable to total control is to misrepresent it. For Lyotard, there can 
never be a stage of complete knowledge about society that allows for total 
control and eradication of indeterminacy. Because of the agonistic character of 
human nature, unpredictability is always a central part of society, as Lyotard 
argues: 
Take the aggressiveness as a state variable of a dog: it increases 
in direct proportion to the dog's anger, a control variable. 
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Supposing the dog's anger is measurable, when it reaches a 
certain threshold it is expressed in the form of an attack. Fear, the 
second control variable, has the opposite effect; when it reaches 
its threshold it is expressed as flight. In the absence of anger or 
fear, the dog's behaviour is stable ... But if the two control 
variables increase together, the two thresholds will be approached 
simultaneously: the dog's behaviour becomes unpredictable and 
can switch abruptly from flight to attack, and vice versa. The 
system is said to be unstable: the control variables are continuous, 
but the state variables are discontinuous (Lyotard 1984:59). 
Lyotard points to the instability of society which he calls "paralogy" (1984:60) as 
always being in tension and conflict. Thus one needs to recognise the 
"heteromorphous nature of language games" (Lyotard 1984:66). From Lyotard's 
perspective conflict and dissensus can acknowledge the complexity, social 
diversity and varieties of language games, but this diversity is denied, 
unacknowledged, and suppressed by the perspective of Habermas's outmoded 
and inadequate theory of rational consensus (cf. Lyotard 1984:60–61, 65–66). 
According to Lyotard (1984:61) consensus is an ideal that is never reached, 
thus if "the goal of dialogue is consensus" this "consensus is only a particular 
state of discussion, not its end" (Lyotard 1984:65). The end or aim is dissent 
because dialogue is an open system and someone will always come with 
something new to say and so disturb the consensus (Lyotard 1984:61). 
Lyotard’s idea is confirmed by Derrida's (1978:116–117) assertion that "there is 
war only after the opening of discourse", by which he implies that a dispute can 
only arise once communication and expression have taken place.  
Moreover, there is always diversity and there is no universally valid 
metaprescription for all language games (cf. Lyotard 1984:65). Attaining 
complete consensus is only possible by an act of terror which eliminates all 
oppositional players from the language game (cf. Lyotard 1984:63–64). Thus 
Lyotard concludes:  
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What is needed if we are to understand social relations in this 
manner, on what ever scale we choose, is not only a theory of 
communication, but a theory of games which accepts agonistics as 
a founding principle (Lyotard 1984:16). 
The implication is that playing a language game may have various motives, but 
nevertheless, winning the game is the primary and the only motive even if at 
times it remains unacknowledged or misrecognised objective (This was also 
shown in the discussion on Huizinga in Chapter 5). In this sense if speaking is 
considered as a move in a language game, in a manner similar to a move in a 
game of chess, then a "move can be made for the sheer pleasure of its 
invention: what else is involved in that labour of language harassment 
undertaken by popular speech and by literature?" (Lyotard 1984:10). But 
behind the pretence that the player claims to be playing for the sake of playing, 
winning still remains the primary motive. Lyotard notes that the motive for the 
use of language in a language game may well be the joy and pleasure gained 
at the level of linguistic parole, but the competitive and agonistic nature soon 
discloses itself, as Lyotard notes,  
undoubtedly even this pleasure depends on a feeling of success 
won at the expense of an adversary – at least one adversary, and 
a formidable one: the accepted language, or connotation (Lyotard 
1984:10).  
Thus the agonistic, competitive and fighting aspects of linguistic communication 
are evident at all levels of communication: 
In the ordinary use of discourse – for example, in a discussion 
between two friends – the interlocutors use any available 
ammunition, changing games from one utterance to the next: 
questions, requests, assertions, and narratives are launched pell-
mell into battle. The war is not without rules, but the rules allow 




The contest and battle is not reserved for the oral interpersonal level of 
interaction but is also evident in institutionalised discourse, "an institution differs 
from a conversation in that it always requires supplementary constraints for 
statements to be declared admissible within its bounds" (Lyotard 1984:17). 
However, the limitation that an institution imposes on "moves" within a 
language game are not fixed for all times, but "the limits are themselves the 
stakes and provisional result of language strategies, within the institution and 
without" and new rules are negotiated and made as the game progresses 
(Lyotard 1984:17). Thus because communication is a social activity it takes the 
form of an agonistic language game whether it is on an individual's level of 
dialogic performance or large scale social interaction (cf. Lyotard 1984:16).  
8.4  The war of all against all: positions for individuals and groups on 
Lyotard's agonistic communication battlefield  
Lyotard imagines communication as an agonistic act where speaking is a 
language game and the individual speakers conduct a fight in the form of 
dialogue. Lyotard’s view is anchored in his understanding that the basic unit of 
communication is an act of an individual human being. The human being is 
envisaged as an atomistic individual existing within a social network (cf. Lyotard 
1984:15–16), or a social bond that is constructed by language. Whatever else 
social relations may be they are primary relations within a language game, and  
there is no need to resort to some fiction of social origin to 
establish that language games are the minimum relation required 
for society to exist: even before he is born, if only by virtue of the 
name he is given, the human child is already positioned as the 
referent in the story recounted by those around him, his relation to 
which he will inevitably chart his course (Lyotard 1984:15). 
However, while the social bond is linguistic it is not composed of a single 
abstract language because there is no language in a general sense (cf. Lyotard 
1988:xii). Nor is there only one single language game in a society: the social 
use of language consists of indeterminate numbers of language games, each 
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with its own rules. Lyotard's view of language follows Wittgenstein's description 
of a multiplicity of language games by comparing it to an ancient city with a 
maze of streets, old and new houses, old and new suburbs (cf. Lyotard 
1984:40). The multiple language games, and their different rules and pragmatic 
efficacy provide a position and place people in different roles so they can play 
their allocated parts. Ultimately the limit of the social bond is death: the social 
bond is always traversed by fear of death and the various forms of death – 
imprisonment, repression, hunger – all threaten to interrupt the social bond (cf. 
Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:99). 
Lyotard seems to conceive of the speech act as a Hobbesian war of all against 
all. This is because the breaking up of the "grand narratives" of modernity leads 
to dissolution of the social bond and "disintegration of social aggregate into a 
mass of individual atoms" (Lyotard 1984:15). But rather than being a radical 
break up of society, Lyotard assumes that it is an "atomisation of the social into 
flexible networks of language games" (Lyotard 1984:17). And the agonistic 
nature of society means that the individual "atoms are placed at the cross roads 
of pragmatic relationships, but they are also displaced by the messages that 
traverse them, in perpetual motion", and the human "atoms" forming its matter 
are competent to handle statements (Lyotard 1984:16). The postmodern 
individual thus exists as an atom linked in a network, but each individual is not 
powerless but is an active player with limited autonomy.  
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each 
exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile 
than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a 
person is always located at "nodal points" of specific 
communication circuits, however tiny they may be. Or better: one 
is always located at a post through which various kinds of 
messages pass. No one, not even the least privileged among us, 
is ever entirely powerless over messages that traverse and 




Lyotard's view of the postmodern individual is no different from the modern view 
of the individual and thus Lyotard seems to accept the modern anthropological 
assumption by his adoption of Wittgenstein's linguistics. For Lyotard in the 
postmodern world an individual's ability to enter and play a language game 
increases by the infusion of new telecommunication technology. As Lyotard 
(1991) notes, "any piece of data becomes useful (exploitable, operational) once 
it can be translated into information", and the use of such data is not limited by 
the place and time of its reception and use (cf. Lyotard 1991:50). This is so 
because the new communication technology changes the use and experience 
of space and time: 
The question raised by the new technologies ... is that of the here-
and-now. What does “here” mean on the telephone, on television, 
at the receiver of an electronic telescope? And the 'now'? Does not 
the “tele-“ element necessarily destroy presence, the “here-and-
now” of the forms and their “carnal” reception? What is a place, a 
moment, not anchored in the immediate “passion” of what 
happens? Is a computer in any way here and now? (Lyotard 
1991:118). 
From Lyotard’s perspective institutionalised communication is an extension of 
the basic position of an agonistic individual's dialogue and only differs in that it 
has some limiting formal rules, However, even these rules are not determined 
with complete finality because they are the product of prior contestation and are 
subject to variation and change by the ongoing play of challenges and 
contestations.  
For Lyotard communication generally follows the model of war because 
language has its origin in fighting and war. Fighting is a “conversation of 
gestures” as in a boxing match that provides a model for communication (cf. 
Bushman 1998). In other words, the social antagonistic fighting action precedes 
the symbol and deliberate communication (cf. Mead 1965:129). As George 
Herbert Mead (in Meltzer, Petras & Reynolds 1980:36) contends: “The blow is 
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the historical antecedent of the word." Consciousness develops first from 
actions and gestures, as Mead (1965:162) contends: "Mind arises through 
communication by conversation of gestures in a social process or context – not 
communication through mind." Lyotard (1984) contention that speaking is 
fighting is based on similar conception to Mead's (This was discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4). Indeed, Lyotard invokes Levinas' comment on some 
theological text that commends: "Do before you understand" and Levinas notes 
that it is always the practice that the people act first and understood after the 
fact (Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:41). 
Thus Lyotard is close to Mead's view of communication as a boxing match 
which is also taken up by Bourdieu as a paradigmatic model. For Bourdieu 
(1977a), the speaking and communication encounter is conducted as an 
exchange of blows: 
In dog-fights, as in the fighting of children or boxers, each move 
triggers off a counter-move, every stance of the body becomes a 
sign pregnant with meaning that the opponent has to grasp while it 
is still incipient, reading the beginning of a stroke or a sidestep, the 
imminent future, i.e. the blow or the dummy (Bourdieu 1977a:11). 
Lyotard's conception of the agonistic individualistic model of communication 
has empirical support from linguistic research. According to Farb (1974:12–14) 
language is always used in order to achieve some objective. This means that 
the ordinary way people speak resembles a verbal duel or a war game: 
Most speakers unconsciously duel even during seemingly casual 
conversation, as can often be observed at social gatherings where 
they show less concern for exchanging information with other 
guests than for asserting their own dominance (Farb 1974:93). 
In less formal situations when "two people who know each other approach, a 
duel immediately takes place over who will speak first" (Farb 1974:93). The 
contest to determine a speaking position is occasioned by the fact that in any 
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conversation only one speaker can speak at a time, and the speaker issues a 
challenge by speaking and establishes positions of domination and 
subordination – active speaker, passive listener (cf. Farb 1974:93–94). In a 
dialogue the role of the one person asking questions includes the right to 
interrogate and the right to pose questions and the person "being interrogated 
... plays a passive role in which he is forced to respond verbally" (Farb 
1974:100–101). In many situations the verbal duel is an alternative to actual 
fighting. This was, for example, the situation of black youth in American society 
in the 1960s, whereby while being relatively powerless the black Americans 
discovered that  
one of the few ways they could fight back was verbally. Verbal 
battle against whites became more important than physical battle, 
where blacks have been outnumbered and outgunned (Farb 
1974:107).  
The verbal combat or “flyting” is a verbal expression of a general mode of 
aggressive, competitive agonistic human interaction rooted in biology, 
psychology and social and cultural existence. The verbal duel is found as 
prelude to battle and is in itself a form of battle and contest (cf. Pagliai 2009:61; 
Pagliai 2010:87; Parks 1986; Parks 1990; Ong 1982; Ong 1989). As Pagliai 
(2009:63) notes, a verbal duel is a genre of argumentative language, a form of 
argumentative dialogue between two persons or parties that challenge each 
other to perform a display of verbal skilfulness in front of an audience. The 
outcome of such duel is victory or defeat and thus social recognition of the 
individual's worth or status.  
8.5  War on totality: the terrorism of consensus 
For Lyotard speaking is fighting and communication follows the model of war 
because language gains its character from its origin in fighting and war. This 
individual-centered ontology of communication is extended by Lyotard to social 
discourse. According to Lyotard (1984) the postmodern condition returns 
language to its pragmatic tradition. As against seeing society from the 
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Structuralists' reductionist perspective of "meaningful action considered as text" 
(cf. Ricoeur 1977), Lyotard acknowledges the nature of linguistic speech and 
language games as proper forms of social action: which means that meaningful 
text can be considered as action.  
For Lyotard (1984) the postmodern fragmentation has a liberating effect and 
provides condition for creativity, as against the totalising spirit of modernity and 
its iron cage of formal logic and forma; discursive rules. Thus modernity 
expressed by the "grand narrative" of progress and emancipation as promoted 
by Habermas was oppressive. Indeed, Lyotard contends that the enforcement 
of universal unity and disregard of local knowledge by the discourse of 
modernity is a form of terrorism. The universalisation enforces conformity and 
eliminates opposing players from the language games, because it threatens 
them: "Say or do this, or else you'll never speak again" (Lyotard 1984:46). 
Terrorism is the  
eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language 
game ... He is silenced or consents, not because he has been 
refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened 
(Lyotard 1984:63–64).  
For Lyotard terrorism is manifest in the fashionable contemporary concepts of 
"system efficiency" increasingly used by social engineers and politicians. In the 
name of efficiency they have destroyed democratic politics, and the true 
practice of scientific inquiry as a contest.  
As against the totalising discourse and practice of modernity, the postmodern is 
liberating and its fragmentation means that there is no unified universal 
narrative or common language to translate the incommensurable variety of 
discourses. According to Lyotard "there is no reason to think that it would be 
possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all these language games" 
(Lyotard 1984:65). This is so because the ultimate goal of dialogue is not 
consensus, "consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its 
end, on the contrary, is paralogy" and search for dissent (Lyotard 1984:65–66). 
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There is only heterogeneity and dissensus on the global level, as well as within 
locally played language games (cf. Lyotard 1984:66). Thus Lyotard's theory 
aptly describes the isolated individual in the postmodern global landscape of 
electronically mediated communication (cf. Poster 1990:129). Here within the 
agonistic and playful culture of the postmodern it is possible for individuals and 
groups to resist the totalising force of the system of consensus and "wage a 
war on totality" and to "activate the differences" in and through speech (Lyotard 
1984:82).  
Lyotard further develops his agonistic theory by introducing the idea of the 
"differend" (Lyotard 1988). The "differend" is a case of conflict between at least 
two parties that cannot be resolved equitable for lack of rules of judgment that 
are applicable to both arguments. Applying some single rule to both arguments 
would distort and will not do justice to one or the other (Lyotard 1988:xi). This 
paradoxical situation is experienced in the postmodern diversity of discourses 
and speech acts because regulating them by one universal metalanguage is to 
do them injustice.  
By declaring such and such a phrase permitted, such and such a 
phrase prohibited, and such and such a phrase obligatory, 
authority subjects them, whatever their heterogeneity might be, to 
a single set of stakes, justice. Singing undoubtedly relates to the 
beautiful, but it may be unjust if it is a certain song, at a certain 
time, in a certain place (Lyotard 1988:143). 
For Lyotard the discursive nature of the postmodern means that speech acts, 
described as "phrases", and genres of discourse are similar to statements 
made within a particular discursive practice (Lyotard 1988:xii). Language 
games are pragmatic and hence they are "events". Within any such event 
phrases come into conflict with each other, and "a phrase offends a phrase, or 
do it wrong" (Lyotard 1988:85). This is to acknowledge that it is impossible to 
avoid conflicts and simultaneously that there is no universal genre of discourse 
to regulate and resolve conflict. This implies that the only thing left to do in a 
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world where one cannot but communicate is "to save the honour of thinking" 
(Lyotard 1988:xii). To save the honour of thinking is important in the 
postmodern condition because of the erosion of belief in the solid foundation of 
knowledge and existence of objective reality. The rise of the ideology of 
instrumentalism and performativity has debased thinking and actively 
preventing critical thinking. The belief that transfer of data, information and clear 
communication is all that is needed for intellectual development is a delusion 
because it neglects the complexity of language and thought. All these attitudes 
promote nihilism which needs to be combated.  
The "linguistic turn" of Western philosophy (Heidegger's later 
works, the penetration of Anglo-American philosophies into 
European thought, the development of language technologies); 
and correlatively, the decline of universalist discourses (the 
metaphysical doctrines of modern times: narratives of progress, of 
socialism, of abundance, of knowledge). The weariness with 
regard to "theory", and the miserable slackening that goes with it 
(new this, new that, post-this, post-that, etc.). The time has come 
to philosophise (Lyotard 1988:xiii).  
For Lyotard, to philosophise is to stimulate thought through agonism and 
rekindle the spirit of fighting and conflict. Indeed, Lyotard invokes Heraclitus as 
providing the principle justification for his own postmodern agonistic theory. 
According to Lyotard (1984:59, 88 note 35) because Heraclitus rightly 
recognised "conflict, [as] the father of all things" therefore conflict can be 
assumed as the single cause for all phenomena (cf. Lyotard 1984:59), and has 
been recognised as the generative engine of all things. In other words, what 
Lyotard aims for is finding a credible way of "speaking" and thinking by 
combining and linking different and incompatible phrases from various 
discursive regimes. Linking these different, contradictory and often 
incommensurable phrases that cannot be translated will obviously give rise to 
internal conflict in the new discourse (cf. Lyotard 1988:xii).  
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Language is not an "instrument of communication"; it is a highly 
complex archipelago composed of domains of phrases belonging 
to regimes so different from one another that a phrase from one 
regime (a descriptive phrase, for example) cannot be translated 
into a phrase from another regime (an evaluative or prescriptive 
phrase) (Lyotard 1986–1987:218). 
To understand the reason for these differences and conflicts it may be useful to 
consult Perelman's discussion of the New Rhetoric. For Perelman differences 
and conflicts arise firstly as the result of the ambiguity in the language being 
used because there is always an unstable link between the linguistic terms and 
their designated concepts or the images they symbolised. Secondly, when 
discussing disputed terms one provides definitions, but "to define" already 
implies that one makes a choice because there are various ways of defining an 
idea and each definition needs to be discussed and explained before it is 
accepted (cf. Perelman 1982:62). Arnold (1982:xiii) explains that according to 
Perelman  
every definition implicitly admits that some other definition is 
possible; otherwise, there would be no need to define in the first 
place. Likewise, every evaluative term or statement implicitly 
admits that one could give a different evaluation and make some 
defense of it. Were it not so, we would have no need to express 
our evaluation.  
While the above are concerned with abstraction of rhetoric, Clausewitz 
(1985:109) notes that similar problems arise in reality when two states contend 
over the political object of war. According  to Clausewitz (1985:109), "one and 
the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different 
people, or even upon the same people at different times" and thus leads to 
different types of warfare. In similar manner the phrases or genres of discourse 
encounter one another and give rise to "differends" (Lyotard 1988:28). Such 
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conflictual interactions and "encounters between phrases of heterogeneous 
regimen" are unavoidable (Lyotard 1988:29), but also lead to innovations.  
With the idea of the differend Lyotard seems to have reified discourse and 
introduced anthropomorphism that is a regression into the old textual position of 
the Structuralists (cf. Sonderling 1994a; 1994b). It is as if language acts by itself 
(cf. e.g. Lyotard 1988:85). As Best and Kellner (1991) note, for Lyotard’s 
postmodern idea of politics is now politics of a discourse and struggles within 
language games: 
Political struggle for Lyotard is a matter of discursive intervention 
within language, contesting rules, forms, principles and positions, 
while offering new rules, criteria, forms of life, and perspectives. 
The struggle takes place within a given language game (such as 
politics, philosophy, and art), and perhaps between these 
language games. Yet Lyotard insists that there is no overarching 
language game, no privileged discourse, no general theory of 
justice within which struggles between different languages could 
be adjudicated (Best & Kellner 1991:163). 
Lyotard's position emerges from the model he uses to describe postmodern 
politics: the Greek Sophists that merely attacked the master discourses and 
fabricated their rules (cf. Best & Kellner 1991:162). Thus having decided that 
politics is not so much a matter of action but a way one speaks, Lyotard further 
theorises the various social groups as "minorities" and reduces them to mere 
language games, “minorities are not social ensembles; they are territories of 
language. Every one of us belongs to several minorities, and what is important, 
none of them prevails" (Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:95). Indeed, for Lyotard the 
physical existence in the postmodern is less important than the discursive 
existence, “the ideal is no longer physical strength as it was for the man of 
antiquity; it is suppleness, speed, the ability to metamorphose (go to a ball in 
the evening and fight a war at dawn)” (Lyotard 1986–1987:219). Of course, 
Lyotard does not show much knowledge of military history, because such 
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flexibility and ability to play on the erotic, social, and cultural fields at night and 
play on the real battlefield in the morning was an integral part of life for the 
European warrior nobility for centuries (cf. Bell 2008).  
However, ultimately Lyotard seems to ask: how can one communicate without a 
common language and not succumb to the terror of totalising discourses of 
rationalism and modernity as well as to terrorism of the multicultural demand for 
political correctness and docility and new terror of religious fundamentalists’ 
encroachment on freedom of speech (cf. Gasché 2000:128). Under these 
conditions the question is: how to restore honour to philosophical thinking that 
has been dishonoured by people demanding conciliation and denial of radical 
differences (cf. Gasché 2000:141). Likewise the language of art, science and 
philosophy is dishonoured by modernity and capitalism and their demands to 
conform to clear communication: phrases must "become communicable" so 
they can be encoded into computer language and marketed and exploited for 
their commodity value (cf. Lyotard 1986–1987:210–212). 
Lyotard is right to suggest that there is no universal language to communicate 
and translate between incommensurable discourses because there is "no 
language in general" (Lyotard 1988:xii). There are only particular discourses, 
genres, and language games which are instances of language-in-use or 
"paradigms" in Thomas Kuhn's (1970) conception of a scientific community. 
According to Wittgenstein (1988:88) each particular language game is "forms of 
life" because for people to play in a particular language game they must agree 
and synchronise both their linguistic definitions and social judgments. Most 
clearly such synchronisation can be seen in the ways scientific and scholarly 
communities socially construct, what Kuhn calls, the dominant scientific 
paradigms. Kuhn's (1970), and more recently Bruno Latour's (1987) extensive 
study of the daily working life of scientists shows that at the centre of 
constructing theories and organising scientific work is a war and a battle 
between various opponents and opposing positions and winning the battle is 
the only thing that matters. In this battle there is a general strategy that can be 
used to win, it aims to  
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weaken your enemies, paralyse those you cannot weaken ... help 
your allies if they are attacked, ensure safe communication with 
those who supply you with disputable instruments ... oblige your 
enemies to fight one another (Latour 1987:37).  
The construction of theoretical paradigm is an "enrolment drive" to gain 
adherents (Latour 1987:111). Winning against opposing paradigms and 
adversaries in the scientific contest is "proof race" and needs to establish a 
large network of committed enlisted members and allies and "make dissent 
impossible" (Latour 1987:103). As Latour (1987:172) notes, the "similarity 
between the proof race and arms race is not a metaphor."  
All this shows that Lyotard may be wrong in suggesting that there is no 
universal procedure for resolution of conflicts and "differends". Such claim can 
only be made if one forgets about the role of power and conflict itself. Indeed, 
Lyotard credits power as being a good performativity and as the ultimate means 
of legitimation of a particular language game (cf. Lyotard 1984:47). Therefore, it 
is possible to assume that the productive use of power does not resolve conflict 
but solves it by cutting the Gordian knot: it cuts off the opponent's head and 
victory is proclaimed. And power is always a social reality where the phrases 
confront one another. Moreover, the fact is that if the phrases belonging to 
different regimens or genres of discourse, encounter each other and come into 
conflict, it means that they have some common properties and that the 
"encounter" takes "place within a single universe, otherwise there would be no 
encounter at all!" (Lyotard 1988:29).  
Thus to speak in the postmodern world is to fight. According to Lyotard (1986–
1987:213–214), "in the absence of narratives of legitimation – there is only one 
possibility left for us: to fight for that work of incommunicability" and for the right 
of a language game to exist; it is also to fight for the "urge in thought to go 




The model for Lyotard's counter-discourse and difference of opinion is provided 
by the "eruption of heterogeneity into the politics of modernity" (Poster 
1990:131). In other words, the small discourses of marginalised revolutionaries, 
militant minorities, and the German and Italian terrorist cells that dominated the 
European political left after the 1968 youth rebellion. Lyotard (Lyotard & 
Thébaud 1989) considers terrorism as having two types of operation: one type 
is fair-play where violence belongs to the "game of war" in which the terrorists 
make incursion and destroy part of the adversary' forces, such as when "the 
group Red Army Fraction makes incursion and destroys the American computer 
in Heidelberg, that is war ... That is part of the rather exact game that is a two-
sided war" (Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:67). The other form of terrorism applies 
when the same group kidnaps a banker. In this form it is not a just and fair 
game because the person kidnapped and threatened with death is not the 
player, and the threat is addressed to a third party, and not to the person 
kidnapped. This "threat of death, that is used as an argument" is part of 
"pedagogical politics" (Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:67).  
Ultimately the relativism and lack of criteria of evaluation expose an existential 
weakness in Lyotard's discourse. By celebrating terrorism the postmodern 
thinker cannot mount a defence against mortal enemies. Indeed, the ability to 
distinguish between enemies and friends, as propounded by Carl Schmitt 
(discussed in Chapter 5) is promoted by Derrida (2005) in his discussion on the 
politics of friendship. Like Schmitt and Nietzsche, Derrida realises that a world 
without enemies is also a world without friends and such non-distinction implies 
that the world has lost all meaning and it is no longer a human world (cf. 
Derrida 2005:76–77, 83–84). 
Lyotard’s concept of heterodox dissensus thinking and speaking as being a 
form of battle is similar to Deleuze’s and Guattari's (1986) conception of thought 
as a nomadic "war machine". Thought is constructed and conforms to the 
model of the State apparatus and its military institution. The model of the State 
sets the goals for thought, provides it with "paths, conduits, channels, organs, 
an entire organon" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:40). The State's claim to 
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universality is reflected in logical thought's claim to universality, where the 
"cogito, is the State’s consensus raised to the absolute" (Deleuze & Guattari 
1986:42–43). The counter-thought, is a nomad thought, comes from outside 
and is always violent, iconoclastic, and has its origin in the attack against the 
sedentary State and its military institution by the mobile people and forces of a 
nomadic "war machine" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:44). The war machine is the 
invention of the nomads and exists outside the State and is distinct from the 
State's military institution which it confronts (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:49). Thus 
dissensus, is the thought from outside the totality and "places thought in 
immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside" and thus 
makes "thought a war machine" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:44). The counter-
thought is like "a tribe, the opposite of a State" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:45), 
and as such "it does not ally itself with a universal thinking subject, but ... with a 
singular race" (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:48). This counter-thought and counter-
discourse is "anti-dialogue", it "speaks before knowing ... relays before having 
understood" and "proceeds like a general in the war machine" and ultimately 
"bring[s] something incomprehensible into the world" (Deleuze & Guattari 
1986:46–47). In this sense any ideological, scientific or artistic movement can 
be a potential war machine (Deleuze & Guattari 1986:121). 
The encounter of speaking and war also shows the limit of language. The 
problem of incommensurability is not that people do not understand language, 
even if they participate in different language games. The problem is not 
linguistic understanding or even translation between discourses.  
Communication sometimes masquerades as the great solution to 
human ills, and yet most of the problems that arise in human 
relations do not come from a failure to match signs with meanings. 
In most cases, situations and syntax make the sense of words 
perfectly clear; the basis of conflict is not a failure of 
communication but a difference of commitment. We generally 




In other words, people understand but do not agree about the ends and means. 
No amount of translation and linguistic clarification will resolve the difference. 
Words and concepts are always “essentially contested concepts” and in any 
social and political discourse, as Pêcheux (1978:265–266) observes, there is 
no objective understanding of political words because there is no 
commonsense understanding in politics. Pêcheux (1978:265) contends that 
“words, expressions, and utterances change their meanings according to the 
position from which they are uttered” and “no universal semantics will ever be 
able to fix what should be understood by” such words. This is an unending 
contest:  
Thus the ideological struggle has nothing whatsoever to do with 
so-called semantic misunderstandings giving rise to vacuous 
problems which will disappear in the light of the formation of a 
universal semantics. On the terrain of language, the ideological 
class struggle is a struggle for the sense of words, expressions 
and utterances, a vital struggle for each of the two opposite 
classes which have confronted each other throughout history, right 
up to the present (Pêcheux 1978:266). 
Like Lyotard and Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe acknowledges the irreducibility of 
conflicts and sees in the multiplicity of discourse, conflicts, antagonism and 
agonism the foundation for a new radical democratic politics (cf. Mouffe 1993, 
2000, 2005). If difference between particular aspects of language games are 
factors in conflict it is so because "people with different basic collective interests 
come into contention over those interests while expressing differences of 
organisation as differences of belief" (Richards 2006:651). 
8.6  Lyotar's paganism: back to the future in a neo-medieval 
postmodern world 
The value of Lyotard's agonistic model is pertinent for understanding 
communication in the postmodern global society. Seeing the world through 
postmodern theory of hyperreality provides a limited view because globalisation 
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suddenly seems as a perplexing paradox of integration and fragmentation: as if 
the world is simultaneously coming together and falling apart, or as Urry 
(2002:57) puts it: a complex system that is neither well-ordered nor in a state of 
perpetual anarchy. 
When talking about globalisation, one is in danger of being blind to 
the opposite trend of fragmentation; when shifting to the discourse 
of fragmentation, one can hardly grasp the evidence of 
globalisation (Friedrichs 2001:478). 
The confusion is intensified because of the emphasis on communication. 
Communication is considered as the paradigm of the new global society and its 
economy that is based on flows of non-material messages (cf. Mattelart 
1994:viii). However, the notions of free flows of communication and the idea of 
the global conjure the idea of homogenisation and unification on a large scale. 
However, such notions are also distorting and reductive because they conceal 
the complex, contradictory, and interdependent processes. The postmodern 
and global world is a "contradictory system" manifest simultaneously in 
homogeneity as well as tension, conflicts, schism and fragmentation. So to 
understand the contemporary world criss-crossed by struggles for hegemony it 
would be better to think of it as a "baroque system" (Mattelart 1994:ix). Other 
scholars looking at contemporary reality suggest that the new postmodern 
world of disorder, seems to resemble the social (dis)order of the Middle Ages. 
Thus on the global scale, Bull (1995) and Eco (1987), suggest that the highly 
developed Western postmodern interaction between societies indicate a neo-
medieval postmodern age, while a society such as Khomeini's theocracy in Iran 
is a return to neo-medievalism based on a medieval tradition of the past (cf. 
Poster 1990:132). And of course, societies in postcolonial Africa still seem to 
exist in a mediaeval condition (cf. Eco 1987:74).  
The idea of a “return of the Middle Ages” as a new characteristic of the twenty-
first century was already used at the end of the nineteenth century to meditate 
on the coming of the twentieth century. One of the earliest expression of such a 
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return of past into the future was given by Nietzsche's observation that “I am 
greatly worried about the future in which I fancy I see the Middle Ages in 
disguise” (Nietzsche in Coker 1994:172). Taking up this idea Umberto Eco 
(1987) considers the postmodern condition as “the return of the Middle Ages.” 
For Eco (1987) the return is not to a reality of the past but to a new Neo-
medieval postmodernity that indicates the similarity between social and cultural 
processes of the present and those of the past (cf. Eco 1987:73). According to 
Eco (1987:65) seeing the world as if it were neo-medieval makes sense 
because “it is not surprising that we go back to that period anytime we ask 
ourselves about our origin … looking at the Middle Ages means looking at 
European infancy.” According to Kobrin (1998:364) an understanding of 
medieval Europe that is our immediate past, “can help us imagine our 
postmodern future.” Such a creative step “back to the future” can provide a 
heuristic framework for understanding the present (cf. Friedrichs 2001:476–477; 
Kobrin 1998:364; Deibert 1997:183-184; Cerny 2005). Human nature does not 
change as is expressed by Latour’s (1993) observation that we have never 
been modern. This would confirm Kaplan (2003:15) argument that “the world is 
not ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’, but only a continuation of the ‘ancient’.”  
Meyrowitz (1986) contends that we may be returning to a world even older than 
that of the late Middle Ages because many of the features of our “information 
age” make us resemble the most primitive of social and political forms: the 
hunting and gathering society (cf. Meyrowitz 1986:315). Extending on 
McLuhan's idea that the electronic media have created a new form of global 
tribal sphere of interaction, Meyrowitz (1986:316) contends that the new 
"hunters and gatherers of an information age" now resemble the nomadic life 
style of primitive hunters and gathers, both have no loyalty to a territory – no 
sense of place – and no sense of borders (cf. Meyrowitz 1986:315). The easy 
availability of information about any individuals makes for a loss of privacy and 
life comes to resemble that of a primitive village society which makes for 
community control over private matters of individuals (cf. Meyrowitz 1986:315). 
Moreover, the breaking down of borders means that people come into contact 
more often or learn about the existence of each other. But rather than a utopian 
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harmony and peace such contacts lead to more wars and conflicts because 
when "people share the same environment, they often see more differences 
among themselves than when they are further apart" (Meyrowitz 1986:317). 
The most important insight for an understanding of our own neo-medieval age 
is that war is the central reality of the world. Just as it was in the Middle Ages, 
so now war as a reality and as an idea is increasingly becoming the central 
structuring principle in the contemporary age of globalisation (cf. Foucault 2003; 
Hardt & Negri 2006). Gray (2004:103) points out, that the 9/11 terror attack 
shattered the Western myth of global peace that chained “us to a hope of unity, 
when we should be learning to live with conflict.” Therefore, to properly 
understand the contemporary world, according to Eco (1987:84), demands 
“developing hypothesis for exploration of disorder, [and] entering into the logic 
of conflictuality.”  
The logic of neo-medieval conflictuality is captured by Lyotard's vision of the 
postmodern condition as being a form of "paganism" (Lyotard & Thébaud 
1989:16, 19). The pagan postmodernity is characterised by its agonism and the 
absence of rules, criteria for judgement, call for the need for experimentation 
and production of new discourses and criteria (cf. Best & Kellner 1991:164; 
Lyotard & Thébaud 1989:14, 17).  
Even behind the seemingly playful diversity and multiplicity of agonistic and 
competing discourses of the postmodern condition, Lyotard (1997) discerns the 
work of an element of terrorism in the dominant liberal discourse of the global 
society. Behind the presumed diversity the system exerts unifying and pacifying 
terror because it only permits agreed-upon deviations from the general 
consensus: "It solicits divergences, multiculturalism is agreeable to it but under 
the condition of an agreement concerning the rules of disagreement. This is 
what is called consensus" (cf. Lyotard 1997:199). Thus the seemingly tolerance 
of diversity is another name for a polite consensus. As Lyotard notes, 
postmodern politics "are managerial strategies" and the postmodern war are 
"police actions" which are not aimed at eliminating or killing the adversary 
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because of self-imposed rules that assert that it is "forbidden to kill one's 
adversary" (cf. Lyotard 1997:199). These wars are pedagogical wars to teach 
the adversary a lesson and constrain him and integrate him into the system.  
Thus radicalism and critical thinking is becoming rare because only subdued 
diversity is permitted so as to keep the noise of dissent down (cf. Lyotard 
1997:199–200). Lyotard notes that while dissent and diversity are seemingly 
praised by liberal discourse, nevertheless increasingly there are calls "to put an 
end to the disorder and the terror" of the multiple discourses of criticism and 
philosophy, and demands for "prohibiting all debate" (Lyotard 1997:204).  
Lyotard is not the first to have noticed the terrorism at the hearth of liberal 
discourse and he shares this awareness with Carl Schmitt's (discussed in 
Chapter 5). Likewise Barthes (1986) is also suspicious of liberal discourse 
which he describes as the "repressive discourse" of good conscience because 
it distracts attention from alternative meanings. Behind the liberal pretence for 
neutrality, when one computes the liberal's declarations for being "neither" for 
this "nor" for that, it becomes clear that the liberal speaker is clearly taking a 
position and "is for this, against that" (Barthes 1986:325–326). Ultimately, since 
2001 and the war on terror, life in the global society is set between the terrorism 
of the liberal system of political correctness that denies the existence of a real 
enemy, and the threat from the real enemy, in the form of individual Islamic 
terrorists: the nomad war machine. 
8.7  Conclusion 
Lyotard's use of the agonistic character of society and realisation that speaking 
is a form of a fight provide a heuristic model to understand the postmodern 
world and its conflicts. Lyotard offers an insightful framework that explains the 
postmodern world as if it were a form of Neo-Medieval world.  
However, despite Lyotard's emphasis on the agonistic and the need to fight, 
and portrayal of a conflictual and war-like society Lyotard seems to imagine war 
as a disembodied contest between linguistic phrases. This view can offer 
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insights on the idea of a virtual war of media spectacle and computer-generated 
graphic reconstructions. However, as Lyotard contends that if nations will go to 
war over information, and that communication is always agonistic then there is 
a need for acknowledging the reality of war and developing criteria to identify 
real enemies and decide victories and defeat. 
The next chapter will offer a general conclusion to the study and explicate the 
implication of war for communication theory and show how an understanding of 





LIFE ON THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 
... war is a product as well as a shaper of culture ... war is a creative act of 
civilized man with important consequences for the rest of human culture, which 
include the festivals of peace – Bobbitt (2003:xxxi) 
... there will always be a new enemy, a new reason to develop weapons, 
medicine, transportation systems and communication networks – White (2005:9) 
One of Africa's post-colonial tragedies continues to be, paradoxically, that there 
have been no external wars for which to plan and calculate, and for which to 
invoke a sense of national purpose – Mazrui & Mazrui (1998:4) 
Give war a chance – PJ O'Rourke (1993); Luttwak (1999) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of the study was to offer a new understanding of war and demonstrate 
how such an understanding can inform the study of culture and communication. 
In providing a new perspective the study also demonstrated how such an 
understanding is linked to a Western tradition dating back to antiquity that 
considers war as a valuable and formative phenomenon that structures human 
thought and communication. A new understanding of war is essential because 
war has become a central concern in the contemporary world. However, a 
critical understanding of war is hindered by anti-war ideological bias and an 
over-emphasis on the imperative of peace. This chapter will draw the 
conclusion and list the implication for understanding society, culture and 
communication in the postmodern global world. 
9.2 Recapitulation and overview 
In order to begin an inquiry into a new understanding of war the prevailing 
ideological bias against a positive evaluation of war needs to be neutralised. 
This necessitates a critical strategy: first to question the taken-for-granted 
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assumptions about the primacy of peace, uncover their shortcomings and then 
reconstruct a new understanding of war.  
Chapter 2 reviewed and critiqued the literature of peace discourse and 
demonstrated that peace may not be absolutely morally good. Peace was 
revealed as a potentially oppressive regime and pacifists were seen as 
expressing a desire for imposing tyranny. Peace emerged as a disguise for 
conducting war by other means. As against the assumptions that peace 
promotes communication it was found that it is war that incites communication 
while peace has an inhibiting and silencing effect.  
Freed from the prevalent anti-war bias Chapter 3 began a reconstruction of a 
positive and formative understanding of war by tracing the experience of war as 
expressed in philosophical discourse. A critical reading of this discourse 
identified fighting, contestation and killing as the central activities of war that are 
the central defining characteristic of humanity and form the foundation for 
individual and social identities. While war is a social and collective activity at its 
core is the action of fighting and killing that require interpersonal engagement, 
and this is the source of identity and meaning for human existence. The 
humanising aspect of war is manifest at the moment that the animal (a potential 
human) is transformed into a human being and this transformation entails the 
risking of life which demonstrates that to be human is to transcend the animal 
survival instinct, and by an act of will power, replaces it with immaterial values. 
Such humanising transition is captured by Hegel's notion of the primordial battle 
at the beginning of history from which consciousness, self-consciousness and a 
social ranking and order emerge.  
Chapter 4 continued the exploration and focused the inquiry to trace the role of 
war and killing in communication. It was demonstrated that war and killing on 
the battlefield are the formative origin of language and play a role in 
transforming concrete bodies into abstract concepts and meaning. It was 
provisionally concluded that language was born from recording acts of war and 
transforming life, death and killing into poetic and aesthetic experiences. Having 
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outlined a framework for understanding war it was used to read, trace and 
understand the way war is experienced as a formative and structuring influence 
in selected writings of twentieth century theorists in the following chapter 
(Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8).  
Chapter 5 provided a case study by a close reading of the play theory of Johan 
Huizinga and his claims that play is the foundation of culture. The reading 
revealed that Huizinga considers play, as subspecie of war and that play and 
war are experienced as interchangeable since antiquity. Huizinga’s critique of 
Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political was evaluated and its similarity to 
Huizinga’s idea of the agonistic spirit was explored. It was demonstrated that 
Schmitt’s contention that war and identifying friend and enemy are the central 
activities of the political, and war and killing are its ultimate limits.  
Chapter 6 offered a close reading of Foucault’s analytics of war as a model for 
society. Foucault provides valuable insights to deepen an understanding of 
Schmitt’s idea of the war-induced political sphere. Foucault shows that war is 
the ever-present structure of thought and social formations and in turn fighting 
and exchange of blows and injuries provide a model that is more informative 
than the linguistic model of society.  
Chapter 7 traced the way war is reflected and shapes McLuhan’s theory of the 
media. The chapter demonstrated how the memory of the Second World War is 
the initially-diffused background influence on McLuhan’s theory and as the 
Vietnam war and the Cold War intensify so the place of war becomes the 
central aspect of his writing. McLuhan demonstrates that war technology and 
media technology have common links and constitute the environment in the life 
of human beings. Thus weapons and media format and not message content 
shape human consciousness and social structure, and ultimately 
communication media are the effective weapons of modern war.  
In Chapter 8 the role of war and fighting in the postmodern theory of Lyotard 
was traced. Lyotard offers a perspective on communication by suggesting that 
speaking is a form of fighting. The agonistic aspect of the language game is 
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acquired by the fact that it is shaped by its social origin which has war-like 
characteristics. Such an agonistic perspective, reminiscent of Huizinga’s 
concept of play as war, is an appropriate framework to consider as being the 
characteristic of the postmodern condition where contestations take the form of 
challenge in and through discourse. Lyotard’s attention to the fighting aspect of 
the postmodern condition provides a new understanding of the contemporary 
world that can be imagined as a return to the Middle Ages, or a Neo-Medieval 
postmodernity characterised by nomad warriors waging war against the totality 
of the state and guerrilla assaults against totalising tendencies of both 
intellectual theories and social groups. The postmodern spirit of indeterminacy 
and lack of fixed evaluation criteria reveal that Lyotard’s agonistic, contestual 
and fighting principle could be used as the possible criteria to evaluate 
incompatible language games and decide outcomes of battles in the 
postmodern agonistic world.  
Thus in conclusion, the questions posed at the outset of this thesis were 
answered: war could be considered as the central force of human life and as 
the model and as efficient means for attaining goals. Thus a wide range of 
phenomena is naturally structured as war and contestations which make war a 
form of universal thought. As such war and communication have been 
interlinked from the beginning of human existence and increasingly war is a 
form of communication while communication is becoming a weapon for war.  
The next section demonstrates how the new understanding of war provides 
insights for a critical evaluation of communication theory in order to make it 
appropriate for the postmodern world.  
9.3 New understanding of war and implication for communication 
theory  
The understanding of war provided by this study could provide a perspective for 
understanding and theorising of communication. Such a new perspective, 
informed by a positive view of war and conflict as formative forces can make a 
valuable contribution to communication theory and cultural studies by firstly 
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providing a critique of the unquestioned assumptions and the prevalent pacific 
imagination of scholars, policy makers and the mass media. What this study 
shows is that against the available tradition of positive valuation of war in 
Western philosophy dating back to the ancient Greeks, such positive 
consideration of the value of war is largely absent from contemporary popular 
and scholarly literature in the field of communication studies. In the fields of 
cultural studies and communication theory such negativity is further enforced by 
the explicit anti-war ideology and the professed pacifist bias of scholars. The 
widespread anti-war bias and promotion of an assumed peace imperative have 
become normative moral values. The result of such valuation implies, according 
to C. Wright Mills (1977:42) that  
the idea of conflict cannot effectively be formulated. Structural 
antagonism, large-scale revolts, revolutions – they cannot be 
imagined. In fact, it is assumed that “the system” once established, 
is not only stable but intrinsically harmonious ... The idea of the 
normative order set forth leads us to assume a sort of harmony of 
interests as the natural feature of any society ... The magical 
elimination of conflict and the wondrous achievement of harmony, 
removes from this “systematic” and “general” theory the 
possibilities of dealing with social change, with history. 
Moreover, the influence and widespread use of the structural linguistic model 
for social analysis tends to strengthen the pacifist anti-war bias of 
communication theory. Underlying the application of the linguistic model to 
social and communication analysis is the belief that language and 
communication are primarily made for understanding. This is based on the 
assumption that   
because all the practices that make up a social totality take place 
in language, it becomes possible to consider language as the 
place in which the social individual is constructed. In other words, 
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man can be seen as language, as the intersection of the social, 
historical and individual (Coward & Ellis 1986:1).  
The social world is imagined as a universe of symbolic meanings and symbolic 
exchanges without much attention being given to the utilitarian and material 
aspects of the linguistic and symbolic exchanges. Thus the world is represented 
in theory as being a potential pacific universe because it is assumed that 
language is “an object of contemplation rather than as an instrument of action 
and power” (Bourdieu 1992:37). The result is that all social relations and 
relations of domination are imagined as if they were symbolic interactions that 
should be contemplated and their meaning interpreted while their practical 
purposes could be disregarded. The pacifism of the linguistic perspective is 
strengthened by application of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism to the study of 
society, culture and communication.  
Lévi-Strauss inscribes social reality within the framework of communication 
theory as the basis for understanding society. For Lévi-Strauss communication 
is the model that can be used to understand and analyse all social and cultural 
phenomena.  
In every society, communication operates on three different levels: 
communication of women, communication of goods and services, 
and communication of messages. Therefore, kinship structures, 
economics, and linguistics approach the same kinds of problems 
on different strategic levels and really pertain to the same thing 
(Lévi-Straus in Harari 1980:19). 
Considering society as a form of communication Lévi-Straus assumes that 
marriage rules account for the “exchange” and circulation (i.e. physical 
communication) of women, economic rules for the exchange and circulation of 
goods, and linguistic rules for the exchange of symbolic messages (cf. Harari 
1980:19). From this it is assumed that because we understand the rules for the 
exchange of words (language rules or langue) in similar manner we can 
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understand all other social interactions because they can be imagined as if they 
were a language.  
The application of such linguistic thinking to social reality is a form of idealism 
because the practical purpose of all social actions and relationships are 
disregarded and they are considered merely as symbolic exchanges of 
meaning, while society is supposedly a mere spectacle to be observed (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977a:1). Ultimately all social exchanges are imagined as polite 
Platonic exchanges of words or exchanges of gifts conceived from a 
perspective of altruistic and benign philanthropy.  
Missing from this model is an important, and the primary social exchange, that 
is the exchange of blows and injuries which is the basis for establishing social 
power relations and defining social hierarchies. The original grounding of this 
social exchange is to be found in war and as indicated by Derrida (1995:17) in 
the specific exchange involving the “gift of death”. Derrida notes that “war is a 
further experience of the gift of death” because it is based on the triumph over 
death by the act of exchanging life for death: “I put my enemy to death and I 
give my own life in sacrificing myself ‘for my country’” (Derrida 1995:17). The 
link with exchange of blows and death highlight the fact that any social 
exchange is not an innocent or benign activity. As Bourdieu (1977a) contends, 
even the gift exchange is a contest and an act of imposition of obligations that 
places the receiver in debt to the giver. More fundamentally, the exchange of 
gifts is a symbolic model of warfare. This highlights the fact that Lévi-Strauss's 
idea of social exchanges as abstract symbolic exchanges is a distortion of a 
more complex understanding of the social exchange of gifts, to which Lévi-
Strauss's interpretation mainly attributes reciprocity and peaceful cooperation 
and thus sees the various exchanges as if they were exchanges of words in the 
Platonic dialogue or a polite conversation. Bourdieu (1977a; 1992) criticises 
such interpretation as misleading because it creates the “illusion of linguistic 
communism” and conceals the operation of power (cf. Bourdieu 1992:43).  
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To reduce to the function of communication ... phenomena such as 
the dialectic of challenge and riposte and, more generally, the 
exchange of gifts, words, or women, is to ignore the structural 
ambivalence which predisposes them to fulfil a political function of 
domination in and through performance of the communication 
function (Bourdieu 1977a:14). 
At its core any social exchange involves provocation and challenge (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977a:12). The gift exchange places the receiver under obligation and 
in subordination to the giver because he has to reciprocate the gift (cf. Bourdieu 
1977a:6), This implies that “giving is also a way of possessing, a gift which is 
not matched by a counter-gift creates a lasting bond, restricting the debtor’s 
freedom and forcing him to adopt a peaceful, co-operative, prudent attitude”, 
the obligation and debt will have to be repaid in the form of homage, respect, 
loyalty, undertaking work and rendering service (Bourdieu 1977a:195). Such 
indebtedness and reciprocity was particularly important in the ancient world and 
during the Middle Ages when there arose a need to mobilise for war, the debtor 
had to repay in forms of political support or readiness to provide troops to fight 
in war (cf. Bourdieu 1977a:180–183). Ultimately, the exchange of gifts becomes 
a competition as every gift must be requited with a greater gift so the result is a 
never-ending spiral of exchanges and competition, a test of strength, or a form 
of battle where each participant attempt to outdo the other:  
Much like someone who fails to return a greeting, whoever 
ultimately receives more than he gives disrupts the equilibrium and 
becomes either an enemy or, if he acknowledges his weakness, 
the inferior in the social relations (Schivelbusch 2004:23).  
According to Claude Lefort, “battle and the exchange of gifts are men’s 
struggles for mutual recognition so that men have no choice but to fight or to 
give” (Lefort in Schivelbusch 2004:307–308). Gift exchange is also identified as 
being part of a more complex phenomenon of revenge:  
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Nietzsche’s definition of gratitude as revenge is the most concise 
formulation of the insight that even the good deed or a gift 
represents an encroachment on the autonomy of the recipient, one 
that the recipient cannot leave unanswered (Schivelbusch 
2004:23).  
From their origin in prehistory humans are linked – in reality and in narratives – 
by "exchanges of benefits" that commonly take the form of "gifts and exchanges 
of injuries that commonly turn into blood debts" (Dawson 1996:74). Ultimately, 
as Keeley (1997) demonstrates, war and relations of force provide a much 
better explanation for all the social dynamics underlying the exchanges of 
women, of goods and of words. In other words, this implies that communication 
and interpretation of meaning do not provide the best model and paradigm to 
understand human beings, their society, culture and communication.  
A corrective to the pacific linguistic model is suggested by Foucault's 
(1983:217–218) identification of three primary social domains: the domain of 
material production; the domain of production of symbols and signification; and 
the domain of production of constraints by power relations. The domain of 
power is characterised by "action on the action" of men, and such actions 
involve the exchange of blows and injuries played in a social field of power 
relations that are described as war-like relation of forces. From this it seems 
that social exchanges resemble a battlefield.  
The history which bears and determines us has a form of war 
rather than language: relations of power, not meaning. History has 
no “meaning”, though this is not to say that it is absurd or 
incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be 
susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail – but this in 
accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategy and 
tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor 
semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the 
intrinsic intelligibility of conflict. Dialectic is a way of evading the 
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always open and hazardous reality of conflicts by reducing it to a 
Hegelian skeleton, and semiology is a way of avoiding its violent, 
bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form 
of language and dialogue (Foucault 1980:115). 
This has theoretical implications and it is possible to propose that a model of 
war is more appropriate to explain history and human society rather than resort 
to the fiction of the linguistic model. Foucault (1980) concludes: 
From this follows a refusal of analysis couched in terms of 
symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures, and a 
recourse to analysis in terms of the genealogy of relations of 
forces, strategic deployments, and tactics (Foucault 1980:114).  
Bourdieu (1977a:11) adds that "the typical hermeneutic paradigm of the 
exchange of words is less appropriate than the paradigm of the exchange of 
blows." Rather than being primarily symbolic, exchanges are agonistic. Thus 
the exchange of blows as in martial duel, hand-to-hand battle combat seems to 
provide a better foundation to explain society, culture and communication. 
Following on the work of Mead, Bourdieu (1977a:5, 12–14) considers that 
speaking and verbal communication resemble the exchange of blows as if in a 
boxing match (cf. Aranguren 1967:16–17): 
It can be seen that the typical hermeneutic paradigm of the 
exchange of words is perhaps less appropriate than the paradigm 
the exchange of blows suggested by George H Mead. In dog-
fights, as in the fighting of children or boxers, each move triggers 
off a counter-move, every stance of the body becomes a sign 
pregnant with meaning that the opponent has to grasp while it is 
still incipient, reading the beginning of a stroke or a sidestep the 
imminent future, i.e. the blow or the dummy. And the dummy itself, 
in boxing as in conversation ... presupposes an opponent capable 
of preparing a riposte to a movement that has barely begun and 
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who can thus be tricked into faulty anticipation (Bourdieu 
1977a:11). 
To place the dog-fight in perspective, it would be useful to follow Eco’s (1979:8) 
distinction between the concepts communication and signification. According to 
Eco (1979:8) the act of communication presupposes a system of signification; 
this implies that communication is a social activity involving the exchange of 
signs or symbolic content within the wider context of social, economic, physical, 
historical and cultural conditions (Eco 1979:158). Signification refers to the 
semiotic or sign system used for communication. Following Eco it is more 
appropriate to say that what is generally called “communication” actually 
consists of both communication and signification and it may be more 
appropriate to define it as discourse: a system of relations between parties 
engaged in communicative activities (cf. Sekula in Hutcheon 1989:4; Sonderling 
1994a; 1994b).   
This means that communication is first and foremost a social form of behaviour 
or practice (praxis) situated within specific historical time and space, and not an 
abstract eternal phenomena of signification, as imagined by structuralists and 
linguistic theories. Moreover, this also highlights the social aspects of both 
communication and signification: communication is a social practice and a form 
of social relations and the signifying systems – the signs and rules for their use 
– are social products rather than merely a-historical and self-enclosed systems 
of language or langue (cf. Sonderling 1994a). This highlights the fact that the 
system of signs (signification) used for communication is also dependent on 
cultural, social and historical influences. What is implied is that the use of the 
sign system imposes a system classification and mental structures (i.e. 
providing names, describing relations and appropriate meanings) that are 
adjusted to correspond with and explain the existing social relations of power in 




although it is legitimate to treat social relations – even relations of 
domination – as symbolic interactions, that is, as relations of 
communication implying cognition and recognition, one must not 
forget that the relations of communication par excellence – 
linguistic exchanges – are also relations of symbolic power in 
which the power relations between speakers or their respective 
groups are actualised (Bourdieu 1992:37). 
The close relationship between logos and polemos (speech and war) suggests 
a need for a revision of the Cartesian notion of the solitary thinking individual. 
For Descartes the logos manifests as reasoned speech in the individual’s mind 
is assumed as being the sole mode of self-control and knowledge. By the 
externalisation of this logos and self-knowledge it becomes the model for social 
organisation and control. However, such a view represents an individualistic 
ideology that can be traced to Plato and Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle identify 
human reasoning (logos) as the controlling faculty of the individual's soul. For 
Aristotle there is an analogy between the faculty of reason as the authoritative 
governing element in the individual's mind and the most authoritative elements 
that govern the city-state (cf. Hampshire 2002:635). This implies that individual 
reason is externalised and becomes the criteria for public control and city-state 
government. But this is a distortion and an inversion: reasoning is not a matter 
of the individual mind; rather the individual mind is a shadow of the process of 
social construction of meaning (social construction of meaning discussed in 
Chapter 4). According to Hampshire (2002) the primary social institutions 
involved in governance of the city or a social group relate to the institution of 
war and conflict resolution. These institutions are the following: a council that 
decides policy regarding war; diplomacy to negotiate with external adversary 
power; and institutions that inquire into social misfortunes such as defeat in war 
(cf. Hampshire 2002:637). Each of these institutions is an example of the 
political and public versions of practical reasoning as they are all involved in 
staging agonistic exchanges of speech acts and procedures for the fair 
weighing and balancing of contrary arguments bearing on a disputed issue. All 
such public institutions, procedures and the actions within them are based on 
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the centrality of the adversary principle (i.e. agon) and the hearing of arguments 
is practice according to the principle of audialteram partem (hear the other 
side). Within these institutions: in the council chamber, in a law-court, at a 
diplomatic conference, at a committee of inquiry and investigation, the various 
locally established techniques and idioms of adversary argument will be refined 
and exercised. Different cultures develop different institutions of adversary 
argument with different procedures. But the necessities of peaceful 
confrontation of un-reconciled enemies entail that the adversary principle is 
everywhere employed in some accepted conventional forms. Ultimately, such 
adversary principle and method of agonistic encounters are internalised by the 
individual’s mind: 
Discussions in the inner forum of an individual mind naturally 
duplicate in form and structure the public adversarial discussions. 
Naturally, because advocates, judges and diplomats rehearse 
what they are to say before they step onto the public stage. 
Anyone who participates in a cabinet discussion, in a law court, in 
a diplomatic negotiation, acquires the habit of preparing for 
rebuttals by opponents. He acquires the habit of adversary 
thinking. The public situations ... give rise to corresponding mental 
processes which are modelled on the public procedures, as a 
shadowy movement on a ceiling is modelled on an original 
physical movement on the floor (Hampshire 2002:638).  
Human thinking is a product of social and material conditions and thinking is an 
embodiment of such practices. According to Hampshire (2000:11) human 
thought is not the solitary meditation of individuals but based on pressing public 
arguments for or against some other counter claim and position. The individual 
learns this form of public argument by transferring the adversarial debate by a 
kind of mimicry, into his own mind and making it a habit of rational thought. This 
implies that the Cartesian model is based on faulty assumption: 
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The Cartesian paradigm should be reversed ... the paradigmatic 
setting and circumstances of intellectual thought is not the solitary 
meditation by the stove but the public arguments for and against 
some claim publicly made ... We learn to transfer, by a kind of 
mimicry, the adversarial pattern of public and interpersonal life 
onto a silent stage called the mind (Hampshire 2000:11). 
Thus assumptions about communication are based on the old Cartesian model 
and in light of the above could be re-formulated to be based on the adversarial 
principle for example, Bourdieu (1998) proposes to “integrate into one and the 
same explanatory model intellectual traditions customary perceived as 
incompatible” (Bourdieu 1998:52). Such a project would  
overcome the opposition between a physicalist vision of the social 
world that conceives of social relations as relations of physical 
force and a “cybernetic” or semiological vision which portrays them 
as relations of symbolic force, as relations of meaning or relations 
of communication. The most brutal relations of force are always 
simultaneously symbolic relations. And acts of submission and 
obedience are cognitive acts which as such involve cognitive 
structures, forms and categories of perception, principles of vision 
and division (Bourdieu 1998:52–53). 
Such grounding for communication and knowledge is congruent with the 
Western agonistic tradition. Critical social and philosophical inquiries have the 
structure of warfare, and indeed, imagining inquiry as a form of warfare dates 
back to antiquity: Plato in The Republic describes inquiry for truth as a hunt 
where the researchers must "behave like huntsmen encircling a thicket" (Plato 
in Havelock 1986:144). In the ancient world philosophers were also soldiers, 
thus Socrates stood in the ranks at the battle of Delium and the dramatist 
Aeschylus is remembered for fighting at the battle of Marathon (Lynn 2004:27). 
And it is Plato's opinion that the philosopher-warrior is best suitable to lead a 
society. Latter philosophers, such as Descartes, by mere necessity of life, were 
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also warriors (Serres 1980:268). Throughout history war as a paradigm for 
thought was familiar to major thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
Following in this tradition Marx (1972:13–14) considers critique as a weapon in 
hand-to-hand battle against an enemy. More recently Peter Winch (1977) 
demonstrates that philosophical inquiry is a paradigmatic instance of war and 
battle strategy: 
I propose in this monograph ... to attack a current conception of 
the relations between philosophy and the social studies. ... The 
strategy of the book will consist of a war on two fronts: first, a 
criticism of some prevalent contemporary ideas ... The main tactics 
will be a pincer movement: the same point will be by arguing from 
opposite direction. To complete the military analogy before it gets 
out of hand, my main war aim will be to demonstrate that the two 
apparently diverse fronts on which the war is being waged are not 
in reality diverse at all (Winch 1977:1–3). 
In particular the Neo-Medieval character of postmodernity that recommends a 
conflictual war-like understanding of the world, of society, and seeing 
communication in the form of a fight or war, as demonstrated in the study (and 
specifically a contribution made by Lyotard in Chapter 8). A general 
understanding of war as foundation for human identity and communication was 
provided in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. A framework for understanding 
communication as a form of war, playful battle, mortal contest and agonistic 
fight was provided in the discussions in the chapters on Huizinga, Schmitt, 
Foucault, McLuhan and Lyotard in this study. From these a heuristic model of 
communication as exchange of blows and injuries has emerged.  
Beyond the contribution to communication theory this study has also utility and 
significance for communication scholars attempting to explain the inter-relation 
between violence of war and communication by placing the emphasis on the 
positive force of war as formative of individual's and nations' identities. This 
study can make practical contribution to practitioners in fields such as media 
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studies, journalism and organisational communication. The study's reevaluation 
of the taken for granted assumptions about the positive value of peace and 
consensus, the discovery of a positive value of war and productive force of 
conflict provides a new perspective for the various communication disciplines 
that will enhance both the practice of communication professionals, journalists 
and researchers in mass media and organisational communication. 
For journalists an understanding of war as a positive and formative force will go 
some way toward improving journalists’ education and hopefully dispel 
ignorance and arrogance. In particular regarding reporting on wars in Africa, 
ignorance and political correctness have allowed journalists to misrepresent 
wars and to let themselves be duped by African politicians (cf. Pottier 2002:62–
80). The result of journalists' preconceptions and ignorance is that war can be 
represented by the mass media as if it were a natural disaster that demands 
external intervention by the fictional international community: 
By calling some terrible historical event a humanitarian crisis, it is 
almost inevitable that all the fundamental questions of politics, 
culture, history and morality without which the crisis can never be 
properly understood will be avoided. And the danger is that all that 
will remain is the familiar morality play of victims in need of aid and 
aid workers who stand ready to help (Rieff 2002:87). 
Misrepresentation of war as disaster allows the journalists to manufacture 
propaganda and present distorted information that exaggerates the supposed 
suffering (Rieff 2002:87). The mass media knowingly and inadvertently 
perpetuate and promote such distorted images because of "the pressures of 
war journalism – ignorance about the place, strict deadlines, trauma and 
empathy" all "combine to produce and legitimate a selectively simplistic, 
distorted version of history" which becomes the accepted politically correct 
version of reality (Pottier 2002:64). The dissemination of selective images of 
war by the mass media rouses the public to empathy with the suffering they 
watch at a distance but know little about (cf. Höijer 2004; Sontag 2004). 
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Constructing such empathy results in financial gain and political prestige for the 
journalists, the peace movements and international relief agencies whose 
purpose and existence depends on public support and finance (cf. Rieff 2002). 
Thus the distorted construction of war and its presentation in the mass media 
are re-imagining constructed by the peace and humanitarian organisations and 
are “imaginings the world wanted to see” rather than a reality (Pottier 2002:3). 
The hegemony of such constructions and the discourse of peace that has 
become the politically correct perspective operate like Orwell’s Newspeak and 
serve to protect the journalists' ideology from the “malicious attack of real 
things” (Thom in Scruton 2006:163). The general conflation of politics with 
police work, and war with crime becomes evident when social theorists, 
journalists and moralists are confronted with the new civil wars of national 
deconstructions in the former Soviet territories and in postcolonial nation-states 
in Africa. 
For instance, the discourse of war around the Kosovo episode was 
one of uncertainty about the cognitive status of war and how it 
should be viewed in relation to other historical events of large-
scale violence: was it a ‘purge’, a ‘genocide’, a ‘war’, a ‘civil war’, 
‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘forced expulsion’? The use of these terms 
and the contestation over them was a striking aspect of the war 
which lacked a clear definition of violence as well as such terms as 
who was the victim and who was perpetrator (Delanty 2001:43). 
Misunderstanding of war among journalists has increased, and claims to 
ignorance such as “the nature of war confuses the role of the journalist” are 
common among members of the profession (Allen & Zelizer 2004:3). For 
example ignorance was evidence among journalists during the first Gulf war 
were "many, perhaps most, were ill-prepared to describe and access American 
performance on the battlefield, a problem already evident in the reporting at 
Granada and Panama (Braestrup 1992:xii). One reason for this was that with 
no general military conscription and the increase in women journalists the 
“cultural gap between the journalist and U.S. military has widened since 
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Vietnam” and military ideas such tactics, logistics, weaponry, and military 
language had become incomprehensible to journalists (Braestrup 1992:xii). The 
journalists justified their ignorance by claiming that good reporters can cover 
anything, however such a claim is contradicted by the fact that coverage of 
specialist areas such as sport is not done by people who are ignorant about 
sports (cf. Braestrup 1992:xiii). Result of ignorance was that journalists made 
fools of themselves by the farcical questions they asked and their self-righteous 
attitudes. As one writer summarised the situation: “Never have so many known 
so little about so much" (cf. Fialka 1992:62). To improve reporting of war and 
discourse on social conflict a practical model of war could be developed to be 
used as a framework. Complementing details to guide such model could be 
found in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1980:80–81) theory of metaphoric 
communication that suggests that the first step in applying the adversarial war 
model for communication requires identification of the participants such as the 
people or groups that play the role of adversaries. The adversaries conduct 
battles from various positions: in the initial condition the participants have 
different positions and each participant assumes that he can defend his position 
and demand the opponenet to surrender. The communication will follow a battle 
strategy: attack, defence, retreat, manoeuvring, counterattack and results in a 
stalemate, truce, surrender or victory. The usefulness of such model could be 
investigated in various communication contexts.  
Such understanding of communication informed by war would be appropriate 
because all human life is war, and war is another name for human history. Such 
an understanding of war as human history is reflected in Nietzsche's enigmatic 
conception of the eternal return: the eternal recurrence of the death and rebirth 
cycle and their complementary cycles of war, peace and war again. Mattelart’s 
(1994) study of international communication since the nineteenth century 
concludes that "communication serves first of all to make war ... War and its 
logics are essential components of the history of international communication 
and of its doctrine and theories, as well as its uses" (Mattelart 1994:xiii). Thus 
war is the preferrd frame of reference for development of communication 
technology and communication theories (Mattelart 1994:xiv).  
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The analysis of the different theorists in this study shows that an analysis of 
communication from a war perspective can provide a realistic understanding of 
society, culture and communication that is not available from a peaceful 
perspective. Considering communication from this perspective is to realise that 
to speak is always to enter a fight and contention. Thus a dialogue can be 
conceived as a boxing match and mutual understanding is the result of such 
battle and contest.  
9.4  Life on the shield of Achilles: how understanding war contributes 
to understanding of society and culture  
This study demonstrated that understanding war can contribute to a better 
understanding of communication in the contemporary world, as well as society 
and the mass media. Such an understanding requires an infusion of an ancient 
understanding of war and linking with the old Western tradition as outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4. To understand the postmodern present requires taking a 
step back to the future of the ancient world or the new/old Neo-Medieval world. 
(This was suggested as being an application of Lyotard’s theory in Chapter 8.) 
Homer devotes the entire book 18 of the Iliad to describe Hephaestus, the god 
of fire and the lame expert blacksmith forging magnificent shining armour for 
Achilles. As Tatum (2003:136) notes, Homer makes the frightening instrument 
of war into poetry: "Homer's readers have always been dazzled by his 
translation of the arts of the divine craftsman of the gods into the sublime poetry 
of the shield." Homer describes the elaborate and painstaking process of 
creation where Hephaestus  
began by making a large and powerful shield, adorned all over, 
finished with bright triple rim of gleaming metal ... The shield 
consisted of five layers, and decorated the face of it with a number 
of designs, executed with consummate skill and representing, first 
of all, Earth, Sky and Sea, ... Sun, the Moon ... and all the 
Constellations with which the heavens are crowned ... Next he 
showed two beautiful cities full of people. In one of them weddings 
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and banquets were afoot .... and the women had come to ... enjoy 
the show ... But the men flocked to the meeting-place, where a 
case had come up between two litigants, about the payment of 
compensation for a man who had been killed ... Both parties 
insisted that the issue should be settled by a referee; and both 
were cheered by their supporters in the crowd ... The other city 
was beleaguered by two armies, which were shown in their 
glittering equipment ... they sallied forth under the leadership of 
Ares and Pallas Athena ... Fully armed and dressed in golden 
cloths, they were big and beautiful ... A pitched battle ensured ... 
and volleys of bronze spears were exchanged ... and the soldiers 
met and fought and dragged away each other's dead like real men 
... Next he depicted a large field ... which was being ploughed ... 
The next scene was a vineyard ... He also showed a herd of 
straight-horned cattle ... at the head of the herd a pair of savage 
lions had seized a bellowing bull ... To this picture the illustrious 
lame god added a big grazing ground ... Next the god depicted a 
dancing-floor ... Finally, round the very rim of the wonderful shield 
he put the mighty Stream of Ocean (Homer 1983:349–353). 
Homer's detailed description of the shield of Achilles is significant both as a 
description of a practical work of an ancient expert craftsman forging the 
necessary utilitarian instruments of war and as a highly symbolic cosmic and 
human narrative.  
The shield served an important practical role in the battles of the Greek Hoplites 
– infantry battalions where the shield served both as a defensive wall and 
offensive instrument to push the enemy off the battlefield. As Tatum (2003:138) 
notes, the shield is a movable wall and enables the warrior to survive enemy 
attacks. The strength of the shield is reflected in Homer's description of 
Hephaestus forging the powerful gleaming shield, made of five reinforced layers 
of metal and silver and artistically decorated. The decorations on the shield also 
have a double function: byond the aesthetic function represented imagery of 
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fearful sysmbols serve the practical purpose to inspire terror in the heart of the 
enemy seeing them. The symbolic significance of Homer’s description of the 
forging of the shield and the intricate and detailed decorations is to showcase 
the artisan's art and intricate workmanship. Thus the shield of Achilles "is a 
fusion of poetry and craft" (Tatum 2003:139). But there is a deeper significance 
in the description. Hephaestus is both the god of fire and the lame god-artisan 
and has power of creation: Hesiod describes him as creating, on Zeus's 
instruction, the female of the human species (cf. Hesiod 1976:61). Homer 
attributes more creative power to Hephaestus: creation of the cosmos and the 
human world. Thus Hephaestus first placed the "Earth, Sky and Sea, the 
indefatigable Sun, the Moon at the full, and all the Constellations with which the 
heavens are crowned" and "next he showed two beautiful cities full of people", 
and around the outer rim of the shield he put the ocean. Thus the shield of 
Achilles is a "panoramic overview of war and the cosmos" and the "poetry of the 
shield enables us to see war's spectacles" (Tatum 2003:138–139). The 
significance is expressed in placing the entire cosmos and the whole human 
world on the shield and this tells the listeners/readers that the universe and 
every aspect of the human world are upheld by, and their existence is 
dependent on this powerful and gleaming instrument of war and on war itself. 
As if the instrument of war provides the condition of emergence of life and 
provides it with its condition of existence. The representation places the entire 
human life cycle on the shield thus confirming their dependence on war. This is 
reminiscence of Heraclitus axiomatic saying that war and conflict are universal 
and all things come into being and are ordained by war (cf. Kahn 1979:205–
207).  
Significant also is Homer's description of life in the two cities depicted on the 
shield of Achilles: in the one city presumably existing in idyllic state of peace, a 
central manifestation among its festivities is the attraction of the spectacle of a 
legal battle; the other city is engaged in the contests of the game of warfare. 
What is significant in these descriptions is that both the legal and military 
activities are examples of contestations or the agon. Homer's narrative thus 
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resonates with Hesiod's (1976) description of war and strife as central 
characteristics of human life, as he puts it in the verses of Works and Days: 
Strife is no only child. Upon the earth  
Two Strifes exist; the one is praised by those  
Who come to know her, and the other blamed.  
Their natures differ: for the cruel one  
Makes battle thrive, and war; she wins no love  
But men are forced, by the immortals' will,  
To pay the grievous goddess due respect.  
The other, first-born child of black Night,  
Was set by Zeus, who lives in air, on high,  
Set in the roots of earth, an aid to men.  
She urges even lazy men to work:  
A man grows eager, seeing another rich  
From ploughing, planting, ordering his house;  
So neighbour vies with neighbour in the rush  
For wealth: this Strife is good for mortal men –  
Potter hates potter, carpenters compete,  
And beggar strives with beggar, bard with bard. (Hesiod 1976:59) 
For Hesiod War and Strife are the two sides of the same coin. Thus while war 
may be terrible, it is nevertheless, an existential fact of the human tragic sense 
of life: by necessity man must suffer this bloodthirsty goddess, while the other 
sibling, the goddess of strife inspires and drives men to compete for greatness 
and their competition resembles a civil war. What Hesiod hints at is that both 
war and strife are necessary: man must first ensure his social existence by 
being ready for war, and then in the safety of the city can strife and strive for 
greater achievements. It is also as Heraclitus believes: war is the originator of 
order and social ranking. According to Hercalitus "war is father of all and king of 
all; and some he has shown a gods, others as men; some he has made slaves, 
others free" (Kahn 1979:67). 
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For Heraclitus war and conflict are expressions of the eternal principle of 
opposition that governs the universe and guarantees its existence. And it is 
from this perspective of war as the upholder of the universe that Heraclitus 
condemns Homer's one wrongheaded verse in the Iliad when he has Achilles 
say: "Would that Conflict might vanish from among gods and men" (Fried 
2000:22–23; Kahn 1979:67). For Heraclitus the elimination of war also implies 
the elimination of the harmony of opposites and thus it is as if Homer were 
calling for the destruction of the universe (cf. Fried 2000:22-23; Kahn 1979:204; 
Manguel 2007:220).  
The acknowledgement of war and strife by the ancient Greek philosophers and 
Hesiod's demonstration of the creativity of war and conflict are of interest to 
Nietzsche (1997:35–38) who takes them as being the true characteristics of 
humanity. However, Nietzsche believes that modern man has gone soft and 
cannot understand the reason why the ancient Greeks rejoiced in description of 
bloody war and battles and the endless representations of corpses and their 
experience of the "cruelty of victory as the peak of life's glories" (Nietzsche 
1997:37).  
Why did the entire Greek world rejoice over the battle scences of 
the Iliad? I am afraid that we do not understand these things in a 
sufficiently "Greek" way; indeed, that we would shudder were we 
ever to understand them from a Greek perspective. 
But contrary to Nietzsche's lament, as was seen in the chapters of this study, 
the dominant cultural sentiment of war is pervasive and war is perfectly 
understood even today. Attesting to this the Iliad is the "primer of tragic art" in 
Western tradition that does not have an equal in any other culture (cf. Steiner 
1961:5–6). The Iliad contains a primordial narrative of war (Manguel 2007:218), 
and as a contemporary Italian writer and translator of Homer, Alessandro 
Baricco, praises the value of reading the Iliad in the time of everyday wars of 
the twenty-first century:  
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To say it clearly, I mean that the Iliad is a story of war, without care 
and without measure. It was composed in praise of a warring 
humanity, and it did it in such memorable way that it should last 
throughout eternity and reach the last descendant of our last 
descendants, still singing the solemn beauty and irredeemable 
emotion that war once was and always will be ... In short ... the 
Iliad is a monument to war (Baricco in Manguel 2007:219). 
Like in the ancient world of Homer, understanding war is important today as the 
West comes to face challenges from ressurected warrior traditions from Africa 
(Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999; Mazrui 1975, 1977) and Islam's vision of a 
dichotomous world divided into the house of peace and the house of war (cf. 
Bobbitt 2009; Khomeini 2008; Lawrence 2005; Lewis 1991; Malik 1992; Perry & 
Negrin 2008; Peters 2005; Ruthven 2004, 2007). As against the non-
Westerners’ and other fundamentalists’ conception of the world as existing 
naturally in a state of perpetual war (cf. Aho 1981; Juergensmeyer 2003), most 
Westerners assume that history has come to an end and believe that they do 
not need to fight and endanger their lives in war and battle (cf. Fukuyama 
1992:311). Not only is such a view self-delusion but even the peaceful 
existence is unsatisfactory for many among the Western youth: 
The fact that a large historical world co-exists with the post-
historical one means that the former will hold attraction for certain 
individuals precisely because it continues to be a realm of struggle, 
war, injustice, and poverty (Fukuyama 1992:318). 
These persons would like to prove their human worth by challenging 
themselves and each such adventurous person will "re-create for him or herself 
all the conditions of historical struggle: danger, disease, hard work, and finally 
the risk of violent death" either in real war and struggle or in competitive sport 
activities (Fukuyama 1992:319), or in the virtual world of the war film or 
computer war game.  
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Moreover, understanding war is important for understanding life and 
communication in contemporary Africa. As against the misinformed views of 
pacifists and contrary to the belief that war in Africa is endemic and it is 
destroying the continent (cf. e.g. Allen 1999; Allen & Zelizer 2004; Arrighi 2002; 
Chabal 1996; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Leys 1994; Pottier 2002), Mazrui and 
Mazrui (1998) proclaim a more robust and realistic perspective, informed by 
historical knowledge of the positive value of war. According to Mazrui and 
Mazrui (1998:3) the problem of Africa is "the tragedy of peaceful borders." For 
Mazrui and Mazrui (1998:4) the lesson of European history shows war to be the 
catalyst for formation of stable national identities. But from such a historical 
perspective it is "a terrible fact to acknowledge that one of the tragedies of the 
African state is that there has not been enough tension and conflict between 
states" (Mazrui & Mazrui 1998:3). External interventions in African wars had 
been destructive rather than beneficial for Africa's development because it 
deprives it of the creative power war to forge identity and unify nations. Thus 
Mazrui and Mazrui (1998:4) conclude:  
One of Africa's post-colonial tragedies continues to be, 
paradoxically, that there have been no external wars for which to 
plan and calculate, and for which to invoke a sense of national 
purpose. 
Not only is war the key to national identity construction but it is also the major 
and only means to achieve peace, therefore as Luttwak (1999) argues there is 
a need to "give war a chance" to demonstrate its positive effects. Wars must be 
given the chance to run their natural course in order to establish condition for 
settlement. War has the great virtue of resolving conflict that leads to peace 
when all the belligerents become exhausted or when fighting continues until 
one side wins a decisive victory (cf. Luttwak 1999:36-37). Indeed, in their study 
on the relationship between peace and war, Hughes and Seligmann (2002:183) 
conclude that most often a peace agreement does not terminate a war but 
prepares the ground for a new war. Ultimately, as Turchin’s (2006:285) study of 
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history uncovers life cycles in the relationship between peace and war: “Peace 
brings war, and war brings peace.” 
Since antiquity peace was always understood as a manifestation of war. For 
Homer the artist's rendering of a scene of war "is never only that of war" but it is 
always a scene of the past, and thus while war confronts man with threat of 
death it is also a reminder of happy events in the past. According to Manguel 
(2007:226), "war is both things" an experience of the harsh present and 
remembrance of beloved past, to these Manguel (2007) adds a third element: a 
"reparation" for the future. Thus understanding the primacy of war provides a 
good understanding of peace but understanding peace as a primary 
phenomenon distorts understanding of reality and cannot comprehend how 
peace can be transformed into a tyrany. 
Human beings find it difficult to exist meaningfully in peace and in a world 
without struggle. If there is no struggle they will struggle out of boredom and 
search out struggle for its own sake because they cannot imagine living without 
struggle, and if their own country is at peace and they live in a prosperous 
democracy then they will fight against peace, against prosperity and against 
democracy (cf. Fukuyama 1992:330). This was precisely the motive of the 
Western student revolts of 1968 that also lead some to join the European 
terrorists’ cells so that they could experience their own war and establish their 
human worth. Indeed, the motive for the youth rebellion of 1968 and the 
subsequent terrorism in Germany are being acknowledged as attempts "to 
create an experiential equivalent of what the war had been to our parents" 
(Winthrop-Young 2002:825). It was thus an attempt by a young generation that 
"without its own war felt compelled to stage a supplement in order to live up to 
its predecessors" (Winthrop-Young 2002:825). Hammond (2007:10) traces a 
similar practice in the political life of Western societies for whom, since the end 
of the Cold War, life has lost its meaning. Thus in a world without meaning they 
attempt to regain a sense of their identity and humanity by fighting humanitarian 
wars. Similar historical experiences lead to the outbreak of the First World War 
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(cf. Fukuyama 1992:318, 330–331). Indeed, a study by Hughes and Seligmann 
(2002:183) indicates that peace ultimately leads to new war. 
Regarding the future of war Van Creveld (1991:218) suggests that form the 
moment Heraclitus confirmed war as the origin of everything "war stood as the 
eternal, unchanging axis around which revolves the whole human existence 
and which gives meaning to all the rest". According to Van Creveld (1991:222) 
if men had a choice they may give up women before they give up the 
exhilarating joy of war: 
It is simply not true that war is solely a means to an end, nor do 
people necessarily fight in order to attain this objective or that. In 
fact, the opposite is true: people very often take up one objective 
or another precisely in order that they may fight. While the 
usefulness of war as a means for gaining practical ends may well 
be questioned, its ability to entertain, to inspire, and to fascinate 
has never been in doubt. War is life written large. Among the 
things that move between two poles, war alone both permits and 
demands the commitments of all man's faculties, the highest as 
well as the lowest. The brutality and ruthlessness, the courage and 
determination, the sheer power that strategy considers necessary 
for the conduct of armed conflict are at the same time its causes. 
Literature, art, games, and history all bear eloquent testimony to 
the same elemental fact. One very important way in which men 
can attain joy, freedom, happiness, even delirium and ecstasy, is 
by not staying home with wife and family, even to the point where, 
often enough, they are only too happy to give up their nearest and 
dearest in favor of – war (van Creveld 1991:226–227). 
This study provided an understanding of war and traced the way war was 
considered as formative force of the individual’s identity and source for 
communication and how selected theorists use war to structure their thought. 
Ultimately, as this last section tries to show by way of the metaphor of Achilles’ 
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shield, is that war is the foundation for all aspects of life, in the words of Philip 
Bobbitt (2003:xxxi): 
War is a product as well as a shaper of culture ... war is a creative 
act of civilised man with important consequences for the rest of 
human culture, which include the festivals of peace. 
In other words, what is implied by Bobbitt’s (2003) statement and by this study 
is that a perspective informed by an understanding of war can also comprehend 
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